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Abstract English 
This thesis analyzes the history of the transnational pro-Arab and anti-Zionist network 
in Western Europe and the US from the start of its activity in the 1920s until the mid-
1970s, when the PLO achieved several international diplomatic successes. Since the 
Palestine conflict’s start, the Arab national movement led by Amin al-Husseini had 
sought to involve other Arab and Islamic actors to add weight to their cause. Parallelly, 
it developed an infrastructure to influence Western public opinion. The resultant 
transnational advocacy network enjoyed the support of Arab states, which competed 
over influence on Palestine and numerous non-Arab anti-Zionist activists motivated by 
a diverse array of ideologies. After 1944, the Arab League coordinated a propaganda 
campaign against Zionism, which failed to prevent the partition of Palestine. In the 
1950s however, the Arab League under the sponsorship of Egypt vastly expanded its 
propaganda network. Besides advocating Egypt’s foreign policy goals, it sought to 
mainstream Palestinian nationalism. Fatah, which later took over the PLO, meanwhile 
built its own network, closely interacting with the ascendant New Left. This network 
was simultaneously involved in propaganda and terrorist activities against Israel and 
Western targets. The threat of terrorism and economic repercussions by Arab states 
were eventually successful in pushing Western European governments to accept 
Palestinian demands and distance themselves from Israel. 
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Abstract Deutsch 
Diese Arbeit analysiert die Geschichte des transnationalen pro-arabischen und 
antizionistischen Netzwerks in Westeuropa und den USA bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre. 
Seit Beginn des Palästina-Konflikts hatte die von Amin al-Husseini geführte arabische 
Nationalbewegung versucht, andere arabische und islamische Akteure einzubeziehen, 
um ihrer Sache mehr Gewicht zu verleihen. Parallel dazu entwickelte sie eine 
Infrastruktur zur Beeinflussung der westlichen öffentlichen Meinung. Das daraus 
resultierende transnationale Unterstützungsnetzwerk genoss die Unterstützung 
arabischer Staaten, die um den Einfluss auf Palästina konkurrierten, und zahlreicher 
nicht-arabischer antizionistischer Aktivisten, die durch eine Vielzahl von Ideologien 
motiviert waren. Nach 1944 koordinierte die Arabische Liga eine 
Propagandakampagne gegen den Zionismus, die die Teilung Palästinas nicht 
verhindern konnte. In den 1950er Jahren baute die Arabische Liga unter der 
Schirmherrschaft Ägyptens dieses Propagandanetzwerk weiter aus. Neben dem 
Eintreten für die außenpolitischen Ziele Ägyptens war es bestrebt, den 
palästinensischen Nationalismus fördern. Die Fatah, die später die PLO übernahm, 
baute gleichzeitig ein eigenes Netzwerk auf, indem sie eng mit der aufsteigenden 
Neuen Linken zusammenarbeitete. Dieses Netzwerk war sowohl an Propaganda- als 
auch an Terroraktivitäten gegen Israel und westliche Ziele beteiligt. Die Bedrohung 
durch den Terrorismus und wirtschaftlichen Sanktionen der arabischen Staaten 
bewegten die westeuropäischen Regierungen schliesslich dazu, palästinensische 
Forderungen zu akzeptieren und sich von Israel zu distanzieren. 
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Introduction 
The Civil War in Syria and the crisis in Saudi-American relations have moved the 
lobbying efforts of Arab states in the US into the media spotlight. According to a 
Washington Post article, lobbying in foreign capitals has become a multimillion-dollar 
industry, employing analysts, PR experts and many others in recent years.1 This, 
however, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, lobbying activities by foreign governments 
and political organizations have a long pedigree. Arab interest groups have sought to 
influence Western foreign public opinion since the 1920s, when the first anti-Zionist 
and pro-Arab organizations were established in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, the 
activities of Arab interest groups and local anti-Zionist activists have generally received 
very limited scholarly attention apart from “cursory historical study”, as Rory Miller 
concluded almost two decades ago.2 This lack of scholarly interest is especially glaring 
when compared with the scrutiny dedicated to the alleged workings of the ‘Zionist 
Lobby’. While these still stir both scholarly interest and exaggerated, often 
conspiratorial, fantasies, evidence that pro-Arab activists have been active in similar 
actions since the Balfour Declaration in 1917 has often been conveniently ignored and 
is therefore missing from the narrative on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This work is concerned with the ways pro-Arab interest groups sought to influence 
public opinion and foreign policy regarding the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine before 
and after the founding of Israel. It studies the history and evolution of a pro-Arab 
network in the US, Britain, Germany and Switzerland over a period of almost 60 years. 
In these countries, both pro-Arab, Zionist and later pro-Israeli activists fought to gain 
the favor of the larger public in a third state. This struggle is not without precedents. 
                                             
1 Ho, Catherine. “Saudi Government Has Vast Network of PR, Lobby Firms in U.S.” 
The Washington Post, April 20, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/04/20/saudi-government-
has-vast-network-of-pr-lobby-firms-in-u-s/. 
2 Rory Miller, Divided against Zion: Anti-Zionist Opposition in Britain to a Jewish State 
in Palestine, 1945-1948, vol. 11 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 2. 
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Previous propaganda wars have for instance occurred in the United States during the 
First World War between Germany and Britain, both powers vying for the support of 
the American public.3 What distinguishes the Arab-Israeli propaganda struggle from 
others is its endurance and the complexity of its actors, having involved individual 
activists, non-state actors and states: Israeli, Arab and even third states. In fact, we 
are speaking of an international advocacy network, which promoted the anti-Zionist 
cause during this lengthy period. This international advocacy network counted several 
setbacks and successes. For almost three decades, it strove to prevent the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine – and spectacularly failed when the UN 
endorsed partition in November 1947.  
The history of these activities bear evidence  to the fact that, since the early mandate 
period, the Arab-Israeli conflict had an international dimension and transcended the 
borders of Palestine. This also resulted from the nature of the parties involved in the 
conflict. Both Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism, as well as Zionism were 
transnational movements. This international dimension of the conflict raised the stakes 
involved and contributed to its escalation. The first Arab-Israeli war of 1948/1949, 
which started as a civil war after the UN partition decision, led to considerable 
casualties on both sides. A majority of the Arab inhabitants fled the future Jewish state, 
partly motivated by fear enhanced by Arab atrocity propaganda, and partly expelled by 
the conquering Israeli armies. They and their descendants, who settled in refugee 
camps in Israel’s neighboring countries, came to remember the events as the Nakba 
(Engl. catastrophe), a source of national trauma. Palestine, a geographical concept 
which had no deep historic tradition among the native Arabs and had been considered 
by most to be a part of Syria, became a place of yearning – much as it had been for 
the Jewish diaspora for 2000 years. This yearning stimulated the growth of a distinct 
Palestinian nationalism and inspired a revisionist agenda, which sought to undo the 
defeat by dismantling the nascent Jewish state, Israel. For the Palestinian Jews, now 
known as the Israelis, the war, which they called the War of Independence, ended in 
military triumph. Israel defeated the invading Arab armies and extended its borders 
                                             
3 Ben D. Mor, “The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Wars: A View from 
Self-Presentation Theory,” European Journal of Political Research 46, no. 5 (August 
1, 2007): 668, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00707.x. 
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beyond the partition lines, albeit shying away from conquering the whole of Palestine, 
as many soldiers, including later peace president Yitzchak Rabin, had wished. But the 
victory came at a significant material and human cost for the country’s Jews. The 
conflict also affected the Jewish diaspora. The Jews in Arab and Islamic countries 
suffered from increasing anti-Semitic violence and discrimination, which resulted in 
their continuing flight to Western countries and to Israel, where they often received only 
a lukewarm welcome. In the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc, which soon switched 
sides in the conflict, the surviving Jews were equally subjected to increasing anti-
Semitism, which masqueraded itself as anti-Zionism.  
The first Arab-Israeli war did not resolve the conflict over Palestine, as the Israelis 
hoped, but only heralded the start of a new phase. Although the existence of Israel 
was momentarily secured, in the mind of the Israelis, this existence remained 
precarious. Faced by the overwhelming economic and demographic weight of the Arab 
world, Israel’s existence had to be constantly reasserted. One central element of the 
Israeli strategy was to keep the military edge. This could only be guaranteed through 
the support of a Great Power. Israel’s dependence on this support presented a 
permanent weak point, as its Arab opponents rightly recognized. It was therefore a 
focal point of the activities of the anti-Zionist network. Since the mid-1940s, the Arab 
League was the most important element of this network. It was instrumental in building 
a global propaganda network to advocate the Arab and later the Palestinian cause. As 
I will show in this study, this network was eventually responsible for the revolution in 
the international arena in the mid-1970s, when the right of the Palestinians to their own 
state was internationally recognized. This development has often astounded observers 
and continues to do so. Thus, the historian Paul Chamberlin has asked: “How, for 
instance, do we understand the success of the PLO? While the organization failed to 
achieve many of its objectives – such as the creation of a Palestinian state, the 
formation of a unified leadership – it proved surprisingly successful on the international 
stage.”4 I hope that my study will provide insight into this question. 
                                             
4 Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order, Oxford Studies 
in International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21. 
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There is a glossary of notions to describe the process of influencing opinions in order 
to change policies. Often, this vocabulary is ill-defined and subject to fashion. In my 
work, I use the notions of propaganda, public diplomacy and less often lobbying. This 
warrants some definitions. Lobbying is part of the democratic system, especially in the 
US, where it has a long tradition. However, many use the notion of lobbying to imply 
that the activity is illegitimate. Thus, those speaking of a ‘Zionist’, ‘Israeli’ or even 
‘Jewish Lobby’ have often sought to insinuate that these lobbies are manipulating US 
foreign policy at the behest of a minority with detrimental consequences for larger US 
interests. In this vein, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have alleged with regard 
to US policy in the Middle East, that “the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is 
due primarily to U.S. domestic politics and especially to the activities of the ‘Israel 
lobby.’ Other special-interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in 
directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far 
from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while 
simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially 
identical.”5 In fact, both authors rehashed a narrative of events which has been put 
forward by US opponents of Zionism since 1948.6 If there is ground for speaking of a 
Zionist Lobby, it would make just as much sense to speak of an Arab Lobby, as one 
recent author has indeed done.7 Such lobbies are best described as foreign policy 
interest groups. Per definition, they strive to exert influence on the foreign policy of the 
state. Interest groups may be state- or non-state actors, but often, this distinction is 
difficult to make. Both states and non-state interest groups have an interest in hiding 
their involvement in lobbying. Often, interest groups may therefore use other actors, or 
front groups, to lobby on their behalf. They do so out of the conviction that their 
arguments are more credible and more neutral when not directly tied to state interests. 
                                             
5 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign 
Policy,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 30. 
6 The foundation text of this narrative is Kermit Roosevelt, The Partition of Palestine: 
A Lesson in Pressure Politics, Pamphlet 7 (The Institute of Arab American Affairs, 
1948). 
7 Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines 
America’s Interests in the Middle East (Harper New York, 2010). 
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The most accentuated form of this behavior is astroturfing, a term that describes a 
campaign seeking to create the illusion of a broad-based movement in order to reach 
political goals, while hiding the identity of the campaign planners. The use of front 
groups can be an element of subversion. One often finds examples of such subversive 
tactics in the history of the anti-Zionist movement. Thus, during the trial against the 
Palestinian terrorists who had attacked an El-Al plane at the Zurich airport in 1969, left-
wing anti-Zionist groups mounted a campaign to change Switzerland’s position 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. While those activists who operated in public were 
locals, the strategies and the talking points had been devised and coordinated by the 
Arab League in Geneva, as will be discussed in this study. In fact, these local interest 
groups acted as information agents for the Arab states. In other words, they were 
instruments of their public diplomacy outreach. 
The concept of public diplomacy needs further clarification. According to Manheim, 
public diplomacy is defined as the“ (…) efforts by the government of one nation to 
influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign 
policy of the target nation to advantage”.8 Similarly, Joseph Nye, who more than 
anybody else has coined the contemporary understanding of the term, speaks of an 
“instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with 
and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Public 
diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through 
broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth.”9 The 
deficiency of these definitions is however that they are limited to states. What we are 
interested in is how an anti-Zionist advocacy network was able to influence foreign 
public opinion and policy. This study therefore employs a more extended 
understanding of the concept of public diplomacy. In my definition, public diplomacy 
describes the concerted or un-concerted actions of a network of state actors, non-state 
actors and individuals to influence the public in order to achieve a common foreign 
policy goal. There are several types of relationships between states and non-state 
                                             
8 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The 
Evolution of Influence (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1994), 4. 
9 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. 
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interest groups. First, states may act as an interest group, making use of their official 
representation as well as their embassy and diplomatic staff. Secondly, states have 
the option of establishing an interest group with which they are openly and directly 
related. Thus, states may open a public diplomacy office, which distributes propaganda 
among the public or engages the press and political shapers. This was the case in the 
1940s, when the Arab League opened such an institution in Washington D.C. in view 
of the upcoming partition vote in the UN. Often, the relationships between states and 
interest groups are more indirect. Third, local interest groups may receive – sometimes 
covertly – support from foreign states to act as fronts. Fourth, interest groups may act 
independently from states, but share policy goals and convictions with these foreign 
states. Fifth, a mix of independent convictions and state support may exist. One 
method to influence public opinion is propaganda. Is propaganda therefore an element 
of public diplomacy? It is worth mentioning that there is no consensus on the difference 
between the concepts of propaganda and public diplomacy in the scholarly literature. 
Thus, Mor argues that the latter is just a euphemism for the former.10 I tend to disagree. 
In fact, public diplomacy is a much broader notion, which includes different methods to 
influence the policy of another state by both direct and indirect means.  
As an historian of propaganda, one has to come to terms with the unease that both the 
word itself and the method of propaganda evokes, particularly in Western societies. 
This is because the wide-ranging use of propaganda by totalitarian states, in particular 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, is still a fresh memory. However, while such 
grotesque examples of propaganda as Moscow’s show trials in the 1930s or Julius 
Streicher’s anti-Semitic newspaper Der Stürmer are most often associated with 
propaganda, they are rather the exception than the norm. Ultimately, every entity finds 
it necessary to shape its image and explain its actions. Propaganda is a forceful, 
reflected and strategic approach to this general need, one which aims to influence, or 
in the negative sense, to manipulate, opinion. The vessels of propaganda are 
unlimited. In theory, anything that can carry information can also transmit propaganda. 
In reality, however, propaganda usually uses printed material, speeches and 
demonstrations, tv or radio shows to exert influence. While authoritarian states have 
shown little restraint in applying propaganda, Democratic states have struggled with 
                                             
10 Mor, “The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Wars,” 678. 
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this method. They have come up with similar solutions to their predicament. In World 
War II for instance, the allies devised an emblematic “Strategy of Truth”, although of 
course they did not always follow it.11 Israel uses Hasbara (Engl. explanation) to 
explain its policies to foreign audiences.12 Most of the Arab states, foremost Egypt, 
have been undemocratic since the 1950s. They therefore occasionally employed false 
propaganda, like in the case of Egypt during the Six-Day War, when it claimed that 
Britain and the US were involved in the war too.13 This was a question which was also 
internally debated. It was recognized by several Arab propagandists in the West, 
including Cecil Hourani, that if one wanted to maintain the credibility of Arab 
propaganda and achieve results in the West, it was necessary to follow a moderate 
and reliable approach. This study however uses the term propaganda in a non-
normative way, considering it to be a natural tool in the communication strategy of 
every state. It does not have to be necessarily abusive, but often serves the state’s 
legitimate interests. From a realist perspective, it is not important whether the 
arguments made by propaganda meet the standards of social norms, but rather 
whether they are believed to do so.14 As an historian however, I see it as my duty to 
discuss the facticity of propaganda and not merely present it. After all, it is not my 
intention to become a purveyor of propaganda. 
As noted, propaganda is a notion which has gone out of fashion. This is a great 
deficiency. Propaganda is a form of communication. Our world today is more than ever 
shaped by communication. Every functioning, democratic civil society harbors 
organizations with the main function of communicating with and influencing the public 
in their direction. In a globalized world, this happens transnationally. Due to 
accelerated globalization since the 1990s, the awareness for and study of transnational 
networks has boomed. But we tend to overestimate the novelty of these developments. 
                                             
11 Phillip M. Taylor, “Perception Management and the ‘War’against Terrorism,” 
Journal of Information Warfare 1, no. 3 (2002): 20. 
12 Jonathan Cummings, Israel’s Public Diplomacy: The Problems of Hasbara, 1966-
1975 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
13 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern 
Middle East (Random House Publishing Group, 2017), 251–63. 
14 Mor, “The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Wars,” 664. 
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In fact, a global communicative space has existed for a long time. As I will show, the 
activists and organizations studied in this work already operated on the stage of a 
global communicative space to advocate their interests seventy years before the 
advent of the most recent information revolution. They thus formed a transnational 
advocacy network. But what does this concept mean? 
In economics, networks have been defined as a loose form of organization, which is 
flexible and malleable. Adopting this understanding, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink see networks as groups of actors, “that share values and frequently exchange 
information and services. The flow of information among actors in the network reveals 
a dense web of connections among these groups, both formal and informal.”15 In fact, 
Keck and Sikkink have recognized that such transnational advocacy networks have 
had an important impact on policy change. Through the process of framing, they can 
shape how issues are perceived.16 How the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine 
underwent repeated framings, for instance from a religious conflict to a nationalist 
conflict and vice versa, is studied in this work. To the outside observer, networks are 
often difficult to recognize. Depending on the purpose of a network, this characteristic 
can be useful. Clandestine groups therefore tend to organize themselves as networks. 
This is both true for a human rights movement in an authoritarian state as well as for a 
terrorist organization. Indeed, networks are the preferred form of organization for 
subversive movements. This also has been recognized in contemporary 
counterterrorism, which relies heavily on network analysis.17  Some parts of the anti-
Zionist network in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s in fact operated like a clandestine 
network. It was connected to illegal or semi-legal organizations like Fatah, the PLO 
and GUPS. 
The anti-Zionist movement analyzed in this study primarily consisted of non-Jews. Anti-
Zionism is not the domain of Non-Jews only, however. On the contrary, before the 
                                             
15 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in 
International and Regional Politics,” International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 
(1999): 91–92. 
16 Ibid., 89–90. 
17 Song Yang, Franziska B. Keller, and Lu Zheng, Social Network Analysis: Methods 
and Examples (SAGE Publications, 2016), 151–57. 
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Holocaust, anti-Zionism was predominantly part of an inner-Jewish discourse. The 
conflict between Zionist and non- or anti-Zionist Jews played out against the 
background of the ‘Jewish question’, i.e. the debate on the future of the Jewish minority 
in Europe, which was threatened by Anti-Semitism. Zionism emphasized the national 
identity of the Jews, awarding them national rights, which they strived to realize in 
Palestine. As Jews constituted a nation, they would also forever remain foreigners 
among the Europeans and anti-Semitism would persist. Thus, the ‘Jewish Question’ 
could only be resolved by the establishment of a Jewish nation state in the Land of 
Israel or Palestine. Anti-Zionist Jews on the other hand, whether liberal or religious, 
tended to argue that Judaism was primarily a religion. Consequently, the answer to 
anti-Semitism lay in assimilation. Moreover, they feared that the Zionists’ insistence on 
the national separateness of Jews would empower anti-Semites. The murder of the 
majority of the European Jews during the Holocaust effectively ended the ‘Jewish 
Question’. The dichotomy of assimilation versus Zionism lost its relevance, at least in 
Europe. The major expression of anti-Zionism after the Holocaust became non-Jewish, 
although non-Jewish anti-Zionists would often co-opt remaining Jewish anti-Zionist 
groups to link up with the tradition of Jewish anti-Zionism before the Holocaust. Usually, 
this was with the purpose of shielding themselves from accusations of anti-Semitism. 
However, given the different historical and sociological context, non-Jewish anti-
Zionism is fundamentally different from Jewish anti-Zionism and should not be 
confused with it. Its most distinctive feature is that it does not pertain to the ‘Jewish 
Question’. This study concentrates on non-Jewish anti-Zionism. 
It is necessary to emphasize that this is not a study about anti-Semitism, but anti-
Zionism. Anti-Zionism can be defined in simple terms as a political conviction that is 
opposed to the ideology and goals of the Zionist movement. Naturally, with the 
progression of time, not only Zionism, but also anti-Zionism, changed. After the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, Anti-Zionism meant the opposition to a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. A national home did not always necessarily mean a state, but increasingly 
assumed this meaning since the partition of Palestine was discussed in the late 1930s. 
After 1948, anti-Zionism needs to be understood as the opposition to the existence of 
Israel as a nation state of the Jewish people. Besides their opposition to Zionism, anti-
Zionists tend to share a number of convictions which are discussed in this study. One 
of the core convictions is that the Jews do not constitute a nation, but a religion, and 
do therefore not possess national rights. My choice of anti-Zionist activists and 
15 
 
organizations in this study should not be controversial. They have seldom made a 
secret of their convictions, as they consider these to be neither morally nor politically 
dubious. Most of the organizations and activists discussed in this study thus openly 
called themselves anti-Zionists and have voiced anti-Zionist opinions.  
Not every supporter of the national independence of the Arab states, a Palestinian 
state or the Palestinian refugees was or is anti-Zionist in his convictions. These are 
different concepts, which should not be confused. One could be both perfectly pro-
Arab and pro-Zionist, as can be shown by different examples. Thus, Zionist leaders 
have repeatedly stressed vis-à-vis Arab statesmen that Zionism was not at odds with 
Arab nationalism.18 The Two-State-Solution, which was accepted by both Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority as a basis for negotiations, is also a reflection of this basic 
fact. It equally seeks to conciliate the existence of a Jewish state and the demand for 
an Arab-Palestinian state in the geographic territory of Palestine. Indeed, many of 
those who have worked to bring about peace between the Israelis, the Arabs and the 
Palestinians are motivated by a concern for the national wellbeing of those 
communities. 
Nevertheless, this should not blind us to the fact that many supporters of Arab or 
Palestinian national interests were anti-Zionists, and vice versa, and saw no possibility 
to reconcile these views. The same is true for the connection between anti-Semitism 
and anti-Zionism. Not every anti-Semite was an anti-Zionist, nor was every anti-Zionist 
an anti-Semite. However, this should not lead us to the false conclusion that there is 
never a connection between the two concepts. Indeed, contemporary empirical 
research continues to show that anti-Zionism often serves as a politically accepted 
cover for anti-Semitism.19 While Western anti-Zionists usually seek to distance 
themselves from anti-Semitism, Arab and Muslim anti-Zionism is generally not shy 
about its association with anti-Semitism, and is often justified through anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories, as will be shown in Chapter One. As we will see in this study, 
numerous anti-Zionist activists harbored anti-Semitic concepts, in particular fantasies 
                                             
18 Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume 2: Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of 
the Mandate (Routledge, 2015), 15. 
19 Florette Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes.,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 97, no. 2 (2009): 290. 
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about Jewish power and wealth. Often, those who criticize anti-Zionists as anti-Semitic 
are accused of being politically motivated. Being aware of this widespread accusation, 
a claim of anti-Semitism in this study is always backed up by sources.  
I first became interested in the topic of pro-Arab propaganda in the West during the 
research for my master thesis at the University of Zurich. Originally, I had intended to 
write on the PFLP terrorism wave against Switzerland in the years 1969/70. In the 
course of my research at the Swiss Federal Archive, I became aware of a trove of files 
dealing with the activities of Swiss anti-Zionist groups that organized a public campaign 
on behalf of Palestinian terrorists standing trial in Switzerland in 1969. Pursuing these 
leads, I became aware of an extensive pro-Arab network, which included local Swiss 
activists, Arab diplomatic personnel and Arab League officials. It was clear to see from 
the Swiss archival material that this network had a high level of sophistication and 
operated across borders. I therefore decided to expand the scope of my research and 
investigate the anti-Zionist network in Western Europe and the US in the broad time 
period between the Balfour Declaration and the talks between the European Economic 
Council and the Arab states in the late 1970s. Some of the research of my master 
thesis, which matched this research topic, was included in this study.  
This study is situated within the wider research on anti-Zionism but deviates 
significantly from its paradigms. There is a rich and growing body of literature on the 
bilateral relations between the US, European states and Israel. In contrast to this, 
research on organized non-Jewish anti-Zionism remains scarce. No comprehensive 
study on international anti-Zionist networks exists to date. However, several books 
have touched on the subject on the national level and deserve to be mentioned. The 
first systematic study of Jewish, Christian and Arab-American organized anti-Zionism 
in the US was written in 1979, but no similar study has followed since.20 Jewish anti-
Zionism, most prominently represented by Elmer Berger and the American Council for 
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Judaism, has repeatedly attracted scholarly interest.21 Protestant anti-Zionist 
sentiment, in particular in missionary circles, has been the subject of many studies and 
is well-documented. However, only a few studies have dealt with organized Protestant 
anti-Zionism. Brian Fishman’s 1973 work is still the most comprehensive and original 
account of organized Protestant anti-Zionism in the US.22 Rory Miller provided the first 
systematic study on organized opposition to Zionism in the UK, prior to partition. He 
also wrote two insightful papers on Arab anti-Zionism in the UK and the US in the same 
period.23 His results often provide a starting point for my own research. A recent 
monograph on the history of Arab communities in the US provides a wealth of insight 
into their early anti-Zionist activities in the US and has also informed this project.24 
Post-WWII anti-Zionist groups in the US have received less scholarly attention. CIA 
support for anti-Zionist groups has been the focus of a new study. The most 
comprehensive study of Arab league propaganda activities in the US is a dissertation 
from 1973, which is thus quite dated.25  
Most works dealing with anti-Zionism in Europe after WWII either discuss the 
problematic relationship between the Left and Israel or the policies in the former 
                                             
21 Thomas A. Kolsky, Jews against Zionism : The American Council for Judaism, 
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Citizenship (University of Texas Press, 2014). 
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Eastern Bloc.26 The subject of organized anti-Zionism is only mentioned in passing.27 
Especially in Germany, there is a vivid discussion on left-wing anti-Semitism and anti-
Zionism. Two recent studies by Wolfgang Kraushaar have significantly advanced our 
knowledge of left-wing terrorism against Jews and Israelis.28 Opposition to Israel is 
understood within the context of German secondary anti-Semitism, meaning anti-
Semitism caused by “guilt deflection” (Ger. Schuldabwehr). Research on anti-Semitism 
and anti-Zionism in Germany is therefore generally very focused on German activists, 
and Arab anti-Zionist networks have not yet been the subject of any particular study, 
although they were especially strong in Germany, as shown in a recent work by an 
Israeli historian.29 The influence of visiting students from the Third World on the 
German student movement in the 1960s has recently been underlined in a study by 
Quinn Slobodian. This same study makes only brief mention of Arab students, 
however.30 A study by Christina Späti on the Swiss left and Israel also fails to address 
                                             
26 See for instance the excellent Robert S. Wistrich, From Ambivalence to Betrayal: 
The Left, the Jews, and Israel (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012); Colin 
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the role played by foreign activists in Switzerland.31 In sum, the scope of efforts by 
Arab activists and organizations to influence public opinion in Europe and the US has 
not been recognized. This also seems to be a consequence of the general lack of 
research into the political activities of Arab and other non-Western transnational 
organizations. Thus, there is no scholarly history of the Arab League, although it is one 
of the oldest and most influential supranational organizations in the world. On the basis 
of my source material, I have come to the conclusion that the Arab factor in the anti-
Zionist movement has generally been neglected. According to my research, Arabs 
have been the drivers of an international anti-Zionist network since the 1920s and were 
not mere bystanders. By the late 1920s, the issue of Palestine had become thoroughly 
internationalized in Arab politics through the propaganda work of Mufti Amin al-
Husseini and his SMC. Arab activists and organizations have also been instrumental 
in the promotion of anti-Zionism in European politics after 1967, as I will show. 
Reflecting these findings and in order to fill this research gap, I have chosen to 
concentrate on Arab actors when describing the networks of the anti-Zionist 
movement.  
The object of this study is to provide a groundwork of the history of anti-Zionist pro-
Arab interest groups in the West, which can then serve as a base for further research. 
I have chosen to concentrate on these groups’ activities in the US, the UK, Germany 
and Switzerland. There are several reasons for this. The UK as the mandatory power 
in Palestine was the central fighting ground between Arab and Zionist propagandists 
for influence before the establishment of Israel. When it became clear that the US 
would replace the UK as the major international liberal power, this fight moved to the 
US. Arab nationalists always felt drawn to Germany, which they considered a natural 
friend of their aspirations. Thus, since the days of World War I, the country featured a 
small, but politically influential, community of Arabs. After World War II, it was from 
Germany that Fatah organized its propaganda networks in Europe. Due to its 
international interconnectedness and its multilingualism, Switzerland and in particular 
Geneva have played an outsized role in Arab networks since the 1920s when the 
                                             
31 Christina Späti, Die schweizerische Linke und Israel: Israelbegeisterung, 
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Syrian nationalist Shakib Arslan settled there. France and Italy, two other countries 
with sizable Arab communities and strong pro-Arab, anti-Zionist traditions, are also 
often discussed, although they are not the focus of this study. I have selected the topics 
based on their relevance to the research question and on the accessibility of material. 
This study does not aspire to be a comprehensive history of pro-Arab interest groups 
and lobbying in the West. Such a goal would not be achievable given the pioneering 
character of this work and the absence of previous research. Rather, it is motivated by 
several research goals, which have already been hinted at above. It seeks to identify 
the major personalities, structures and tendencies of this movement. It aspires to shed 
light on the influences this movement had on policymaking, and why it often succeeded 
and sometimes failed in its goals. It investigates how the movement repeatedly 
reframed the conflict to appeal to the targeted audience, be it Christian, Western, 
Middle-Eastern or Muslim. The study investigates the shifting partnerships the anti-
Zionist movement formed with other political actors, whatever their political hue. The 
adopted transnational perspective allows us to recognize parallels and discrepancies 
between the different countries, and to discern between those approaches which 
reflected a common strategy and those which were adaptions to the local environment. 
While I will often discuss the arguments and narratives used by anti-Zionists, my 
primary focus is on identifying the relevant actors, their backgrounds, motivations and 
strategies. 
As I did not have the luxury of working with a well-known body of sources on an 
established topic, I had to proceed in my research in an exploratory fashion. Pursuing 
my leads, I did occasionally find myself at a dead end. More often however, I came 
across fascinating material, sometimes where least expected. After years of research, 
I managed to piece together an extensive collection of research material, much of it 
never studied before, to answer my research questions. The study processes 
secondary literature and primary material from archives in Switzerland, Germany, 
France, the UK, the US, and Israel in French, German, English, Hebrew and Arabic. 
The source material varies in its character including autobiographies, propaganda 
material, private letters, government correspondence, as well as files from both police 
and intelligence. Unfortunately, archives in Arab countries remain difficult to access for 
researchers. It would be helpful if the academic community would work together to 
change this situation. For as long as this is not the case, Middle East historians have 
to find detours. Autobiographies play an important part in the historiography of the 
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contemporary Middle East. Prominent activists like Ahmed Shukeiry, Izzat Tannous, 
Cecil Hourani and others have left us with accounts of their lives. These works form an 
important source for this study. Furthermore, the published documents of the Arab 
League compensated to some extent for the unavailability of Arab archives. 
The scope of this study encompasses the Arabo-Muslim world, the UK, the US, 
Germany and Switzerland during the extensive period from the conquest of Palestine 
in WWI until the recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people 
in the mid-1970s. The subject is treated in seven chapters. The first chapter Pan-Arab 
and Pan-Islamic Propaganda and the Arab-Jewish Conflict before 1939 investigates 
the role Arab propaganda played in the Arab-Jewish conflict in the first two decades of 
British rule in Palestine (1917-1939). What was the purpose of this propaganda and 
who led it? The chapter moreover describes the major propaganda themes of the 
period, their pedigree and their use. The conjectures of Arab propaganda activity are 
placed in relation to the key events of the period and analyzed. Early in this period, 
Arab nationalists became acutely aware of the importance of public opinion in Western 
states. What techniques and messages did they use to convince Western audiences 
and decision-makers? A particular focus is laid on the development of propaganda 
networks during the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), a watershed moment in the mandate 
period. A professionalization of Arab propaganda, symbolized by Fakhri al-Barudi’s 
Arab National Bureau, was detectable. Outreach towards the West was also intensified 
during this period. What was the goal of this outreach and how was it achieved? The 
chapter sheds light on the role of Christian Arabs and pro-Arab sympathizers in this 
outreach toward Western and Christian audiences. Lastly, it discusses the role of the 
revisionist powers Italy and Germany in supporting the Arab national movement and 
its propaganda campaign. 
The second chapter Anti-Zionist Networks in the US before World War II looks at the 
groups that formed the core constituents of American anti-Zionism: Protestants of 
missionary background and Arab-Americans. It asks about the origins of their anti-
Zionism and their visions for the Middle East after the Ottoman defeat. The chapter 
sheds light on the key members and organizations. It further investigates their activities 
and their efforts to exert influence on US foreign policy. These activities are analyzed 
within the framework of State Department policy towards Zionism and the Palestine 
issue, which often acted independently from the US political leadership or even ran 
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against its wishes. A further section deals with the propaganda campaign of the AHC 
in the USA. It was motivated by views about the Jewish role in American politics, which 
will be discussed in the chapter. Arab Christian intellectuals played an important role 
in advocating Arab national interests and opposing Zionism. Their background and 
their beliefs will also be highlighted. The configuration of the fight over US public 
opinion and policy between Zionists and anti-Zionists shifted ground often. It was not 
only influenced by domestic factors, but also by events abroad, such as the 1929 riots, 
the Arab Revolt and the rise of National Socialism. This was therefore a tumultuous 
period in the history of anti-Zionism and Zionism, and one which had a large effect on 
the history of the Jewish people, the Arabs and Palestine. 
The third chapter The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure to fight Partition takes 
a closer look at the Arab League’s and the AHC’s propaganda campaign in Western 
countries after World War II. In anticipation of the approaching showdown with Zionism 
over the future of Palestine, they build an elaborate propaganda infrastructure in 
Western countries. The complicated deliberations which preceded its establishment 
are discussed here. The chapter will show how the British assisted the Arabs in their 
information campaign in a critical way and investigate their motives. The central pillar 
of this infrastructure was made up by the Arab Offices, which were established in 
Jerusalem, London and Washington. Their workings and personnel will be studied. A 
central focus of the chapter is to explain the rifts among the different Arab factions and 
states, which hampered the Arab propaganda effort and eventually led to its demise. 
The fourth chapter The Campaign against a Jewish State in the United States looks at 
the struggle between anti-Zionists and Zionists in the years 1942-1948 for the 
dominance of American public opinion and foreign policy regarding the Palestine issue. 
Both movements realized that the US and not Britain was the place where the future 
of Palestine would be decided and invested their resources accordingly. The Holocaust 
and the destruction of Eastern European Jewry changed the configuration of the 
conflict. However, not everything did change. Thus, the State Department maintained 
its traditionally critical attitude towards Zionism, which meant that it was often at odds 
with the President, especially under Truman. The Arab side was strengthened by the 
establishment of the Arab League, which organized its own campaign in the US. It was 
joined by the anti-Zionist organizations of Arab-Americans, Protestant and Reform 
Jewish bodies. The chapter will investigate how these groups worked together in 
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addition to describing their composition and policies. As such, this chapter disproves 
narratives which try to portray the pro-Arab faction in the debate over Palestine in this 
crucial period as insignificant, or even try to ignore them entirely. Rather, I suggest that 
the claim that the anti-Zionists wielded no influence on US policy, nor that they had 
tried to do so, was part of the mythmaking of the anti-Zionist movement. In fact, which 
side would prevail in the contest was unclear until the very end. Lastly, I will analyze 
the problems the pro-Arab side encountered, and which contributed to its defeat at the 
UN in November 1947 and the US recognition of Israel in 1948, this despite the 
investment of heavy resources and the support of the State Department. 
The fifth chapter The German-Arab Friendship between the First World War and the 
Six-Day War discusses the history of the concept that there exists a natural friendship 
between the German people on the one hand and the Arabs and Muslims on the other. 
It looks at the revival of this concept after World War II. Was it just a slogan, or was 
there some merit in it? The chapter analyzes the reaction of pro-Arab and far-right 
circles in Germany to Adenauer’s reconciliation policy toward the Jews. In the course 
of the 1950s, several pro-Arab organizations were established in Germany. Who were 
their founders and what was their motivation? This chapter takes a deeper look at their 
ideology, known as Liberation Nationalism. It also looks at the different level of 
collaboration between the German far-right and Egypt. Moreover, the chapter 
discusses how the events in Germany influenced the growth of the anti-Zionist scene 
in Switzerland. It lastly asks about the relationship between far-right Liberation 
Nationalism and New Left anti-Imperialism. 
The sixth chapter The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure and its Partners looks 
at the period between the establishment of Israel and the Six-Day War. How did the 
Arab League rebuild and extend its propaganda apparatus in the US after its 
dissolution following the partition vote of 1947? Which factors pushed it to establish an 
international network that would eventually cover four continents? It investigates the 
role of Egypt in the Arab League and its use of propaganda to advance its foreign 
policy goals. The different strategies of the Arab League offices in their different 
countries are assessed. Indeed, particularly regarding the collaboration with anti-
Semitic activists, it will be shown that the local staff proceeded differently. How were 
these strategies subject to changing political circumstances? The chapter also 
evaluates the strategic response of the Arab League to the Arab military defeat in 1967, 
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when it decided to reframe its political message and target new audiences. Moreover, 
a case study investigates the collaboration between New Left activists, the Arab 
League and the PLO in Switzerland during a campaign on behalf of three PFLP 
terrorists. 
The seventh and last chapter The PLO Network in Europe and Palestine Solidarity 
reveals the extent of the Palestinian paramilitary and propaganda networks in 
Germany and other European countries in the 1960s. It discusses the origins and 
political aims of these movements and studies the use of these networks for military 
recruitment and political action. Special attention is paid to the relationship between 
the GUPS and the rising New Left, which contributed to the latter’s turn against Israel. 
The chapter tells the story of the mushrooming Palestine solidarity movement in 
Europe and looks at the efforts to unite and coordinate these disparate, and sometimes 
ideologically mutually hostile, groups. Besides members of the New Left, other 
traditionally hostile circles to Zionism joined the new anti-Zionist bandwagon. These 
included the Middle East specialists responsible for foreign policy making in the Middle 
East, also The pro-Israeli mood among the European population during the Six-Day 
War had not only angered the Arab states, but also left European governments worried 
about their economic investments in the Arab world and raised questions of security. 
As I will show in this chapter, they therefore tended to accommodate Arab demands. 
Unknown to the public, they also entered into negotiations with the PLO in the early 
1970s, which would eventually result in the official presence of PLO diplomats in many 
West European countries by the mid-1970s. The local PLO representatives not only 
engaged in diplomacy, but also did their best to support the local pro-Palestinian 
movement. The dependence of these organizations on the PLO will be analyzed in this 
chapter. As I will show, the distinction between propaganda work and terrorism was 
thereby often blurry. Lastly, the chapter will look at the question of how this mobilization 
translated in a policy change of the European government with respect to its stance 
towards the PLO and Palestinian issue. 
It is my hope that this study will make it possible to reach a proper assessment of the 
extent of the anti-Zionism movement and the impact it had on the public and politics of 
Europe and the US. Consequently, this work may also help to dispel myths of 
conspiracy theories about all-powerful ‘Zionist lobbies’, which undergird modern anti-
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Semitism, and instead allow for a more balanced view on the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
its echoes in the West. 
  
26 
 
1 Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic Propaganda and the Arab-
Jewish Conflict before 1939 
The following chapter analyzes the evolution of the central themes of pan-Islamic and 
pan-Arab propaganda and the evolution of a sophisticated propaganda infrastructure, 
which was able to propagate these themes first in the Arabo-Muslim World and later 
also in the West. It covers the extensive period between the Young Turk Revolution in 
1908 and the Alexandria Conference in 1944, which prefigured the establishment of 
the Arab League, which would become the central antagonist of Israel in the 
information sphere. This period was formative both for Zionism as well as pan-Arab 
nationalism pan-Islamism, containing many key events. The British Balfour Declaration 
in 1917 recognized for the first time the legal claim of the Zionist movement on 
Palestine, while the 1929 Wailing Wall Riots raised doubts about the sustainability of 
the Zionist project. The Jerusalem Conference in 1931 marked the Islamization of the 
conflict, while the formation of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) on the eve of the 
Arab Revolt (1936-39) cemented Amin al-Husseini’s, the Mufti of Jerusalem, 
leadership over the Arab opposition to Zionism and led to the first international Arab 
propaganda campaign extending to the West. This chapter represents an introduction 
into the foundations of the Arab propaganda effort against Zionism, its central themes 
and organizational history, all of which is fundamental to the understanding of the 
history of the post-World War II Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. 
1.1 Pan-Islamism, the ‘Jewish War against Islam’ and the Crusaders 
Propaganda against Zionism in the Arab World started well before the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917. The conspiracy theory of a Jewish War against Islam was one of 
its earliest and most powerful manifestations. It even remains popular among 
contemporary Islamists. As I will show, it has played a central role in Arab national and 
in pan-Islamic propaganda since the 1920s. Due to its importance, the theory will be 
analyzed in detail. Rumors of a Jewish takeover of the Islamic sites in Jerusalem first 
gained traction after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which toppled the 
authoritarian rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The Young Turks were organized in the 
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clandestine Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), about which little was known at 
the time. Its members were mostly of military background, hailing from the Western 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Early on, the rumor spread that Jews and 
Freemasons were instrumental in the CUP’s successful revolution, with the Jews 
seeking to establish a Jewish state in Palestine after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. The theory seems to have been first voiced by the newspaper ‘Nahdat al-Arab’ 
in May 1909, which was edited by a certain Syrian Central Committee in Paris. It 
claimed that the soldiers who had defended the CUP against the counterrevolution on 
March 31, 1909, were mostly Jews, which was false. 32 It is however possible that the 
Masonic-Jewish conspiracy theory was already in circulation before its first publication 
in the Syrian newspaper in May 1909. The allegation that Jewish members of the 
Young Turks and the founders of the Ottoman Zionist club were on the hit list of the 
counter revolutionaries, would support this possibility.33 The CUP’s claim of masonic 
collusion in the revolution was a powerful accusation of the CUP, as freemasonry was 
widely associated with atheism.34 There was some truth to the claim of masonic 
involvement. The CUP did indeed meet in Masonic lodges to organize the 1908 
revolution. This however happened for practical reasons. Masonic lodges were under 
European authority and thus the Ottoman police was barred from entering them.35 The 
conspiracy theory of masonic-Jewish collusion was to gain widespread reception in the 
following years. Among others, it was taken up by British diplomats, pan-Islamic 
activists and Arab nationalists.  
One of the early purveyors of the theory was the British ambassador in Constantinople, 
Sir Gerard Lowther. In a letter to the Foreign Office in July 1909, ambassador Lowther 
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spoke of the “the Jew Committee of Union and Progress”.36 In another extensive letter 
from May 1910, Lowther speculated that the reasons for Jewish-Masonic conspiracy, 
which he took at face value, lay in the Jewish plan to create a Turkish-Zionist-German 
alliance to punish Russia for its anti-Semitic actions and by extension also Britain, 
which had allied itself with Russia since 1908. Moreover, the Jews wished to facilitate 
Jewish settlement in Palestine and Iraq.37. To secure their stronghold on Turkish 
politics, they were even ready to secure sectarian strife. “(…) the Jew (…) is equally 
interested in keeping alive the flames of discord between the Turk and his (the Jew's) 
possible rivals, i.e. the Armenians, Greeks, etc., while it is to be inferred that he would 
not be averse to the new regime increasing the national indebtedness to the Hebrew 
financiers.”38  In fact, the Young Turks were not enthusiastic about Zionism, as they 
sought to strengthen the unity of the Empire and therefore were eager to prevent what 
they considered to be the creation of another ‘minority problem’ in Palestine. In a 
meeting with the president of the Zionist Organization David Wolffsohn in the summer 
of 1909, the Young Turks had expressed their opposition to Jewish settlement in 
Palestine.39 However, the British had a confirmation bias to believe in the theory. On 
the one hand, they were wary about German diplomatic and economic expansion in 
the area, seeing the Jews basically as German agents and fearing that Jewish 
settlement in Iraq and Palestine would strengthen their plans.40 In the context of these 
fears, the Masonic-Jewish conspiracy theory seemed to make sense. On the other 
hand, the popularity of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories like the Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion, then widely believed to be authentic, gave credence to the Masonic-Jewish 
conspiracy. Ambassador Lowther realized the potential usefulness of the Jewish-
Masonic conspiracy theory, advising the Foreign Office to relay his report to the British 
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representatives in Egypt, Iran and in particular India to discredit the Committee vis-à-
vis the Muslim population and thereby weaken anti-British propaganda. “For if the 
prominent Indian Moslems were discreetly given to understand that the Young Turkey 
movement is seriously influenced by Jewish and atheistic political Freemasonry, the 
effect would be to counteract any potentially anti-British national Pan-Islamic 
propaganda carried on by extreme chauvinist Young Turks.”41 The theory seems to 
have been widely believed by the British Foreign Policy establishment, and was also 
reproduced in an article in the Arab Bulletin on September 26, 1916, which carried the 
title ‘Notes on Freemasonry in Turkey under the New Regime (1908-1914)’.42 They 
were however not the only ones to take up this theory. 
Among those who embraced the theory was Rashid Rida, one of the leading thinkers 
and propagandists of pan-Islamism. Through the pages of his journal, al-Manar, Rida 
was an influential voice in contemporary Arab political thought. He was also one of the 
first Arab thinkers to address the issue of Zionism in 1898. His stance to Zionism was 
subject to considerable change in the following years. Initially, he was dismissive of 
Arab fears of Zionism and presented Jewish solidarity as a role model for the Arabs. 
In 1902, he started to warn that the Jews, making no distinction between the Jews and 
Zionists, were bent on taking over the Holy Land and reestablishing the Jewish 
kingdom there. The anti-Semitism, which had already appeared in milder forms before, 
escalated after the Young Turk revolution. In late 1910, Rida claimed that the Jews 
were instrumental in organizing the French, the Russian and the Young Turk 
Revolution through the mediation of the Freemasons. It is obvious that he took his cue 
from the Protocols. In an al-Manar article appearing on December 2, 1910, he further 
warned that the Jews intended to turn the Al-Aqsa into the Jewish Temple and expel 
the Arab population from Palestine.43 Thus, the myth of the Jewish plan to take over 
al-Aqsa was born, a myth which would take full effect in the 1920s. The British war 
correspondent for the Daily Mail, J.M.N. Jeffries, while travelling in the Middle East in 
the early 1920s, reported an interesting experience he had with one of the early 
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propagandists of the Islamic cause in Damascus: “I learned how every pilgrim of any 
consequence to Mecca had our policy exposed to him. I came to know, in a sparring-
partner sort of way, one of the Moslem sheiks chiefly engaged in this. He had just come 
from Mecca. (…) He was responsible, I had little doubt, for the leaflets distributed to 
Mecca pilgrims which bore a representation of the Mosque of Omar with either the 
cross or a Jewish symbol (I forget which) placed at its summit, supposedly, of course, 
by the British authorities in Jerusalem.”44 The picture Jeffries described had been 
painted in the late 19th century by a Yeshiva, a religious Jewish establishment, for 
fundraising and decorative purposes. Thus, it bore no connection to the Zionist 
movement or the British government, nor of course did it express any intent to take 
over the Haram al-Sharif, the complex of Muslim holy sites on the Temple Mount. 
Nevertheless, Arab and Islamic propagandists have used it as proof since the 1920s 
of alleged Jewish plans to take over the Al-Aqsa.45 In their view, Jewish state-building 
in Palestine during the 1920s seemed to confirm the correctness of the ‘Jewish War 
against Islam’ theme.  
The Western Wall, also called the Wailing Wall, in Jerusalem became the central 
battlefield against this supposed Jewish conspiracy. After the establishment of British 
rule over Palestine, the Jews sought to remove the discriminatory restrictions on their 
worshipping at the Wailing Wall, which had been imposed by the Ottoman authorities. 
The Ottomans had prohibited the use of religious appurtenances at the Wall, like scrolls 
or dividing screens, but had tolerated them tacitly. They also sought to gain authority 
over the site. This was not an entirely new development. In 1887, Jewish figures had 
already received the acquiescence of local Ottoman officials, among them the local 
Mufti and grandfather of Amin al-Husseini, to acquire the ground of the Wailing Wall, 
which belong to the Waqf. They withdrew the plan however because of the local Jews’ 
fear that this might negatively affect the Arabs. After the war, these plans were revived. 
Moreover, after the start of repairs at the Haram al-Sharif above the Wailing Wall, 
repairs which the Jews regarded as desecration, the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem 
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asked the British to hand over control of the site. The Muslim leadership portrayed 
these steps as a prelude to efforts to take over the Haram al-Sharif and opposed all 
steps for a change favorable to the Jews. The British authorities supported the SMC in 
their strict understanding of the Ottoman directives, which had in fact not been applied 
previously. On Pesach 1922, the SMC even directly hindered Jews from bringing 
religious appurtenances to the Wailing Wall, incidents which would repeat themselves 
in the following years. 46 The Muslim religious leadership failed to interpret Jewish 
demands in their proper context, as the justified empowerment of the Jewish 
community following Ottoman discrimination, but instead saw them as a consequence 
of feared Jewish efforts to take over the entirety of the country and uproot the traditional 
order of Muslim supremacy. 
Whether the SMC’s agitation against any change in the status of the Wailing Wall was 
initially due to real apprehensions, the claim that the Muslim holy sites were in danger 
quickly turned into a powerful theme of propaganda detached from reality. The theme 
allowed the Arab leadership in Palestine to gain solidarity in the wider Arab-Muslim 
world and internationalize the conflict. The supposedly threatened Islamic holy places 
in Jerusalem provided an excellent rallying point for the propagation of pan-Islamic 
solidarity. Moreover, they became a symbol of both the national and the religious 
struggle of the Arab people in Palestine. This should not be too surprising. Unlike other 
forms of nationalisms evolving during the same period in Egypt or Lebanon, there was 
no clear separation between Arab nationalism and Islam in Palestine. This was also 
reflected in the SMC’s use of mixed terminology, speaking for instance of “national 
Islamic” instead of “national Palestinian” when describing local institutions. Moreover, 
the SMC was strongly influenced by the neo-Salafi movement in Egypt, where the clear 
majority of Palestinians seeking higher religious education studied. Uri Kupferschmidt 
has theorized that religious penetration of Arab nationalism in Palestine may also be 
related to the special challenge of Zionism, which connected to the Jewish past and 
the sanctity of the country that they called Eretz Israel. A strictly secular Arab 
nationalism would also have meant an embracement of this Jewish past.47 The Arab 
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nationalist movement was not ready to do this. Instead, it proceeded to Islamize and 
internationalize the conflict. The Fourth Palestinian Congress, which was held in 
Jerusalem in June of 1921, discussed the idea of dispatching delegations to the Middle 
East to propagandize their struggle and raise money. In June 1922, the first such 
delegation departed for Mecca, consisting of Abd al-Kadir Muzaffer, Rafiq Tammimi 
and Amin Nurallah. During a stay in Egypt, they produced a leaflet designed to call 
attention to the supposed threat, and which included a print of the by that time well-
known picture of the Star of David topping the mosque. After meetings with the 
religious leadership of the country and Rashid Rida, they published a Fatwa to call for 
the defense of Al-Aqsa. In Mecca, the delegation took part in the pan-Arab al-Jazirah 
congress, again raising this issue and  resulting in the establishment of ‘Association 
for Muslim Solidarity’ to defend Al-Aqsa on August 9, 1922. In early 1923, Kamel al-
Budeiri campaigned among the Transjordan Bedouins using the yeshiva picture.48 To 
a significant degree, the spreading of the ‘Jewish War against Islam’ theme in the first 
half of the 1920s was therefore the consequence of a conscious propaganda 
campaign. 
Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), pursued a 
strategy of deliberately enhancing the status of the Islamic sites in Jerusalem in the 
Muslim world, motivated by both political expediency and his personal ambition to be 
recognized as a Muslim leader.49 In agreement with British authorities, the SMC issued 
an appeal to the Muslim World lamenting Haram al-Sharif’s derelict state. The appeal 
emphasized the site’s importance and called for donations to renovate it, but did not 
include any claims about possible threats , as these would not have received British 
agreement.50 Between 1923 and 1924, the SMC then sent a total of six delegations 
out into the wider Muslim world to fundraise.51 The first delegation travelled to Egypt 
and Mecca in July 1923, and consisted of Amin al-Husseini, Mohammed Murad, the 
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Mufti of Haifa, and Ibrahim Ansari. The British authorities in Egypt however reported 
that the delegation was less concerned with fundraising than with spreading nationalist 
propaganda and promoting “the notoriously untrue statement that the Haran esh Sherif 
[sic] in Jerusalem was being placed under the control of the Jews.”52 In Cairo, 
Husseini’s delegation established a so-called Association for the Defense of the Holy 
Places. In line with the majority of the pan-Islamic movement, it was vociferously anti-
British and pro-Turkish. After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, it sent a 
congratulatory letter to the Turkish newspaper Tevhid Efkiar on July 30, 1923. The 
letter expressed the hope that the Turkish nation would return as the “Standardbearer 
of Islam, and will encompass the union of Moslems and the salvation of the East,” and 
serve as a protector to the Islamic holy places.53 Besides the spread of propaganda, 
the delegation also carried a political message to King Hussein in Mecca. They planned 
to inform him of three secret decisions taken by only the Moslem delegates at the 6th 
Arab Congress, which had taken place from June 16-20 in Palestine, and in which the 
proposal of a political union of Palestine and Syria under the sovereignty of Turkey had 
been met with favor. Moreover, they sought to ask Hussein to change his stance vis-
à-vis the British, a stance which the Arab nationalists deemed to be too friendly.54 A 
second delegation, which included Jamal Husseini and which enjoyed the support of 
the British authorities, set sail for India.55 With the Turkish abolition of the Caliphate in 
1924, the hopes of the Pan-Islamists, including Amin al-Husseini, to restore Turkish 
authority over the Islamic sites in Jerusalem and remove the supposed Jewish danger, 
were dashed. 
Besides al-Husseini’s SMC, the main purveyors of the international pro-Palestinian 
propaganda effort in the Arab world during the 1920s were individual activists, such as 
Mohammed Ali al-Taher or Rashid Rida in Egypt and Shakib Arslan in Switzerland. In 
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the late 1920s, the pan-Islamic and neo-Salafi associations, which first emerged in 
Egypt and quickly expanded to Palestine, assumed an important role in the 
propaganda and internationalization effort of the Arab cause in Palestine. Leading 
associations among them were the Young Men’s Muslim Association (Arab. Jamiyat 
al-Shubban al-Muslimim) founded in 1927 and the Muslim Brotherhood (Arab. Jamyat 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimim) founded in 1928 by one of the YMMA’s earliest supporters, 
Hassan al-Banna.56 In its first years, the YMMA overshadowed the currently much 
better-known Muslim Brotherhood in activity and influence. The YMMA’s board of 
directors consisted of twelve members, including prominent representatives of the Al 
Azhar University, the press and the Ministry of Education. Abd al-Hamid Said, a famous 
nationalist and Egyptian MP, served as the YMMA’s president in the first years of its 
existence. The leading intellectual figure however seems to have been Yahya Bey 
Ahmad Dardiri, who had degrees in law and political science from the University of 
Geneva.57 An article published in 1929 in the first number of the magazine published 
by the organization conveys a comprehensive impression of the organization’s 
worldview and aims, which have been described as neo-Salafi. According to Dardiri, 
the Muslim world was suffering from moral anarchy due to three reasons: Ignorance, 
the adoption of bad facets of Western civilization, and the negligence of the elite. Only 
a return to the Koran, he stipulated, could inspire a moral revival that would be a 
condition for a revival in other fields as well.58 However, despite their neo-Salafi 
ideology, groups like the YMMA and the Muslim Brotherhood were not entirely inimical 
to innovation. This was evidenced by their adoption of the Palestinian cause, which 
was grounded both in nationalism and in Islam. 
In contrast to its propaganda campaign abroad, the SMC pursued its propaganda in 
Palestine with greater restraint. Thus, the call for the defense of Al-Aqsa did not affect 
the country until 1928. The public festivities held on the occasion of completion of the 
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renovations of the Islamic holy sites in August 1928 proved the success of the 
internationalization strategy. The event was attended by many international guests, 
including Abdullah I of Jordan and Abd al-Hamid Said, the president of the Islamist 
YMMA in Egypt.59 One year later, the conflict erupted again. In mid-August 1929, the 
youth group of the Revisionist Zionists demonstrated at the Western Wall. The action 
was designed to underscore the Jewish claim on the Western Wall.60 A week after the 
events, Arab demonstrators started a nation-wide riot, which culminated in the 
massacres of the Jews in Hebron and Safed in late August 1929. According to the 
Palestinian journalist Emil Ghoury who became Amin al-Husseini’s chief propagandist 
in the late 1930s, it was a “a day of brilliance and glory in the annals of Palestinian-
Arab history. This is a day of honour, splendour and sacrifice. We attacked Western 
conquest and the Mandate and the Zionists upon our land. The Jews had coveted our 
endowments and yearned to take over our holy places. In our silence they had seen a 
sign of weakness, therefore there was no more room in our hearts for patience or 
peace; no sooner had the Jews begun marching along this shameful road than the 
Arabs stood up, checked the oppression, and sacrificed their pure and noble souls on 
the sacred altar of nationalism.”61 The British commission which investigated the 
events questioned Muslim representatives from several countries, a fact which further 
underscores that the status of the religious sites in Jerusalem had become a question 
of international concern.62 One of the groups which showed particular zeal with regard 
to the issue was the YMMA, one of the first internationalist Islamist groups. It sent 
several letters to the British authorities and to the League of Nations to protest Jewish 
claims to the Wailing Wall.63 The first such letter stated: “Every Moslem in whatever 
part of the earth regards himself as a warrior who stands up together with the Moslems 
of Palestine to defend a pledge put into their hands. Moslems will never allow Zionists 
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to make of a site sacred to them a centre of their national propaganda, as long as there 
is left on the surface of the earth one Moslem, and as long as there is living blood 
pulsing in the veins of that Moslem.”64 In the understanding of the pan-Islamists like 
those of the YMMA, the fight against Zionism had thus assumed the trappings of a 
religious war. 
This interpretation of the events was further developed by international propaganda. 
During the Wailing Wall riots in 1929, the Egyptian branches of the YMMA echoed the 
Mufti’s propaganda in Palestine, portraying the clashes as a religious struggle. The 
most popular allegation claimed that the Zionists were intent on destroying the Islamic 
holy places in Jerusalem and re-erecting their Temple. Moreover, the propaganda cited 
hadiths to prove Islam’s eternal enmity to the Jews. The major Egyptian newspapers 
published calls for the defense of Al-Aqsa. Paradoxically, the Jews were accused of 
seeking to reestablish their ancient kingdom and of spreading Bolshevism at the same 
time.65 In al-Manar, Rida began speaking of a “War on Islam” by the British and the 
Jews, crediting the latter with intent to destroy the three holiest places of Islam.66 In 
parallel, the SMC emphasized the Muslim character of Palestine by declaring its 
sanctity for Islam. This coincided with the now frequent use of the term ‘holy country’ 
by Muslims, which was probably influenced by the Jewish and Christian designation 
for the Land of Israel. SMC publications alleged that Zionism sought to eradicate Islam 
from Palestine.67 Common holidays like Balfour Day on November 2 provided a further 
vessel to push for the internationalization of the Palestinian cause. On this day, political 
protests were held in many places in the Arab and Muslim world, often erupting into 
violence against the local Jewish communities. 
Besides the ‘Jewish War against Islam’, there was another theme which helped unite 
pan-Islamists and Arab Arabists against a common danger and strengthened their 
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identity. This was a fear that the British would use the conquest of Palestine to spread 
disunity among its population and convert its Muslims to Christianity. The Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA) quickly became the focal point of those fears because it 
enjoyed the support of the mandate government in Palestine. Regardless of their 
religion, public servants joined the association to socialize with their colleagues and 
advance their careers. Some leading functionaries of the mandate government were 
also active in the YMCA.68 This begged an explanation. The country’s most read Arabic 
newspaper ‘Filastin’, which was edited by the Christian Arab Issa al-Issa, contended 
that the British supported the YMCA in order to spread sectarian strife between the 
Arab Christians and Muslims.69 The Meeting of the International Missionary Council in 
Jerusalem in March/April 1928, during which amongst other things the mission towards 
Muslims was also discussed, provided additional fodder.70 The most strident critiques 
of the conference appeared in the newspaper ‘al-Jamia al-Arabiya’, and formed part of 
a veritable press campaign. Its editor was Munif al-Husseini, a supporter of the 
Husseini faction in Palestinian politics, who also happened to be Amin al-Husseini’s 
nephew. While the Christian conference was still sojourning in Jerusalem, he published 
a scathing attack on it on March 22, 1928. The article claimed that the conference was 
in fact part of a wider conspiracy: “These conventions are only one of the forms in 
which colonial western countries are taking over the East. Their goal is not only to 
attack Islam, rather to disseminate missionary activities and to ignite sectarian hatred 
in Palestine between Muslims and Christians, thus putting an end on their common 
national interest, founded on Muslim-Christian brotherhood, and paving the way for 
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foreign takeover of the Land.”71 The struggle against Western Christian influence soon 
revealed sectarian tensions within the Arab national movement. Thus, in 1930, the 
YMMA tried to introduce a new national holiday to remember the Muslim victory at 
Hittin in 1187 against a crusader army, a move which triggered heavy criticism in the 
Christian Arab press.72 After all, there was always an implicit threat in the call to 
Muslim-Christian brotherhood. Those native Christians, who, like the Armenians, were 
not necessarily Arab, who fraternized with their Western coreligionists instead of the 
Arab Muslims, were viewed as complicit in the Western conquest of the region and 
therefore traitors. 
The media campaign against missionary activities created a fertile climate for the 
growth of political Islam in Palestine. As a response to the Christian conference in 
Jerusalem, activists held a Congress of Islamic Clubs in Jaffa in April 1928, which 
ended with the establishment of the Palestinian branch of the YMMA. Already six 
months later, the organization counted ten local chapters in Palestine. As mentioned 
above, its ideology was a blend of Salafi Islam and nationalism, in which Islam was 
viewed as necessary to preserve the Arab Nation and its culture.73 How can this 
success of Salafi Islam in Palestine be explained? Among other factors, like 
geographic proximity, Palestine was very receptive to Salafi ideology due to the close 
connections of its Ulema to Egypt, where most of them had received their higher 
education.74 The SMC also used the outcry over missionary activity to further the 
internationalization of the Palestinian cause. In late April 1928, Amin al-Husseini sent 
a letter and several copies of the newspaper al-Jamia al-Arabiya to Maulana Shaukat 
Ali, the leader of the Khilafat Movement in India, to warn him about the activities of the 
Christian missionaries in Palestine. Moreover, he urged Shaukat Ali to organize a 
campaign in the leading Indian newspapers to denounce the mandate governments’ 
alleged plans to convert the Muslims, “annihilate Islam and destroy the reputation of 
                                             
71 Kabha, The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929-39, 39–40. 
72 Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, 236. 
73 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation, 56–57. 
74 Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, 224. 
 
39 
 
its holy Prophet” via their proxy, the missionaries.75 Due to its sizable Muslim 
population, India ranked high in the strategic calculations of the Palestinian leadership. 
By winning them over, pressure could be exerted on the British mandate government. 
Groups like the YMMA stressed the importance of Islamic solidary to confront Western 
rule over Muslim communities. Besides Palestine, the French and Italian presence in 
North Africa were at the center of their attention. A congress held in 1930 was 
dedicated to the issue, discussing fifteen propositions to promote Islamic solidarity. 
The projects included the establishment of an Islamic daily newspaper. The resolutions 
adopted at the congress included the work for the resurrection of the caliphate and the 
founding of a League of Islamic Nations. Another concern was the fight against 
missionary activity and the Islamic education of children. The congress urged the 
government to introduce laws restricting the freedom of thought by banning the 
defamation of religion, meaning all criticism of Islam.76 The Islamic Conference in 
Jerusalem in 1931, which was organized under the auspices of Amin al-Husseini, was 
another milestone in the creation of a pan-Islamic community of solidarity. Shakib 
Arslan, the head of the Syro-Palestinian delegation in Geneva and a gifted networker 
and propagandist of the Arab cause, hailed it as the “the spiritual and social parliament 
of Islam.” 77 Despite such high hopes, most of the projects of the congress, such as the 
establishment of an Islamic university in Jerusalem, ended in failure.78 
The next pan-Islamic conference would take place in Geneva and target the continent’s 
growing Muslim communities. Shakib Arslan headed the preparatory committee for the 
European Muslim Congress of 1935, while the Persian Zya al-Din Tabatabai worked 
as its General Secretary. Tabatabai had served for the Jerusalem Congress of 1931 
in the same function, thus forming a link between the two events. The congress was 
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not only to rally representatives of the Muslim communities in Europe, but also the 
continent’s Muslim political emigrants.79 The organizing committee consisted of old 
acquaintances of Arslan, including his collaborator Ihsan Jabiri, Ehsan Hakky, and Zaki 
Kiram from Berlin and Ali Zaki from Vienna.80 Ehsan Hakky, who solicited the 
authorization for the event from the police, presented it as a networking event for 
European Muslims, where they could also learn to acquire “the new scientific theories, 
which are not in contradiction with the truth, (…) in the manner of preventing a 
caricature of modern civilization.”81 This had been the original aim of the Salafi 
movement: To reconcile Islam with modernity. Hakky moreover promised the Swiss 
authorities that the congress would be apolitical in nature and not meddle into politics, 
a necessary precondition for its legality.82 However, the issue of Palestine occupied 
center stage in its proceedings. The organizers escaped the predicament by claiming 
that in contrast to the Jews and Great Britain, which considered Palestine a political 
issue, it “is a strictly religious one from the Muslim point of view.”83 Thus, they again 
underlined that the conflict over Palestine was religious in nature. 
Pan-Islamism had a number of Western admirers. Among those was the German 
orientalist Georg Kampffmeyer, the editor of the scholarly journal Die Welt des Islam, 
who was sympathetic to the neo-Salafi project of the YMMA. He was as skeptical as 
the Islamists about the allegedly corrosive influence of the West on Egypt’s culture and 
society. In his opinion, groups like the YMMA indicated that the Egyptians were 
successful in preserving their heritage: “During the last 20 years, there has been a 
danger that the Egyptians might lose, by contact with Western civilization, their 
individuality, might part with their own past, with religion and morals, and surrender 
themselves to what is bad in Western civilization without the possibility of taking in what 
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is good in it. The danger seems to have been overcome. National feeling has grown, 
has deepened and become almost general. With it has grown the understanding of the 
real needs of the Nation and the East. There is, in fact, a widespread feeling of which 
the activity of the Y.M.M.A. is a strong and organized expression.”84 Kampffmeyer 
believed that the revival of Islam was in the interest of Christianity, as it helped stem 
the rise of secularism, and all efforts to convert Muslims were in fact 
counterproductive.85 Kampffmeyer was no outlier. Many Western scholars in the Arab 
world tended to look with sympathy on the rising nationalism in the region and identified 
with its views, including those towards Zionism, as will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapters. 
1.2 The Arab Revolt, the AHC and Propaganda in Britain 
The Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1936-1939 was a watershed moment in the history 
of Mandatory Palestine. It convinced both the Zionists and the British that a conciliation 
between Jewish and Arab interests in Palestine was no longer achievable and thus 
prefigured partition, which was first proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937. The 
revolt began in April 1936 with a general strike directed against the British mandate 
government and the Yishuv. On April 25, 1936, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) 
under the leadership of Mufti Amin al-Husseini was established to coordinate the strike 
activities. The AHC demanded the cessation of Jewish emigration, the end of land 
sales to Jews and the establishment of a constitutional government. The cessation of 
the strikes in October marked the end of the first phase of the revolt. The second, more 
violent phase of the revolt started in September 1937. It was marked by large scale 
irregular fighting between the British forces and Arab guerilla bands and would last 
until 1939.86 The militarization of the conflict was accompanied by a professional effort 
by the Arab leadership to internationalize the conflict via propaganda and diplomacy. 
While the propaganda was still largely concentrated on the Arab-Islamic world, 
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significant investments were made to influence Western public opinion and decision-
making circles, in particular in Britain and the US.  
This was not an entirely new development. The Arab Executive had realized the 
necessity of exerting some influence on the mandate administration via the Britain 
government early on. To that end, it decided to dispatch a delegation to London in 
March 1921. A British committee in support of the Arabs in Palestine encouraged this 
decision. The committee counted many prominent personalities, the politicians Lord 
Sydenham and Lord Lemington among others.87 According to the prominent Syrian 
pan-Arab propagandist Fakhri al-Barudi, Lord Northcliffe, the publisher of the the 
Times and the Daily Mail, who had toured Palestine in 1922, had also advised the 
Arabs during his stay to invest more in propaganda in order to make their case heard: 
“Lord Northcliffe, owner of the newspaper ‘The Times’, during his stay in Palestine, 
said to a group of Palestinians who visited him: ‘You are complaining here and nobody 
in England hears you because you practice no propaganda there. The English opinion 
might be more interested in the result of a soccer match than in the Palestinian 
question.’”88 From the beginning, the Arabs could thus count on a fine collection of 
dedicated pro-Arab activists. During its long stay in Britain, the Arab Executive 
delegation also enjoyed support from the right-wing and anti-Semitic press. This 
included the Morning Post, the newspaper which had become notorious for its 
publication of the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’. Its editorial line pressed for a British 
withdrawal from the Middle East. The most famous pro-Arab British journalist was 
Joseph Jeffries. Jeffries had worked as a war correspondent for the Daily Mail 
newspaper during World War I and had visited Palestine several times. His criticism of 
Zionism was evidently tinged by anti-Semitism. In the pages of the Daily Mail, he 
inveighed against the financial schemes and atheism of the “Bolsheviks” and “Judeo-
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Slavs”, who had secured Palestine by duping the British.89 Jeffries continued to provide 
substantial support for the Arab Cause in Britain. In 1923, he published the first 
excerpts of the MacMahon-Hussein correspondence to support Arab demands 
regarding Palestine.90 Between 1921 and 1939, several emissaries and six official 
delegations visited London, half of them before 1929. Then, with the flaring up of the 
Arab-Jewish conflict after the Wailing Wall riots in 1929, the diplomatic effort resumed. 
A fourth and a fifth diplomatic mission were dispatched in 1930 and in 1936. The last 
official Arab-Palestinian delegation made the journey to the London Conference in 
1939. In 1930, an SMC delegation including Shakib Arslan was also sent to the US to 
lobby with the government and the Arab-American community – with limited success.91 
In the 1930s, the Arabs moved to establish permanent diplomatic structures in the 
British capital so that they could communicate directly with the British government and 
public. The first such plans to permanently staff an Arab center in London had in fact 
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already been made in 1923, but never materialized.92 These plans would eventually 
be realized in the 1930s.  
Since 1934, Amin al-Husseini had entertained the idea of opening a propaganda 
mission in London, but these plans were only to be realized after the outbreak of the 
Arab Revolt in 1936.93 Thus, two months into the revolt, on June 10, 1936, an AHC 
delegation consisting of Jamal Husseini, Izzat Tannous and Shibly Jamal was 
dispatched to London. Their primary goal was to try to bring Colonial Secretary William 
Ormsby-Gore around to their viewpoints. Ormsby-Gore had previously refused to give 
in to the AHC demands and was therefore accused of pro-Zionist leanings.94 While the 
1936 delegation to Britain did not achieve much progress on the diplomatic front, it was 
a public relations success. Izzat Tannous was instrumental in cultivating the pro-Arab 
network in the country, meeting up with several prominent British sympathizers of Arab 
nationalism. The list included such eminent figures as S.F. Newcombe, a former 
Arabist in the British Army who had been instrumental in the Arab Revolt and was one 
of T.E. Lawrence’s closest friends and collaborators; Joseph Jeffries; the conservative 
MP, Clifton Brown; and the travel author, H.V. Morton.95 The latter was a highly 
influential writer whose book about his travels in the Middle East was distributed to 
British servicemen stationed in the region during WW II. It was later revealed that he 
harbored anti-Semitic convictions and had some sympathies with the ideology of 
National Socialism.96 MP Clifton Brown facilitated the AHC delegation’s being 
introduced to sympathetic MPs, many of whom would later form the pro-Arab 
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Parliamentary Committee in the House of Commons.97 Lord Winterton, a friend of the 
Hashemite Jordanian King Faisal, chaired the group, which counted about sixty MPs 
at its apogee, all of them conservatives.98 Moreover,  it was decided to establish a 
permanent base for pro-Arab propaganda in the UK at H.V. Morton’s house. This base 
was initially known as the Palestine Information Centre (PIC) and was later renamed 
Arab Centre. The leadership of the new center was shared by Morton, S.F. Newcombe, 
Mrs. Stewart Erskine, Mrs. Frances Newton--the daughter of a missionary and a 
fervent anti-Zionist herself--as well as Musa al-Husseini. During their stay, the 
delegation also authored an eleven page pro-Arab pamphlet with the title ‘The 
Palestine Case – Statement by the Palestine Arab Delegation’, which was the first anti-
Zionist propaganda publication in Britain authored by an Arab body.99 However, the 
body did not retain its independence  for long. Acting as the honorary secretary of the 
Arab Centre, Frances Newton met the Mufti in 1937, and offered to submit the pro-
Arab Centre directly to him and the AHC. The Mufti agreed and dispatched his 
delegates Emil Ghoury and Izzat Tannous to London.100 The good spirit of the English 
pro-Arab sympathizers amazed the latter: “They acted as if the Arab Palestine case 
was their own, exerting honest keen effort  which lasted three consecutive years only 
to be interrupted by the second catastrophe of the century, the Second World War.”101 
The enthusiasm of the  foreign pro-Arab activists was in no way inferior to that of the 
AHC functionaries. 
When Izzat Tannous arrived in London, he held a meeting with the staff of the Arab 
Centre. It was decided to start the publication of a weekly bulletin, The Arab Center 
Bulletin, which was to be distributed to politicians, the media and various organizations, 
starting with a circulation of 5’000.102 The pamphlets the Arab Centre produced during 
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the Arab Revolt in Palestine caused controversy. Additionally, in 1937 and 1938, the 
Centre published two booklets by Frances Newton, titled ‘Punitive Measures in 
Palestine’ and ‘Searchlight on Palestine’, which accused the British of acting 
excessively and arbitrarily in their suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. British 
officials invested great effort to prove the mendacity of these accusations. The latter 
booklet also featured the picture of a torn-up Coran, allegedly desecrated by the British, 
although the event was not personally witnessed by Newton. This had British officials 
worried that it may be used to stoke anti-British sentiment among Muslims. Archibald 
Wavell, then General Officer Commanding of the British forces in Palestine, rejected 
the veracity of this report in a letter to the Colonial Office: “The torn Koran is a regular 
feature of such propaganda, and is simply manufactured evidence to provoke religious 
feeling. I am absolutely certain that no Koran has at any time been torn or defaced 
during a search by troops.”103 Material produced by the Arab Centre was not only 
directed at the British public, but also distributed in Arab and Muslim countries. 
Warnings in this regard reached British officials from Egypt,104 Damascus,105 and other 
countries, leaving British officials fearing that the booklets would “’fan anti-British 
propaganda in 35 Arab countries”.106 The fact that anti-British propaganda was being 
spread from England must have been a new experience. 
The PIC not only consorted within respectable circles, but also found support amongst 
the British extreme right, which it reciprocated. Thus, the PIC announced its events in 
the fascist press and members of the AHC and Amin al-Husseini’s Palestine Arab 
Party, such as Emil Ghoury and Izzat Tannous, published in it. In these instances, Arab 
propagandists revealed their extreme anti-Semitism, which they otherwise often 
sought to hide from Western audiences. In the late thirties, PIC member George 
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Mansur lectured in front of the anti-Semitic Nordic League, stating that “extermination 
is the only solution to the Jew problem in Palestine and he could think of no better one 
for this country.” 107 Mansur also maintained contact with Robert Gordon-Canning, an 
advocate of an alliance between Fascism and Islam.108 Robert Gordon-Canning was 
a longtime Islamo- and Arabophile. Gordon-Canning had first discovered his 
enthusiasm for Islam during the Rif War, when he served as the honorary president for 
the Committee for the Defence of the Muslim Rif. His admiration for Islam sprang from 
his disaffection with the West and Christianity. In an article in 1924 in the Islamic 
Review, a journal run by the Ahmadiyya sect, he contrasted the virtues of Islam with 
the corrupted and materialist West. In the following years, he also voiced his opposition 
to Zionism using anti-Jewish rhetoric. Gordon-Canning arrived in Palestine in early 
November 1929, where he was hosted by the Mufti and other Arab Executive 
Committee functionaries. He was probably responding to an initiative by the Arab 
Executive’s Awni Abdel Hadi, who sought to recruit a pro-Arab advocate to participate 
in the inquiry into the anti-Jewish pogroms, which had shaken  Palestine in August 
1929. Gordon-Canning toured the country, visiting dignitaries and openly railing 
against Zionism. In a speech in Haifa, he compared the Arab struggle against Zionism 
to Mohammed’s jihad against the polytheists. After his return, he tried to act as an 
unofficial spokesman for the Mufti vis-à-vis the Colonial Office, but failed to be 
recognized by it in that role.109 Gordon-Canning joined the British Union of Fascists 
(BUF) in 1934, and was responsible for the BUF’s  international relations, particularly 
with Germany and Italy. But he also maintained contact with Shakib Arslan in Geneva. 
A column on foreign affairs by Gordon-Canning regularly appeared in the BUF’s central 
organ, Action. In his function, he possessed a certain influence on shaping the BUF’s 
stance on international affairs and especially Palestine. His views were largely 
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congruent with that of the Nationalist-Islamic faction, which was organized around the 
Mufti Amin Husseini and his Palestine Arab Party.110 His 1938 book ‘The Holy Land: 
Arab or Jew?’ shows the influence of the anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and the ‘War 
on Islam’ narratives, which at that time were popularized in Palestine by the YMMA 
and the Mufti’s newspapers.111 The book presented Zionism as a conspiracy of Jewish 
bankers, who sought to subjugate or eradicate the Arabs for their imperial interests. 
He called Zionism the “tenth crusade”, which was however not Christian in nature, but 
Bolshevistic.112 In his combination of far-right and Islamic anti-Semitism, Gordon-
Canning could be described as a pioneer. Besides Britain, AHC propaganda also 
targeted the US. Its campaign started with a fundraising tour by Tannous in May 
1937.113 AHC propaganda in the US in the years 1937-1939 will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Two. 
1.3 Emil Ghoury and the AHC’s Christian Outreach 
For years, Amin al-Husseini’s AHC had campaigned in Arab and Muslim countries 
against Britain and Zionism. With the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936, 
Arab Christians were instrumental in pushing for the internationalization of the Arab 
cause towards the West as well. In August 1936, leaders from all Christian confessions 
signed an appeal to the Christian World warning of a Jewish rule, which would result 
in Socialism and Anarchy. Reflecting Islamic propaganda, which peddled theories that 
the Zionists were intent on demolishing the Muslim holy structures on the Temple 
Mount in order re-erect their ancient temple, the appeal asked their foreign brethren 
“to save the holy places from the Zionist danger” and to stop Jewish immigration.114 
Emil Ghoury was the AHC propagandist responsible for Christian outreach. His 
Western education and Christian background perfectly prepared him for this role. 
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Ghoury had studied at the University of Cincinnati in the US, before returning to 
Palestine in 1933.115 There, he worked as a journalist, writing prolifically for several 
pro-Mufti newspapers, including the weekly Al-Shaab, Jamal al-Husseini’s Al-Liwa, Al-
Shabab and the daily The Arab Federation (Arab. Al-Wihda al-Arabia), which appeared 
in both Arabic and English intermittently until 1935.116 When Jamal Husseini left 
Palestine in 1936, Ghoury became the co-editor of Al-Liwa.117 Many Arab Palestinian 
journalists were sympathetic to the rise of Fascism and National Socialism. This group 
included Emil Ghoury. In a 1934 article in Al-Shabab, he called on the Palestinian youth 
to emulate their European brethren: “Oh Arab Youth! Awaken [sic] and see what the 
aggressive enemies have done to you. Exploited Palestine calls upon you to save it 
from the teeth of enslavement and exploitation. (…) In every town every village and 
every tent, you must found national youth companies as in Italy and Germany that will 
operate in favour of independence and Arab unity.”118 It was probably no coincidence 
that Amin al-Husseini had concluded an alliance with the Italians one year earlier, as 
will be discussed later. 
Ghoury had started his political career as a follower of Amin al-Husseini in the early 
1930s. He was active in the multi-partisan Youth Party, which was headed by Issa 
Bandak. Together with Alfred Rok, a lawyer from Jerusalem, he led the Palestine Arab 
Party since its establishment in 1935 by the Husseini faction to counter the influence 
of the Nashashibis’ National Defense Party.119 After 1936, he became the AHC’s roving 
propagandist. From 1936 until 1939, he visited England, the Balkan countries and the 
US. One reason for choosing Ghoury for a senior position within the Arab political 
establishment seems to have been his Christian-Orthodox background. The British 
mandatory government drew a very unflattering portrait of him. High Commissioner 
Harold MacMichael wrote of him in 1940: “He is in no sense a responsible leader, but 
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an adventurer pure and simple, taken up by Haj Amin who was anxious to have a 
following amongst the Christian communities as well as amongst Moslems, and 
nothing more or less than a creature of Haj Amin. Apart from his qualifications as an 
agitator it may be assumed that in taking up Haj Amin was particularly influenced by 
the fact that he is a member of the Orthodox community and could be used to offset to 
some extent the influence of Yacoub Eff. Farraj who is a prominent member of that 
community but a staunch supporter of the rival Nashashibi faction.”120 However, Emil 
Ghoury proved loyal to Amin al-Husseini. 
The first destination of Emil Ghoury was Eastern Europe. According to Nicola Khuri, 
an Arab nationalist and Orthodox priest from Jerusalem, it was Shakib Arslan who 
urged Amin al-Husseini to send a Christian delegation to Eastern Europe in order to 
solicit Christian support for the Arab national movement in Palestine.121 At that time, 
there were two Christian members sitting on the AHC: Yacoub Farraj, a Greek 
Orthodox and Alfred Rok, a Roman Catholic.122 After rejecting the Mufti’s bid for him 
to undertake the trip, Farraj instead recommended Emil Ghoury and Nicola Khuri. In 
early September 1937, both men embarked on a public relations trip which brought 
them from Damascus to Istanbul and from there on to Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest and 
other Eastern European cities, where they met with church representatives, media and 
politicians.123 Leo Cohen from the Political Department of the Jewish Agency estimated 
that the tour pursued the goal of convincing the Balkan states to side with the Arabs in 
the League of Nations and to sway public opinion in “Greek-Orthodox circles” against 
the Jews in general and against Zionism in particular. On September 9, Cohen asked 
the Zionist Federations in Greece and Romania to take appropriate steps “to counter 
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this campaign of incitement.”124 In Romania, the two AHC delegates delivered an 
interview to the extreme right-wing daily, Curuntul, where they again raised the specter 
of the holy places being in danger. Like in the case of the crusader states, they 
declared, the Arab word would eventually wipe the Yishuv from the face of the world. 
Moreover, they described the Jewish woman as devoid of honor and claimed that 
Zionism had introduced communism to Palestine, as well as that the Arabs were not 
profiting from the Zionist project. Even if they were, they stated that the Arabs would 
prefer “to be poor but free than rich but slaves.”125 Their messages thus exploited the 
rising fascist and anti-Semitic mood in the country. 
At that time, Romania held a certain importance for the politics of the Yishuv, as its 
foreign minister, Victor Antonescu (not to be confused with the later dictator, Ion Victor 
Antonescu), served as rapporteur to the Permanent Mandates Commission at the 
League of Nations. According to the Romanian Zionists, these statements were widely 
received in the public, which was already widely permeated by anti-Semitism. In 
September, however, Romanian Zionist activists planned to counter the delegation’s 
statement with a vigorous counter campaign and asked the Political Department of the 
Zionist Executive to assist them. They demanded more material on the pro-Zionist 
statements by the Maronite Patriarch, who had travelled Europe a few months before, 
for publication in the European press. Moreover, they suggested that the Political 
Department urge the Patriarch and the Lebanese president to release statements 
rejecting the claim that the holy places in Jerusalem were in danger and that the whole 
of the Arab Christian World was opposed to Zionism.126 In December 1937, only five 
months after the delegation’s visit, the openly anti-Semitic government of Octavian 
Goga would come into power, later introducing the first set of anti-Jewish laws. 
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1.4 The Revisionist Powers and the AHC Propaganda 
In contrast to France and Great Britain, National Socialist Germany and fascist Italy 
were motivated by a revisionist agenda, which sought to revolutionize the international 
order. Italy considered the Eastern Mediterranean as its own sphere of influence, 
challenging British dominance of the region. The escalation of the conflict in Palestine 
after 1936 can therefore also be understood as a result of Italian aspirations in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Since the 1920s, Italy had sought to increase its influence in 
the Middle East by means of economic expansion, propaganda and eventually, military 
conquest. Propaganda encompassed an open, legitimate form, which can be 
summarized as cultural propaganda. The establishment of language schools within the 
framework of the Dante Aligheri Society, concert tours by Italian opera ensembles, and 
official state visits all belonged to this category. In 1928, the Italo-Palestine Committee 
was established under the aegis of the former Minister of Colonies Lanza di Scalea, to 
advance Italian interests.127 However, since the early 1930s, Italy had indulged in an 
aggressive propaganda campaign in the Middle East, a campaign which was pro-
Arabic, pro-Islamic as well as anti-British and anti-Zionist in nature. Italian propaganda 
invoked both geopolitical and ideological arguments, claiming a general affinity 
between Islam and Fascism, to justify Italy’s friendship with the Islamic world.128 These 
efforts were organized and coordinated in a centralized fashion. The Ministry of 
Popular Culture was responsible for the operational planning, following the guidelines 
set out by Foreign Office. Thus, propaganda was an essential pillar in realizing Italy’s 
foreign policy goals.129 Two events pushed the Italians to undertake a vigorous 
propaganda campaign towards the Arab and Muslim world in the 1930s. The 
suppression of the Libyan resistance had culminated in the forced resettlement of 
100’000 inhabitants and the execution of the resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar, in 1931. 
Public opinion in the Arab world erupted against Italy, especially in Egypt. Italy’s attack 
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on Ethiopia in 1935 provoked a similar reaction.130 The campaign involved different 
operations. Radio Bari started broadcasting to the Middle East in 1934, finding a 
receptive audience in Palestine and Egypt. According to a British report from 1936, 
many Arabs found the mixture of news and entertainment appealing and the station 
was widely played in cafés. Its transmissions took on a sharp anti-British edge after 
1935, which only lessened for a short period after the Easter Accords in April 1938.131 
While radio propaganda targeted the broader Arab population, other methods were 
prepared to gain support among the Arab elite. This included providing money to Arab 
newspapers, including Shakib Arslan’s La Nation Arabe, bribing Arab intellectuals and 
offering assistance to the Arab nationalist movement in general, in particular its youth 
organizations.  
During the 1930s, the Arab national movement in Palestine under the leadership of 
Amin al-Husseini profited greatly from its Italian ties. In spring 1933, Rome instructed 
the Italian Consul General in Jerusalem to establish relations with Amin Husseini and 
the Arab-Palestinian leadership.132 At the same time, Shakib Arslan, suffering from 
financial difficulties, also chose to accept Italian bribes. For the next three to four years, 
he received two million Lira (about 27’000 pounds) each year for his publications. In 
addition, Arslan and Jabiri served as the intermediaries for Italian financial support to 
the Palestinian national movement under Amin al-Husseini. The effects of the 
agreement with Italy became immediately visible in Arslan’s propaganda outlets. 
Dropping his former strident criticism of Italian policies, Arslan now concentrated his 
venomous attacks against the two other European powers in the Middle East, France 
and England. In a meeting between Arslan and Mussolini in early 1934, the terms of 
the agreement were finalized: Italy promised to soften its policy towards the Libyan 
Arabs and support the Arab cause in Syria and Palestine, in particular in matters of 
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propaganda. In exchange, the Arabs would rein in their criticism of Italian policies in 
North Africa.133  
The effects of this alliance and Italy’s increased aspirations in the Middle East were 
also felt in Europe. On December 21, 1933, the Italian Institute for the Middle and Far 
East (Ital. Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente) under the chairmanship of 
Giovanni Gentile, Italy’s leading fascist philosopher, was inaugurated. One day later, 
on December 22, the first Conference of Oriental Students took place in Rome. It was 
a major cultural event, having been organized under the auspices of Fascist University 
Groups (Ital. Gruppi universatiri fascisti) and enjoying the attendance of about 600 
students.134 Shakib Arslan assisted the Italians in organizing the conference.135 
Mussolini himself graced the event with a speech, positing the resurrection of a 
Mediterranean nation under the leadership of fascist Italy. A common spirit and their 
opposition to the Western powers united both. In particular, he blamed capitalism and 
liberalism for the European estrangement from the East: “The Idea that Asia was 
inimical to Europe was formed and spread, while, in reality, it was about a particular 
mentality developing in certain European countries, which was incapable and 
indifferent to understand Asia.” The reaction in Asia against the “liberal and capitalist 
degeneration”, against the “lack of soul and ideal” in the West, was the same, which 
motivated Fascism, he declared. “Today, with the Fascist renaissance, a foremost 
spiritual renaissance, Rome and the Mediterranean are about to reassume their 
unifying roles. And it is for this that the new Italy – this Italy – has assembled you 
here.”136 The listeners greeted Mussolini’s speech with enthusiastic applause. The son 
of Ihsan Jabiri, Awnallah Jabiri, who represented the Arab students at the conference, 
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served as vice president, with the Indian representative Hussein Dabish acting as 
president. The conference lasted until December 27 when Dabish announced the 
establishment of the Confederation of Oriental Students (COS) to be seated in Rome. 
On April 6, 1934, the Permanent Office held its first reunion. According to president 
Jabiri, the COS’s goals were to promote the feeling of comradeship among Asian 
students, to encourage Asian students to study in Europe and lastly to facilitate the 
rapprochement between Orient and Occident. After the conference, the COS of 
Oriental Students published the first issue of the monthly magazine Jeune Asie, which 
served as its official organ.137 The Arab-Italian alliance was however not without risks, 
in particular for the Arabs. 
Many Arabs and Muslims viewed Italy’s propaganda offensive with suspicion, as Italy 
continued its colonial politics in Libya. This conflict would quickly enter the Arab student 
movement in Europe. On June 6, an Arab Student Committee in Geneva published a 
manifesto which condemned the COS as an “Instrument in the hands of the 
imperialists” and called for a boycott of everyone collaborating with the Italians.138 The 
COS defended itself against this criticism by claiming that it was an apolitical body and 
cared simply for the interests of the students and their countries. A second conference 
of oriental students was held in Rome on December 28, 1934. There, it was decided 
to turn the COS into an umbrella organization for student groups. Jabiri was again 
elected as vice president to the COS with the representative for China, Suanne Liao, 
serving as president. At the conference, the leadership looked with optimism to the 
future, expressing its hope to be recognized as an official student organization by the 
League of Nations.139 Three Jewish students from Palestine also attended the 
conference. An incident occurred when, during a discussion, an Arab student hit one 
of the Jewish students.140 One of the Jewish students attending was probably Eliahu 
Epstein, who was later responsible for Oriental Affairs at the Political Bureau of the 
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Jewish Executive.141 However, due to rising tensions with Ethiopia, resulting in the war 
against Ethiopia in October 1935, the organization ceased most of its activity. The last 
issue of the Jeune Asie appeared in March 1935.142 According to Eliahu Epstein, the 
oriental expert of the Political Bureau of the Jewish Agency, the majority of students 
left the group because of the war, with the remaining members being mostly Arabs. 
Many had ignored the organization’s character as a tool of Italian foreign policy for a 
long time. Among those was also Eliahu Epstein, who reported that he had taken part 
in the activities of the COS during his time in Rome before becoming aware of its pro-
fascist character.143 The Arab-Italian alliance also proved to be controversial in 
Palestine itself. 
Arslan’s well-known political and personal ties to Amin al-Husseini soon become a 
liability for their enemies to exploit. Arslan’s partner Ihsan Jabiri was also Musa al-
Alami’s father in law. This closeness of both circles turned Arslan’s friendly stance 
toward the Italians into an issue of intra-Palestinian politics. In 1935, the Palestinian 
newspaper Al Moqattan published a letter by Arslan to the Mufti, in which he spoke 
about the agreement with Italy and a coordinated propaganda campaign. In the letter, 
Arslan also revealed how he had advised the Italians on how to sell their war in 
Abyssinia to the Muslim World by emphasizing alleged Abyssinian actions against 
Muslims. This left the impression that Arslan had sold out Arab interests. Arslan 
disputed the letter’s authenticity. However, Munif al-Husseini’s embrace of a pro-Italian 
line in an article in March 1935 in his newspaper Al-Jamia al-Islamiya, the Husseini 
clan’s mouthpiece, seemed only to confirm the opposition’s accusations of collusion 
between the Italians, Arslan and the Husseini clan. Another two subsequently 
published letters by Arslan both added credence to the accusation of collusion with the 
Italians. The first appeared again in the newspaper Al-Jamia al-Islamiya in April 1935, 
openly calling on the Mufti to abandon the British and support an Arab-Italian alliance. 
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The second appeared a month later in the newspaper Filastin.144 The British Foreign 
Office also learnt that Ihsan Jabiri had stated in private meetings that the Italians and 
the Syro-Palestinian Delegation had indeed reached an agreement.145 The Italian’s 
support for the Palestinian national movement encouraged an escalation of its 
diplomatic, propagandistic and military efforts. 
Despite such controversies, Italian financial contributions to the Arab national 
movement were too significant to let go. In total, the Italians would expend about 
150’000 pounds between 1933 and 1938. In early 1936, the Arab-Palestinian 
leadership under Amin Husseini prepared a plan to launch an insurgency in Palestine 
and topple Emir Abdullah in Transjordan, with the Italians pledging to contribute 
100’000 pounds to the enterprise.146 The money was directly funneled to the Mufti 
through Shakib Arslan, Ihsan Jabiri and Mariano de Angelis, the Italian Consul General 
in Jerusalem. Donations from Egypt, India, Iraq, but also the diaspora communities in 
the Americas collected by roving propagandists added to the financial base of the 
uprising, as discussed in Chapter Two. Ali Masud, an employee of the Italian consulate 
in Cairo, remitted the money collected in Egypt to the assistant manager of the Misr 
Bank, who would hand it out to Jamal Husseini.147 However, in 1936 the British had 
become aware of these financial networks. British investigations moreover revealed 
that Ihsan Jabiri had embezzled 22’000 pounds from  the donations. The Italians 
therefore advised the Arab leadership to organize the transfer of funds through an 
intermediary outside of Palestine. This function was assumed by Musa Alami, a 
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confidant to the Mufti and the son-in-law of Jabiri. This allowed him to carry on his 
mission with due diligence for the duration of the entire revolt.148 Musa Alami would 
play a central role in organizing AHC propaganda after World War II. The Italians also 
manipulated the Arab press on behalf of the Arab Revolt. They furnished articles, 
bribed journalists and financed newspapers in Palestine, Egypt and Syria to push them 
to an anti-British and pro-Italian line. In Jerusalem, the Swiss priest Alessandro 
Mombelli served as a liaison between the Arab journalists and the Italian government. 
He also provided atrocity propaganda to the Italians and to many Catholic newspapers 
in Europe, for which he served as their correspondent in Palestine.149 The alliance 
between Italy, Arslan and the Husseini clan would hold for three years until the signing 
of the Easter Accords on April 16, 1938, the Mediterranean equivalent to the Munich 
Agreement, when Italy promised to halt its anti-British propaganda campaign in return 
for receiving Britain’s acquiescence to its colonial conquests.150 The cessation of Italian 
support contributed to the demise of the Arab Revolt in 1939. 
After National Socialism’s rise to power, several Arab leaders approached Germany, 
among them Amin Husseini and Abdullah I of Jordan, in the hope of securing its 
support. They wished to build on the traditional partnership between Imperial Germany 
and pan-Islam. Few others were better disposed than Arslan to provide a link between 
German foreign policy and Arab nationalism. Arslan had a long history with the 
Germans which reached back to World War I, when Germany had recruited a number 
of Arab propagandists. In October 1918, Oppenheim’s colleague Curt Prüfer received 
the assignment to provide German passports for pro-German Arabs to help them settle 
in Switzerland. Among them was the Syrian Shakib Arslan, a gifted networker and 
already then one of the preeminent pan-Muslim intellectuals and publishers.151 Arslan 
continued to maintain close personal and business ties with Germany. His old friend 
Curt Prüfer from the days of German-Turkish brothers-in-arms was now responsible 
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for Oriental Affairs at Abteilung III, the Anglo-American and Middle Eastern Division in 
the German Foreign Office AA (Ger. Auswärtiges Amt). Curt Prüfer harbored a deep 
sympathy for the pan-Arab project to unify the Arabic-speaking peoples, which he felt 
paralleled German history. Moreover, he shared the religious nationalists’ opinion that 
Islam would need to form the spiritual and legal base of such a state. Despite his 
personal affinities, he followed the precepts of German foreign policy in the early Hitler 
years, which considered the Middle East an area of minor importance and situated in 
the Italian sphere. Hitler was also keen to avoid provoking the English and the French 
during this early phase of his regime.152 German reluctance was evident in November 
1934, when Arslan and Jabiri travelled to Berlin to meet up with Curt Prüfer. In the 
meeting, Arslan proposed an Arab-German alliance, which would be useful in a future 
confrontation between Germany and France. After the meeting, Prüfer recalled 
Germany’s disappointment with the Muslims in the First World War in his private notes. 
In spite of the Turkish declaration of Jihad, few Muslims had joined the German war 
effort. Prüfer therefore formally rejected Arslan’s offer of alliance and his request for 
an audience with Hitler. In an internal memorandum from November 7, 1934, he 
recorded that Germany could not provide the Arabs with money and arms.153 In 
February 1935, Arslan and Jabiri also approached Fritz Grobba, the German 
ambassador in Iraq, only to be rejected again.154 Several other approaches followed. 
Only when Hitler abandoned his plans for a compromise with Great Britain in 1938, did 
he decide to support the Arab Revolt. German Intelligence chief Wilhelm Canaris 
reported in June 1939 that the Mufti Amin al-Husseini had thanked him profusely for 
this support, by asserting that “Only through the monetary means provided by us had 
it been possible for him to stage the insurgency in Palestine.”155 Although militarily 
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defeated, the Arab Revolt in Palestine had reached its political goal. With the British 
adoption of the White Paper in 1939, the immigration of Jews was limited to 70’000 
persons. As a result, there would never be a Jewish majority in Palestine and the 
Balfour Declaration had essentially been voided. Moreover, the White Paper trapped 
hundreds of thousands of Jews wanting to escape from Europe, with the worst possible 
consequences.  
1.5 AHC Networks in Syria and Egypt, Barudi’s Arab National Bureau and the Bludan 
Congress 
The outbreak of the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936 also greatly affected Palestine’s 
neighbor states, in particular Syria. Many Syrians, especially from the elite, had family 
and business ties to Palestine. Both countries had belonged to the geographic and 
cultural region of Syria before the Ottoman defeat in World War I. Public support for 
the insurrection was pervasive. Many of the political elite belonged to the landowning 
class and had vested interests in Palestine. The governing Syrian party, the National 
Block, however was torn between pan-Arab solidarity and the pursuit of Syrian 
interests. When the Arab Revolt broke out, the National Block was in the middle of 
negotiations with France and was therefore interested in good relations with both 
Britain and France. Regarding the economy, the boycott of Jewish goods strengthened 
Arab entrepreneurs against their Jewish competitors, but it also jeopardized the 
extensive trade between Palestine and Syria. The National Block’s initial policy was 
therefore inconsistent, vacillating between stoking public sentiment and acting in 
support of the revolt, while promising its Western partners to keep it at an acceptable 
level.156 Still, the National Block hoped to derive legitimacy from its support of the 
insurrection. 
Egypt’s initial reaction to the outbreak of the Arab Revolt was very different from that 
of Syria. Until the 1930s, most Egyptians had shown little interest and/or sympathy for 
                                             
156 Philip S. Khoury, “Divided Loyalties? Syria and the Question of Palestine, 1919–
39,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (1985): 324–31. 
 
61 
 
the Palestine issue.157 With the Arab strike, which initiated the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 
the advocates of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity in Egypt intensified their 
propaganda efforts. On May 16, 1936, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Central 
Committee for Aid to Palestine.158 The YMMA convened a conference to find ways to 
help the Arabs in Palestine, which lay the groundwork for the establishment of the 
Supreme Committee of Relief for the Palestinian Victims (Arab. al-Lajna al-uliya li-
ighatat mankubi Falastin). Although headed by Abd al-Hamid Said, the YMMA’s 
president, it was not exclusively pan-Islamic in character, but also included liberal 
voices and prominent politicians from the ruling WAFD party. A press campaign in the 
leading Egyptian newspapers incited the popular mood with stories about desecrations 
of Mosques by British soldiers and Zionists besides the by now well-known allegations 
of plots to destroy the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Anti-Semitism became rampant 
in Egypt. A weekly radio show by two professors from the renowned Al-Azhar 
University, which coupled their Coran commentaries with anti-Semitic remarks, also 
inflamed the situation.159 David Kelley, the acting High Commissioner in Egypt, whose 
reports had hitherto emphasized the indifference Egyptians felt towards the Arab world 
and the Palestine Issue, observed the rise of a new “Arab state of mind” in Egypt.160 
The Egyptian government under Mustafa Nahas however was wary of losing control 
and set out to limit the activities of the Arab nationalists in the country. Thus, the 
newspaper al-Shura of Muhammed Ali al-Taher, an anti-Semitic and Islamist journalist, 
did not receive a license to continue its publication.161 As a result of British and 
Egyptian policies, the extent of support for the Arab Revolt remained limited.  
The situation was very different in Syria, where the French mandate government turned 
a blind eye to militant Arab nationalist activity on their soil. This and covert National 
Block support allowed Syria to become a safe haven for the organizers and 
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propagandists of the Arab Revolt as well as a military staging ground for the entrance 
of Arab volunteers into Palestine. Both Islamic and Arab nationalist groups were active 
in the field, foremost the League of National Action and a multitude of Islamic societies. 
The latter would later form the core of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Yusuf al-Issa, a 
Palestinian Christian and a relative to the editor of the newspaper Falastin Issa al-Issa, 
had filled the pages of his publication Alif Ba, the leading Arabic newspaper in 
Damascus, since the 1920s with criticism of Zionism.162 He now assumed the chair of 
the newly founded Palestine Defense Committee (PDC). Syrian support for the Arab 
Revolt proved essential for the revolt’s maintenance. It was organized through the 
Istiqlal (Engl. Independence) party, which had branches in several Arab countries, but 
was strongest in Palestine and Syria. Soon after its establishment, leaders of the 
Istiqlal party, including Fakri al-Barudi, Fuad Mufarrij and Nabih al-Azma, took over the 
Palestine Defense Committee. Istiqlal members also collected money in Syria, which 
was then transferred through Istiqlal member Nabih al-Azma, who lived in Palestine, 
to the AHC leadership. In the same vein, weapons procured by members of the Istiqlal 
in Transjordan were funneled into Palestine. In July 1936, the Palestine Defense 
Committee dispatched about 700 Arab volunteers to fight in Palestine under the 
command of Fawzi al-Qawuqij, a veteran of the 1925-27 Great Syrian Revolt.163 After 
the outlawing of the AHC in late September 1937, Syria effectively became the staging 
ground for the Arab Revolt in Palestine in the second, more violent phase of the Arab 
Revolt. The Palestinian Istiqlal politicians Akram Zuaiter, Izzat Darwaza as well as 
Jamal Husseini and other notable figures formed the Central Committee of Jihad in 
Damascus, which aspired to coordinate the Arab Revolt.164 Syria was not only 
important from a military point of view. 
Syria was also the country where much of the international propaganda for the Arab 
Revolt was organized. The Arab National Bureau for Research and Information ANBRI 
(Fr. Bureau National Arabe de Recherches et d’Informations) was central in this effort. 
The man behind ANBRI was Fakhri al-Barudi, a leading Arab nationalist publicist and 
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politician of Syrian origin with a long experience in propaganda. He was born in 1889 
to a wealthy landowning family and for a time studied agriculture in Paris without 
graduating. He fought with the Ottomans during World War II, attaining the rank of an 
officer, before joining the Arab Revolt in 1917. Switching to business endeavors, he 
was long absent from politics before he reemerged during the Great Syrian Revolt 
(1925-27) as one of its chief propagandists. In 1928, he was elected to the Syrian 
Constituent Assembly for the National Bloc. A special concern for Barudi was 
education. For this purpose of setting up national education programs, he started a 
fundraising campaign in 1932. However, the collected donations were not invested in 
education, but used to fund his Barudi Bureau for Propaganda and Publication (Arab. 
Maktab al-Barudi lil diaya wa al nashr), which was opened in October 1934, and later 
became known as ANBRI.165 ANBRI employed several employees, recruiting 
unemployed Syrian intellectuals, and even possessed its own printing press.166 With 
its level of sophistication, ANBRI undoubtedly fulfilled a pioneering role in the history 
of Arab propaganda. 
Barudi believed that in order to achieve a pan-Arab state, it was essential to put the 
issue onto the international agenda. The way to do this was through propaganda, as 
was evidenced by several historic examples. This was the rationale for founding 
ANBRI, as he explained in a 1937 article: “History lets us know that modern Poland as 
well as Czechoslovakia could only constitute themselves as independent countries 
with the help of certain efficient means, among else ‘propaganda’. We mean 
propaganda in its double function as external and internal. The men of these countries 
could, thanks to the propaganda effectuated by them in the different capitals of the 
word, turn the questions of their countries into international and global questions. The 
Arabs must follow their example and make use of a disciplined propaganda, active and 
continuous, in order to make the questions of their countries an international question, 
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which bears influence on the global peace and war.”167 Al-Barudi seems to have taken 
this idea from a British author, Eugene Young, who believed that the fact that the Arabs 
had not invested enough effort in propaganda was the principal reason for the failure 
to establish a Greater Syria after World War I: “Mr. Eugene Young, in his book entitled 
the ‘Arab Revolt’, says: ‘The principal reason for the failure of the Arabs at the Peace 
Conference and for the ills which afflicted them since then needs to be attributed to 
that they have not, in contrast to the Poles, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs, put 
propaganda to use in the service of their cause.’”168 Al-Barudi also cited the advice of 
British publisher Lord Northcliffe, already mentioned above, in which he advised the 
Arabs to invest more in propaganda in Britain.169 The advice, whether real or imagined, 
obviously made an impression on al-Barudi and is also cited in the report by the 
propaganda committee at the Bludan Congress in September 1937, which he 
headed.170 The Arab congress, which took place in the Syrian resort town of Bludan in 
September 1937, enhanced al-Barudi’s already prominent role in the pan-Arab 
propaganda effort. 
The Bludan Congress took place one month after the return of the Syrian intellectual 
Amin Rihani to the Middle East from a propaganda tour in the US together with AHC 
member Izzat Tannous. He returned with the impression that the Zionists wielded 
enormous financial and political power in the US.171 This was a general pattern among 
Arab propagandists in the US. It is not difficult to see that this obsession with supposed 
Zionist power led Arab nationalists to be concerned with international and US public 
opinion and may have contributed to the issue’s move to the center stage at the Bludan 
Congress. Kedourie suggests that Amin al-Husseini organized the congress with the 
goal to increase pressure on Great Britain, already heavily under stress due to the Arab 
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Revolt in Palestine, to abandon its promise of a Jewish national home and drop the 
Peel partition plan.172 Recognizing the explosive potential of the conference, the British 
pressed the Egyptian and the Syrian governments not to attend.173 A confidant of the 
Egyptian premier Mustafa Nahas, Amin al-Uthman, however did attend in secret.174. 
According to Italian records, the main organizer of the event was Nabih al-Azma, a 
member of the Syrian National Bloc party, who received payments from the Italians. 
This confirms British information at the time that Italy clandestinely supported the 
congress financially. Other funding came from the AHC as well as Lebanese and 
Syrian sources.175 Despite the pressure, the event was well-attended by leading Arab 
nationalist and pan-Islamic politicians and would prove instrumental in 
internationalizing the Arab-Zionist dispute in Palestine and in mobilizing Arab and 
Muslim public opinion 
Underscoring its centrality, the sole concern of one working committee was the 
question of propaganda. The committee was chaired by ANBRI chief Fakhri al-Barudi 
and consisted of 37 members. Syrians and Lebanese constituted a clear majority of 
23. Four members were Palestinians, among them the famous journalist and editor of 
Falastin, Issa al-Issa, Akram Zuaiter as well as Yussef Haikal and Wadi Bustani. This 
list of members alone attests to the fact that the conflict had already reached a high 
level of internationalization. The committee identified the lack of propaganda as the 
principal reason behind Arab foreign policy failures from the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 until contemporary issues in Palestine, echoing al-Barudi’s thesis. It devised a 
comprehensive propaganda program directed at Arab, Muslim and foreign audiences. 
The propaganda would drive home the point that a Jewish state was a concern for all 
Arabs, a threat to the realization of Arab independence and unity as well as glory. The 
future Muslim propaganda effort would concentrate on emphasizing the religious 
importance of Palestine due to the presence of Muslim holy places, warning that other 
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Muslim holy places and the Muslim faith itself were threatened by an expanding Jewish 
State. “The evil of a Jewish state in Palestine will not be confined to the holy places 
there, but will spread to other places held as holy by the Arabs and Moslems 
everywhere, (…) and prevent them from enjoying their religious liberty which is the 
most essential part of the Moslem's life.”176 Thus, the Bludan Congress subscribed to 
the conspiracy theory of a ‘Jewish war against Islam’ and was dedicated to spreading 
it. To organize its propaganda campaign, al-Barudi’s propaganda committee decided 
to establish a main office with local branches in all Arab countries as well as London, 
Geneva and the United States. Furthermore, they planned dispatch delegations to 
Arab, Islamic and other countries to inform on the Arab view point regarding Palestine. 
The program foresaw the involvement of Arab states in the propaganda campaign on 
a massive scale and in a comprehensive way, which mirrored that of the totalitarian 
regimes in Europe: Thus, holidays should be dedicated to the conflict in Palestine to 
spread awareness and raise financial, moral and political support, propaganda material 
produced and speeches held at schools, churches and mosques.177 This prefigured 
the information policy of the Arab dictatorships, which were established after World 
War II.  
In the view of its participants, Bludan was a resounding success. In the preface of the 
proceedings of the congress, which were published by ANBRI, Amin Rihani stated that 
the Bludan conference constituted an important step towards Arab Unity. Its program 
can be summarized in three points: Liberation of Palestine from Zionism and 
imperialism, the liberation of the other Arab countries from foreign oppression and, 
eventually, the union of said Arab countries.178 Bludan also catapulted al-Barudi’s 
propaganda bureau to greater prominence, which only now assumed the name Arab 
National Bureau for Research and Information and took on a more or less official 
character. At its apogee in 1939, ANBRI employed 16 persons.179 Fakhri Barudi’s 
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secretary, the young Syrian nationalist Fuad Mufarrij, played an important role in 
ANBRI. Mufarrij had studied at the AUB, graduating in 1935 with a thesis on ‘Syria and 
Lebanon under French Mandate’.180 Despite his young age, Mufarrij was one of the 
leading Arab nationalist activists in Syria, acting as the Secretary General of the 
Palestine Defense Committee since 1936 together with other leaders of the Istiqlal 
party, among them Fakhri Barudi and Nabih al-Azma,.181 Mufarrij would accompany 
Barudi in 1938 on a trip to the USA, where he would die in a car accident. The Arab 
National Bureau could also profit from a community of politically active exiles in Syria 
and abroad. In January 1938 for instance, the Tripolitanian exile leader Bashir Saadawi 
wrote to Shakib Arslan to ask for a position in the propaganda office. Shakib’s brother 
Adil had just been selected as the Syrian legate to Paris and Saadawi must certainly 
have hoped that Shakib would be able to exert some influence on ANBRI’s 
composition. A section of ANBRI dealt exclusively with North Africa, printing anti-
Italian, anti-Spanish and anti-French pamphlets. Although these efforts were 
apparently in vain.182  
Besides propaganda, ANBRI pursued a broad and ambitious educational program, 
which was set out in its statutes. Its content followed the spirit of Arab reformists. It 
included general social concerns, such as the promotion of women’s and workers’ 
rights. However, the main goal of ANBRI, as suggested by its name, was propaganda 
and popular education. Although most of the aims set out in its program were certainly 
unrealistic and never achieved, they give a good impression of the ideas of its founders 
and therefore merit mention here. True to Barudi’s original plans, the program 
described ANBRI as a place of research and also education. It would collect 
publications in the Arab world, send out students to comb through libraries to find Arab 
books and manuscripts, organize conferences, and encourage students to study in 
Europe at ANBRI’s expense. In contrast to most of the other points of the program, its 
propaganda plans at home and abroad were more realistic. In Syria, ANBRI would 
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refute the critiques of foreign writers and support the friends of the Arab cause. Abroad, 
ANBRI would seek to establish branches in European and American cities (the 
foremost being London and Paris) to collaborate with Arab diplomats, furnish articles 
to the press as well as liaise with eminent personalities and sympathizers. Besides 
political propaganda, it would also promote tourism and trade. The Arabs who lived as 
foreigners in the West were of special concern to ANBRI. A special branch of ANBRI 
would form links between the emigrants, their associations and their respective 
governments. It would also strive to tighten the connections between the Arab youth 
abroad and Arab countries by different means, such as the organization of trips.183 
Such an ambitious program certainly required extensive funding, which would have 
been difficult for a private body to obtain. It seems that the Arab National Bureau was 
directly submitted to the Syrian Foreign Office, reflecting the fact that it was primarily 
created to target foreign audiences in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.184 Its 
statutes declared that it set upon itself to “deliver authentic news to parties, 
associations, newspapers, Arabs at home and abroad and to sound the voice of the 
country to the English and French world in particularly and to all European nations in 
general.”185 The contemporary Italian orientalist Virginia Vacca observed: “The Office 
should be regarded as a quasi-public body, which in the long period of transition from 
the Mandate to independence, lends itself to actions that the government cannot carry 
out directly.”186 It is unclear whether ANBRI assumed its official function only after the 
Bludan conference in September 1937, or before. The rational for its unclear status 
however is evident: During the 1930s and especially after the outbreak of the Arab 
Revolt, which received substantial support from Syria, the Syrian government was 
interested in deniability. Because it was engaged in negotiations with France and 
counted on British support for independence, it sought to maintain good relations with 
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both European powers, while not renouncing its support for the more radical Arab 
nationalists. 
AMBRI not only sought to appeal to the Arab world, but also to a Western audience. 
Thus, AMBRI’s publications appeared in French, English and Arabic, dealing with the 
contemporary political issues in the Arab world, especially Zionism and the question of 
Alexandretta. One booklet defended the boycott of Jewish-Palestinian goods then in 
place in Syria, making the case that it was not harming the local economy. Another 
booklet titled ‘Dictatorship in the Holy Land’ contained an article by T. E. Richmond, 
the former council on Arab Affairs in Mandate Palestine, which, repeating a popular 
misconception among anti-Zionist Arabs, equated Zionism with Bolshevism. The works 
generally promoted a pan-Islamic and pan-Arab agenda. In the booklet ‘Panarab 
Developments’, the Syrian-American man of letters Amin Rihani recounted the recent 
history of the Arab nationalist movement and praised Ibn Saud as its leader. ANBRI 
also published a daily Arabic-language bulletin, which reported news from all the Arab 
countries and from American Arabs as well as comments by ANBRI, which were widely 
reported in the Syrian press.187 As noted above, ANBRI directly sought to influence 
public debates with regard to Middle Eastern issues in Europe. Thus, in 1938 it 
published a response to the book ‘Alerte en Syrie!’ directed at French readers by the 
then popular French writers and reporters Jérôme and Jean Tharaud. Allegedly, each 
parliamentarian had received a copy of it. The booklet, which carried the title ‘Syrie – 
La situation en Syrie après la conclusion du traité franco-syrien’ attacked the two 
French intellectual figures for inaccuracies and affirmed Syria’s loyalty to France to its 
readers.188 In line with its internationalization strategy, ANBRI sought the cooperation 
of public figures of anti-Zionist and pro-Arab convictions in France and England, like 
the Socialist politician Robert Longuet, a colleague of Shakib Arslan, or Lord 
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Sydenham and planned to open branches in the major cities and in the capitals of the 
leading nations.189 However, these grand plans never materialized. 
ANBRI propaganda included anti-Semitic material. Thus, ANBRI published a heavily 
anti-Semitic 31 page booklet with the title ‘Jews and Moslems in past and present – 
The Jews and Palestine and the verses of Jihad and the hadiths related to it’ (Arab. al-
Yahud wa al-Islam qadiman wa hadithan wa ayat al-jihad wa al-ahadith anhu). 
Mohammed Ali al-Taher’s Arab-Palestinian Information Office in Cairo for the Islamic 
World had first edited the booklet.190 Anti-Semitic material published by ANBRI even 
reached the French-ruled North African countries.191 ANBRI publications were also 
distributed with the help of the AHC’s propaganda network in the Middle East. The 
outlawing of the AHC by the Palestine mandate government in late September 1937, 
after the murder of a British official, and the subsequent dispersal of its followers had 
paradoxically helped the AHC to extend its propaganda network. Amin Husseini’s 
nephew Munif Husseini, whom the British had exiled from Palestine in the winter of 
1937, moved to Cairo after a short stop in Damascus. Munif, the former editor of the 
newspaper Al-Jammat al-Arabiya, was one of the most experienced propagandists of 
the Husseini clan who, through his publications, had played an instrumental role in 
promulgating the myth that one of the main goals of Zionism was to take over the 
Temple Mount. In Egypt, he supported the propaganda work of the existing pan-Arab 
and pan-Islamic circles by joining Taher’s Arab-Palestinian Information Office. 
However, he was soon arrested by the British authorities and exiled again, this time to 
the Seychelles, but released in 1939.192 Akram Zuaiter, Izzat Darwaza and Jamal 
Husseini, the leaders of the Central Committee of Jihad in Damascus also opened a 
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branch of the Arab-Palestinian Information Office in Damascus in 1938, which 
published propaganda manifests.193 The military defeat of the Arab Revolt in August 
1939 however terminated the AHC’s international propaganda effort. 
This defeat was brought about by a number of factors. From 1938 until 1939, the 
leaders of the Revolt lost their support from Italy, Syria and Saudi Arabia. With the 
negotiations with Britain progressing, in early 1938 Italy halted all help to Amin al-
Husseini. On the background of British endeavors to appease the Arabs, which would 
find expression in the 1939 White Paper, the Italians urged the Arab leadership to find 
a settlement with the British. The Easter Accords signed on April 16, 1938 cemented 
the Italian-British rapprochement. From this time forward, Mussolini and his Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo Ciano, would turn down all Amin Husseini’s pleas for 
support. This happened against the explicit advice of Italian career diplomats. In 
September 1937, the British had also discovered that Saudi Arabia, which they had 
long believed to be a loyal friend, was funneling money and weapons provided by Italy 
to the Arab Revolt. When the British later confronted Ibn Saud with these facts, he 
resolved to discontinue his support.194 Perhaps even more importantly, the AHC 
support base in Syria had also dried up by late 1938. The French had long ignored 
requests from the British to shut down the militant nationalists’ scene in Syria, which 
provided a safe haven for the organization of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. Quite 
possibly, they acted this way as a retaliation for the British having ignored similar 
support from Palestinian soil during the 1925-27 Arab Revolt in Syria.195 In early 1939 
however, the French started to act and cracked down on the militant Arab nationalist 
groups operating from Syria. Akram Zuaiter and Nabih al-Azma of the Palestine 
Defense Committee were arrested in March 1939 and two of their newspapers banned. 
The Committee was moreover discredited by the publication of evidence showing that 
Nabih al-Azma had been embezzling funds from the Palestine Defense Committee. 196 
The Mandate government in Palestine planted similar stories in local newspapers and 
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distributed these articles to Syrian Arab associations abroad.197 As a result, the Arab 
National Bureau also toned down its propaganda and the support network eventually 
collapsed.198 On the military front, the Arab Revolt was defeated through British 
counterinsurgency in Palestine.199 Still, the paramount goal of the Arab Revolt, a 
curtailing of Jewish immigration to the country, had been reached with the introduction 
of the White Paper.  
1.6 Conclusion 
Propaganda has been central feature of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine since the 
second decade of the 20th century. The propaganda conducted by the Arab national 
leadership in Palestine, in particular Amin al-Husseini and his SMC, sought to turn the 
conflict into an issue of international concern by appealing to all Arabs and Muslims. 
For this purpose, it framed the conflict as a religious war between Muslims and Jews, 
aided by the British, and popularized the conspiracy theory of a ‘Jewish war against 
Islam’, which had first become prominent after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. 
Thus, there was no Islamization of the conflict. Rather, the conflict had both a religious 
and a national dimension from the beginning. Through the organizations of 
conferences, the dispatching of delegations to Muslim countries and the distribution of 
propaganda, the Arab national leadership in Palestine sought to raise the profile and 
thereby secure the solidarity of Muslims from around the world. Already in the early 
1920s, Arab nationalists became aware of the need to influence both the government 
and public opinion in Britain. In this effort, Arab propagandists were aided by local 
sympathizers, many of whom harbored anti-Semitic prejudices. The outbreak of the 
Arab Revolt in 1936 led to a professionalization and intensification of the propaganda 
effort. The AHC established information offices in London, Cairo and Damascus and 
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dispatched delegations to the US, the UK and Eastern Europe. Christian, Western-
educated Arabs like Emil Ghoury were preferred for the outreach to Western and 
Christian audiences. During their trip to Eastern Europe, an AHC-delegation including 
Ghoury exploited the reigning anti-Semitic mood in the region. The AHC could also 
count on the professional services of the semi-official Arab National Bureau of Fakhri 
al-Barudi. Networks of Arab emigrants and pro-Arab sympathizers in Switzerland, 
Germany, France, the US and Britain supported this information campaign. In addition, 
it enjoyed the support of the two revisionist powers, Italy and Germany. Belief in 
overwhelming Jewish financial power and political influence pushed the Arab 
nationalists into further investing in propaganda after the Arab congress in Bludan in 
Syria. Despite the Arab Revolt’s military defeat, it achieved major political gains for the 
Arab national movement in Palestine. By successfully internationalizing the conflict and 
recruiting sympathizers from both the Arabo-Muslim world and the West, the 
propaganda campaign contributed to intimidating Britain into effectively scrapping the 
Balfour Declaration through the adoption of the White Paper. Thus, the propaganda 
campaign accompanying the Arab Revolt had created a template which would be taken 
up again after 1944 in the international campaign against the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Palestine.  
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2 Anti-Zionist Networks in the US before World War II 
This chapter studies the history of anti-Zionism in the US during the period from 1917-
1941. The period is delineated by two watershed moments. On November 2, 1917, 
Britain endorsed the goals of the Zionist movement to establish a Jewish national home 
in Palestine as its own policy. In December 1941 on the other hand, the US declared 
war on the Axis powers. Prior to the Balfour Declaration, Zionism had been a primarily 
intra-Jewish issue. The bulk of opposition to Zionism in the US had initially come from 
Reform Jews, who rejected Jewish nationalism based on their belief that Judaism was 
a religion and not a people. They were fearful that Zionism would hinder their 
integration into society, exposing them to the charge of dual loyalty. After the Balfour 
Declaration, however, Zionism became a topic of public debate for the broader society. 
Both the president and Congress had supported the Balfour Declaration, but there was 
significant opposition to Zionism from influential political circles and in the wider civil 
society. The State Department had been skeptical about Zionism since the Balfour 
Declaration and continued to follow its own agenda, often defying the wishes of the 
American political leadership. Anti-Zionist Reform Jews, mainstream Protestants of 
missionary stock as well as pan-Syrian Arab Americans stood at the forefront of anti-
Zionism, seeking to shape American foreign policy according to their ideas and 
establishing their own organization. Activist scholars, such as Philip Hitti or George 
Antonius, turned the university into another battlefield between Zionists and anti-
Zionists. Events in Palestine, foremost the 1929 riots and the outbreak of the Arab 
Revolt in 1936, but also the rise of National-Socialism and the persecution of the 
European Jews, affected the general public opinion and thus the fate of the anti-Zionist 
movement in the US. With US public opinion regularly shifting, the debate on Zionism 
would only be resolved after the war.  
2.1 The Missionary Network and the origins of Protestant anti-Zionism 
US foreign policy expertise regarding the Middle East was concentrated in a small 
circle, most of whom were united in their Protestant missionary background. Since 
1819, American Protestants had been involved in missionary work in the Middle East. 
Originally, there was a strong dispensationalist element within the missionary 
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enterprise. The religious movement of dispensationalism considered the conversion of 
the Jews to Christianity and their restoration to the Land of Israel as a precondition for 
the return of Jesus. However, the focus of the missionaries soon shifted from the Jews 
and the Muslims, where they made precious few converts, to the region’s native 
Christians.200 The original enterprise was replaced by a ‘mission civilisatrice’, which 
sought to achieve what the director of the American University of Beirut, Stephen 
Penrose, later called “a regeneration in the spirit of the people”.201 The promotion of 
Arabic printing and the establishment of elementary and secondary missionary 
schools, most notably the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut in 1864, were crucial in 
accomplishing this mission. The Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, which was 
renamed the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1920, came to be one of the 
intellectual centers of Arab nationalism.202  
Pro-Arab scholars and activists in the 1930s and 40s acknowledged the important role 
American Protestant missionaries played in the ushering in of an Arab revival, which 
led to the creation of pan-Arab nationalism. They looked back at this period with 
unequivocal pride, a feeling which united anti-Zionist Arabs and Americans. Thus, 
George Antonius wrote about this period: “The educational activities of the American 
missionaries in that early period had, among many virtues, one outstanding merit; they 
gave the pride of place to Arabic, and, once they had committed themselves to 
teaching in it, put their shoulders with vigour to the task of providing an adequate 
literature. In that, they were the pioneers; and because of that, the intellectual 
effervescence which marked the first stirrings of the Arab revival owes most to their 
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labours.”203 Harry R. Snyder, a longtime pro-Arab activist and trustee of the AUB,204 
wrote about this period in 1950: “Thus, by the middle of the 19th century, Americans 
had succeeded beyond Napoleon’s wildest dreams of conquering the Middle East, but 
the Americans conquered the area by the book and not by the sword.”205 Moreover, it 
is at the AUB, where “young Middle Easterners are trained to take control of their own 
countries and of their own destinies.”206 Only much later, American intellectual 
influence in the region through the so-called ‘Orientalists’ came to be perceived more 
critically by pro-Arab thinkers. 
The pro-Arab sentiment of the missionary circles contrasted sharply with their view of 
the Turks who were perceived to be uncivilized and warlike. This negative perception 
of the Turks is easily understandable in light of the persecution of Christian minorities, 
and in particular of the Armenians, to which the American missionaries in the Ottoman 
Empire were often eyewitnesses. Although the missionary circles were also fearful of 
Islamic extremism among Arabs, they retained a distinctively more positive outlook 
towards them. This was also partly due to the racial concepts of the time. Students at 
the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut were taught that the Arabs were part of the 
white race and superior to the Turks, although inferior to the Anglo-Saxons.207 Non-
Jewish Westerners in the Middle East and Palestine, including colonial officials and 
missionaries, also often appreciated Arabs for their naturalness and “putatively exotic 
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qualities”.208 This perception of the Arab stood in the tradition of the ‘noble savage’. 
Jews defied such an easy categorization. Rather, in Protestant missionary literature, 
Jews were often described as being materialistic, exploitative, nationalistic, bigoted or 
bolshevist, reflecting common anti-Semitic prejudices.209  These attitudes including the 
history of the Protestant presence in the region and Christian theological arguments 
against Jewish nationalism (to be discussed in more detail below) all influenced the 
Protestant missionary attitude towards Zionism negatively. It was therefore no surprise 
that the reaction towards the Balfour Declaration by the US Middle Eastern experts 
and the Protestant missionary circles, two groups which were to some extent 
congruent, was overly negative. They saw Zionism as an aggressive attempt by a 
minority to dominate the Arab majority in Palestine in connivance with an imperialistic 
power.  
After World War I, the Protestant missionary network in the Middle East soon became 
involved in US foreign policy during the peace negotiations. As noted above, these 
American missionaries tended to identify with the interests of Arab nationalism and as 
a result opposed the French presence in the region. Though less inimical than towards 
the French, they were also skeptical of British aspirations in the region.210 In 1918, 
Abraham Mitrie Ribhany, an Arab-American Unitarian minister in Boston published the 
book ‘America Save the Near East’. Therein he made the case for the creation of a 
Greater Syria under an American mandate.211 Rihbany was sympathetic to the Jewish 
people and recognized their historical rights in Palestine. Moreover, he recognized that 
Arab opposition to Zionism was “(…) not entirely free from racial and religious prejudice 
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(…)”. Anti-Semitism was a crucial factor in it: “The impetus which Zionism has received 
recently has greatly alarmed the Christians and Mohammedans of Palestine. In the 
first place, the universal prejudice against the Jews is shared by those sects in the 
East. The Jews ‘crucified Christ’ and ‘dealt treacherously with Mohammed.’ Until they 
abjure the sins of their fathers and are converted to the faith of their persecutors, the 
Jews will remain in disfavor.”212 Nevertheless, he was convinced that the project of a 
Jewish state lay in the interests of neither the Jews nor the Arabs. Palestine was unable 
to provide for a solution to the ‘Jewish Problem’, having the capacity to accept 3 to 4 
million new immigrants. He argued that the Muslims would never accept a Jewish state 
in Palestine. Despite Palestine’s Jewish past, the Muslims regarded Palestine as their 
land because their conquest of the land had turned them into its legal owners. 
Separating Palestine from Greater Syria and turning it into a Jewish state would be the 
source of future national and religious conflict. Instead, he advocated local self-
government for the Jews and constitutional safeguards.213 This was the intellectual 
climate that influenced the upcoming peace negotiations, which would decide the 
future of the former Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
At the stipulation of Howard Bliss, the President of the AUB, on March 20, 1919, the 
Paris Peace Conference formed a multilateral commission to investigate the conditions 
in Greater Syria and the will of its local people. Out of fear of finding popular opposition 
against the mandate order, both the British and the French withdrew from taking part 
in the Commission. The commission became known as the King-Crane commission 
after its two chairmen Charles Crane and Henry C. King, a professor at Oberlin 
College. They were assisted by Captain William Yale, Dr. George Montgomery and 
Albert Lybyer, a Middle East historian and a former professor at the Oberlin College.214 
Oberlin College was strongly connected with missionary enterprises in the Middle East. 
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Crane also served as a trustee for two missionary colleges in Constantinople.215 Thus, 
from the outset, Protestant missionary influence within the commission was 
substantial. The choice of Charles Crane as the head of the enquiry was also 
controversial due to his history of anti-Semitism. Hailing from a wealthy background, 
Charles Crane had no need to earn his livelihood and thus spent his life travelling the 
four corners of the world. Before becoming infatuated with the Arab world, his mind 
was caught by the cultural and spiritual riches of Russia. Possessing a strongly 
partisan character, he vigorously defended Czardom against accusations of anti-
Semitism after Cossack-led pogroms and became an enemy of Japan after the 
Russian-Japanese War. His animosity towards the Jews and the Japanese caused the 
State Department to cancel his appointment as the US ambassador to China in 1909. 
This seems only to have increased his negative feelings. He blamed New York’s 
German Jews, and in particular Jacob Schiff, for alienating Americans and Russians 
from each other because of anti-Jewish pogroms. At the latest by 1910, he became 
convinced there was a global Jewish-Freemasonry conspiracy and started distributing 
anti-Semitic literature among his colleagues. Moreover, he believed Jews to be disloyal 
to the US and ready to disregard its interests in favor of Jewish ones, as he wrote in a 
letter to President Wilson in 1913.216 All this should have raised serious questions 
regarding Crane’s aptitude to lead the commission. 
However, in 1919, these prejudices seem to have been the very reason pro-Arab 
circles within the State Department pushed for his selection. Upon its arrival in the 
Middle East, the investigation operated largely in the echo chamber of anti-Zionist 
British officers and American missionaries, with Crane noticing widespread fear among 
the Arabs against what he called “the modern, pushy Jew.”217 Unsurprisingly, the 
commission never seriously considered the realization of the Balfour Declaration, 
communicating after only a few days that its realization was not feasible. After just six 
weeks, the commission finished its investigation. Its report recommended that Greater 
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Syria be placed under the mandate of the US. The officials to administer this mandate 
would be drawn from the Protestant educational establishment in the region.218 The 
technical experts of the commission, William Yale and George Montgomery, however, 
dissented. In light of Palestine’s Jewish history, anti-Semitic persecution, Muslim 
fanaticism and the more advanced culture of the Jews vis-à-vis the Arabs they opposed 
the recommendations of the report.219 The findings of the King-Crane commission not 
only reflected the prejudices of its members, but also the tensions within Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points program. The principle of national self-determination, a notion which 
is never explicitly mentioned in the original, was not easy to fulfill when faced with the 
national demands of a majority and a minority. Like the Arab nationalists, the Zionists 
believed that the realization of a Jewish national home in Palestine, their ancient 
homeland, was in line with this principle, despite the fact that the majority of its future 
population was yet to immigrate. The King-Crane commission, being praised by anti-
Zionists to this day for its allegedly fair treatment of the issue, was no less ideological. 
It made the conscious decision to prioritize the Arab call for national self-determination 
over that of the numerous minorities within the area of Greater Syria, including that of 
the Jews. This did in fact contravene the letter of number twelve of the Fourteen Points, 
which maintained that “the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should 
be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
autonomous development.”220 Nor did the Fourteen Points ever suggest that questions 
of national sovereignty should be decided solely by the majority of the ruled population. 
Rather, it declared that regarding “(…) questions of sovereignty(,) the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined.” 221 This was a far stretch from ignoring 
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the interests of the war victors, as the King-Crane commission suggested. After all, it 
was hardly in the interest of the victor states to create a Greater Syria, the elites of 
which were overwhelmingly pro-Turkish, just as it had not been in the interest of the 
war victors to condone the establishment of a Greater Germany by allowing Austria 
and other majority German territories to join it. Still, the report had no immediate effect. 
Due to its hostility to French and English plans, the government decided to bury it. It 
would remain unpublished until 1922.222 Reflecting America’s isolationism post-war, 
the State Department acted with increasing indifference towards the Middle East.223 
Through their influence in elite circles, the missionary circles were henceforth less 
concerned with realizing their grand plans in the Middle East than with making sure 
that the US would not lend any support to the establishment of a Jewish national home 
in Palestine.  
2.2 Arab-American lobbying against Zionism 
American Jews and American Protestants were not the only groups who debated the 
future of the Middle East and Zionism. Quite early on, Arab-Americans also started to 
voice their opinions on the issue prominently. Nevertheless, Arab-American anti-
Zionist activism has remained understated for a long time by historians of the field.224 
The first one to speak out against Zionism was the American-Lebanese man of letters 
Amin Rihani, whose status among Arab-Americans has been compared to that of 
Justice Brandeis among American Jews.225 In September 1917, two months before the 
Balfour Declaration, Amin Rihani penned an article hostile to Zionism. Rihani, who had 
come to the US in 1898, had joined the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Disillusioned 
by their policy towards the Arabs, he had turned to Arab nationalism. In his article, 
Rihani enumerated several anti-Zionist arguments. Believing Zionism to be primarily a 
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religious movement, he feared the creation of a Jewish theocracy. Moreover, the Arabs 
would not tolerate Jewish domination. Lastly, echoing well-established anti-Zionist 
arguments from Reform Jews, Zionism would expose Jews to the accusation of dual 
allegiance.226 In 1917, Ramallah-born New York surgeon, Fuad Isa Shatara, and N.A. 
Katibah founded the Palestine Antizionism Society. It was among the organizers of an 
anti-Zionist rally on November 8, 1918 in Brooklyn. Besides the two founders, the 
young Lebanese Orientalist Philip Khoury Hitti made an appearance as a speaker at 
the event. The rally passed a resolution, describing the Arabs at risk of being 
dominated by “a race rendered more powerful and wealthy through contact with the 
western civilization thus applying might against right” and protesting the “artificial 
importation of Zionists flooding the country against its natural capacities and thus 
forcing an emigration of the rightful inhabitants.”227 Thus, by 1918, the anti-Zionist 
Arab-American movement had already found both its central arguments and its 
leaders. Rihani, Hitti and Shatara would shape the movement over the next two 
decades. 
The Arab Americans worked to influence the State Department and other influential 
elements of the foreign policy strata. Fuad Shatara of the Palestine Antizionism Society 
wrote two letters to Secretary of State Robert Lansing in November 1918 and February 
1919, arguing that Zionism was in contravention to Wilson’s Fourteen Points.228 In 
December 1918, Hitti and George Khairalla established the New Syria National 
League. The group lobbied for the establishment of a Greater Syria under American 
protection, reaching from the Sinai to the Euphrates.229 These groups intensified their 
activities in light of the upcoming peace conference in Paris. Shatara and Hitti reached 
out to John Huston Finley, the chief of the Red Cross Commission in Palestine, asking 
Finley not to detach Palestine from Greater Syria.230 During the conference, Hitti’s New 
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Syria National League also sent a telegram to Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
advocating an American protectorate over Syria. 231 Abraham Mitrie Ribhany, the 
author of ‘America save the Near East’ (cited above) and a member of both the 
Palestine Antizionism Society and the New Syria National League, attended the Paris 
conference. His presence allowed for direct lobbying with the American 
representatives in Paris and the members of the King-Crane commission. On March 
15, he sent a petition on behalf of the New Syria National League to the Americans, 
which was also read by commission chief Henry C. King. The petition made the case 
for an American mandate over a Greater Syria because it was the only European 
country which was “free from colonial and imperialistic interests.”232 Self-rule was not 
at an option at the moment, the petition further stated, “because of ages of oppression, 
the people cannot at present assume the responsibilities of complete self-
government.”233 In late May 1919, Ribhany also organized a meeting between the 
members of the King-Crane commission and a delegation of Palestinians and Syrians, 
which probably came from the US. They expressed their opposition to Zionism and 
again pressed for a US mandate over the region. In contrast to the pro-Syrian and anti-
Zionist groups, the Zionists neglected the King-Crane commission out of the false belief 
that it would not even depart for Syria.234  This was the climate from which the King-
Crane commission emerged and under which it operated. Given its own composition, 
background and exposure to lobbying efforts, it came as little surprise that the King-
Crane commission found exactly what it was supposed to, meaning popular support 
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among Syrians for an American mandate. While the shelving of the report came as a 
disappointment, its eventual publication in 1922 was a major success for the Arab-
American activists.235 Although it had no immediate effect, the King-Crane 
commission’s findings remain an orientation point for those who believe that the Zionist 
project is the source of the disorder and illiberalism which mark the history of the Middle 
East in the 20th century.  
The Paris peace conference had energized the pan-Syrian and anti-Zionist segment 
of the Arab-Americans. In the following years, they showed little activity generally. This 
reflected the general feeling among Arabs  that Zionism had not proved to be the 
danger they expected it to be; only few Jews immigrated to Palestine in the period up 
until 1929, hardly upturning the country’s demography. Occasionally, they would still 
participate in the foreign policy debates. On April 21, 1922 Fuad Shatara and the New 
York attorney Selim Totah testified alongside anti-Zionist Jews in front of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs with regard to the Lodge-Fish resolution.236 In 1921, the 
Palestinian National League, the successor organization of the Palestine Antizionism 
Society, also published the book ‘The Case against Zionism’, a collection of anti-Zionist 
articles by Jewish and Arab-American thinkers. The book ended with a call for 
“Palestine not be separated from her neighboring sister states.”237 The case of the 
Arab-Americans was still overwhelmingly pan-Syrian and not in favor of an 
independent Arab Palestinian state. This focus would only change much later. 
2.3 The State Department and Zionism 
The Balfour Declaration was welcomed by the political leadership of the US, including 
both the president and Congress, but the State Department reacted with skepticism to 
it. Secretary of State Robert Lansing advised Wilson not to endorse it, citing as reasons 
opposition from the Turks and the dividedness among the Jews themselves on the 
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issue of Zionism.238 Moreover, in a letter written in December 1917, Lansing warned 
that “many Christian sects and individuals would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy 
Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ.”239 In 
their assessment of the situation, the State Department and the Protestant missionary 
circles overlapped. State Department correspondence of the time also reveals the 
existence of anti-Semitism within its ranks. Many believed that the Zionists were agents 
of Bolshevism, a theory which was also inspired by the publication and distribution of 
the English version of the ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ after World War I.240 
The spread of such conspiracy theories, which experienced mounting popularity during 
these years, strengthened the anti-Zionist case. To those already disposed towards 
anti-Semitism, Zionism appeared to be an international Jewish conspiracy. Thus, the 
contradictory claims that the Jews sought to establish a theocracy in Palestine and that 
they were communist agents, were often levelled at Zionism simultaneously.241 US 
support for Zionism was further undermined by a generally isolationist climate under 
the three republican presidents who followed Wilson, which limited US foreign 
involvement. 
In the early 1920s, the State Department thus embarked on a course of active 
opposition to Zionism. In a series of internal memorandums drafted in 1922, NEA chief 
Allan W. Dulles and Secretary of State Charles Hughes committed the State 
Department to a policy of non-intervention in Palestine’s affairs and a rejection of 
Zionist demands. This tendency became obvious during the draft negotiations for the 
Anglo-American Treaty on Palestine. Against British wishes and seeming US interests 
as well, the State Department sought to restrict US rights to intercede with the British 
mandate in Palestine. This was made in order to foreclose US involvement in the 
country. In addition, it requested the excision of the preamble, citing the Balfour 
                                             
238 Steven L. Spiegel, “Religious Components of U.S. Middle East Policy,” Journal of 
International Affairs 36, no. 2 (1982): 235. 
239 Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, 259. 
240 Cohen, The Year After the Riots, 19–20. 
241 Naomi W. Cohen, The Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948, 1st Printing edition 
(Hanover: Brandeis, 2003), 64–75. 
 
86 
 
Declaration. Moreover, US interests were narrowly defined as those of the missionary 
educational establishment and business interests in the Middle East, not as those of 
the supporters of Zionism.242 Already at that time it became clear that the State 
Department’s stance toward Zionism was significantly at odds with that of Congress.  
The political organs of the US maintained their support for Zionism. On September 11, 
1922, Congress had accepted a joint resolution endorsing the Balfour declaration, 
which came to be known as the Lodge-Fish resolution after its initiators. The 
resolution’s language was unequivocal: “Resolved by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, and that the Holy places and religious buildings and sites in 
Palestine shall be adequately protected.”243 The State Department however sought to 
downplay the legal bindingness of the resolution in its aftermath.244 Eventually, the 
British prevailed in including the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the preamble 
of the Anglo-American Treaty on Palestine of 1924. Moreover, Article 7 of the treaty 
afforded the US the right to intercede with the British in the case of a change of the 
Mandate treaty: “Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any 
modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate, as recited above, unless 
such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.”245 This article 
remained an issue of contention. In the opinion of those who advocated a greater US 
involvement in Palestine, the US had herewith secured a right to intervene with Britain’s 
Palestine policy. This was one of the principal reasons that both Zionists and anti-
Zionists regarded the US as a battleground on which to decide the future of Palestine. 
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However, the State Department was generally reticent to apply this right, or even 
acknowledge its existence. 
The State Department was convinced that support for Zionism was detrimental to US 
interests in the region. It was apprised on the situation in Palestine through its Consul 
in Jerusalem, who tended to have strong opinions on the relevant issues and whose 
competence was not always beyond doubt. Those who filled the position were usually 
not well disposed towards Zionism and influenced by the ‘Red Scare’. Reverend Otis 
Glazebrook, who officiated in Jerusalem since 1914, favored the conservation of the 
Ottoman Empire under an American mandate and rejected Zionism. His stance had 
influenced the findings of the King-Crane commission.246 In his reports to Washington, 
Glazebrook showed little understanding of intra-Zionist dynamics. Probably influenced 
by the spread of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories after World War I, he believed the 
moderate Zionist Organization to be a violent, radical Jewish group, hostile to 
Christianity. A report by his successor Addison E. Southard equally described Eastern 
European Jewish immigrants as “potential troublemakers of Bolshevist tendencies.”247 
His successor George C. Cobb showed a more impartial attitude towards Zionism.248 
However, charges that the Zionists were tied to Bolshevism resurfaced with Paul 
Knabenshue, who acted as consul from 1928 until 1932. In 1929, Arab riots erupted in 
Palestine and culminated in the massacres of the ancient Orthodox Jewish 
communities in Hebron and Safed. In total, more than 400 Jews were killed or 
wounded. The State Department was generally unsympathetic to the Jewish victims of 
the riots. In his reports, Knabenshue ignored the incitement of the SMC and put the 
blame squarely on the shoulders of the Zionist ‘provocateurs’. Moreover, he was of the 
opinion that the Jews possessed no rights at the Western Wall.249 American reticence 
to appear pro-Zionist was also motivated by the fear that such an impression would 
compromise US interests in the region, which were never defined as including the 
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interests of American Jews. Thus, Knabenshue closely monitored Arabic newspapers, 
highlighting those articles which were critical of US-Zionist collaboration in his 
correspondence with Washington.250 The anti-Zionist stance of the State Department 
was strengthened by the reports authored by the Shaw and the Hope-Simpson 
commissions, which were published in 1930. These reports investigated the reasons 
behind the riots. Both ascribed the responsibility for the riots largely to the Zionist policy 
in Palestine. They were especially critical towards the effects of the acquisition of Arab 
land and Jewish immigration. The findings therefore recommended a revision of the 
British policy towards Zionism, suggesting limiting Jewish land acquisition and 
immigration.251 These suggestions were in line with the thinking in the State 
Department. The riots in Palestine also had a great effect on public opinion towards 
Zionism in the US. 
2.4 The 1929 riots and the ascendancy of anti-Zionism 
Anti-Zionism in the US gained traction after the riots in Palestine of 1929, which had 
culminated in the massacres of Orthodox Jewish communities in Hebron and Safed. 
This was an unexpected outcome, as six American Jews were among the victims of 
the massacre. Initial public outrage was, however, short-lasted and soon the critics of 
Zionism gained the upper hand. They felt that the events vindicated their arguments 
about the impracticability of the Zionist enterprise.252 The Arab-American activists 
sought to present the violence, which was largely directed at Orthodox Jews, as an 
unfortunate, but understandable reaction to Zionism and to the British support for it. In 
this effort, the Palestinian National League joined hands with two other Arab-American 
organizations, the New Syria Party and the American branch of the Islamist Young 
Men’s Moslem Association. In August 1929, the alliance protested the press coverage 
of the riots. Moreover, a delegation of the three groups, including Amin Rihani and 
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Peter S. George, met with Secretary of State Henry Stimson and the British 
ambassador Esme Howard to press their view that Zionism was responsible for the 
violence. In contrast to the Arab national leadership in Palestine, they emphasized that 
this was a “conflict between the Arab nationalism of the native majority and the Zionism 
of a small minority of foreign Jews,” which had nothing to do with religion.253 However, 
the sincerity of these statements was questionable. The riots had been primarily 
motivated by the warning of a takeover of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem by the 
Jews, as detailed in Chapter One. Moreover, most of the victims were Orthodox Jews 
from the Old Yishuv; that is, Jews who had lived in Ottoman Palestine prior to the first 
wave of Eastern European Jewish immigration in the 1880s. 
In December 1929, Arab-Americans established another group, the Friends of 
Palestine Arabs in the New York office of Selim Totah to launch a propaganda 
campaign against Zionism. Amin Rihani acted as one of the organization’s chief 
propagandists, touring the United States in 1929 and 1930. Appealing to the then 
preponderant isolationist feeling, he warned in an article in the progressive newspaper 
the Nation in October 1929 that the US might be drawn into a Pan-Islamic revolt 
provoked by the Zionists. Rihani also debated with Zionist activists like Jacob de Haas 
on several occasions. Witnesses to the debates noted that de Haas was no match for 
the gifted orator Rihani who, at one point, called for the burning of the Balfour 
Declaration. One observer remarked that she had never seen “anti-Semitism in mass” 
like during such a debate.254 The Arab-American anti-Zionist campaign was seconded 
by the political leadership of the Arabs in Palestine. In early January of 1930, the SMC 
and the Arab Executive sent two delegations to the US and to Britain to promote the 
Arab Cause. The delegation to the US consisted of the Syrian pan-Islamic activist 
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Shakib Arslan, his brother Adel Arslan, Issa Bandak and three other members. In the 
US, the delegation met with the State Department, arguing that only the abolition of 
the Balfour Declaration could lead to a reconciliation between Jews and Arabs. The 
delegation also appealed to the Arab-Americans to “emulate the American Jews” by 
giving donations to the SMC. However, the undertaking was reportedly a financial 
disaster.255 This may explain why there were no further Arab delegations from 
Palestine during the next seven years. 
In the post-1929 debate, many progressive and liberal newspapers, which had 
welcomed the Balfour Declaration in 1917, switched their allegiance and joined the 
anti-Zionist camp. The most famous example is that of journalist Vincent Sheean, who, 
after travelling to Palestine with the support of the Zionist Organization of America 
(ZOA), became an anti-Zionist activist. According to his own account, a meeting with 
George Antonius caused the change of opinion. The loss of the liberal press, which 
had been a traditional ally to Jewish causes, was a bitter setback for the Zionist 
movement in America.256 The anti-Zionist cause was further bolstered by the non-
dispensationalist Protestant media. The non-denominational Protestant newspaper 
Christian Century was one of the main forums to discuss contemporary issues affecting 
mainline Protestantism, including Zionism in the period from the 1920s until the 40s.257 
Its editorial attitude towards Zionism tended to be negative and opposition to Zionism 
was often expressed in unequivocal terms. This was also the case after the 1929 riots. 
Harvard philosophy professor William E. Hocking, one of the most prolific anti-Zionist 
writers of the time, put the blame for the explosion of violence squarely on the Jews. 
He attacked the foundation of Zionism by questioning the historical Jewish identity of 
the Land of Israel: “Palestine does not belong to the Jews. It does not belong to them 
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on historical grounds. They had full possession of it for less than five hundred years. 
The Jews were not driven out of Palestine by the destruction of Jerusalem and Titus. 
Their dispersion for several hundred years had been a voluntary diaspora.”258 These 
were of course questionable historical assertions, which ignored the fact that Palestine 
had been under the rule of foreign empires for most of the time since the Roman 
conquest, and that the Jews could hardly be considered to have exerted full control 
over their country or their destiny. However, such claims were reflective of a larger 
Protestant bias against Zionism. In the wake of the riots, the British Colonial Office 
decided to limit Jewish immigration and land sales.259 Another author of the Christian 
Century welcomed this decision, which in its view had put an end to the Balfour 
Declaration, “a mischievous and ambiguous promise”, which had infringed on the rights 
of the non-Jewish inhabitants of the country.260 The reaction to the pogroms of 1929 
proved that anti-Zionism had strong support in many US circles.  
The 1929 riots met the Zionists in a moment of weakness. The membership of the 
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) had been decreasing constantly during the 
1920s. Its membership only numbered 18’000 in 1929, a mere tenth of the membership 
number in 1919.261 The Zionists and the non-Zionists, the latter being Jewish groups 
who were committed to building a Jewish home in Palestine while not sharing Zionist 
ideology, were unwilling and unable to mount an effective counter measure, with the 
result that American Zionism was significantly weakened.262 Moreover, the Zionists 
themselves were divided on the right strategy to take. Weizmann’s unwavering loyalty 
to England forced his American colleagues to distinguish between the anti-Zionist 
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mandatory government and the supposedly friendly British government, an analysis 
which was difficult to communicate to the public.263 To further complicate the matter, 
the initiative of Judah Magnes led to confusion among the supporters of Zionism. 
Magnes, the Chancellor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, publicly called for a 
binational state in November 1929. Without a mandate from the Jewish Agency, he 
entered into negotiations with the Mufti, thereby angering the Zionist leadership.264 
Pierre van Passen, a famous journalist and sympathizer of Zionism, summarized the 
American Zionists’ failure in the following observations: “We saw before our very eyes 
how the great wave of moral indignation which swept America (…) was not seized and 
held and that instead public opinion was dangerously allowed to swing (…) in a totally 
different direction.”265 Another Zionist activist, Emanuel Neumann of the Zionist 
Organization of America, wrote bitterly in 1932: “In the end, we who were the victims 
of an organized and murderous assault [that is, the recent Arab riots], found ourselves 
depicted as the aggressors. To add to our distress, it was the liberals who took the 
lead in placing such a construction upon the situation. We were betrayed, as it were, 
in the house of our friends.”266 Would they be better prepared next time? 
The debate in 1929 clearly showed that anti-Zionism was a popular conviction among 
non-evangelical, mainline Protestants. Protestant anti-Zionism was a complex 
phenomenon with several causes. Since the early 19th century, the teachings of 
Dispensationalism, which originated in England, had gained popularity in the US and 
permeated different denominations. Dispensationalism rejected the notion that 
Christendom, the ‘new Israel’ had replaced the Jews or ‘the old Israel’ as God’s chosen 
people. In dispensationalist theology, both peoples had to fulfill their distinctive 
purposes.267 Dispensationalism thus affirmed Jewish peoplehood and preached the 
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millenarian belief of a return of the Jews to the Land of Israel. This concept was alien 
to mainline Protestants. A Christian Century article titled ‘What is Palestine’s future?’ 
which appeared in 1929 argued against a literal reading of the biblical sources in favor 
of Jewish nationhood. It stated, “it is the conviction of most modern biblical scholars 
that the Old Testament contains no anticipation of the restoration of Israel to its ancient 
homeland which can apply to the Jewish people in the present age.”268 Mainline 
Protestantism’s rejection of dispensationalism seems to have affected their stance 
towards a Jewish collective identity – or vice versa. The Christian Century criticized 
the American Jewish community for conserving their culture, for their intra-group 
solidarity and for their particularistic religion, which they contrasted with Christianity’s 
universalistic message. As Fishman notes, this critique was reserved exclusively for 
the Jews, while other minority communities in the US, like Black Americans, were not 
subjected to it, thus revealing a double standard. By maintaining the traits of their 
Jewish identity, the Christian Century theorized that the Jews were fostering Anti-
Semitism. Consequently, it warned menacingly that the Protestant “spirit of tolerance” 
may also eventually come to an end.269 In line with some Reform Rabbis, many 
mainline Protestants claimed that there was no Jewish people and that the Jews were 
solely defined by their adherence to Judaism. Following this thought to its logical 
conclusion, there was no basis for Jewish nationalism, meaning Zionism. 
The rejection of Jewish nationalism was grounded in traditional theological reflections. 
In May 1933, no more than two months after the National Socialists had come to power 
in Germany, the article ‘Jews and Jesus’ appeared in the Christian Century. Its author 
was Charles C. Morrison, the journal’s editor. The article was a damning critique of 
Jewish nationalism and drew clear parallels between biblical times and the present day 
of 1933. Although he opined that individual Jews were not responsible for the death of 
Jesus, Jewish leadership was. It had crucified Jesus because his message of 
universalism threatened their nationalism and power. “It was nationalism that crucified 
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Jesus,” the article concluded.270 This represented an update of the Christian deicide 
view. By crucifying Jesus, Jews had not only forfeited their right to be God’s people, 
but also their claim to the Land of Israel. This marked a clear transition from Christian 
anti-Semitism to Christian anti-Zionism. Such opposition to Jewish nationalism was 
expressed in increasingly vitriolic and hysteric terms. In 1945, the magazine compared 
National-Socialism to Judaism, suggesting that both shared “an ideology of a unique 
and privileged race”, provoking criticism from its readers.271 Such shrill, 
disproportionate criticism of Jewish nationalism suggests that a deeper, hostile attitude 
towards Jews lay at the heart of much Protestant critique. 
Opposition to Zionism had a strong voice, but not the only one within US mainline 
Protestantism during the period discussed here. Because of their failure to adequately 
respond to the 1929 riots in Palestine and the loss of liberal sympathy, American 
Zionists realized the need to build alliances with Christian Zionists. The American 
Zionist official Emanuel Neuman was instrumental in establishing the American 
Palestine Committee in 1932. Another group, the Pro-Palestine Federation, had 
already been formed in 1930 and assembled a list of prominent Christian supporters 
of Zionism. It defined its task as mainstreaming Zionism among non-evangelical 
Protestants also. Recruiting Christian public opinion to influence the Roosevelt 
government was more imperative than ever – especially after 1936: Only the US 
government possessed the capacity to pressure Britain to abandon its restrictive 
immigration quotas and thus save European Jewry from its increasing predicament. 
However, the majority of the Zionist leaders were liberals or even, like the rabbi 
Stephen Wise, socialists. They therefore unanimously supported the election of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. This partisanship robbed the Zionists of leverage to 
influence the new administration in a pro-Zionist direction. Moreover, there are 
indications that the Zionists neglected Christian Zionists after Roosevelt’s election and 
showed no inclination to support them meaningfully. The ZOA officials also did not get 
                                             
270 Charles C. Morrison, “Jews and Jesus,” Christian Century, May 3, 1933, 582–84; 
cited in Carenen, The Fervent Embrace, 9. 
271 “Untitled,” Christian Century, June 13, 1945, 702; cited in Fishman, American 
Protestantism and a Jewish State, 37. 
 
95 
 
along with the Jewish secretary of the Pro-Palestine Federation. This all contributed to 
the political failure of American Zionism in this decade.272 Still, despite the Zionists’ 
many strategic and organizational mistakes, Zionism gained new supporters during the 
1930s. Persecution of Jewry by Nazi-Germany pushed many Protestants to adopt a 
more pro-Jewish stance in the following years, especially after the horrors of the 
Holocaust became known to the American public. Even some committed anti-Semites 
now softened their opinions about Jews. 
Despite the wave of anti-Semitic horrors, opposition against Zionism remained strong 
among mainline Protestants throughout the 1930s and 40s. The anti-Zionist American 
Council for Judaism led by Elmer Berger worked to co-opt this stance. In 1944, it sent 
an editorial, which drew attention to the existence of anti-Zionist Jews and argued that 
Zionism stood in contrast to American Judaism, to several hundred Christian 
clergymen and educators. Their responses, at least those which affirmed the content 
of the editorial, were then published in the pamphlet ‘Christian opinion on Jewish 
Nationalism and a Jewish State’.273 Criticism of Zionism continued to appear not only 
in the Christian Century, but in other Protestant newspapers as well. Although there 
were many Zionists within the church, at no point did Christian Zionism dominate the 
debate and no official church body ever endorsed a Zionist position. In general, the 
Protestant press was also markedly less enthusiastic about Israel than the secular 
press.274 Some mainline Protestants opposed to Zionism joined Virginia Gildersleeve 
and Kermit Roosevelt’s Committee for Justice and Peace in Palestine, which was 
established in 1948.275 Protestant anti-Zionists proved to be among the fiercest 
opponents of the establishment of a Jewish state until the establishment of Israel and 
even thereafter, as will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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2.5 George Antonius, Philip Hitti and the American Campus 
In the 1930s, anti-Zionist activists had a firm base at the country’s universities. The 
world of universities was dominated by the same Protestant elites who staffed the State 
Department. These elites were often wary of the Jewish newcomers. Unsurprisingly, 
universities proved to be fertile soil for anti-Zionist and pro-Arab sentiments. Many of 
the high profile non-Arab anti-Zionist activists, like William Hocking or Virginia 
Gildersleeve, occupied leading positions in institutes of higher learning. Not 
incidentally, both were accused at some point of harboring pro-German and pro-fascist 
sympathies.276 This atmosphere and the rise of the nascent field of Middle Eastern 
studies provided an excellent opportunity for the politically-minded, young, ambitious 
scholars Philipp Hitti and George Antonius to advance their careers and to share their 
view points with colleagues and students.  
George Antonius is still remembered today as the author of the seminal ‘The Arab 
Awakening’, the first comprehensive work on the history of Arab nationalism. Antonius 
was born to Christian Orthodox parents in Lebanon in 1891 and had worked as a public 
servant for the British administration’s Department of Education in Palestine. Until his 
early death in 1941, he was one of the most energetic and prolific pro-Arab 
propagandists, enjoying a large following in England and the US. Since at least 1930, 
George Antonius was sponsored by Charles Crane.277 Antonius thanked him by putting 
the dedication “To Charles R. Crane, aptly nicknamed Harun al-Rashid, affectionately” 
at the front of his main work ‘The Arab Awakening’. 278 The two had probably met first 
at one of the dinner parties which George Antonius and his wife regularly hosted for 
prominent members of the Jerusalem society in the early 1920s, thus laying the 
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foundation for a lasting cooperation.279 Given their close relationship, it is worth it to 
take a closer look at Crane’s activities since his participation in the King-Crane 
commission in 1919. During the following years, Crane widely traveled the Arab world, 
where he was often received as a hero. At one point, he was suspected of financing 
an insurrection against French rule in Syria. Crane saw the Zionist project in Palestine 
within the context of the global Jewish conspiracy, which, he believed, had fought a 
campaign against religion for 2000 years. Such views easily dovetailed with the 
conspiracy theory of a ‘Jewish war against Islam’. In 1931, Crane met with the Saudi 
King, intimating to him that the Jews did in fact control Soviet Russia. The Saudi ruler 
responded that he entertained similar ideas. To fight this alleged Jewish conspiracy, 
Crane envisaged an alliance between Islam and Catholicism. To this end, he set up a 
Muslim Committee in Cairo in 1933 and met with Cardinal Pacelli, the future Pope Pius 
XII, who expressed interest in the idea. He also sought to include the Mufti whom he 
had met in the same year in the alliance.280 According to the Israeli historian Menahem 
Kaufmann, these schemes were pursued until 1934, with his protégé George Antonius 
acting as the Mufti’s liaison in the negotiations with the Catholic Church.281 In contrast 
to the man who financed him, George Antonius strove to maintain an academic and 
neutral outlook. 
Antonius enjoyed excellent relations with American diplomats and institutions. Thus, 
Antonius served as a source and expert on the Arab world and the Palestinian Arab 
leadership for the State Department’s Near East Division.282 He also maintained 
contact with anti-Zionist activists in the US, such as the famous war reporter Vincent 
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Sheean. Sheean credited George Antonius for his own conversion to anti-Zionism after 
visiting him on a tour to Palestine. Sheean subsequently introduced Antonius to 
Charles Merz, a journalist for the New York Times.283 In 1930, George Antonius 
received a permanent stipend from Crane’s Institute of Current World Affairs in New 
York, which allowed him to dedicate the rest of his life to the cause of Arab nationalism 
and to write the history of the movement, an idea which Charles Crane had 
suggested.284 In 1930, Crane invited Antonius to visit the US. In March, he was 
received by NEA chief Wallace Murray.285 During his stay, Antonius contemplated 
starting a lecture tour of US campuses with the support of Princeton professor Philip 
Hitti, which however did not materialize.286 Nevertheless, Hitti would certainly have 
been the right choice to help him promote pro-Arab narratives at the American campus. 
The Orientalist Philip Hitti was the paragon of an activist scholar. Both through his 
scholarly work and his political activities, he helped to raise awareness for Arab cultural 
achievements and promote the Arab cause. Born in Lebanon in 1886 to a Maronite 
family, he was a scion of the educational system established by American Protestants. 
After graduating from the Syrian Protestant College in 1908, he moved to the US, 
where he received a PhD from Columbia University in 1915. Subsequently, he returned 
to Lebanon to teach Oriental history at the Syrian Protestant College.287 Since 1917, 
Hitti had been involved in anti-Zionist Arab-American groups, as mentioned above.288 
In 1926, Philipp Hitti was chosen to chair the new Department of Oriental Languages 
and Literatures at Princeton University. In this function, he criticized what was in his 
opinion a focus of Oriental departments on Hebrew studies and ancient history at the 
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expense of Arabic and Islamic Studies. 289 “The more I became aware or this general 
blind spot in the American curriculum the more I was determined to find a remedy,” 
Hitti wrote in his unpublished autobiography.290 He ascribed American indifference 
towards the Middle East to a deep-rooted enmity for Islam in American culture: 
“Americans had inherited from Europe  a measure of political and religious prejudice 
against Islam, the only medieval religion which vied with Christianity and conquered it 
on all fronts: western Asia, western Europe, northern Africa, and south-western 
Europe.291 Such statements suggest that Hitti’s unease over the presence of Hebrew 
studies and ancient history at Oriental departments  sprang not only from academic 
considerations, but had its source rather in his world view. Both Hebrew studies and 
biblical archeology had little to say about the Arabs, but confirmed the Jewish historical 
memory, underlining their rootedness in Palestine. To the dismay of anti-Zionists, 
Bible-versed Americans tended to consider the Jews to be the “descendants (and 
rightful heirs) of the ancient biblical occupants of Palestine.”292 This ran counter to the 
anti-Zionist historical narrative, epitomized by Hitti, which portrayed and continues to 
portray the Jews as outsiders with a limited connection to the Land of Israel. Hitti’s 
efforts to push the field of Oriental studies in a different direction and create a counter 
narrative were crowned with success. Princeton significantly extended its Arabic 
studies program with its courses underlining “the significance of Arabia as the probable 
cradle of the Semites, and the importance of the Arabians as representatives of the 
Semitic race.”293 Hitti also began to offer courses in Arab history, although he had never 
received any training in the field. Many students from abroad would study under Hitti. 
His first PhD student was the eminent Syrian intellectual and politician Constantine K. 
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Zurayk, one of the most influential thinkers of Arab nationalism.294 Hitti’s scholarship 
marked nothing less than a paradigm shift in Oriental studies. 
 Antonius did not visit the US again until five years later in 1935. Living on Crane’s 
stipend, he sought to maintain the appearance of a neutral observer during this period. 
Thus, he refrained from participating in discussions on the Arab-Jewish conflict in 
Palestine on the side of the Arabs. This changed in 1935, when he planned to conduct 
a lecture tour of US and Canadian universities, which also relied on the Protestant anti-
Zionist network. During his preparations, Antonius was contacted by William E. 
Hocking to help draft a lecture on the situation in Palestine from the Arab point of 
view.295 His tour, which started in March, included lectures at Princeton, Harvard, the 
University of Chicago and the Brookings Institute as well as an informal meeting at the 
Council of Foreign Relations. To his audience, he was presented as a renowned 
scholar of the Middle East rather than as a partisan activist. 296 In Princeton, Antonius 
called for the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration and a redefinition of the mandate 
in the sense that its mission be defined as stopping Zionism and promoting the 
independence of Palestine, which was almost exactly the opposite of its original aim. 
Antonius also visited Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto. During the lecture tour, Antonius 
met with leading figures form the world of journalism and politics as well as old friends 
like Charles Merz from the New York Times, who read a first draft of his ‘The Arab 
Awakening’ and found it to be to his liking. His contacts at the State Department even 
arranged for a meeting with President Roosevelt, which took place on May 1, 1935. 
His stay in the US was not dedicated solely to the dissemination of information, but 
also to research for his upcoming book. Through NEA chief, Wallace Murray, Antonius 
gained access to confidential material regarding the subject matter.297 Already then, it 
was clear that Antonius had never planned for ‘The Arab Awakening’ to be a purely 
scholarly work. In letters to his American friends, he let them know that it was also 
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meant to serve the Arab Cause.298 In this sense, it would fulfill its mission beyond all 
expectations. 
Impressed with the success of his 1935 tour, Antonius suggested in a letter to his 
sponsor, Crane’s Institute of Current World Affairs, that he should continue the pro-
Arab campaign in the US, a suggestion Charles Crane took up readily. The first step 
was to provide George Antonius with a regular academic position at a US university. 
An opportunity arrived in May 1936 when Richard Gottheil, professor for Semitic 
languages at Columbia University and a prominent Zionist leader, died. Charles Crane 
proposed Antonius for filling the vacant position. While not hiring him on a permanent 
basis, the university agreed to employ Antonius as a guest lecturer for the period of 
one year. This led to a public outcry. Richard Gottheil’s widow Emma called Antonius  
an anti-Semite and a propagandist, accusing him of being responsible for inciting 
violence against Jewish civilians in Palestine. Jewish leaders informed Columbia on 
Antonius’ close connection to the Mufti. They were seconded by scholars like 
professors William F. Albright and James Montgomery, who asserted that Antonius 
was a propagandist and lacked adequate academic education. The campaign led to 
the cancellation of Antonius’ appointment, with Columbia accusing Crane and his 
Institute of Current World Affairs of having deceived them regarding Antonius’ aptitude 
for the post. The latter defended themselves by pointing to academics and institutions 
which supported Antonius’ appointment, like the AUB.299 George Antonius would never 
hold an academic position. 
In March 1937, George Antonius visited Rome and England. From there, he travelled 
to Canada and the United States, where he stayed for two months, giving lectures and 
attending numerous meetings. Despite his recent scandal, he also visited Columbia 
University, where he repeatedly met with faculty members of the Department of 
History. In June 1937, he left for England after securing a book deal for his upcoming 
publication ‘The Arab Awakening’.300 George Antonius would travel to the US another 
two times until 1939, the year of Charles Crane’s death. However, with the Mufti fleeing 
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to Berlin and openly associating himself with the Axis powers, George Antonius was 
discredited. On the urging of the State Department, the Institute of Current World 
Affairs cancelled its stipend shortly before Antonius’ death in 1942.301 Like in the case 
of Philip Hitti, the background to Antonius’ work is nowadays largely forgotten or 
ignored, while his ‘The Arab Awakening’ has become one of the founding texts of the 
modern field of Middle Eastern studies.  
2.6 The Society of the ‘American Friends of the Arabs’ 
While Arab-Americans had established their first anti-Zionist groups immediately after 
the Balfour Declaration, Protestant anti-Zionism remained unorganized until the late 
1930s. In early 1937, former AUB professor Harry Roscoe Snyder (1906-1988) and 
the Oriental scholar Elihu Grant decided to establish an informal association that would 
be friendly to the Arab Cause and opposed to Zionism. The organization, which 
originally had no name, assumed the name ‘American Friends of the Arabs’ (AFA) in 
1938. Snyder, Grant and the philosopher William E. Hocking, the author of several anti-
Zionist articles in the Protestant press, as mentioned above, formed the executive 
board. From the beginning, Fuad Shatara and Habib Katibah from the Arab National 
League (ANL) were also intimately involved in the endeavor. During its two-year 
existence, the organization sought to coordinate the anti-Zionist efforts with the Arab 
National League and lobby the administration against taking sides with the Zionist 
cause. The organization helped to build a long-lived network of opponents of Zionism, 
which would outlast the creation of Israel in 1948. 
The leading figure behind the organization was Harry Snyder, a young activist, who 
had served as Methodist minister from 1925 until 1927 and as an adjunct professor at 
the AUB from 1927 until 1929.302 Of the two, Elihu Grant, a well-known biblical scholar 
and archeologist, was certainly the more prominent, although it was Snyder who largely 
directed the business of the nascent organization. Both Snyder and Grant shared a 
Methodist missionary background. After his ordination as a Methodist priest in 1900, 
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Grant went to the Ottoman Empire to work as a superintendent at the American Friends 
School in Ramallah and Jerusalem from 1901 until 1904.303 Here he met the young 
Khalil Totah, whose career he encouraged, becoming his mentor. Khalil Totah would 
also later become the director of the American Friends School in Ramallah and upon 
his return to the US, a pro-Arab activist for the Institute of Arab American Affairs, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Four.304 Upon his return to the US in 1904, Grant taught 
biblical literature first at Smith College and then from 1917 at Haverford college until 
his retirement in 1937. In 1928, he returned to Palestine to conduct excavations in Beit 
Shemesh. However, Grant’s interest in the Middle East transcended scholarly interest 
and he became an advocate for Arab interests, in particular in Palestine.305 
In the beginning, the form of the new group was unclear. The question whether to form 
a small elite group or an organization with a more public appeal stood at the center of 
the deliberations between the group’s core members:  Snyder, Grant and the ANL’s 
Fuad Shatara.306 William Hocking also raised concerns about the character of the 
group, expressing that it was “neither necessary nor desirable that a pro-Arab 
propaganda group should be formed; such a group would antagonize and be 
antagonized.”307 Instead, he advocated a non-polemical approach. Nevertheless, he 
later joined the executive board of the association.308 As a result of these discussions, 
the association was planned as an informal body with little public profile, which sought 
to organize and coordinate pro-Arab sentiment within the American elite. For this 
purpose, Snyder intended to send a regular circular letter to personalities supposedly 
friendly to the Arabs ranging over the entire country. Habib Katibah helped Snyder to 
create a list of recipients. Names were collected through different means, including 
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scouring the lists of non-partisan organizations dealing with the Middle East or during 
the speaking tours of Amin Rihani and Fuad Shatara.309 This collaboration underlined 
that the AFA was a joint project of anti-Zionist Arab-Americans and Protestants. 
The first AFA newsletter stated that there was a general problem with the perception 
of the Arabs in the US. The letter lamented not only the “profound ignorance of the 
Arab, (…), but also the suspicion, distrust, and prejudice that exists and is being 
nurtured in this country.”310 With a touch of self-criticism, the letter noted: “Perhaps 
those of us who know the Arab more intimately have failed to do our part to help our 
fellow American understand him. Certainly we have neglected to coordinate our efforts 
to this end.”311 Calling on a feeling of patriotism, the letter compared the Arab Cause 
and American Exceptionalism, maintaining that the Arab “struggle for liberty and 
equality (…) is following in the footsteps of our forefathers. (…) Perhaps this may 
explain the respect and admiration the Arab holds for the American.”312 The letter 
drafted a program on how to raise sympathy for the Arab Cause in the US, mentioning 
the spread of information, the holding of events and the coordination of activities which 
sought to portray the Arab political life and culture in a favorable light.313 Most of the 
answers to the newsletter were positive. Many of those who chose to join belonged to 
the missionary Protestant groups most associated with anti-Zionism at the time. 
Among those were such influential figures as Stephen B.L. Penrose, the future 
president of the AUB, or William W. Eddy and Halford L. Hoskins, who in their later 
function as State Department officials for the Middle East supported its anti-Zionist 
policy. Hoskins was particularly enthusiastic about the initiative and offered to 
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collaborate in it.314 Others sympathized with the endeavor but chose to abstain. Daniel 
Bliss did so in order not to “embarrass the University, (…which) has to keep a neutral 
position.”315 In sum, the responses clearly showed that there was a demand for a 
mainstream pro-Arab, anti-Zionist organization, which did not only appeal to Arab-
Americans but to a broader segment of the population. 
Few of the answers were also anti-Semitic and a small number of persons declined. 
The Orientalist and later head of the AUB Stephen ‘Bikes’ Penrose, then working at 
Whitman College, who entertained friendly relations with Snyder, immediately 
accepted. However, Penrose raised some concerns about the character of the new 
organization. He was fearful of alienating the Jewish population: “I do feel that 
considerable diplomacy would be necessary in presenting our intentions publicly. It is 
one thing to admire and seek to foster Arabian traditions of culture, but it is another to 
appear to back them politically against the encroachment of the Zionism. I would make 
a perfectly well friend of the Arab if it did not necessarily involve my becoming an 
enemy of the Jew. If you can assure me that the letter would not be an implication of 
the former, all of my doubts would be set at rest. Do not feel, I beg you, that I am pro-
Jewish or anti-Nordic, or anything of the sort. I simply feel that it is not wise to 
antagonize a group of people who have themselves a considerable cultural tradition, 
and who are not all as black as they are painted.”316 In his response, Snyder addressed 
these concerns, stating that being pro-Arab does not imply being anti-Jewish and that 
he wished to convince the Jews in a non-partisan fashion. Still, he argued that it was 
“impossible to divorce a cultural renaissance from its political aspects (…)”, implying 
that the Arab cultural renaissance was incompatible with Zionism.317 Despite Snyder’s 
assertions, anti-Semitism remained an issue for the organization during the whole 
course of its existence. In the second newsletter sent in November 1937, Snyder 
mentioned the receipt of letters from sympathizers who wished to turn the pro-Arab 
body into an anti-Semitic organization. He rejected these demands, without 
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condemning anti-Semitism explicitly. In the letter, he also announced for the first time 
the official formation of an organization under the name of ‘American Friends of the 
Arabs’.318 The next circular letter was sent in July 1938 under the new name of the 
association. The letter emphasized the non-partisanship of the organization, although 
the fight against Zionism remained the primary goal. The letter again addressed the 
issue of anti-Semitism, arguing that that pro-Arab advocacy was not equal to anti-
Semitism: “We have wholehearted sympathy for the Arab cause in the Palestine 
conflict but we oppose any action that is anti-racial and, particularly, anti-Semitic.”319 
In a private letter, Snyder also mentioned that he had rejected overtures by Nazi 
organizations for collaboration.320 Such associations were always liable to damage the 
anti-Zionist cause. 
Despite such assertions, Snyder shared the obsession with Jewish power and wealth 
with many anti-Zionists. Thus, he repeatedly drew a picture of an all-powerful Zionist 
lobby, although the 1930s marked a low point of American Zionist influence in 
comparison to the years before 1917 and after World War II. Thus, in October 1938 he 
wrote in a newsletter that “The Zionist lobby is well organized and powerful and will 
prevail if each one of us does not protest vigorously.”321 The Pro-Palestine Federation, 
a Christian Zionist group launched in 1930, presented the biggest challenge to 
Protestant anti-Zionism at the time. Counting about 300 members, it was the most 
public face of Christian Zionism during the pre-war years.322 Harry Snyder sought to 
counteract the actions of the Christian Zionists. The latter had petitioned President 
Roosevelt in June 1937 to intercede with the British to facilitate the partitioning of 
Palestine and the easing of restrictions on Jewish immigration. In response, Harry 
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Snyder launched a counter petition. The petition called on American non-interference 
and neutrality in the Middle East.323 The AFA’s own lobbying showed some signs of 
success when the State Department accepted an audience with the group in October 
1938. Despite the visible sympathy and access the anti-Zionists enjoyed there, Snyder 
still had the feeling that the sympathizers of the Arab Cause were on the defensive, as 
he wrote to Halford Hoskins, whom he invited to join the delegation: “The Zionists are 
up to their old tricks once more and this time their Washington lobby is operating very 
effectively. The pressure they are bringing to bear on our State Department to 
intercede with Great Britain on their behalf cannot easily be resisted.”324  Snyder seems 
not to have been aware that the State Department was actually committed to an anti-
Zionist stance. This would change with his visit there. On October 21, 1938, the 
delegation of Arab-American and AFA activists, including Snyder, Rev. Charles 
Edward Souter and Dr. Leland W. Parr, but without Hoskins who had declined, visited 
the State Department. In a 45-minute talk with Secretary of State Hull, they pressed 
against involvement of the US in the affairs of Palestine and inveighed against the 
Zionists. A latter newsletter noted that they felt that they had made a difference in the 
discussion and that therefore there was no further need for action in this matter.325 The 
Arab-American part of the delegation, which included representatives from the ANL 
and Muslim groups, equally gained the impression that Jewish organizations enjoyed 
little influence on the government’s foreign decision makers.326 This was certainly a 
realistic assessment. 
Indeed, Zionism had remained alien to the State Department even after the election of 
President Roosevelt, an appointment which was enthusiastically welcomed by many 
American Jews. After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, record numbers of Jews 
sought refuge in Palestine. In 1936, the Arab Revolt erupted after a series of strikes to 
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halt this immigration. In order to accommodate Arab demands, the British downsized 
the contingent of Jewish immigrants. Faced with an increasing Jewish refugee problem 
in Europe, the Zionists pushed the US to intercede with the British to ease immigration 
restrictions. They argued that the British policy was in contravention to the Balfour 
Declaration and that the US had therefore the right and the duty, in line with the 1924 
Anglo-American treaty, to intervene. However, the State Department used its influence 
in a very limited fashion only and pursued the same policy of non-intervention it had 
during the 1920s. In contrast to missionary and business interests, Zionism, or the 
American Jewish immigrants in Palestine, were never considered to be a general US 
interest, despite the fact that Americans had invested more manpower and money in 
Palestine than in all the Arab countries combined.327 In truth, there was no Zionist 
influence in the State Department – on the contrary. 
Besides Arab-Americans, the Protestant anti-Zionists of the AFA were also eager to 
cooperate with the group of anti-Zionist Reform Jews. In a letter to Arthur H. 
Sulzberger, the anti-Zionist editor of the New York Times, Harry Snyder seems to have 
sought to appeal to him by again expressing support for changing the immigration laws 
and opening the borders for Jewish refugees. However, this opinion seems also to 
have been partly motivated by an effort to equate the persecution of Jews in Germany 
and the Zionist policies vis-à-vis the Arabs in Palestine. This tendency was clearly 
noticeable in the letter: “In connection with the bitter Arab-Jewish controversy over 
Palestine, we [AFA] always have and always shall denounce selfish, intolerant, 
imperialistic ambitions of both the Zionists and the British in Palestine, as we now 
denounce the inhuman, brutal acts of the German Government against the Jews.”328 
Despite such questionable comparisons between Nazism and Zionism, defending 
himself and his association from accusations of anti-Semitism remained a primary 
concern for Snyder, as he did in a NBC radio broadcast during prime time. He claimed 
that “(…) we are not anti-semeitic (sic!) in any sense. We are wholeheartedly opposed 
to political Zionism (as are non-Zionists among the Jews themselves) but that does not 
imply anti-Semitism any more than does opposition to Nazism imply anti-German 
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feelings. Be assured that it hardly behooves us as a Christian nation to refuse to accept 
the refugees and yet insist that little Palestine keep its doors open to them.”329 Although 
his criticism of US refugee policy was certainly to the point, it served as a rhetorical 
vehicle for Snyder to again implicitly compare Zionism and Nazism. Such equations of 
Zionism and Nazism were popular among anti-Zionists at the time and even gained 
wider currency after the horrors of the Holocaust. 
There was little activity of the AFA after these events. A certain Charles H. Carhart 
from Chevy Chase Md. made an interesting remark in light of the future of pro-Arab 
advocacy. He suggested to use the notion Palestinian instead of Arab: “In the general 
uninformed opinion among us the Arabs are the people of Arabia; the Jews belong in 
Palestine, having taken their home from Judea. (…) Would it not be better to present 
the case as between Palestinians, whose ancestors have lived in the land for many 
centuries, and a group of foreigners, supported by foreign money and permitted to 
come into the land by a foreign government that began by conquest and is sustained 
by armed force.”330 Perhaps this was something to pursue. In the last years of his life, 
Elihu Grant authored one more book on the Palestinians titled ‘Palestine Today’, which 
was published in 1938. It was based on his last trip to the country during which he had 
talked with its political elite, including the Mufti.331 It was a passionate defense of the 
Arab Cause in Palestine and distributed by the ANL and the American Friends of the 
Arabs as propaganda. The publication of ‘The Arab Awakening’ by George Antonius 
in February 1939 was welcomed as a major success by AFA.332 There is no record 
that the association sent any more newsletters after late 1938 and its activity soon 
ceased. In 1942, Elihu Grant passed away and Harry Snyder joined the war as a 
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military intelligence officer in the Arab Gulf. 333 Protestant anti-Zionist activism would 
resurface after the war with a vengeance.  
2.7 The Arab Americans and the AHC 
After the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936, the Arab-American anti-Zionist 
movement further intensified its propaganda efforts and sought closer cooperation with 
the AHC and its Middle Eastern allies. At this time, a pro-Arab network consisting of 
several organizations and dedicated activists had been in place in the US for more 
than a decade. The ‘Palestine National League’, and Faris Malouf’s Syrian and 
Lebanese ‘American Federation of Eastern States’ were the most important ones and 
both dedicated to the cause of Palestine.334 In summer 1936, the Palestinian National 
League was replaced by its successor the Arab National League (ANL) in New York.335 
The bulk of politically active Arab-Americans were of Syrian origin. Most of them had 
been followers of a pan-Syrian ideology, as seen above, before their eventual 
conversion to Arab or even Palestinian nationalism. The establishment of the Arab 
National League signified such a shift towards Arab nationalism. However, the 
language of pan-Syrian ideology was still present in the ANL’s publications. A 
manifesto published in 1937, which lays out the founding principles of the organization, 
for instance calls for “complete independence of the Syrian nation as a united, coherent 
political unit within the natural geographic borders of Natural Syria.”336 The term 
‘Natural Syria’ not only includes the territory of the modern state of Syria, but also those 
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of Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine.337 The same manifesto declared “effective 
resistance to Zionism, the biggest threat to Syrian Unity”, as imperative.338 After the 
establishment of the ANL, the Syrian Habib Katibah was selected as its secretary. 
Shatara also set out to assemble an advisory board composed of prominent historians, 
theologians and clergymen both familiar with and sympathetic to the Arab Middle East. 
The recipients of his letters of invitation included Orientalist Philipp Hitti, philosopher 
William Hocking, missionary Howard Bliss and the archeologist Elihu Grant.339 All of 
them were already active in pro-Arab advocacy. It was also probably no coincidence 
that the American Friends of the Arabs (AFA) was founded shortly after the ANL. The 
ANL was also well-connected to the thriving Arabic press, with its office located right 
next to that of one of the leading Arab-American newspapers, Al-aih, which carried 
many of the ANL’s publications and thus made its propaganda more effective.340 The 
ANL was a body well-prepared for lobbying on behalf of Arab nationalist interests in 
the US. 
The superior goal of the ANL during its active years from 1936 until 1941 was to 
influence US public opinion on the Middle East in a pro-Arab direction. It believed itself 
to be on the right path to achieving this. In the second year of its existence, it stated 
that the fact that these efforts were already “beginning to bear fruit is one of the most 
important accomplishments of the organization.”341 Among the first activities of the ANL 
was the production of several publications, among others the booklet “Whither 
Palestine?” The booklet criticized Jewish farming communities in Palestine for not 
being economically viable and dependent on subsidies from Baron Edmond the 
Rothschild. This criticism was reflective of the pro-capitalist stance assumed by the 
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leaders of the Syrian community, which had achieved considerable economic success 
since their arrival in the US.342 Such criticism also appealed to all those who believed 
the Zionists to be Bolshevists, a widespread view point in the era. This contrasted 
sharply with the politics of the Jewish community, which, also due to the large Eastern-
European immigration, tended towards left-wing politics and the Democratic Party. In 
light of this, it is no surprise that the dangers of a Jewish State governed by Socialists 
was a recurring theme in the ANL’s propaganda, warning the US foreign policy 
establishment that support for it ran against geopolitical US interests. 
From its start, the ANL coordinated its propaganda activities with the AHC. The most 
important collaborative effort was the holding of speaking tours throughout the US by 
intellectuals and politicians close to or belonging to the AHC. These tours served the 
function of raising sympathy for the Arab cause and gaining new adherents, as well as 
of collecting money on behalf of the AHC. Between 1937 and 1939, the AHC sent three 
propaganda delegations to the US, which will be discussed here in detail. This 
presented the high point of Arab anti-Zionist propaganda activity in the US in the inter-
war era. The first speaking tour was conducted by AHC senior member Izzat Tannous 
and Amin Rihani. In May 1937, AHC chairman and Mufti Mohammed Amin al-Husseini 
had ordered Tannous to depart for a propaganda and fundraising mission in the United 
States.343 After his arrival in New York in May 1937, Izzat Tannous met with ANL 
representatives. During the meeting, he painted a bleak picture of the future of the 
Arabs in Palestine. His arguments were later reproduced in an anti-Zionist and anti-
British leaflet, which supposedly reached a circulation of 50’000. The leaflet was not 
entirely free of anti-Semitic imagery, describing the Jews as an arrogant and rich 
minority: “Atrocities are being committed [by the British] which would have caused a 
Turkish soldier to blush (…) For the first time in history, a majority finds it necessary to 
appeal for protecting its inalienable rights against an arrogant domineering, and highly 
organized financed minority.”344 AHC propagandist Izzat Tannous was convinced of 
the overwhelming wealth and influence of the Zionist US Jews, which contrasted 
sharply with the powerlessness of the Arab-American anti-Zionist. Writing in retrospect, 
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he considered US Jews to constitute a powerful monolithic body able to dictate US 
policy: “However, all the efforts and the enthusiasm the members of the Arab National 
league were exerting were insignificant compared to the Zionist propaganda in the 
United States. In 1937, the Jews in the United States were well-established in all fields 
of life. They were very influential in the Supreme Court where they were represented 
by the able Supreme Court Louis Brandeis. They were influential in the law courts 
where Jewish judges and Jewish lawyers were in dominance. They were influential in 
the Senate and in the House of Representatives. The diamond, the fur and the clothing 
industries were their specialties. Hardly could an American buy a fur coat or a sport 
jacket without it passing through a Jewish hand. They were overwhelming in 
Hollywood, in the medical profession and most influential in the press.”345 It was evident 
that Tannous, like many other anti-Zionists, was obsessed with images of Jewish 
power. 
After the meeting, Tannous embarked on a speaking and fundraising tour together with 
Amin Rihani, whose prominence overshadowed that of Tannous. Amin Rihani was a 
famous American-Syrian man of letters and intellectual. He was not only known for his 
intellectual achievement, but also as a pioneer of Arab-American anti-Zionist activism 
in the US and was a longtime friend of Amin al-Husseini.346. Their first station was New 
York, where more than 300 persons attended an ANL event on June 5, 1937 to listen 
to a presentation of the Arab point of view. The evening was opened with the public 
reading of two telegrams by Amin al-Husseini and Prince Adel Arslan, expressing their 
support for the ANL. William Hocking also spoke at the event, defending the Arabs’ 
legal rights and arguing that the Balfour Declaration did not advocate a Jewish state. 
Public radio broadcasted the whole event, leading to controversy among New York’s 
Jewish community. Some critics argued that the program was anti-Jewish. However, 
other Jewish and Zionist leaders rushed to its defense. Among the latter was Rabbi 
Stephen Wise, the president of the World Jewish Congress, who disclaimed charges 
of anti-Semitism in the pages of the New York Times, “as if Arab and Jews alike were 
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not Semites.”347 Stephen Wise must have been aware that anti-Semitism had always 
meant hatred for Jews, but he did not seek to confront the Arabs.  
The speaking tour took Rihani and Tannous from the East Coast cities to the Midwest 
metropoles of Chicago, Minneapolis and Cincinnati back to Detroit and its suburbs, 
which had the highest concentration of Arab-Americans. They spoke to a wide array of 
audiences, including both meetings with the local Arab communities and speaking 
events at universities under the sponsorship of the Foreign Policy Association.348 
Tannous was greatly impressed with the skills of Rihani, who was the uncontested star 
of what seems to have been a successful tour: “His oration was superb and the way 
he stole the hearts of his audience was magnificent. As an apprentice in the art of 
information and propaganda I was greatly impressed by that learned scholar.”349 
According to Tannous the money raised at these events was destined for the “orphans 
of our brave men who died in battle.”350 This was probably a euphemism for funding 
the Arab Revolt. After completing the tour, Rihani travelled back to Lebanon on an 
American cruise liner. During a stopover in Palestine on August 8, 1937, he extended 
an invitation to AHC leaders Amin al-Husseini and Awni Abd al-Hadi, chairman of the 
Istiqlal Party, as well as Ragheb Mitrage to visit him on the ship. He wanted to get their 
opinion on “fundamental issues”. 351 His exchanges with Rihani seem to have 
influenced Amin al-Husseini’s stance towards the United States. Later in the same 
month, he complained to the American consul in Jerusalem, George Wadsworth, about 
the Zionists’ alleged political and financial power in the US. He expected these Zionist 
lobbying efforts to result in eventual US support for Zionism.352 The impression that 
Jews possessed overwhelming dominance in the American arena may have pushed 
the Mufti to put propaganda on the top of the agenda at the Bludan Congress in 
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September 1937. Despite the success of the speaking tour of Rihani and Tannous, it 
would take more than a year before the arrival of the next AHC delegation in the US in 
November 1938.353 Before that, Fakhri al-Barudi, the head of the propaganda bureau 
in Damascus, would arrive in the US to prepare the next step of the campaign. 
The World’s Fair, which was set to take place in New York in 1939 and 1940, provided 
the opportunity for Arab nationalists to present their case in the US. Syria was one of 
the 54 nations present at the fair and Fakhri al-Barudi alone  was responsible for the 
Syrian pavilion. On August 17, 1938, Barudi and his assistant Fuad Mufarrij therefore 
travelled to the US. Officially, their mission was to observe the preparations for the 
Syrian pavilion and help establish a Syrian-American body, which would assist. To the 
dismay of some Syrian critics, the pavilion was not designed in a specifically Syrian 
style, but in a generalized Arab Oriental style, reflecting al-Barudi’s pan-Arab 
politics.354 In spite of their official mission, al-Barudi and Muffarij’s principal occupation 
would be in assisting the Arab-Americans in professionalizing their anti-Zionist 
activism. After a month in the US, al-Barudi returned to Syria, but Mufarrij stayed on 
and joined the ANL office in New York, where he linked the Arab-American group up 
with the propaganda network in Damascus. In this function, Mufarrij collaborated with 
Habib Katibah and Harry Roscoe Snyder from the American Friends of the Arabs in 
organizing the speaking tours of pro-Arab advocates throughout the US, which started 
in November 1938 with AHC representatives Emil Ghoury and Mohammed Beyhum.355 
Harry Roscoe Snyder wished to include his friend Elihu Grant in the delegation. The 
latter however had expressed his unease with audiences and instead suggested 
Shatara or Hocking as speakers: “My contempt for the crowd must be modified by 
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severe discipline of self. It may even be necessary for me to go to a good actors-school 
to be trained a bit before I could be worth my salt (…). My great immediate concern is 
that a channel be provided for frequent, or instantaneous appeal and representation of 
Arab virtues, courtesies, even rights.”356 Despite Grant’s reluctance, he would join his 
Arab colleagues on several occasions during the tour.357 
Al-Barudi and Muffarij’s visit to the US definitely had an effect. Jewish Agency official 
Eliahu Epstein, who was acquainted with Fuad Mufarrij from his days at the AUB, had 
warned that his presence would energize the anti-Zionist campaign in the US. “Fuad’s 
arrival in America led to an increase of the activities of the [Arab National] League (…). 
Fuad is personally known to the writer as a fellow-student in the American University 
of Beirut. He possesses excellent organizing skills and is a good speaker in both 
English and Arabic. He is an extreme pan-Arabist and organized a secret Pan-Arab 
society at the American University when he was teaching there before he entered the 
services of the propaganda office of Fakri el-Baroudi. He belongs to a Greek-Orthodox 
family. He is a friend of Amin el-Rihani who, no doubt, prepared the ground well for 
him in the United States and gave Fuad good instructions before he left for America. 
The harm which the activities of Fuad is likely to do or cause should not be under-
estimated. It is very desirable that our friends in New York should keep an eye on the 
activities of the League and keep us informed of them.”358 Epstein was proven right. In 
January 1939, Mufarrij started his own propaganda tour in the North-Eastern parts of 
the US and the Canadian Great Lakes region. The tour plan made use of the existing 
network of anti-Zionist Protestant missionary circles. A former AUB teacher and 
colleague, N.M. Pletcher, invited him to speak at several venues in the small town of 
Faribault MN. In his lecture at the high school, Mufarrij compared the situation in 
Germany to that in Palestine: “The only difference is that the situation is completely 
reversed. In Palestine, the Arabs are being persecuted by the Jews who claim that 
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Palestine is their homeland and should become a national home for Jews.”359 As 
discussed above, Muffarrij’s comparison between Zionism and Nazism was then a 
popular anti-Zionist theme and continues to be so.  
According to Muffarij’s further statements, the Arabs were ready to grant the Jews 
cultural autonomy, but not political independence. Citing Philip Hitti, he drew a picture 
of the Arabs’ history which was inspired by the nationalist historiography of his time. 
The Arabs had lived through a golden era until the twelfth century, when they were 
more advanced than Europe and had figured as the guardians and transmitters of 
classical teachings and scientific progress. Subjugated by Turkic people, the Arabs 
declined until the start of their re-ascent in 1908, when, as Mufarrij incorrectly informed 
his audience, an Arab revolt against the Turkish rule supposedly took place. Zionism, 
he explained, presented an obstacle to this Arab renaissance and its unification 
efforts.360 His next station was Duluth in the north of Minnesota, where the city’s mayor, 
who was acquainted with Mufarrij since their student days in Geneva, had invited him 
to speak.361 In January, Fuad Mufarrij continued his speaking tour in the Ontario and 
Quebec regions of Canada, appearing before different audiences, among others in the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and speaking to the press. Zionist activists 
monitored his tour and attended his speeches, where they made every effort to counter 
his arguments.362 At the fourth conference of the ANL in early September 1939 in Flint, 
Mufarrij held a speech besides keynote speaker Elihu Grant. It would be his last. After 
attending a party in celebration of the successful conference, he died in a car accident, 
causing extensive grief among his fellow activists.363 His loss was an immense blow to 
the anti-Zionist campaign in the US. 
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After his Eastern Europe tour, Ghoury’s next destination was the US where he 
undertook a propaganda and fundraising tour. Ghoury was perfectly suited for 
engaging in public relations in the US given his Christian background, his American 
education and his experience in journalism. On November 11, 1938, he arrived there 
together with Mohammed Jamil Beyhum, a Beirut man of letters and writer who acted 
as the Mufti’s emissary. The AHC leadership attributed major strategic importance to 
these trips. This had become clear during the recent congress in Bludan. In his 1946 
work on the Palestine issue, Beyhum also dedicated two chapters to foreign 
propaganda, in which he stated: “Palestine itself is not the battleground between Arabs 
and Zionists: It is only the object of these battles. The battleground is Europe and the 
American continent, especially England and the United States.”364 The AHC delegation 
used different vehicles to get its message out. A few days after their arrival, Beyhum 
sent a letter to President Roosevelt.365 Newspaper reports and interviews afforded the 
delegation the opportunity to spread their viewpoints to the American public. Shortly 
after their arrival, they threatened via the New York Times that American trade with the 
Muslim world was in danger because of Zionism.366 In an article in the Detroit News in 
late November 1938, Beyhum claimed that Palestine could not support more than 
another 400’000 Jewish refugees. In contrast to the AHC rhetoric in Arabic, Beyhum 
rejected the view that the conflict was a religious war, as Zionist and Jews were not 
identical. He claimed to advocate a “democratic government like that enjoyed in 
America, where all will be proportionately represented.”367 By mentioning the fact that 
large numbers of Jews still lived in Iraq and Syria, he sought to imply that there was 
no danger for the Jewish minority in a binational state. Like Ghoury, Beyhum did his 
best to distance himself from National Socialism and Fascism, rejecting reports that 
the Arab leadership received money from the Germans and the Italians to fund their 
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revolt, which we now know to have been true. Beyhum was not being honest as he 
knew about the funding from the revisionist powers. In his 1946 book, Beyhum 
described how he spoke to Amin al-Husseini in his exile in Lebanon about a trip to 
Europe to discuss the AHC’s cooperation with Germany and Italy during the same time. 
According to Beyhum’s account, the Mufti rejected Beyhum’s proposal for travelling to 
Europe, but this seems unlikely.368 Italian and German support for the Arab Revolt is 
well documented, as discussed in Chapter One. Rather than portraying events 
truthfully, Beyhum’s account sought to diminish the extent of the Mufti’s collaboration 
with Germany, which had become a target of much criticism after the war. 
In the course of their tour, Ghoury and Beyhum spoke to a wide array of audiences, 
journalists and government members. They visited town halls, and Arab and Muslim 
associations throughout the whole country. An early highlight was the three-day long 
Third Arab Conference by the ANL, which was held in Detroit beginning on November 
24,1938. During their travels, Beyhum and Ghoury received much support from Middle 
Eastern experts and Orientalists, including Elihu Grant. Robert Carson, an 
acquaintance of Beyhum, who worked as a teacher at the AUB, helped find a specialist 
to advise them on public affairs. The friendly reception by the US public came as a 
surprise, as Beyhum, like most of the Arab nationalists, had been convinced that 
Zionists were dominating US public opinion. After their tour of the US, the delegation 
proceeded on a short trip to Cuba and Mexico.369 On January 20, 1939, Ghoury and 
Beyhum were also received by NEA chief Wallace Murray. They were introduced by 
Peter S. George of the ANL, who presented them as emissaries of the AHC. In the 
conversation, the Arab delegates urged the US not to intervene in the conflict and 
stressed the Palestinian Arab’s right for self-determination in line with the Wilson 
Principles. Ghoury affirmed that the Arabs demanded a stop to Jewish immigration, 
the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration and independence for an Arab state in 
Palestine.370 There were no immediate results to the talk, nor was there much need for 
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convincing, as the State Department had already agreed to pursue a policy of non-
intervention with the British, despite the provisions of the 1924 treaty. 
Besides raising sympathy for the Arab cause in Palestine, the primary focus of the tour 
was the collection of donations for the AHC. According to Beyhum, they would not 
directly accept money, but instead refer supporters to another committee. This 
committee would then transfer the funds to middlemen in the Middle East: Omar Daouq 
in Beirut, Talat Pasha Harb in Cairo and Hajj Yaseen Diab in Damascus, who would 
hand it over to “Palestinian casualties”.371 This meant in fact that the donations were 
meant to fund the Arab Revolt. Several bodies were responsible for handling donations 
to the Arab Revolt, such as the Supreme Committee of Relief for the Palestinian 
Victims (Arab. al-Lajna al-uliya li-ighatat mankubi Falastin), which had been created in 
1936 in Egypt on the initiative of the Islamist YMMA and also enjoyed the support of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.372 That money collected in the US was used to fund the Arab 
Revolt is also confirmed by British Intelligence. The British Colonial Office gathered 
information that the Palestine Defence Committee had received 3’346 pounds from 
Arab and Muslim sources in South and North America, India and South Africa.373 In 
sum, Ghoury and Beyhum’s tour seems to have been a resounding success from both 
a financial and a political standpoint. The Jewish Agency received information that Emil 
Ghoury had collected $25’000 for the AHC.374 The wealthy Arab communities overseas 
were no doubt an attractive target for fundraising. Upon Beyhum and Ghoury’s return 
to Palestine, Amin al-Husseini sent a letter of thanks to ANL leader Amin Farah in July 
1939, noting that the delegates “both speak highly of you and greatly appreciate all the 
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financial and moral support you extended to them.” 375 The Mufti would remain a highly 
popular figure among the country’s pro-Arab activists. The ANL asked the Mufti for his 
pen to have it auctioned at their next conference. The revenue generated would help 
pay for the ANL’s office in New York.376 
Not everybody in the Arab-American community shared the two emissaries’ anti-
Zionist views. Salloum Mokarzel, the editor of the Arabic newspaper al-Hoda, 
disagreed with Beyhum on the merits of Zionism. Salloum Mokarzel and his deceased 
brother Nahum, the former editor of the newspaper, were of Lebanese Maronite 
extraction. They represented a significant group among American Lebanese, which 
was critical to Islam, Arab nationalism and their local supporters. In 1925, when the 
Great Syrian Revolt erupted, Naoum Mokarzel defended the French Mandate, arguing 
that only the French guarded them from an alliance of Muslim extremism, pro-Arab 
American missionaries and foreign powers.377 A similar alliance played out during the 
Arab Revolt in Palestine and Salloum Mokarzel was certainly recognizant of the 
parallels. For Beyhum, a Maronite State in Lebanon strengthened by a Jewish State in 
Palestine presented a real threat. Nevertheless, al-Hoda joined the other US-Arabic 
newspapers in their extensive coverage of Beyhum and Ghoury’s speaking tour.378 
This would not be the last time that the Lebanese community clashed with the broader 
Arab-American community and foreign Arab emissaries on the question of Zionism. 
The success of the tour also motivated the ANL to increase its activity. Shatara sought 
to extend the ANL by having a list assembled of individuals and organizations from the 
US, Mexico, Canada and Central America sympathetic to its cause. Eventually, the list 
counted 36 affiliates and 57 individuals.379 The AHC’s public relations activities in the 
US caught the attention of the Zionist leadership. Shortly after the return of the AHC 
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delegation, Eliahu Epstein of the Political Bureau of the Jewish Agency wrote to Nahum 
Goldmann, the president of the World Jewish Congress in New York, about the Mufti’s 
activities in the United States. Epstein warned that the Mufti sought to further expand 
his fundraising activities among Arab-Americans and circles friendly to the Arabs. 
Another aim was to increase his influence in the country’s Arab press in particular and 
the press in general. The report mentioned Amin Rihani as one of the AHC’s agents in 
the US. The Jewish Agency had intercepted several letters to Rihani’s friends in 
Lebanon, in which he explained that he had succeeded in getting a number of 
important American journalists, writers and entrepreneurs to promise their support for 
Palestine’s Arabs.380 However, such plans did not come to fruition. Despite the success 
of the Beyhum-Ghoury delegation, it marked the end of the AHC propaganda offensive 
in the US and no other followed. There were several reasons for this. Arab nationalism 
in Palestine and Syria had suffered a setback with the defeat of the Arab Revolt in 
Palestine in 1939. The AHC had been dissolved and its leaders were either expelled 
or had fled abroad into exile. The adoption of the White Paper further reduced Arab 
discontent. Lastly, the outbreak of World War II made the organization of foreign 
propaganda campaigns impractical. 
In the US, the cooperation of the AHC leadership and other Arab nationalists with 
National Socialist Germany during World War II would lastingly discredit them and their 
friends from the ANL. This exposed them to accusations of pro-Fascism and anti-
Semitism. According to undercover journalist Roy Carlson, the international German 
propaganda service Welt-Dienst praised the ANL’s work in “spreading the truth.”381 
The secretary of the pro-Nazi German-American Bund James Wheeler-Hill equally 
promised ANL’s Georg Kheiralla full support and cooperation.382 Fuad Shatara’s 
suicide in 1942 came at the low point of Arab-American anti-Zionist activism in the US. 
It also left the organization without a leader. Arab nationalists in the US and in Britain 
were eventually forced to dissociate themselves from the AHC and the Mufti if they 
wanted to avoid charges of anti-Semitism or even treason. 
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2.8 Arab Christians, Islam and Anti-Zionism 
Arab Christians played a leading role in the propagandization in the West of the Arab 
nationalist view point towards the conflict in Palestine. Indeed, most of the those who 
interacted with European and American audiences on public relations trips were 
Christians; so were those who negotiated with the British officials in London. This was 
a deliberate strategy: The Mufti even pushed for higher Christian participation in these 
delegations. There was also an element of self-selection. Arab Christians were more 
urban, educated and wealthy than their Muslim brethren. They were thus more prone 
and more suitable to interact with their Christian counterparts in the West as well as 
more likely to solicit their sympathy. There was an influential elite group of Christian 
Arabs of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian extraction, which was dedicated to Arab 
nationalism in Palestine. Among this group were such distinguished persons as 
George Antonius, Emil Ghoury, Philipp Hitti, Amin Rihani, and later Albert Hourani. 
They shared some common background and outlook. They all came from Western-
oriented, wealthy families. Most importantly, they all had enjoyed a higher education at 
universities in the US, Europe or in Western-led institutions in the Middle East. They 
also tended to downplay their Christian identity. While Arab Muslim actors emphasized 
their religious credentials, Arab Christians could not afford to be equally proud 
Christians and Arab nationalists. They often resorted to accommodating Islamic 
sentiments, with some even praising Islam as the true Arab religion. 
The intellectual and writer Amin Rihani was a prime example of this pattern. This 
pioneer of Arab anti-Zionist activity in the US was of Lebanese Maronite background, 
a community which to a substantial degree sympathized with Zionism. His fierce 
criticism of the Maronite church eventually led to his excommunication. However, he 
purposefully refrained from ever criticizing Islam.383 Such characteristics are even 
more clearly discernible in Hitti’s and George Antonius’ main works, respectively. ‘The 
Arab Awakening’ and Hitti’s ‘History of the Arabs’, were inspired by their political 
convictions and sought to raise sympathy and understanding for the Arab cause in the 
West. Both works shared a similar attitude toward the issues of Arab identity, Islam 
and the Jews. Hitti wrote that he considered Islam a more natural progression from the 
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original Semitic religion than Judaism or even his own Christianity: “Islam too, in its 
original form is the logical perfection of the Semitic religion.”384 Antonius equally 
lavished praise on Islam, crediting it with the establishment of a moral culture.385 It is 
understandable that they sought to accommodate the views of their Arab Muslim 
readership. However, these works were directed at a Western, Christian readership, 
suggesting that these convictions were not only of a tactical nature but also, to some 
degree, authentic.  
Philipp Hitti seems not to have been entirely free of racist prejudice towards Jews and 
racial pride about his own Arab heritage. In a passage of his otherwise still readable 
‘History of the Arabs’, which first appeared in 1937, he depicted the Arabs positively 
as the ideal and purer version of the original Semitic people vis-à-vis the lesser Semitic 
Jews. In contrast to modern scholarly opinion, he still understood the Semitic people 
to be a group foremost connected by race and not by language. There were only two 
Semitic peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. The speakers of Semitic languages in 
Ethiopia did not count therefore as Semitic people: “Of the two surviving 
representatives of the Semitic people, the Arabians, in a larger measure than the Jews, 
have preserved the characteristic physical features and mental traits of the family. 
Their language, though the youngest among the Semitic group from the point of view 
of literature, has nevertheless conserved more of the peculiarities of the mother Semitic 
tongue (…) than the Hebrew and its other sister languages.”386 Hitti moreover 
complained that it was wrong to associate the Jews foremost with Semitic peoples, as 
it was done in Europe and in the US. Citing the Jewish-American assyriologist Ephraim 
Avigdor Speiser, he argued that the Jews had weakened their Semitism by 
intermingling with other people. Traits that were considered typically Jewish were not 
Semitic at all, but the result of this process and distinctive to the Jews, he concluded. 
“In Europe and America, the word ‘Semite’ has come to possess a primarily Jewish 
connotation, and that on account of the wide dispersion of the Jews in these continents. 
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The ‘Semitic features’ often referred to, including the prominent nose, are not Semitic 
at all. They are exactly the characteristics which differentiate the Jew from the Semitic 
type and evidently represent an acquisition from early intermarriages between the 
Hittite-Hurrians and the Hebrews.”387 Considering that Hitti wrote these sentences in 
the 1930s on the background of the racist persecution of Jews in Germany, they make 
a particularly toxic impression. 
George Antonius on the other hand sought to impress upon his Western audience that 
there was no anti-Semitism in the Arab world. Speaking to the Peel Commission in 
January 1937, he stated: “There is no anti-Semitism in the Arab mind. The Arab mind 
throughout its history has been singularly free from any such thing as anti-Semitism, 
which we all know, is a European and not an Arab invention, and I am sorry to say, a 
European Christian invention; but the Arabs throughout their history, and more 
particularly, the Moslems, have been entirely free of the taint of anti-Semitism; and it 
is a fact that the greatest days of Jewish efflorescence [since the Dispersion] have 
taken place when the Jews were under Moslem rule, whether in Baghdad, Cordova, 
or Cairo, or anywhere else where large Jewish communities were living under the rule 
of Moslem [sic].”388 However, this statement was clearly disingenuous. As shown in 
Chapter One, by 1937 anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories had 
permeated Arab nationalist and Muslim political thought. Antonius’ associate, the Mufti 
Amin Al-Husseini, played an instrumental role in spreading these theories and in 
presenting the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine as a religious war against Islam. 
Political activism by Arab Christians on behalf of Arab nationalism and sometimes 
Islam could not overshadow the fact that their status in the Arabo-Islamic world was 
always volatile. Religious hatred could even target the most dedicated activists, like 
Philip Hitti. In a 1962 polemic by an Al-Azhar professor against ‘Orientalism’, a 
traditional critique within Islamism which was later taken up by Edward Said, Philip Hitti 
was described as “A Christian from Lebanon (...). One of the most disputatious of the 
enemies of Islam, who makes a pretense of defending Arab causes in America and is 
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an unofficial advisor of the American State Department on Middle Eastern Affairs. He 
always tries to diminish the role of Islam in the creation of human civilization and is 
unwilling to ascribe any merit to the Muslims (...) His History of the Arabs is full of 
attacks on Islam and sneers at the Prophet. All of it is spite and venom and hatred 
(…).”389 This volatile status was also apparent in the Arab national movement in 
Palestine. During the Arab Revolt, Christians were underrepresented in the military 
leadership. This raises the question how deeply Palestine’s Christian Arabs were really 
invested in the Arab Revolt. Yishuv and British officials felt that they had acted in 
solidarity with the insurgents mainly out of fear for Arab Muslim reprisals. Indeed, 
several Arab Christians related this viewpoint to Yishuv and British officials, and there 
were also several incidents of anti-Christian violence by Muslim insurgents. The AHC 
leadership strongly denounced these actions, fearing Arab intercommunal violence. 
The publication of such incidents would have led to an erosion of Western anti-Zionist 
support for the Arab cause in Palestine, which the AHC so eagerly sought.  
2.9 Conclusion 
American non-Jewish anti-Zionism rested on two groups: Protestant missionary circles 
and Arab-Americans. Protestant missionaries, which had established themselves in 
the Middle East since the early nineteenth century, predominantly felt sympathy for the 
national aspirations of the Arabs, which they considered to be a fruit of their civilizing 
mission, while they rejected Zionism. This rejection of Zionism not only stemmed from 
a political assessment of the situation, but also from antipathy towards Jews rooted in 
Christian theological arguments. In line with classical replacement theory, it was 
argued that Jews had forsaken their claim on the land of Israel and on peoplehood by 
not recognizing Jesus. The rise of dispensationalism, from which mainline Protestants 
sought to distinguish themselves, further motivated the rise of Protestant anti-Zionism. 
Arab-Americans, most of them of Syrian or Lebanese extraction, immediately voiced 
their opposition to the Balfour Declaration and started establishing their anti-Zionist 
groups. Pan-Syrianism was the dominating creed. Leading Arab-American anti-
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Zionists like Abraham Mitrie Ribhany advocated a Greater Syria under American 
protection after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In this, they agreed with 
Protestant missionary circles. The influence of both groups was palpable in the King-
Crane commission in 1919, which was tasked to investigate the conditions in Syria. It 
quickly found Zionism to be unrealizable and proposed an American mandate in 
Greater Syria, including Palestine, just as its proponents had hoped it would. 
The foreign policy establishment was also apprehensive of Zionism. The Middle East 
experts in the State Department and in particular its Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
(NEA) were united by their critical attitude towards the Balfour Declaration and ignored 
the pro-Zionist statements of Congress and the president. They rejected a more active 
role of the US in Palestine, despite British wishes to involve the Americans. Many State 
Department officials were influenced by conspiracy theories and prejudiced in their 
views of Zionism, believing it simultaneously to be bolshevist, atheistic or theocratic. 
The Zionist movement in the US experienced a decline after the Balfour Declaration 
and had little influence. This became apparent after the 1929 massacres in Palestine, 
which shocked the US Jewish community and led to calls for a more active role of the 
US in Palestine. However, the Zionist movement proved unable to use this outrage to 
push for a more pro-Zionist US policy. The State Department actually pushed into the 
opposite direction, embracing the new British policy, which limited immigration and 
land sales to Jews. The way in which the Zionists and the anti-Zionists tried to exert 
pressure was a function of the structure and the goals of these respective groups. The 
anti-Zionists enjoyed access to the State Department and to the decision-making 
process. This fact was symbolized by George Antonius, who was a source for the State 
Department on Palestine. Therefore, their influence rested mainly on personal contact. 
The Zionists on the other hand had no voice in the State Department. They therefore 
had to resort to larger degrees of public campaigning and appealing to elected officials 
to exert influence – which, however, remained largely inefficient during the period 
discussed in this chapter.  
The rise of National Socialism and the Arab Revolt altered the configuration of the 
conflict. When the European Jews were already facing mounting anti-Semitism and 
thus emigrated in record numbers, Britain reduced Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
The anti-Zionists were fearful that the State Department would press the British for a 
more pro-Zionist policy in Palestine, which was their right according to the Anglo-
128 
 
American Treaty of 1924. Convinced of overwhelming Jewish power and influence, the 
AHC extended its propaganda to the US, which they considered an area of prime 
importance. In collaboration with the ANL, they organized a fundraising and 
propaganda campaign. Protestant anti-Zionists, who formed their first organized body 
during this period, joined in. The anti-Zionists were helped by the fact that a group of 
Arab nationalist scholars like Philip Hitti and George Antonius helped shape 
conventional wisdom about the Middle East. However, the anti-Zionists soon found out 
that the State Department had no intention of influencing the British government on 
behalf of the Zionists. With the adoption of the White Paper in 1939, the wishes of the 
Arab national leadership and their anti-Zionist supporters were formally satisfied. 
Palestine was closed as a haven for Jewish refugees from Europe, without the State 
Department willing to intervene. Anti-Zionism in the US had contributed to this fateful 
State Department foreign policy. Had the Zionist groups prevailed over them in the 
crucial period of 1929-1939, many more Jews could have been saved from the horrors 
of the Holocaust. The alliance of the Palestinian national movement with the Axis 
powers during World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust would severely weaken 
the anti-Zionist movement in the US in the following years, but it nevertheless remained 
a viable force in American politics. 
129 
 
3 The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure to fight 
Partition 
After the suppression of the Arab Revolt and the start of World War II in September 
1939, a temporary peace reigned in Palestine. The Jewish Agency had resolved to 
cooperate with the mandate government, in spite of the recent introduction of the White 
Paper, which had practically abrogated the Balfour Declaration. Ben Gurion expressed 
the policy of the Jewish Agency in the formula: “So far as the war against Nazi Germany 
is concerned we must aid England in every way possible as if there had been no White 
Paper. So far as the enforcement of the White Paper' is concerned we must continue 
our struggle against it as if there were no war against Nazi Germany.”390 With the 
defeat of the Axis powers however in sight, the question of the future Palestine 
reemerged on the political stage. Supported by the British, the AHC reconstituted itself 
as the representative body of the Palestinians. In Musa Alami, a moderate follower of 
the Mufti, the British believed to have found the ideal person to direct the Arab national 
movement. The Arab League, which was founded in March 1945, took over the mission 
to explain the Arab view point to the West, with mixed results. 
3.1 The Reestablishment of the AHC 
Since the late 1930s, the Arabs in Palestine lacked political representation. The AHC 
under the chairmanship of Mufti Amin al-Husseini and later his relative, Jamal al-
Husseini, had been disbanded by the British Mandatory Administration in 1937. Al-
Husseini and many of his followers first found refuge in Lebanon and then in Rashid 
al-Gaylani’s Iraq. After the failure of Rashid al-Gaylani’s Axis-sponsored revolt against 
the British, he fled to Nazi Germany, where he worked as a propagandist for the Nazi 
regime. 391 Musa Alami, a loyal follower and relative of the Mufti, was the unlikely man 
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to put together a new Arab representation. Since 1943, Alami worked to put together 
a new Arab leadership acceptable to both Arabs and British. In this task, he was 
assisted by Albert Hourani’s brother, Cecil Hourani. Unlike many other Arab Leaders 
of pre-WW II Palestine, foremost Amin al-Husseini, Alami emerged from the war 
relatively untainted. According to his collaborator Cecil Hourani, Alami had no known 
history of collusion with Nazism, although he had stayed with the Mufti Amin al-
Husseini in Iraq in 1940 and 1941. Hourani also believed him to be of a diplomatic 
nature, free from anti-Semitism. Musa Alami’s stature was strengthened at the inter-
Arab Alexandria Conference in October 1944, which prepared the establishment of the 
Arab League. Palestine figured on the top of the agenda. With the leading nationalist 
leaders of the Palestinians in exile, Musa Alami was chosen to represent them at the 
conference. This happened after much flip-flopping by the British, who had initially 
opposed his presence due to Palestine’s unresolved status. Alami used the opportunity 
to hold a lengthy and eloquent speech, criticizing Britain for failing to implement the 
White Paper of 1939 and for not putting a stop to Jewish immigration, which might 
result in a Jewish majority or the partition of Palestine. Despite this, his moderate 
politics and his Arab nationalist credentials would make him an acceptable partner for 
the British. Cecil Hourani had made the acquaintance of Alami during the latter’s 
attendance of the St. James Conference in 1939 probably through the mediation of 
Jamal Husseini, a friend of Hourani’s father and Alami’s brother-in-law. During these 
war years, Cecil Hourani and his brother Albert worked for British Intelligence in 
Cairo.392 It was here where the post-war order of the Middle East was to be shaped.  
The Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC) was headed by Brigadier Iltyd Clayton, a 
mysterious figure, whose influential role in determining Britain’s Middle East policy has 
until recently been underestimated due to its clandestine character. The historian of 
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British Arabists McLoughlin calls him “the greatest mover and shaker in planning 
Britain’s future role in the Arab world.”393 Clayton pursued a grand imperial strategy to 
secure Britain’s dominating influence in the Middle East in the post WWII era. His plans 
aimed at expelling France from the region and establishing a regional military alliance 
against the Soviet Union. Clayton opposed an independent Jewish State in the Middle 
East. Instead he envisaged a Jewish entity in a Greater Syrian state, which was to 
enter into a confederation with Iraq. Through his close personal relations with Arab 
League president Abdul Azzam and his service as the British envoy to the organization, 
Clayton bore a great influence on the original nature of the Arab League. But he also 
continued to maintain close contact with the Arabist circles in Britain, in particular with 
its leading think-tank Chatham House, for which he acted as deputy in Cairo.394 Cecil 
Hourani worked in Cairo as a liaison between Clayton and Arab politicians. In this 
function, he helped Musa Alami to convince Clayton that there was a need for a new 
Palestinian leadership and that Jamal al-Husseini, a former collaborator of the Mufti, 
whom Britain had expelled from Palestine in 1941, would be its most suitable leader. 
According to the plan, “[…] Jamal Husseini […] could be rehabilitated and become the 
figurehead behind which Musa would be the effective power.”395 Through Musa Alami, 
the new body could be pushed into a moderate direction, amenable to dealing with the 
British. 
The idea to reestablish the AHC and appoint Jamal as its leader was embraced by the 
British administration. They also hoped to exert a moderating influence on the new 
AHC through the nascent Arab League.396 In light of the upcoming Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, which was to investigate the situation in Palestine, High 
Commissioner Alan Cunningham endorsed the idea of reestablishing the AHC: “It was 
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clearly unsatisfactory to have no representative body to represent all the Arabs, and I 
therefore agreed to recognize a new Arab Higher Executive under Jamal’s leadership 
[…]. It should be remembered that this was at the time when we were expecting the 
report of the Anglo-American Committee to bring us a solution.”397 Syrian Premier Jamil 
Mardam Bey also travelled to Jerusalem in 1945 on behalf of the Arab League on a 
mission to unite the contesting factions in a new representative council of the Arab 
Palestinians.398 On November 22, 1945, the reconstitution of the AHC was declared, 
and whose party composition was identical to the one dissolved eight years earlier by 
the British. The chairmanship was kept open on purpose to be later assumed by Jamal 
al-Husseini. The Committee was dominated by the Husseini clan, who controlled 5 out 
of 12 seats via their Palestine Arab Party (PAP), while the five other Arab parties 
possessed one seat each. There were also two independents, Ahmed Hilmi Pascha 
and Musa al-Alami, who through familial and political ties were however connected to 
the dominating PAP.399 This problematic ‘compromise’ antagonized the other parties 
and in the end stoked inter-Arab rivalry in Palestine instead of calming it. 
After several public appeals by the Arab League and others, High Commissioner 
Cunningham agreed on November 24, 1945 to release Jamal al-Husseini from his exile 
in Rhodesia.400 He had been kept there since his arrest by the British in Iran in 1941, 
where he had fled after participating in the abortive Nazi-supported Iraqi coup d’état by 
Rashid Ali Gaylani together with the Mufti.401 Haim Levenberg suspects that the 
liberation of Jamal was decided upon beforehand and that the whole sequence of 
events surrounding his release was a ruse put into effect to shield Jamal from 
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accusations of being a British agent.402 This afforded him greater credibility with the 
Arabs. The plan, if it existed, succeeded for the moment. When Jamal returned to 
Palestine in early February 1946, he persuaded a recalcitrant AHC, against the 
opposition of PAP secretary Emil Al-Ghoury, to testify before the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry due to arrive on March 5, 1946 in Palestine.403 If the British 
believed that the new AHC would be more open to compromise, they were wrong. The 
report, which was published on April 30, 1946, was rejected by the Arabs. Instead, the 
new AHC, like its predecessor during the Arab Revolt, internationalized the fight 
against a Jewish state in Palestine, which suddenly seemed likelier than ever. 
3.2 The Preparation of the Propaganda Campaign 
During 1944, Arab governments started to consider a new propaganda campaign in 
Western countries in order to influence their future policy towards Palestine. In August 
1944, the British Embassy in Jeddah reported to the Foreign Office that Ibn Saud had 
received a telegram from the Iraqi government requesting his opinion and support on 
the establishment of Arab bureaus in Washington and London.404 The idea of 
establishing propaganda offices in Washington and London was first brought up at the 
preparatory committee for the Arab congress in Alexandria between September and 
October 1944. The Saudis presented a memorandum to discuss the idea. Its preamble 
stated that the “danger of Zionism is one that threatens the interests of all Arabs and 
Moslems.” The plan was first to send a delegation to President Roosevelt and the King 
of England to ascertain their views. Their missions would have to be kept secret. 
Otherwise, “the Jews and their supporters will create confusion and nullify our work.” 
If the other Arab states agreed, they proposed the dispatch of a propaganda mission, 
which should commit itself solely to the issue of Palestine and refrain from other 
particularistic, possibly contentious issues.405 The idea was again brought up at the 
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inter-Arab Alexandria Conference in October 1944, which prepared the establishment 
of the Arab League. In his speech, Musa Alami proposed the creation of an Arab fund 
modelled on the Jewish National Fund to finally stop Arab land sales to Jews. The 
body’s mission was to acquire land and turn it into waqfs as well as improving the 
cultivation methods of Arab peasants. The Arab Development Society would later grow 
out of this project. Musa Alami also touched upon the topic during his speech in 
Alexandria. He proposed sending Arab delegations to London, Washington and 
Moscow to lobby the respective governments with regard to the Palestine question, 
with Syrian Prime Minister Saadallah Jabiri suggesting the attachment of a propaganda 
officer to each delegation.406 The inter-Arab discussions on propaganda in the West 
continued after Alexandria and took on a more concrete form. 
In December 1944, a draft proposal for a comprehensive propaganda campaign on 
behalf of an Arab state in Palestine, including the establishment of Arab Offices, was 
submitted to the delegates of Arab governments. It noted that insufficient attention had 
so far been paid by the Arabs to propaganda, while “the efforts of the enemy and their 
propaganda have continued since the last war and have greatly increased recently.”407 
Therefore, it was expedient to start a large-scale public diplomacy effort in the West, 
aimed both at influencing public opinion and lobbying the government. The plan 
foresaw the opening of two Arab Offices in London and New York with branches in 
Washington, San Francisco, Chicago and Boston. While the Arabs could count on a 
large network of supporters in England, the draft assessed that the situation would be 
more difficult in the US. Here, the Arab propaganda effort would also have to rely on 
employing the services of PR-agencies as well as on the support of the local Arab 
community. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Consul General in Palestine, was 
suggested for director of the New York office, while Hussein Khalidi, president of the 
Reform Party (Arab. Islah) and a member of the AHC, would head the London office. 
Both offices would be assisted by an Advisory Committee consisting of prominent 
supporters of the Arab cause from the arenas of politics, the military, media, science 
and religion. The suggested Advisory Committee for the Arab Office in London included 
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MPs from both Labour and the Conservatives, for example, the influential travel writer 
Freya Stark, the historians Hamilton Gibb and Arnold Toynbee, Army Colonel 
Newcombe as well as others. They would thus make use of the existing anti-Zionist 
network, which was already involved in the Palestine Information Office. Furthermore, 
the draft suggested that another office be opened in Cairo and delegations sent to the 
Soviet Union and the Vatican.408 The British enjoyed a good relationship with Musa 
Alami and were regularly updated by him on such plans. Thus, he told the Oriental 
Counselor at the British Embassy in Egypt in November 1944 that, at the Alexandria 
conference and the subsequent Preparatory Committee of the General Arab 
Conference, the sum of £1 million for the propaganda campaign had been discussed. 
Egypt would cover half of the expenses and Iraq a fourth, while the rest would be 
divided among the other Arab countries. Interestingly, they planned to invest the bulk 
of the money in the US.409 This underlined the fact that the Arabs, like the Zionists, 
considered the US to be the central area of the struggle over the future of Palestine. 
However, it seems that these proposed budgets were subject to frequent changes 
because of the power struggles between the different Arab states, which will be 
discussed below. 
Despite initial skepticism, there were voices within the British Foreign Policy 
establishment who looked with favor upon the increased Arab propaganda effort. In 
September 1944, the Eastern Department sent out a letter, collecting opinions on the 
Arab plans. The British ambassador to the US, the Earl of Halifax, was most 
enthusiastic about such plans. Like the Arabs, he believed that the Zionists held sway 
over the public arena: “Hitherto propaganda in the United States about the Middle East 
has mainly been conducted by extreme Zionists. In consequence, the Arab countries 
and we ourselves have suffered. An organization presenting the Arab case in the 
United States would in my view be helpful, provided it is conducted on the right lines. 
But it would have to reckon on unscrupulous opposition from Zionists with ample funds 
and much influence.”410 The Earl of Halifax made several recommendations regarding 
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the procedure and organization of these offices. Thus, he advised them to recruit Arabs 
who had been educated at Western institutions in the Arab world, maybe some 
Americans, but no British. Furthermore, their work should not focus on the playing off 
of Western nations against each other or against their Jewish communities. Instead, it 
should primarily address the American public, emphasizing the cultural, scientific and 
historical achievements of the Arabs and their current needs. He suggested Turkish 
propaganda which had promoted a “new Turkey” as a role model to emulate.411  
It is interesting to mention at this point that the British ambassador not only encouraged 
the Arabs to conduct propaganda in the US but would also organize his own campaign. 
For this purpose, he sent the Orientalist and committed anti-Zionist activist Freya Stark 
on a lecture tour of the US.412 This could not halt the rising sympathy for Zionism in the 
US, which resulted from the expanding knowledge on the horrors of the Holocaust. 
The fate of the displaced persons (DPs), Jewish refugees lingering in German camps, 
who had mostly sought to emigrate to Palestine, was used by the Zionists to further 
raise sympathy. The British therefore started another propaganda campaign in the US, 
which not only sought to disassociate the question of the DPs from the future status of 
Palestine, but also to taint the image of the Zionists.413 This attempt, however, was met 
with little success. On October 4, 1946, Truman publicly endorsed the establishment 
of a Jewish state and the admittance of 100’000 Jewish refugees to Palestine, coupling 
both questions and thus rendering the British campaign in the US obsolete. Musa Alami 
was meanwhile pursuing his plans for the establishment of Arab propaganda bureaus. 
In January 1945, Musa Alami met with the Saudi King, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, to discuss 
the issue of Arab propaganda abroad. Ibn Saud was averse to the idea of opening the 
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offices immediately. Instead, he favored sending representatives of each Arab nation 
to King George, Roosevelt and Churchill, respectively. Upon completion of their 
mission, these emissaries would decide whether there was a need for propaganda 
offices. If so, he would personally dispatch his son Faisal to work for the offices and 
contribute to their funding. Alami was skeptical, informing the British that he felt that 
Ibn Saud was reluctant to support the establishment of the offices because he could 
not offer as much financial support as his position in the Arab world demanded.414 In a 
telegram to the British embassy in Jedda, the Foreign Office rejected the idea of 
sending special emissaries to London and Washington given the war situation, but 
agreed with the need for a careful selection of personnel for propaganda offices, 
underlining again their involvement and the care that they had invested in the 
project.415 This intervention again underscored the impression that they were not 
merely observing the Arab propaganda effort, but were a partner in it. 
At the next Arab League conference in Cairo, the plans for establishing propaganda 
bureaus and an organization similar to the Jewish National Fund were largely 
confirmed. It was decided to endow the Arab Offices with £2 million and the Arab 
Development Society with £5 million. Both organizations were placed under the 
chairmanship of Musa Alami.416 But when he turned to the respective governments to 
deliver on their promises, they demurred. During lunch with Brigadier Clayton and 
British embassy staff in Cairo, Musa Alami told them that the plans had become the 
object of inter-Arab rivalry. Every party sought to appoint their own candidates, with no 
regard for qualifications. The Egyptians originally had promised £250’000, reducing the 
sum later to £200’000. In return for the money, they also asked for a say in choosing 
the Offices’ staff.417 Eventually, only Iraq complied, paying a mere £250’000 for the 
Arab Development Society for the first two years and then discontinuing its payments 
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as well.418 The payments were done under the sponsorship of Iraqi strongman Nuri 
Said, whom Musa Alami had met for the first time several years before while 
collaborating to negotiate an end to the Arab general strike in Palestine in 1936. Later, 
they also met at the London Conference and in Iraq in 1940, when Nuri advised the 
Arab exiles to accept the 1939 White Paper.419 Nuri Said probably sought to strengthen 
Alami as an independent leader at the expense of the Mufti Amin al-Husseini and his 
followers, whom Nuri considered an enemy since he had instigated the Iraq coup in 
1941. At that time, the coup had forced Nuri Said to flee his native Iraq for Palestine 
temporarily.420 But the Iraqi contributions turned Alami’s projects into a contentious 
issue in the inter-Arab rivalry. There were two rifts: One between the Hashemite 
countries, Iraq and Jordan, and the rest of the Arab countries, and one between the 
followers of Amin al-Husseini, known as the Husseinis, and their foreign and domestic 
enemies. It was almost impossible to reconcile these different factions with each other, 
even for a man as understanding  as Musa Alami. Arab League Secretary Azzam 
Pasha was also instrumental in cutting support from the Arab Offices, which enjoyed a 
high degree of independence under Musa Alami.421 This inter-Arab rivalry affected the 
efficiency of the Arab propaganda campaign. Alami had initially planned to open offices 
in Jerusalem, London, Washington, Paris and Moscow, although the latter two are not 
mentioned in the Arab League protocols as permanent offices but as delegations. As 
a result of the refusal of all Arab states apart from Iraq to meet their obligations, Alami 
had to raise the money by himself and so scrapped the plans for offices in Paris and 
Moscow. Thus, in 1945, Arab offices were only opened in London and Washington, 
with the central office located in Jerusalem.  
This was not the end of the dispute. The Arab League conference in the Syrian town 
of Bludan in June 1946 strengthened the authority of the AHC and confirmed its claim 
to be the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, the delegates 
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decided that the AHC was the only organ allowed to present the Arab case to an 
international audience and that the Arab Offices had to work under its authority. Musa 
Alami, who had effectively been toppled, and Iraq did everything to sabotage these 
plans. Jamal al-Husseini meanwhile raised money from the Syrian and Lebanese 
governments for AHC propaganda, receiving more than £1’000’000 from Syria alone 
by March 1947. He however failed to convince the Iraqi government to change their 
view and provide support for placing the Arab Offices under the authority of the AHC. 
Due to its failure to overtake the Arab Offices, the AHC planned to launch its own 
propaganda campaign. 422 Propaganda delegations visited Russia, North and South 
America as well as Europe to lobby for the Arab cause. Izzedin Shawa was sent to 
London to establish a separate AHC Propaganda Office, although it was to collaborate 
with Alami’s Arab Office.423 Other AHC Propaganda Offices were established in New 
York and Washington.424 In early 1946 another office was opened in Beirut led by 
another member of the Husseini clan, Dr. Daud al-Husseini.425 However, the damage 
was already done. The Arab leaders’ lack of will to compromise had invariably 
weakened their ability to win the struggle for the hearts and minds of Western 
audiences. This contributed to their loss at the UN in November 1947. Not long after 
that, in December 1947, Iraqi Premier Salah Jabr informed Alami that it would cease 
payments to his Arab Offices within a week. Without Arab League support and lacking 
funds, the Washington Office closed within months, while the London Office continued 
for another two years.426 The Arab League would cease its propaganda activity for a 
few years. 
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3.3 The Arab Offices 
Despite these conflicts, Musa managed to set up Arab Offices in two Western and two 
Arab capitals over the course of the next two years. In April 1945, Musa Alami travelled 
to Bagdad in order to recruit personnel for the Arab Offices in London and 
Washington.427 The London Office was set up in the spring of 1945, the Washington 
Office in the summer of the same year. The Arabs considered the US office to be the 
most important one from a strategic point of view. Most resources were therefore 
invested there.428 The Washington Office will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
The central Propaganda Office (Arab. maktab al di’aya) in Jerusalem coordinated the 
activities of the different Arab Offices. It was formally established in March 1945, with 
Musa Alami assuming the post of General Director.429 It was officially opened three 
months later, in June 1945, and chaired by Rajai al-Husseini, another member of the 
Husseini clan. He was shortly thereafter replaced by Ahmed Shuqayri who had 
returned from the Washington Office. In 1946, Darwish al Miqdadi replaced Shuqayri, 
who continued to work for the Jerusalem Office.430 Miqdadi was an important Arab 
nationalist activist and intellectual. Musa Alami showed remarkable success in 
recruiting young, Western-educated Arab intellectuals for his task. One of his brightest 
recruits was certainly Albert Hourani, who then worked together with his brother Cecil 
at the Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC) in Cairo.431 The proceedings of Hourani’s 
employment for the Arab Office confirm the impression that the British looked 
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benevolently upon Musa Alami’s propaganda plans and did their best to support them. 
With the approval of the Foreign Office, the Minister Resident in the Middle East, where 
Hourani had worked since 1943, released him in 1945 for the purpose of working at 
the Arab Office in Jerusalem.432 Hourani started working at the Arab Office in 
November 1945. In the same month, Musa Alami wrote to the Ministry of Labour to 
have him released from Military Service, as he planned to send him to London the next 
spring. Addressing Hourani’s superior, Brigadier Iltyd Clayton, he wrote: “I hope you 
will emphasise that his work here is not as much to do propaganda in the narrow sense 
as to help in establishing better Anglo-Arab relations.”433 Clayton complied with Alami’s 
request to release him from his duties.434 Besides Shuqayri and Hourani, the 
Jerusalem staff included Ruhi Katib, future mayor of Jerusalem, Walid Khalidi, Nasr al-
Din Nashashibi, Burhan Dajani, Wadi Tarazi and Abdul Hamid Yasin.435 It was a fine 
assortment of talented young men. 
Albert Hourani’s career is exemplary for many Arab intellectuals from elite 
backgrounds who turned Arab nationalism into their cause. He was born in Manchester 
to Christian Lebanese parents in 1915. After graduating from Oxford, he returned to 
his parents’ homeland and became a lecturer at the American University of Beirut 
(AUB).436 The AUB was a hotbed of Arab nationalism and it was no coincidence that 
Musa Alami and many other figures like the later PFLP-leader George Habash counted 
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among its graduates.437 There, Hourani came into contact with the leading intellectuals 
of pan-Arab and pan-Syrian nationalism, among others the secular nationalists 
Constantine Zurayk, who taught history at the AUB, leaving a great impression on his 
world view:438 In retrospect, he wrote about this important period in his life: “At this time 
I saw the problems of Syria and Palestine in the perspective of Arab nationalism. This 
was an idea about which I learned in Beirut; that there was an Arab nation of which the 
emergence to full, independent and united national life was being impeded by British 
and French rule, and by the artificial frontiers imposed upon it after the First World War, 
and that if only its energies could be released, it could move into a new and more 
fruitful period of social and intellectual growth.”439 Most of the publications of the Arab 
Office in Jerusalem were written by Albert Hourani. They clearly targeted a Western 
educated and liberal minded audience. He addressed them in a scholarly tone, using 
rational arguments rather than emotions to press his case. In ‘Is Zionism the Solution 
of the Jewish Problem’, one of the first publications authored by Hourani for the Arab 
Office, he contended that Zionism offers no solution to the ‘Jewish Problem’. Instead, 
Hourani opts for assimilation of Jews into Western societies.440 This indicates that 
Hourani must have been aware of the inner-Jewish debate on Zionism. However, by 
the sheer dimension of the Holocaust, this debate had been won by the Zionists. 
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But his most significant contribution to the Arab cause in Palestine was the preparation 
of the testimonials for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (AACI).441 Hourani 
himself made his appearance before the committee, arguing against the partition and 
advocating an independent Palestinian state ruled by its Arab majority. If the Arabs’ 
demands were not fulfilled, he warned that the Arabs would turn away from the West 
for good.442 For Hourani, the decision on Palestine was a pivotal moment in the 
relationship between the West and the Arab world. The future of Arab liberalism indeed 
depended on it, he believed. If the West frustrated Arab aspirations in Palestine, he 
warned that the Arabs might turn away from Western values.443 This was a strong 
claim. However, it ignored that the many Arab nationalists, in particular those of Amin 
al-Husseini’s ilk, hardly advocated for liberal values. Hourani was confronted with 
similar skepticism from the AACI, which he answered honestly. Thus, when the AACI 
inquired whether the spread of Arab nationalism would not pose a risk to the fair 
treatment of Jews in Arab countries and thus also in an Arab state in Palestine, Hourani 
admitted this risk.444 Nevertheless, the Arabs achieved a limited victory when the AACI 
recommend a binational state instead of partition. Such a state would have been 
dominated by the more numerous Arabs. But the AACI also recommended extending 
the British mandate, postponing independence, and not relenting on Truman’s promise 
to allow 100’000 Jewish refugees to immigrate to Palestine. The recommendations 
were never implemented and Britain instead chose to turn to the UN. The new UN 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was boycotted by the Arabs in Palestine. 
Hourani’s previous work for the Arab Office was expanded and published by the Arab 
Office in London under the title ‘The Future of Palestine’, which was a forceful plea 
against partition.445 After the defeat of the Arabs at the UN, Albert Hourani entered into 
academia and started what was to be an illustrious scholarly career. 
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The Arab League office in London opened in the spring of 1945, with World War II still 
raging.446 Like in the case of the Arab Office in Jerusalem, Musa Alami selected highly 
educated college graduates to staff the London Office. Its head was Edward Atiya, a 
Christian Lebanese, who had been educated in England and settled there. Anwar 
Nusseiby, Samir Shamma and AHC member Izzat Tannous assisted him.447 Far more 
than its branch in the US, the Arab Office in London could build on already existing 
widespread opposition to Zionism and pro-Arab sentiment within elite circles. In August 
1945, these native anti-Zionists formed the Committee for Arab Affairs (CAA) under 
the chairmanship of Edward Spears, a prominent British General and politician, who, 
in spite of or maybe because of his partially Jewish ancestry, was a lifetime opponent 
of Zionism. 448 The Arab Office closely cooperated with the CAA and even shared the 
same address with it. The CAA’s purpose was to deflect attention from the Arab 
propaganda effort. In a conversation with Arab League president Abdul Rahman al-
Azzam, Spears shared the idea that it was “Important that money should not come 
directly from an Arab source so as not to seem as direct propaganda."449 The Arab 
Office also enjoyed substantial sympathy among the foreign policy establishment. 
Thus, when the question of visas for the propagandists came up, the Colonial Office 
was in favor. The British Embassy in Washington also consulted with the Arab Office 
on the best ways to carry out propaganda.450 This was because the interests of the 
moderate Arab nationalists, best typified by Musa Alami, head of the Arab Offices, and 
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the foreign policy establishment overlapped at this time. Both opposed the 
establishment of a Jewish state as well as the extremist policies of the Mufti.451 The 
result was a common Arab-British propaganda effort against Zionism. 
As was the case before the war, the Arabs did not only enjoy support from the foreign 
policy establishment and anti-Zionists, but also from hardened anti-Semites and 
fascists. In post-1945 Britain, the air was ripe with anti-Semitism. Many shared the 
outrage about the killing of British servicemen by Jewish paramilitary and terrorist 
groups like the Irgun and Lehi. The British League of Ex-Servicemen and Women, an 
anti-Semitic group headed by Jeffrey Hamm, a member of Oswald Mosley’s British 
Union of Fascists, sought to exploit these sentiments. For this purpose, he made 
contact with the Arab Office in order to “open their eyes to the general run of feeling in 
this country” and propose a closer collaboration.452. Hamm also contacted the Islamic 
Press LTD., which was part of a so-called Arab Information Service.453 The Arabs 
seemed not to have been entirely opposed to the idea of working with the fascists. 
Thus, Hamm was invited to the Egyptian embassy. Another fascist colleague 
introduced Hamm to Musa Alami. This willingness to work with British fascists also 
extended to military matters. In view of the upcoming military confrontation with the 
Yishuv, the Arabs made an active effort to recruit foreign fighters and raise money in 
Britain and other Western countries. In this vein, Jamal Nasir, a member of the Arab 
Office, spoke to fascists in Hampstead, whereupon some of them volunteered to fight 
with the Arab Legion for “killing Jews”.454 The AHC also fundraised in non-Muslim 
countries, as it had done before the war.455 Izzet Shawa, a member of the Palestine 
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Arab Political Mission in London, which was under the direct control of the AHC, 
bragged to the press that he had received more than four thousand applications from 
British volunteers who wished to fight for the Arabs in Palestine, which had been 
forwarded to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo.456 This figure certainly needs  to 
be taken with a grain of salt. Still, the American undercover journalist John Roy 
Carlson, who travelled Egypt and Palestine during the Israeli War of Independence, 
noted the presence of non-Arab foreign fighters, including some from Britain, in the 
ranks of the Arab armies invading Palestine.457 The British were not the only foreign 
fighters. German volunteers hailed from the community of German Templars, which 
had been interned by the British after the start of World War II.458 Members of the four 
Polish divisions, which had fought for the British and were stationed in Palestine, 
complemented the foreign volunteers on the Arab side.459.This is a chapter of the war 
in Palestine which has still not been properly researched. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Under the guidance of Musa Alami and Cecil Hourani, the British supported the 
reconstitution of the AHC. There were several reasons for this. Among else, they 
believed that Zionism was a danger to the US-British relationship and sought to prevent 
a Jewish state in Palestine. For this reason, they intended to strengthen the Arab side 
in the upcoming struggle over the future of Palestine. The establishment of the Arab 
League in March 1945 provided the framework for conducting an extensive information 
campaign in Western countries on behalf of the Palestinians. The pillars of this 
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campaign were the Arab Offices, which were to be established in several capitals. In 
coordination with the Arab League, Musa Alami started building an international 
propaganda infrastructure in the West, the purpose of which was to prevent the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. At every stage, Alami enjoyed the support 
of the British for his propaganda preparations. At this time, the British were involved in 
their own campaigning against Zionism. Alami succeeded in recruiting well educated, 
gifted young Arab intellectuals, including Albert Hourani, for the job. However, the AHC 
did not prove to be the stable and cooperative body the British had hoped for, but rather 
turned into an instrument of Amin al-Husseini, who sought to dominate every aspect of 
the Arab struggle in Palestine, including propaganda. As a result, Alami was constantly 
undermined by Amin al-Husseini’s supporters and the non-Hashemite Arab states, 
which worked to submit the offices to the authority of the AHC, a move which Alami 
opposed. As a result, his Arab Offices suffered from a shortage of funds. This power 
struggle led to the establishment of a parallel propaganda structure. One under the 
authority of Musa Alami, another under that of al-Husseini, creating an ineffective 
organizational structure. Despite these conflicts, the Arab Offices displayed 
remarkable activity and were able to achieve several successes. Thus, Hourani’s 
appearance before the AACI made a positive impression, possibly influencing their 
final rejection of partition. However, the infighting contributed to the eventual failure of 
Arab propaganda in the West. After the UN vote for partition, the funds dried up and 
the Arab Offices were forced to close down. Arab propaganda in the West would take 
several years to recover from this blow. 
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4  The Campaign against a Jewish State in the United 
States 
This chapter studies the activities of the states, organizations and individuals who 
sought to push US public opinion and foreign policy towards a neutral or negative 
stance regarding Zionism in the years between 1942 and 1948. In retrospect, this 
proved to be the decisive period of the struggle between Zionists and anti-Zionists. 
Both the Arabs and the Zionists recognized that the future of Palestine would be 
decided in the US. After the Biltmore conference in 1942, the Zionists intensified their 
political campaign to gain American support for the Jewish state in the US. The Arab 
League and the AHC on the other hand had established their own bodies to fight the 
battle against Zionism in the US. As in the period before 1939, the most powerful 
opponent of Zionism was the State Department and in particular its small core of Middle 
East experts. A number of geopolitical factors which the State Department sought to 
emphasize spoke against the Jewish state. Arab American anti-Zionists and the Arab 
League also got involved in the struggle over public opinion in the US. After the 
dissolution of the ANL, Philip Hitti took control of Arab-American anti-Zionist activism, 
establishing the Institute of Arab American Affairs (IAAA). The IAAA collaborated with 
anti-Zionist Jews, including the controversial Benjamin Freedman. Freedman’s anti-
Semitic rhetoric, but also the resurgence of the AHC under the authority of Amin al-
Husseini and its work with the pro-Arab bodies in the US, strengthened Jewish and 
anti-fascist organizations like the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League (NSANL) in their 
conviction that the pro-Arab cause was fundamentally anti-Semitic. The Arab League 
invested most of its resources for propaganda in the US where it opened an Arab Office 
in 1945 as part of Musa Alami’s network. Its functioning however was marred by 
continuous inter-Arab intrigues, and suspicions that it was associated with the AHC 
and collaborating with pro-Nazi elements. The struggle over the future of Palestine was 
meanwhile nearing its resolution when the British decided to hand over the question 
over the future of Palestine to the UN in February 1947. The UN recommended 
partition. The Arab States and the AHC sought to prevent this by extending their 
propaganda activity and warnings of war. Despite that, the UN endorsed a proposal to 
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partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. The plan was endorsed by the 
Zionists but rejected by the Arabs. Amid the civil war engulfing Palestine, Protestant 
anti-Zionists started to lobby for a US withdrawal from partition. When the US 
ambassador to the UN made a statement in this direction in March 1948 it seemed that 
the lobby had been successful. However, Truman prevailed over the anti-Zionists in 
the State Department and recognized the Jewish State on May 14, 1948. 
4.1 The State Department and Zionism 
World War II saw a considerable cooling down of the Palestine conflict. Most of the 
leaders of the AHC were in detention or in exile, while the Zionist executive pledged 
allegiance to the British war effort despite its deep opposition to the White Paper of 
1939. This phase of calm came to an end in May 1942. At the Biltmore conference, 
more than 600 American and foreign Zionists resolved to demand the immediate 
establishment of a Jewish army to fight National Socialism and of a Jewish state in 
Palestine after the War. At the conference, Weizmann warned that the Nazi genocide 
against the Jews would destroy one fourth of Eastern European Jewry and that the 
survivors would need to be settled in Palestine. The Zionist cause also enjoyed 
significant parliamentarian support. Reports on the Holocaust helped to gain sympathy 
for Zionism. A breakthrough occurred on December 4, 1942, when 63 senators and 
181 representatives signed a resolution by Senator Wagner, which expressed support 
for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and the settling of Jewish refugees from Europe 
within its borders. In January 1944, a bipartisan resolution in the House and Congress, 
named the Wright-Compton resolution after its sponsors, called for unrestricted Jewish 
immigration and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth after the war. The 
resolution is also sometimes referred to as the Wagner-Taft resolution after its 
sponsors in Congress.460  The resolution was an important victory for American 
Zionism but drew protest from the Arabs, with the presidents of the Iraqi parliament 
comparing it to a declaration of war on Palestine’s Arabs.461  Opponents of the 
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resolution, including a number of Arab-American and Jewish anti-Zionist activists, 
appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in February 1944.462 The stiffest opposition however came from the 
State Department and the War Department, which was influenced by the former. This 
would be a pattern in the following years. Each political advance by Zionism would be 
opposed by the State Department. Its lobbying eventually succeeded in having the 
Wright-Compton resolution postponed.463 However, this was a pyrrhic victory. After 
speaking with Roosevelt, in March 1944 Abba Hillel Silver released a statement by the 
president rejecting the White Paper and endorsing the emigration of refugees. In the 
presidential election campaign of November 1944 between Franklin Roosevelt and his 
challenger, Thomas Dewey, both parties ran on pro-Zionist platforms. 
Opposition from the State Department against Zionism had been a persistent feature 
since the 1920s, as discussed in the previous chapter. During the 1940s, the State 
Department took on an active role in fighting American Zionism, both through official 
channels but also at times by lending support to anti-Zionist activists in the US. The 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), which was responsible for the Middle East and 
most of Africa, was renamed the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in 1944. 
The Division of Near Eastern Affairs, which exclusively covered Palestine, the Levant 
and the Arab countries, became one of its three subdivisions. State Department Middle 
Eastern expertise at the time was formed by an extremely small circle. The total staff 
of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was just twelve persons. Political 
appointees, like the Secretary of State, usually relied on these experts to make their 
decisions. Thus, this small circle had tremendous influence on US foreign policy in the 
Middle East. The NEA consisted of about five persons, but Wallace Murray, Paul H. 
Ailing and Gordon P. Merriam were the principal actors. The staff was marked by its 
permanence and by its similarity of backgrounds. From 1929 until June 1945, Wallace 
Murray served as the NEA and later Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs chief. 
Murray opposed Zionism, believing that Jewish loyalty to the US and support for 
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Zionism were irreconcilable. After leaving the State Department, he later joined the 
ACJ. His right-hand Paul H. Ailing had served as a foreign service officer in Beirut, 
Aleppo and Damascus, frequenting the American missionary circles in the region. The 
Arabic-speaking Gordon P. Merriam on the other hand had taught at Robert College 
in Istanbul in the 1920s and served at the same stations as a vice consul for a longer 
time in Cairo, as well as Lebanon and Syria. They formed a tight-knit group.  
Although the NEA was certainly well acquainted with the region, its perspective was 
uniform, Arabo-centric and lacking diversity of thought. This was also reflected in the 
diplomatic infrastructure in the region. Thus, in contrast to other stations in the region 
and despite its superior strategic importance with regard to US interests in Palestine, 
the US consulate’s staff size in Jerusalem remained unchanged during the war years. 
Moreover, none of the officers in the Foreign Service spoke Hebrew, while Arabic skills 
were emphasized. In the same vein, none of the State Department officials entrusted 
with formulating policy in the Middle East had an academic background in Jewish 
studies, while several had studied Oriental Islamic studies and Arabic. Foreign Service 
officers, who often served abroad, made up about half of the Office of Near Eastern 
and African Affairs. They tended to identify with the small, Western-educated Arab 
elite, with which they consorted. Among the ranks of these Arabists, as they were often 
called, were George Wadsworth, William Eddy, Harold B. Hoskins and Loy 
Henderson.464 In their official as well as in their private lives, these persons fiercely 
opposed Zionism. 
William Eddy, a former member of the American Friends of the Arabs, and his cousin 
Harold B. Hoskins worked for the OSS in the Middle East during the war. Both were 
instrumental in furthering US-Saudi relations, which Washington considered a strategic 
asset.465  When Hoskins returned from the Middle East in late 1942, he reported to the 
State Department that Zionism was endangering American interests in the region. In 
response, the State Department introduced the idea of issuing a joint American-British 
statement on Middle Eastern policy, with Harold Hoskins being tasked with drafting it. 
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Behind the initiative stood Wallace Murray, who was in the opinion of Henry 
Morgenthau one the State Department’s worst anti-Semites. In July 1943, both the 
State Department and the Foreign Office agreed on a draft by Hoskins, which was set 
to prove controversial. In a passage obviously aimed against Zionist efforts, it 
stipulated that all public political activities in the US with regard to Palestine should 
cease. This was a clear infringement on constitutional rights. Furthermore, the draft 
demanded that the future political status of Palestine and the question of Jewish 
immigration should be dependent on Arab acquiescence. After the War Department 
withdrew its support for the draft and internal opposition grew, among others from 
Henry Morgenthau, the State Department retracted it – to the disappointment of the 
British Foreign Office.466 However, Zionist activities within the country continued to irk 
the State Department. Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew complained to 
President Roosevelt in January 1945 that “Zionist activities in this country will remain 
the gravest threat to friendly relations between the United States and the countries of 
the Near East.”467 Eddy also continued to work in Jidda, explaining the Arab view point 
to Washington and hoping to build a “moral alliance” between the Christian and the 
Muslim world. He was also close to Ibn Saud and translated during the meeting of 
Roosevelt with the Saudi monarch in February 1945. When the US voted for partition 
in November 1947, Eddy resigned from the State Department.468  
Another prominent anti-Zionist was Stephen Penrose, who was responsible for 
intelligence collection on the Arab world at the OSS Cairo station together with his 
young assistant, Kermit Roosevelt. Penrose had been born in Lebanon to missionary 
parents and was strongly associated with the missionary educational enterprise, being 
also a member of the Near East College Association. He would later head the AUB 
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from 1948 until his death in 1954.469 Typical for his circles, Penrose was also an ardent 
opponent of Zionism and a veteran of the anti-Zionist ‘American Friends of the Arabs’, 
a group which had been active in the late 1930s, as discussed above. In 1942, he 
helped organize the opposition against the initiatives to set up a Jewish army to fight 
National Socialism. However, he was mindful of covering his tracks, as he told a 
likeminded anti-Zionist friend: “Some very potent stuff is brewing in opposition to the 
Zionist (…). Although I am one of the chief cooks, I shall not appear in the dining 
room.”470 Penrose would continue to torpedo Zionism. 
Loy Henderson, the NEA chief from 1945 until 1948, was the most controversial of the 
State Department Arabists. Henderson was not an Arabist in the strictest sense, but 
an expert on Eastern Europe by training, who came to the Middle East at a relatively 
late stage in his career. US. Congressman Arthur G. Klein of New York, accused him 
of having been “working, with fanatical zeal, for a backward and decayed [pro-Arab] 
policy-out of conviction (..). This man Henderson has a foreign policy of his own, based 
on such deep-seated prejudices and biases that he functions as a virtual 
propagandist."471 In retrospect, Henderson was not ashamed of the criticism he 
received, but was rather proud of the fact that his office allegedly “received sometimes 
200 to 500 letters a week against me”.472  
Henderson’s career shows some parallels with those of Charles Crane, the sponsor of 
anti-Zionist activism in the 1930s. Like Crane, Henderson started his career on the 
international stage in Russia, volunteering for the Red Cross at the end of World War 
I and witnessing Imperial Russia’s collapse. After his return to the US, he joined the 
ranks of the State Department as a Soviet expert. One of his first missions was to 
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investigate the collaboration between US left-wing organizations and the Comintern. 
At one point, Henderson expressed intensive dislike for New York, the city often 
identified with American-Jewish culture. Henderson, like Crane, associated Jews with 
Communism. In a diplomatic cable, he blamed “international Jewry” for supporting 
Stalinism.473 Indeed, there were many Jewish intellectuals among the left-wing 
apologists of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. The most influential pro-Soviet 
voice in the US liberal camp however, the Soviet correspondent for the New York 
Times, Walter Duranty, was not Jewish.474 Nor were the owners of the New York 
Times, the Sulzberger family, particularly pro-Jewish or Zionist. The truth was in fact 
closer to the opposite. During World War II, the New York Times did its best to play 
down the Holocaust.475 Its editor, Arthur Sulzberger, was an opponent of Zionism and 
a supporter of the anti-Zionist ACJ. As a witness to Soviet brutality, the purges and the 
oppression of Poland, Henderson became a committed enemy of the Soviet Union, 
influencing the stance of the later Wise Men George F. Kennan, Acheson, and Lovett 
as well as others. After assuming the position of Assistant Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs in March 1943, the Soviets warned that Henderson was harming 
relations between the two countries.476 As a result, he was transferred from Moscow 
to Bagdad in 1943, where he served as the US ambassador. Although he came to 
symbolize the quintessential pro-Arab, anti-Jewish Arabist, he was then already 51, 
only spending the later years of his career in the Middle East and never learning Arabic. 
The Jews of Baghdad had suffered a horrible pogrom in June 1941, known as the 
Farhud. The pogromists had been instigated by anti-Semitic propaganda and the 
actions of the Arab Palestinian exiles in Baghdad around the Mufti, who blamed the 
Jews for the failure of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani’s anti-British coup in April 1941.477 Despite 
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this, Henderson felt little compassion for Iraq’s Jews, blaming their sympathies for 
Zionism, “the public dishonesty, profiteering and greed of some of the Jewish 
merchants” and their feeling of social and cultural superiority for the violence against 
them.478 Thus, Henderson unquestionably was not free from anti-Semitism. 
Even when working in Baghdad, his dispatches to Washington show that Henderson 
remained primarily concerned with the Soviet threat. Unfamiliar with the local 
language, he saw Soviet expansionism and intrigue as the central issue in the Middle 
East, and he believed that Zionism was helping the Soviets to achieve their goals.479 
After two years in Baghdad, Henderson assumed the directorship of the State 
Department’s Office for Near Eastern Affairs in 1945. Not sympathetic to Jews in the 
first place, he was convinced that supporting the Jewish state was unwise on the 
background of the threat of Soviet expansion in the Middle East. The strategic 
importance of the Arabs was crushingly superior and acting against their interests 
would disadvantage the US in the upcoming Cold War, risking the “rise of fanatic 
Mohammedism.”480 The statements of Arab statesmen, in particular the Saudis, 
warning of a rapid deterioration of US-Arab relations should the US support the Jewish 
state, fueled this conviction. Henderson was not exemplary in this regard. Rather, he 
just expressed what was seen as common sense at that time in the foreign policy and 
intelligence circles. Thus, when the Americans tried to push the Saudi King Abdul Aziz 
to a more moderate position in 1945, the desert king answered them: “As to Palestine, 
America and Britain have a free choice between an Arab land of peace and quiet or a 
Jewish Land drenched in blood. We do not ask for the removal of Jews; those who are 
there may stay, but there must be no more. (…) If America should choose in favor of 
the Jews, who are accursed in the Koran as enemies of the Muslims until the end of 
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the world, it will indicate to us that America has repudiated her friendship with us and 
this we should regret.”481 
Beside the NEA staff in Washington and the Foreign Service officers, a third group was 
important in shaping US Middle East policy. The members of this group included Dr. 
Philipp W. Ireland and Professor William Yale, who left their academic posts in 1942 
to join the planning staff for the post-war order of the Middle East. They were assisted 
by a team, which included Halford L. Hoskins and others. Ireland had worked as a 
teacher at the AUB in the 1920s. He then pursued an academic career as a professor 
for Middle Eastern history at Harvard and other universities. He also shared the 
consensus anti-Zionist view in the NEA. But a former colleague also remembered him 
as an anti-Semite, who liked to compare Zionism to National Socialism during 
meetings. William Yale on the other hand was a veteran diplomat, whose stance 
toward Zionism was more complicated. We remember that he had signed the minority 
report of the King-Crane commission, which had rejected the pan-Syrian 
recommendations of the majority report. He also tended to sympathize with Sephardic 
Jews and the assimilated elite of German American Jews. However, he abhorred the 
religious and more politically conscious Eastern European Jews, who formed the 
strong base of Zionism. Like his colleagues, he was convinced that the State 
Department had to defend American interests from the machinations of the Zionists. 
Like Ireland, Yale compared Zionism to National Socialism. His anti-Zionism had 
terrible consequences. Like other State Department officials, he did nothing during the 
war to put plans, which sought to settle Jewish children in Palestine to help them 
escape from the Holocaust into action, since he believed that these efforts were bound 
to strengthen Zionism. The State Department also shared the Palestine mandatory 
government’s view that the refugees were basically a ploy by Hitler to drive a wedge 
between the British and the Arabs. Thus, only by the extremely low standards of the 
State Department he could be considered a fair arbiter of the Palestine issue. However, 
unlike the majority of Middle East experts in the State Department, he did not advocate 
                                             
481 William A. Eddy, “The Minister of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary of State,” 
February 1, 1945, FRUS 867N.01/2–145; in United States Department of State, 
Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The Near East and Africa, 687. 
 
157 
 
an Arab national state, but a binational state.482 Given the composition of the NEA and 
its biases, it is clear that Zionism never enjoyed a fair hearing. 
In January 1942, the American consul in Jerusalem General L. Pinkerton reported to 
Washington that Britain was not enforcing its pro-Arab policy in Palestine sufficiently 
for fear of challenging American Zionist influence. In consequence, the NEA made a 
study of American Zionism, concluding that it represented only a small, but organized 
minority in the face of a conservative, more passive Jewish majority, which was open 
to compromises, but not as well organized. The political progress Zionism was making 
in the US since the Biltmore conference in May 1942 put this assessment into question 
and hardened the State Department’s opposition. Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles recommended that the British embassy should conduct an information 
campaign in the US against demands to raise a Jewish army to fight Hitler.483 The 
British Foreign Office later directly involved itself in the public debate on Zionism, being 
concerned that Zionist activities were detrimental to the Anglo-US relations and were 
jeopardizing the common war effort. They were especially worried by the public outrage 
over the White Paper, which allowed only a small number of Jewish refugees to find 
safety in Palestine. Thus, in October 1944, the British Ambassador to Washington Earl 
of Halifax warned that the “Zionist campaign (…) could affect the outcome on the lend-
lease settlement and a dollar loan.”484 The young Isaiah Berlin was then working at the 
British Embassy in Washington, sharing these worries. He therefore proposed to send 
Freya Stark on a speaking tour of the US. The obvious aim behind the plan was to 
strengthen the pro-Arab camp and challenge the Zionist campaign. Freya Stark was a 
known supporter of the Arab cause, with critics calling her an “Arabophile”.485 Prior to 
her trip to the US, she visited Palestine to get an impression of the situation in the 
country, but showed no interest in meeting with the Jewish Agency or hearing their 
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point of view.486 The State Department was obviously less worried about foreign 
propaganda on US soil than about the activities of the American Zionists. 
The Biltmore conference in May 1942 also provoked an answer from the Reform-
Jewish anti-Zionist forces within American Judaism. In June 1942, they formed the 
American Council for Judaism (ACJ). 487 Although a decidedly anti-Zionist body, they 
were primarily concerned with what they considered to be the danger of Zionism to the 
integrity of Judaism and not the Arab cause. They cannot therefore be strictly 
considered a pro-Arab body, although their executive, Elmer Berger, repeatedly liaised 
with Arab activists.488 Many State Department officials looked favorably upon the 
increasing activity of the Jewish anti-Zionists. Besides weakening Zionism, the Jewish 
anti-Zionists had the additional advantage of shielding non-Jewish anti-Zionists from 
accusations of anti-Semitism. If Jews opposed the establishment of a Jewish state, 
opposition from non-Jews could not be anti-Semitic after all. One of the first to identify 
the usefulness of the Jewish anti-Zionists was William Yale. In March 1942, not yet 
working for the State Department, he encouraged the dissident anti-Zionist Jewish 
faction, which was opposed to the establishment of a Jewish fighting force and would 
form the core of the ACJ, in a letter to Morris Lazaron: “A thoroughly aroused American 
Jewry can best check the unbridled activities of the political Zionists.”.489 In September 
1942, William Yale further suggested to the State Department that they contact anti-
Zionist Jews in the US and Britain to build a front against Zionists. These plans 
however were not further pursued. Still, the State Department liaised with the ACJ and 
the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee through Morris Rosenwald and Judge 
Joseph M. Proskauer, who kept it updated on the current developments within 
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American Zionism and occasionally sought to use them to undermine the Jewish 
consensus.490 The Jewish anti-Zionists were generally motivated by a fear that a 
muscular pro-Jewish and pro-Zionist advocacy would result in an anti-Semitic 
backlash, disregarding the fact that US anti-Semitism usually targeted the assimilated, 
established Jewry to which most anti-Zionists belonged.491 The State Department 
would continue to occasionally lend direct support to anti-Zionist groups in the US, both 
Jewish and non-Jewish, in the following years, as further discussed below. 
Besides the fear of Communist penetration of the Middle East and the need to keep 
the Arabs in the Allied camp during the war, a third issue became increasingly 
important in the geopolitical considerations of the State Department, all of which 
weighed against Zionism. This was petroleum, which became a strategic asset during 
World War II. Its continued procurement necessitated the establishment of friendly 
relations with the oil-producing states. In 1941, there were the first warnings within the 
administration that the US was turning from an exporter to an importer of oil. A study 
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1943 estimated that the size of the reserves in the gulf 
countries was almost three times as high as that of the US, with Saudi Arabia 
possessing the largest share.492 After the war, the importance of Middle Eastern oil 
even increased. The Americans planned to supply Europe with it to boost its economy 
recovery and prevent a Soviet encroachment.493 This awarded Saudi Arabia and 
Aramco, the Saudi subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, paramount influence on the 
strategic calculations of the US. Aramco was keen on conserving the good nature of 
US-Arab relations and, since 1937, had warned the State Department that American 
support for Zionism would endanger the US position in the Middle East. In particular, 
the relationship with Saudi Arabia and the oil concession would be at risk. In the late 
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1940s, Aramco’s vice president James T. Duce spoke regularly with the top echelon 
of the State Department. He was particularly close to the Department of Near Eastern 
and African Affairs and Loy Henderson, who served as its head from 1945 until 1948.494 
However, unlike in the case of the Zionists, there was no urgent need for oil companies 
to raise awareness among the public for their cause because both Henderson and the 
Secretary of Defense, James W. Forrestal, agreed with their stance. Forrestal had 
been convinced since 1943 that Saudi oil was of crucial strategic importance to the 
US.495. William ‘Bill’ Eddy was one of the chief engineers of the Saudi-US alliance. In 
1943, he was dispatched to Saudi Arabia to gain the trust and deepen the relationship 
with Ibn Saudi. He helped to set up a new airbase next to Aramco’s American Camp.496 
The Zionists looked upon the appointment with apprehension, as Eddy was an AUB 
graduate and a known friend of the Arabs. They therefore qualified his appointment as 
a further win for the anti-Zionist pro-Arab camp within the State Department.497 They 
were not wrong. He indeed proved to be a fierce opponent of the establishment of a 
Jewish state in the coming years. President Roosevelt sought to mediate between US 
support for Zionism and its interests in Saudi Arabia. Before his meeting with the Saudi 
King on the USS Quincy on February 14, 1945, he had been warned by the State 
Department that the Saudi ruler was a rabid and uncompromising anti-Semite. 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt tried to convince him of the moral plight of the Jews and of 
the pioneering role the Jews could play in the Middle Eastern economy. The Saudi 
King did not budge, stating that any compromise would be “an act of treachery to the 
Prophet and all believing Muslims which would out my honor and destroy my soul.”498 
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American Zionists were acutely aware that the question of oil posed a serious 
challenge to their movement’s aspirations. They therefore sought to reconcile 
American oil interests in the Middle East with Zionist policy in Palestine. In the period 
between 1943 and 1945, leading Zionist activists held a number of talks with oil 
company representatives and government officials. They argued that the oil-producing 
Arab states would be dependent on American know-how for exploration despite the 
disagreement over Zionism, warning that the oil company’s anti-Zionist policy may 
harm their image. After the war, the Zionist emergency council prepared a campaign, 
which at first sought to convey that there was no need for Middle Eastern oil. 
Eventually, they recognized that the oil company’s propaganda for cheap Middle 
Eastern oil to supply the downtrodden European continent carried the day. Adapting 
their message, they campaigned for a pipeline connecting Israel to Haifa, which would 
help to integrate Israel economically into the region. The nascent Jewish state, a loyal 
friend to the United States would provide for better security.499 These efforts by the 
American Zionist leadership to use oil politics as a means for Arab-Jewish 
reconciliation were looked upon critically by the Yishuv’s leadership, in particular Ben 
Gurion, who considered them uninformed and naïve, as well as meddling in matters 
beyond their concern.500.However, it seems questionable that the US dependence on 
Middle Eastern oil had any effect on the State Department. Both before and after 1943, 
there was an anti-Zionist consensus within its ranks. The oil issue only complemented 
the anti-Zionist arguments. Moreover, the State Department interpreted the US 
economic and strategic interests in the region in a very narrow, distorted way, which 
did not take into account the significant economic interests of Jewish Americans. Until 
the 1940s, the bulk of American private capital was invested in Palestine, where nearly 
80 percent of US citizens in the region were living. This fact appears to have had no 
effect on the State Department’s strategic considerations.501 
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With the victory against Nazi Germany, the question of the future of Palestine 
resurfaced with verve. The British White Paper, which had introduced a strict quota on 
Jewish immigration and de facto rendered obsolete the promise of Jewish statehood, 
had come under criticism by the Truman administration already during the war years. 
Like the Zionist leaders had warned before the onset of the Nazi genocide, it had 
contributed to the hardships of the European Jews by blocking their escape route to 
Palestine. Now, the fate of the hundreds of thousands of Jewish survivors lingering in 
camps in Europe, and US pressure to allow for their immigration to Palestine only 
increased the sense that a continuation of the White Paper was untenable.  On 
November 13, 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin eventually announced the 
creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (AACI). Based on an investigation 
of the situation of the Jewish refugees and on hearings with experts and Arab and 
Jewish representatives in Palestine, it was to “make recommendations […] for ad 
interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.”502 The 
Arabs denied any connection between the refugee issue and the political settlement in 
Palestine. The statement and the possibility of a lifting of the White Paper, which it is 
important to note they had initially opposed at its inception in 1939, already signified a 
political defeat.  
Both the State Department and the Foreign Office feared Soviet penetration of the 
Middle East. They also opposed a Jewish state and they believed that both questions 
were related. NEA assistant chief Evan warned the committee members in one of his 
briefings that, should the final report be too pro-Jewish, “an aroused Arab world might 
turn to the Soviet Union for support.”503 They therefore took steps to steer the AACI in 
the direction they wanted. All AACI members were unacquainted with the Palestine 
issue. The committee therefore was dependent on an extensive staff, numbering 26 
persons excluding the 12 elected officials. Despite their efforts to avoid partisanship, 
the staff included dedicated anti-Zionists. Harald Beeley, an Arabist with the Eastern 
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Department of the Foreign Office, was appointed as one of the two principal secretaries 
of the research and information staff, an influential position. Beeley had acted as the 
principal advisor to the Foreign Office on Palestine and had published a survey on the 
issue of Palestine in 1938, which was criticized as anti-Zionist by Lewis Bernstein 
Namier, a prominent British historian and Zionist activist. Loy Henderson proposed 
William Eddy as the second research secretary. The committee was kept in the dark 
about his post as minister to Saudi Arabia and only told that he was of missionary 
stock. Still, this sufficed to raise McDonald’s suspicions, as he was well aware that 
most diplomats with this background shared a pro-Arab and anti-Zionist outlook. This 
was quickly revealed to be true in the subsequent interview, and Eddy’s application 
was rejected. In his stead, William F. Stinespring, professor of the Old Testament at 
Duke University, a personal acquaintance of McDonald, was selected. However, 
Stinespring was not as unprejudiced as the committee believed. In 1940, after 
spending more than three years at the American School for Oriental Research in 
Jerusalem, he published an article in which he blamed the Zionists for the Arab-Jewish 
conflict. The only possible solution lay in the Jews accepting a permanent minority 
status in Palestine, he asserted. Crum and McDonald only learned about these 
statements after Stinespring’s appointment, accusing the State Department of 
deceiving them by telling them that Stinespring had never expressed himself with 
regard to the Palestine question.504 
Despite these efforts to influence the AACI, the conclusion it presented on April 22, 
1946 after a four-month inquiry flew in the face of the State Department. Among its 
recommendations was the admission of 100’000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. Britain 
rejected the report. However, in a statement on October 4, 1946, Truman for the first 
time openly endorsed the establishment of a Jewish state and supported the 
admittance of Jewish refugees to Palestine. This was a crucial moment in the eventual 
triumph of Zionism. It is also recognized as such in anti-Zionist historiography. Based 
on a newspaper story, which was first published in the New York Times on October 7, 
1946, Kermit Roosevelt argued that the Truman statement was the result of domestic 
pressure. The two Democratic runners for the posts of Governor and Senator of New 
York, James M. Mead and Herbert H. Lehman, expected their Republican contender 
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Thomas Dewey to make a pro-Zionist statement. They felt at risk of losing the pro-
Zionist vote and therefore urged President Truman to forestall such an outcome by 
making a statement by himself.505 Even after the Truman Statement, the State 
Department continued to work against the establishment of a Jewish state, although it 
was now official government policy. In February 1947, the British decided to relegate 
the decision on the future of Palestine to the UN. After investigating the situation, the 
UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended partition, which the UN 
General Assembly accepted on November 29, 1947. In the following months, the State 
Department lobbied intensively to roll back the decision. 
Practically the entire US national security and foreign policy establishment opposed 
the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. This group included the so-called 
Wise Men, the shapers behind US policy in the nascent Cold War. All ascribed major 
strategic importance to maintaining good relations with the oil-rich Arab states against 
the backdrop of the upcoming Cold War and were certain that support for a Jewish 
state would antagonize them.506 Many had become convinced from firsthand 
experience in the region that that the Arabs were implacable enemies of Zionism and 
that there was no chance for a settlement.507 Truman reflected on this period in his 
memoirs: “There were some men in the State Department who held the view that the 
Balfour Declaration could not be carried out without offense to the Arabs. Like most of 
the British diplomats, some of our diplomats also thought that the Arabs, on account of 
their numbers and because of the fact that they controlled such immense oil resources, 
should be appeased. I am sorry to say that there were some among them who were 
also inclined to be anti-Semitic.”508 
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Another actor in the effort to roll back partition was the oil lobby. Through its access to 
the State Department, but also its links to anti-Zionist NGOs, Aramco had the means 
at its disposal to do so. Terry Duce was on the board of the anti-Zionist Committee for 
Peace and Justice in the Holy Land, which will be discussed below. According to a pro-
Zionist source, the group also received money from Aramco.509 Another access point 
was Philip Hitti, who offered training for Aramco’s staff in his center in Princeton. A 
more efficient way to gain influence within the administration however was by recruiting 
the State Department’s Middle East experts, as Aramco did with William Eddy and 
Halford Hoskins, as well as others. These figures were able to directly access senior 
government officials and they did so regularly. In September 1947, Eddy wrote to 
Secretary of State George Marshall that the prospective Jewish state would be a 
“theocratic sovereign state characteristic of the Dark Ages”.510 This statement seems 
a little ironic, given his friendship with the Saudi monarchy. One month later, in October 
of 1947, he resigned from government services and became a consultant for Aramco. 
Halford Hoskins, equally an Arabist by background and expertise, joined the latter in 
1948 in leaving the government services and working with Aramco in a senior 
managerial function.511  
At times, the State Department seems to have exaggerated the risks of harming the 
relations with the Arabs on purpose, ignoring that the Arabs never credibly threatened 
to cut off the supply of oil, an act which would have harmed them more at the time than 
the US. Already in December 1947, the Saudis promised that they would not break 
relations with the US.512 During the crucial period between the UN partition decision 
on November 29, 1947 and the establishment of Israel in May 1948, Eddy and Hoskins’ 
alarmist reports were read in the State Department and the DOD. In January 1948 
moreover, William Eddy was invited to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and asked to 
author an analysis of Truman’s Palestine policy. The resulting report glaringly warned 
of the consequences of US support for the establishment of a Jewish state, which 
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included a loss of the oil concession. At the same time, in January 1948, Hoskins and 
Terry Duce also sent reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, 
which warned of the same scenario and Communist penetration of the Middle East.513 
The efforts to dismantle partition eventually failed. In retrospect, Truman felt that some 
officials in the State Department had sabotaged his government by pursuing their own 
policy instead: “Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel, however, 
I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. (…) I was 
told that to some of the career men of the State Department this announcement came 
as a surprise. It should not have been if these men had faithfully supported my policy. 
The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that they regard 
themselves as the men who really make policy and run the government. They look 
upon the elected officials as just temporary occupants.”514 Truman’s recognition of 
Israel however did not mean the end of the State Department’s opposition to Zionism 
and the newly established Jewish state, Israel. 
4.2 Arab-American Opposition to Zionism and the Institute of Arab American Affairs 
With the liquidation of the ANL in 1942, there was no Arab-American anti-Zionist body 
active in the US for the first time in 25 years. With the hearings before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the pro-
Zionist Wright-Compton resolution in February 1944, a new opportunity presented itself 
for the Arab-American anti-Zionists to voice their critique. While Emanuel Neumann, 
Rabbi Stephen Wise and Louis Lipsky of the ZOA recommend the adoption of the 
resolution, the anti-Zionist’s side also had a strong presence during the hearings, with 
contributions from Morris Lazaron of the ACJ, Faris Malouf, Philipp Hitti and others .515 
Unquestionably, Philip Hitti, who spoke on the second day, made the biggest 
impression on the committee members. He opened his presentation with a 
compliment, stating that “No Westerner (…) is more highly respected and more 
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implicitly trusted by the Arab and Moslem people than the American.” 516 This, Hitti 
argued was the product of the missionary enterprise in the Middle East, which was 
threatened by the US sympathy for Zionism in general and by the Wright-Compton 
resolution in particular. Moreover, the resolution would give fodder to German 
propaganda and threaten the stability of the post-war world order. Hitti adduced several 
other arguments against Zionism. Thus, he claimed that the British had never intended 
to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, which would naturally infringe on the rights of 
the native Arabs. Many of them were descendants of the Canaanites, he claimed, and 
arrived in Palestine before the Jews. Linking the Zionists to the Crusaders, he predicted 
that the Jewish state would share the fate of the Latin states and had no chance of 
survival in a sea of Arab and Muslim people. The Muslims, who had gained the country 
through Jihad, would never again relinquish it. Lastly, the Jewish problem was not the 
responsibility of the Arabs, who were largely free from anti-Jewish prejudice.517 His 
statements were discussed by friends and foes alike, underlining their impact. Among 
his critics was his Princeton colleague, Albert Einstein. He criticized Hitti’s “racial 
genealogy” of the Palestinians as descendants of the Canaanites as “entirely 
hypothetical and precarious at that. (…) Besides, as we have pointed out before, this 
whole issue of priority counts for nothing in the actual apportionment of our globe and 
in the presence of our most urgent contemporary problems.” 518 Einstein further 
contended that Hitti purposefully ignored the continued Jewish history in Palestine 
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throughout the time since the last Jewish revolt under Bar Kokhba and sought to 
present the Jewish presence as a mere intermezzo.519 
As detailed in the last chapter, Hitti had  established his reputation as the most 
prominent and gifted advocate of the Arab cause in the US long before the committee 
hearings. Through his Princeton institute, he maintained excellent relations with the 
State Department, the missionary schools and the oil industry. The employees of 
Aramco took their Arabic classes at his institute and he was in contact with James 
Terry Duce, the vice-president of Aramco, who harbored sympathies for the Arab 
cause. Hitti also did translation work for Aramco.520 Moreover, together with Halford 
Hoskins, Harry Roscoe Snyder and other leading Arabists of missionary extraction, he 
sat on the trustee committee of the AUB.521 In 1944, Philip Hitti was making plans to 
found a “national organization in the United States which will serve the best interests 
of our people and native lands”.522 For this purpose, a provisional committee was set 
up in the autumn of 1944, consisting of Hitti, Faris Malouf and four other persons. The 
committee planned to hold a meeting to which representatives of the Arab 
organizations from the US and Canada were invited. The agenda of the meeting was 
threefold: To elaborate strategies to improve relations with the Arab world, to discuss 
the problems of the Arab-American communities, which also included Zionism and 
lastly, to set up a national bureau of information. The meeting, which took place on the 
weekend of November 25 and 26, 1944, in New York, resulted in the establishment of 
the Institute of Arab American Affairs.523 The leadership and members consisted of 
distinguished Arab-Americans, which was proudly acknowledged by the organization. 
In a leaflet, the IAAA advertised that many of its members were graduates of the 
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American University of Beirut.524 Hitti initially served as its executive director, with 
Ismail R. Kahlidi, the brother of the former Jerusalem mayor and prominent Palestinian 
politician Hussein Khalidi, and Farhat Ziadeh working as the Arabic and English 
secretary of the institute. They were later replaced by James Daher, Omar Haliq and 
James Batal. Faris Malouf officiated as the IAAA’s president, being succeeded after 
one year by John G. Hazam, a history professor at City College New York.525 Despite 
its name, in purpose and composition the IAAA  functioned as a successor organization 
of the ANL, dedicating the bulk of its efforts to the issue of Palestine and not to Arab-
American matters. 
As is to be expected, Hitti’s pro-Arab and anti-Zionist activism was not embraced by all 
scholars in his field of Oriental studies. In 1945, an interesting exchange took place 
between him and the eminent Palestinian Jewish scholar Shlomo Dov Goitein from the 
Hebrew University on the Palestine issue. Goitein opened the exchange of letters in 
January 1945, lauding Hitti for his research on Syrian immigrants in the US. He raised 
objections to Arab anti-Zionism: “If the Arabs – as we all believe – are going to become 
again a great nation, they have also the responsibility of great nations. The Jewish 
case, as the events of the last ten years have shown, need some solution. So the Arabs 
it seems have also to contribute to it. (…) the efforts of the Arabs are being led into a 
direction, where there is no greatness, no pursuing of national interest.”526 Hitti did not 
respond to the criticism, but instead accused the Zionists of spreading “half-truths” 
about the Arabs in their US campaign. The response also shows how Hitti, like other 
Arab anti-Zionist activists, was preoccupied with the notion of international Jewish 
power and financial might. “Thanks to this highly financed internationally organized 
propaganda, the American public is not even conscious of the fact that there is another 
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side of the question.”527 In his response, Goitein conceded to Hitti that some American 
Zionists may indeed be too outspoken and ill-informed on the issue. However, he 
asked Hitti to take a more conciliatory approach to the issue. The scholar further 
lamented that the voices of Zionist moderates were being exploited by the Arabs for 
their cause, without taking a more moderate approach themselves: “Men like Dr. 
Magnes have an extremely difficult, if not impossible stand, if their words are used by 
the other side only to corroborate a preaching of the Muslim Jihad.” 528 In particular, he 
argued, Arab nationalism had to make concessions to the right of the Palestinian Jews 
for self-determination: “One cannot expect that such a community [as the Yishuv] 
suffers to be swallowed up by a [Arab] state which denies it the very right of 
existence.”529 In his response, Hitti accused Goitein of having implied that he was 
preaching Jihad. However, only a very malicious reading of the Goitein letter allows for 
such an interpretation. One cannot escape the impression that Hitti was evading an 
honest discussion about the nature of Zionism and Arab nationalism. Again, he also 
made an effort to direct the conversation towards the US: “Do you and your Zionist 
friends insist that all avenues of information to the American public should be in your 
monopoly and that the people should blindly espouse your cause and bear the 
consequences?”530 The exchange of letters seems to have stopped afterwards.  
The establishment of the IAAA raised the curiosity of the Arab legations in Washington. 
On December 7, 1944, the Egyptian minister Mahmoud Hassan Bey invited an IAAA 
delegation of four led by Joseph Howar to discuss the new organization. Hassan Bey 
relayed to the group that Egypt’s government was interested in the Palestine issue and 
therefore offered its help to support the new body. The IAAA delegation however was 
skeptical because foreign contributions would have necessitated the IAAA to register 
as a foreign agent for the Egyptian government, something which was bound to limit 
its impact on American audiences. Hassan Bey accepted the argument and turned the 
conversation to the Arab League’s plans to open its own information office in the US. 
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He let them know that Egypt intended to finance it on its own and asked the visitors for 
an estimate of the required costs. The delegation proposed to put the Egyptian minister 
in touch with Professor William Yale and Dr. Philip W. Ireland, two NEA advisors who 
were sympathetic to the Arab cause.531 At the time, the NEA numbered just 14 officers. 
Philip Ireland and William Yale, who had left academia to work on the post-war order 
in a different State Department division, worked with several NEA officers on the policy 
for Palestine. Given their expert status and the small number of officers, their influence 
on State Department policy in the Middle East cannot be underestimated.532  
In a subsequent phone call between an IAAA member, who had participated in the 
meeting, and Philip Ireland, the official took a liking to the idea of setting up two distinct 
pro-Arab bodies. However, he advised them “to have the closest liaison in order to 
work together effectively, supplying each other with the necessary information.” He 
emphasized that “this liaison of course must be undercover.”533 The IAAA member 
advised Philip Hitti to treat the information with great discretion, as Ireland had 
intimated to him in their conversation “(…) that you have an ‘informer’ within your ranks. 
Whoever he is,” Ireland added, “he must be eliminated before you get on with your 
main work particularly if the other bureau materializes.”534 The meaning of the word 
‘eliminated’ is not further clarified in the letter. Whatever he meant, Philip Ireland’s 
behavior was exceptional for several reasons. By counseling the pro-Arab body, 
Ireland not only undermined US policy, which officially endorsed the abolition of the 
White Paper, he also advised them to break US law, i.e. the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. Moreover, he probably exposed intelligence to the pro-Arab activist 
by telling him about the mole in the IAAA. This was however not the first time a State 
Department official had reached out to anti-Zionist activists, as discussed above. The 
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IAAA letter adds evidence to the finding that there was active collusion between State 
Department officials and anti-Zionist activists. 
In September 1945, Hitti appointed the Palestinian Arab Khalil Totah as the new 
executive director of the IAAA, allowing him to concentrate more on his research and 
on his projects, which sought to further US interests and involvement in the Arab Middle 
East. Hitti was in the process of planning a new center for Ooriental studies in 
Princeton, “which will help our country to play its part more effectively and more 
intelligently as a great and leading power (…).”535 Since November 1945, Hitti and the 
State Department were also discussing to send him on a trip to the Middle East as part 
of an exchange program.536 The State Department eventually offered him a five-month 
visiting lectureship in Beirut, paying for all expenses, which Hitti accepted.537 Additional 
funds were provided by the Lebanese government.538 The stay afforded Hitti an 
opportunity to see his old friends from the AUB, who welcomed him graciously. But he 
also used it to witness the political turmoil in the region. In June 1946, Hitti attended 
the Arab League conference in Bludan, Syria.539 In the post-war days, the AUB had to 
face many challenges. The prices in the Middle East were soaring, putting the 
missionary institutions in a precarious financial situation. As a result, the Near East 
College Association was forced to plan for a large fundraising tour in the US and the 
Arab countries in 1946.540 The AUB had never defined its mission as strictly academic, 
as discussed above, but as a tool of a broader enlightening endeavor. The ascendancy 
of Arab nationalism after the war kindled this sense of mission. Animated by this spirit, 
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Harry R. Snyder doubted the university “should remain aloof from the turmoil that arises 
from the birth throes of a new nation”, declaring: “The ivory phase is passed.”541 It was 
therefore no surprise that the AUB was deeply concerned with the American support 
for Zionism, which seemed to stand in the way of Arab-American cooperation to build 
up the new Arab nations, as he shared with Hitti: “Of course it has been humiliating for 
us to have President Truman push the Zionist program as he has done. It has neutrally 
aroused a lot of bad feeling. But I do not think that it has done permanent harm, 
provided he and the other politicians will now keep quiet and put their own country’s 
interests ahead of the Jews. On the other hand, the Communist propaganda is so 
aggressive, that if the Anglo-Saxons keep on arousing ill will over Palestine, nobody 
knows just what may happen.”542 The intermingling of the missionary enterprise and 
anti-Zionist activism in the US would also continue with Hitti’s successor, Khalil Totah, 
at the head of the IAAA. Hitti on the other hand would continue to fight Zionism in his 
function as an academic and public intellectual. 
Like Hitti, his successor, Khalil Totah, was a scion of the missionary establishment. His 
mentor had been Edward Kelsey, the principal of the Quaker Friends Boys School in 
Ramallah and the biblical archeologist Elihu Grant, who probably had met the young 
Totah during his time in Palestine between 1901 and 1904. Both men promoted Totah’s 
career morally and financially, allowing him to travel to the US to receive an American 
education.543 In pursuance of a policy of nativization or “devolution”, which motivated 
natives to assume leadership roles in the Quaker missionary institutions, Totah 
assumed the directorship of the Friends Boys School in Ramallah in 1927.544 Since 
1930, he had fought continuously with his superior from the American Friends Board 
of Missions over financial and administrative issues. At one point, Totah was even 
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accused by the superior body of laundering money.545 Totah presided over the school 
in an authoritarian manner which was at odds with the democratic Quaker spirit.546  
Whether these accusations were justified or not, they certainly contributed to 
embittering Totah towards the missionary enterprise. Like George Antonius, Khalil 
Totah linked his personal history with the larger Palestine issue. In this vein, he 
considered his career setbacks to be examples of discrimination towards Arabs and 
part of their struggle for independence.547 In a letter to Merle Davis, the secretary of 
the American Friends Board of Missions, sent in February 1944, he expressed that he 
felt it was a “disgrace for my people to be missionarized. This is the land which 
produced the Bible and I am conscious of belonging to a race which has given mankind 
its great monotheistic faiths.”548 This statement is not only surprising for its antagonistic 
tone towards the missionary enterprise, of which Totah had been a part all his life, but 
also its appropriation of Jewish and Christian history by Arab nationalism. In the same 
letter, Totah declared his goal of an Arab Quaker movement, a goal he felt the 
Americans were sabotaging: they have “been attempting to minimize, discredit and kill 
a yearning, a longing, a desire for a self-respecting rejuvenation of Arab Quakerism in 
Palestine (…). They are practicing the maxim of Roman imperialism of 'divide and rule’. 
They may be belittling the movement to you declaring that it will prove to be of short 
duration."549 In his response, Merle Davis criticized Totah’s nationalistic tone and 
faulted his character, alleging that he had a “double personality. At times, when you 
become emotionally stirred, (…) you lose your sense of proportion, even bordering on 
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the violent.”550 Totah’s difficult character also impacted his later career, as well will see 
later in this chapter. Given the acrimonious tone of this exchange and his high-handed 
management style, it was no surprise when Totah was eventually forced to resign in 
October 1944. When news of Totah’s forthcoming dismissal became known in 
Palestine, he received support from Arab nationalist circles. Former Istiklal leader Awni 
Abd al-Hadi, the father of one of his students, and the entrepreneur Wadie A. Said, the 
father of Edward Said, offered him jobs.551  
However, Totah decided to move his family to the US, the native country of his wife, 
where he arrived in November 1944, finding work as an interim minister in a church in 
Massachusetts. In January 1945, he wrote to Philip Hitti, whom he knew from before, 
to apply for a job at the IAAA and, in September 1945, Hitti eventually appointed Totah 
as the executive director of the IAAA, replacing himself in that position.552 Totah was 
well-versed in US and Arab culture, knowledge which seemingly predisposed him for 
this position. Moreover, he had spoken on behalf of the Arab Cause in the past, 
testifying in 1937 in front of the Peel Commission to discuss the education of the Arabs 
in Palestine and to demand higher investments from the mandate government.553 
Merle Davis, who was otherwise critical of his management style, had recommended 
him for such a position in a letter in December 1944: “A number of people have 
expressed the hope that a way would open for you to be the voice of the Arab people 
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in this country (…) I do not know of anyone that is better fitted to do that than you 
are.”554 However, it soon became clear that this was not entirely the case. 
The IAAA was a body which sought both to address a larger audience through public 
diplomacy and to cultivate links with the foreign policy circles in Washington. The 
festive dinners the IAAA’s hosted were attended by the State Department Arabists, 
including Loy Henderson, and the representatives of the Arab legations. This was a 
mutual interest. The State Department also solicited the IAAA’s opinion on issues 
concerning Palestine. Exchanges between the State Department and the IAAA were 
certainly facilitated by the fact that the IAAA board of advisers consisted of many 
eminent personalities of the same Protestant missionary and Arabist circles which also 
staffed the NEA. Among those were Virginia Gildersleeve, William Hocking, former 
member of the King-Crane commission Albert Lybyber, Kermit Roosevelt, oil 
entrepreneur Max Thornburg, and Glora Wysner, to name but a few.555 
After Totah joined the IAAA in September 1945, he displayed impressive activity on its 
behalf. On October 5, 1945, the IAAA joined the Arab Office and the Arab legations in 
protesting Truman’s endorsement of settling 100’000 Jewish refugees in Palestine, 
with Totah calling the refugee issue a Zionist “subterfuge for its political ends.”556 The 
Institute scored a success when it was invited to give testimony to the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry in January 1946, the only pro-Arab US organization to do so. The 
Washington hearings started on January 7, 1946 and took 7 days. On days 5 and 6, 
the committee listened to testimonies opposed to Zionism by Jewish, Protestant and 
Arab-American representatives. Lessing Rosenwald of the AJC expressed the 
standard Reform Jewish anti-Zionist argument, namely that Zionism exposed the Jews 
to the accusation of dual allegiance. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who was also present, 
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interrupted him, citing Justice Brandeis: “There is no inconsistency between loyalty to 
America and loyalty to Jewry.”557 Next to speak was Leland S. Albright of the Foreign 
Missions Conference of North America, representing the anti-Zionist missionary view. 
In his opinion, the new Jewish state would be of an expansionist character, seeking 
more and more “Lebensraum”. By using the loaded German term ‘Lebensraum’, 
Albright likened the Zionist project to that of the National-Socialists.558 
The next day, Professor Philipp Hitti testified. At the time, his speech was widely 
credited with having been the most erudite and efficient. In retrospect, the factual basis 
of his arguments seems surprisingly spurious. At first, Hitti dissected what he believed 
to be the Zionist core arguments. To counter the biblical claim of the Jews to the Land 
of Israel, he cited the short span of time the Jews had reigned over the country and 
their origin as invaders. The Arabs on the other hand were continuously inhabiting the 
country, he claimed: “You came from outside and occupied a land which was already 
occupied (…) Amorites and Canaanites and by other Semites from whom we are 
descended.”559 Moreover, he questioned the importance of Jerusalem for Judaism by 
citing its holy status in Islam and Christianity. This was nonsensical, as it ignored that 
Jerusalem’s special importance in both of the other monotheistic religions stemmed 
from the presence of the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. Hitti’s next point against Zionism 
was even more surprising and, possibly, self-defeating: “Sir, there is no such thing as 
Palestine in history, absolutely not,” he insisted. Rather, he maintained, Palestine was 
merely a geographic reference for a patch of land with no natural borders located in a 
“solid Arab-speaking block- 50’000’000 people.”560 His claim of Palestine’s non-
existence was meant to strengthen calls for Arab unity. Hitti also took a hard line in the 
refugee issue. In Hitti’s vision, the Jewish community would receive some unspecified 
community rights in Palestine, but its numbers would be frozen and the admittance of 
refugees – one of the main demands of the Jewish leadership – rejected. Hitti argued 
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that even peaceful refugees were a means for the Zionists to achieve domination of 
the country. “In the mind of the Arab, every Zionist coming in is a potential warrior,” he 
stated unequivocally.561 After Hitti followed Dr. John G. Hazam, Khalil Totah and 
Wilbert H. Smith, who were all also representing the IAAA. Hazam was a history 
professor at the City College in New York. Wilbert Smith was of missionary 
background, being an official of the Young Men’s Christian Association. He had served 
as the organization’s secretary for Egypt and Palestine in the 1930s and was 
instrumental in setting up numerous branches.562 Hazam’s main arguments were that 
the Balfour Declaration underestimated the Arabs’ political maturity as they had 
already gathered democratic experience in the Ottoman parliament, and that the 
Jewish problem should not be solved at the expense of the Arabs, who had no guilt in 
it. He further rejected that the Arabs had economically profited from Zionism. Khalil 
Totah followed a similar line, maintaining that the Arabs had not profited from Zionist 
development and aid. All the Jews could hope for was “the traditional hospitality of the 
Arab majority”.563 Lastly, Wilbert Smith saw the conflict primarily as an issue of national 
self-determination, which was denied to the Arabs. Charles T. Bridgeman, who had 
served as the American Episcopal Church’s representative in Palestine from 1924 to 
1944, was the last to speak against Zionism.564 
The Institute had at their disposal an extensive mailing list, including thousands of 
recipients both in the US and abroad. Most missives, about two thousand, reached 
Arab and non-Arab American sympathizers. The list also included hundreds of 
addresses from the press, politicians, public officials, and Arab governments, among 
others. Interestingly, 500 communications were addressed to the clergy, underlining 
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the important role Christians played in anti-Zionist activism.565 Publications such as 
‘Arab Progress in Palestine’, which was published in 1946, emphasized the modernity 
among the Arab-Palestinian population. The tone of the brochure was distinctively 
modernist and pro-Western, praising the West’s “dynamic spirit”.566 This translated into 
a positive assessment of the history of Western involvement in the Middle East, 
mentioning explicitly its missionaries, schools, hospitals and printing presses, which 
the brochure contrasted with the detrimental influence of the Turks. The creation of 
insurances was cited as evidence that “enlightened Arabs” were abandoning fatalistic 
religion.567 Describing the Palestinians’ adaptions of modern techniques and the quick 
development of industry, commerce and education, the outlook towards the future 
seemed optimistic. The brochure dedicated a section to the social progress of Arab 
women, responding to an obvious area of concern among Westerners.568 
Khalil Totah was a regular guest on radio shows and at public events during the three 
years from 1946 until 1948. The Bulletin, the monthly publication of the Institute, 
reported these activities under the cheerful title ‘The Tide is Turning’ in its September 
1946 issue. In August and September 1946 alone, Totah engaged in a public debate 
with James Heller of the Zionist Organization of America, as well as holding talks in 
front of large audiences at the Chautaqua organization, the Rotary Club and the military 
base in Fort Dix. Representatives of the Arab Office and the Institute as well as 
sympathizers sent letters to the editors of the New York Times and the Herald 
Tribune.569 On November 16, 1946, Totah debated against Jewish Agency 
representative to the US, Nahum Goldmann, at the Foreign Policy Association 
luncheon meeting on ‘The Problem of Palestine’ held at the Waldorf Astoria in New 
York, which was attended by 700 listeners. Some in the audience booed when Totah 
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stated provocatively that “the great contribution of Zionism to the Holy Land has been 
bloodshed since Zionism began,” forecasting menacingly that the Yishuv risked 
annihilation if the Zionists’ demands were not moderated.570 However, this negative 
reception was not the rule and IAAA speakers were welcome to speak at many venues, 
churches, and colleges etc. After one successful event held by the Foreign Policy 
Association, the IAAA felt compelled to report the positive reception to the State 
Department.571 
Totah also sought to work with the anti-Zionist Jews of the ACJ and was in touch with 
Alfred Lilienthal and Elmer Berger, regularly appearing on stage with the latter. The 
IAAA praised his book, ‘The Jewish Dilemma’, in its publications.572 However, the 
admiration seems not have been mutual. Although obviously sympathetic to Totah’s 
opinions, Berger described Totah as an agreeable, but unstable and easily provoked 
character. Interestingly, his words mirror those of Totah’s former Quaker friends: “He 
was a very nice man - a Quaker as I recall. We would meet occasionally at some public 
forum or debate. Totah's formal presentations always seemed to me reasonable and 
predicated upon political equities and justice. But the Zionist claques which regularly 
came to such sessions (and usually sat in a bloc) had Totah's number. During question 
or discussion periods they would ask loaded questions or bait him with derisive 
comments about "Arabs." And the old boy would obligingly just go through the ceiling. 
He would lose control of his intellectual resources and become an almost maniacal, 
emotional hunted animal, screaming and striking back with anything that came to his 
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mind or to his saddened and despairing heart. I tried, several times, to advise him to 
keep control. I told him he was performing exactly as the Zionist errand boys wanted 
him to do. He might feel better for letting off steam, but the majority of Americans in 
any audience who had come with the serious intention of learning were being cheated, 
which was exactly what the Zionists wanted to do to them. And although I - or some 
other American who might be on the platform - could argue American interests and I, 
more particularly, could demonstrate the differences between Zionism and Judaism, it 
was Totah's responsibility to state the Arab position and to do it responsibly and with 
credibility.”573  
The IAAA press output also sought to co-opt Jewish anti-Zionism. A collection of 
essays by prominent anti-Zionist Jews was published in 1947, featuring contributions 
by Arthur Sulzberger, Morris Raphael Cohen, Henry Morgenthau Sr., Rabbi Irving F. 
Reichert, Israel M. Rabinovitch from McGill University and Benjamin Freedman. All the 
contributors had established pedigrees of anti-Zionist activism. Morris Cohen, a 
distinguished philosopher who had fought Zionism for almost three decades, 
considered Zionism a form of romantic nationalism antithetical to the values of 
America.574 Arthur Sulzberger, the editor of the New York Times, was a supporter of 
the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism. But Benjamin Freedman was 
undeniably the most controversial figure among the contributors. Freedman, who was 
then a well-known Jewish anti-Zionist activist, became notorious for his Holocaust 
denial in the 1950s. Freedman’s article was titled ‘There is no Jewish Race’ and argued 
that most Jews were descended from converts and therefore did not form a Jewish 
nation. Making use of the Khazar Myth, he claimed that Eastern European Jewry was 
descended from the Khazars, a Turkish Tribe that had formed a kingdom in the 
Caucasus region in the Middle Ages. This implied that, as converts to Judaism, the 
contemporary Jews had no national rights to the Land of Israel.575 Freedman 
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popularized the Khazar Theory. He relayed this theory to the Arab delegates at the 
UN. The Syrian representative Faris al-Khoury later argued in the General Assembly 
that the Jews had no right to a state because the majority of them were not real Jews.576 
In the letter section of the New York Times, Khalil Totah regularly fought supporters of 
the establishment of a Jewish state. In response to a letter by James G. McDonald in 
favor of the UN Special Committee on Palestine’s (UNSCOP) partition plan, Totah 
contradicted McDonald, arguing that it dispossessed the Palestinian Arabs and would 
lead to war, an expansionist Jewish state and, possibly, a US military intervention. He 
concluded that the US was being led into a dangerous scheme as the “(…) Zionists, it 
would seem, would not mind having the United States going to any limit in antagonizing 
the Arab world as long as their whim for a Jewish state is satisfied.”577 McDonald 
interpreted the statement as a threat of war, despite the Arab states’ promise to refrain 
from using violence to settle the Palestine conflict.578 However, Totah stuck to his point. 
He believed that the Americans were underestimating the Arabs’ will to go to war over 
partition. This was dangerous and wrong, as it was “no longer a matter of patriotism to 
defend Palestine but the religious duty of every Arab and every Moslem.” Correctly, he 
also noted that this was not only the sentiment of “’sinister’” leaders like the Mufti, but 
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a far broader attitude.579 Another discussant was Karl Baehr, the executive secretary 
of the American Christian Palestine Committee. After the outbreak of war in Palestine, 
Totah continued to speak out against the alleged “clever manipulations” of Zionism and 
did not recognize Israel. Baehr questioned the sincerity of Totah’s claim to stand for a 
solution based on “justice and righteousness”, which he had made in the New York 
Times.580 Rejection of partition would have endangered the Yishuv and have meant 
the “destruction of a civilization which had been built upon the foundation of 
international law (…)”.581 Moreover, Baehr felt that his own support for Israel had been 
vindicated by the persecutions against Jews in Muslim Arab states: “Recent murders 
and executions of Jews in Egypt, Iraq and other lands make one realize how ‘just and 
righteous’ an all-Arab Palestine would be in its treatment of a Jewish minority and 
underscore the validity of the U. N. decision to create a viable Jewish state.”582 
Despite the immense amount of his activities, Totah proved an unskillful advocate of 
the Arab cause, both for his temperament and his convictions. The American Zionists 
identified the Arab spokesmen in the US – largely correctly – as followers of the 
discredited Mufti. To them, the fight against the anti-Zionists appeared like a 
continuation of the fight against National Socialism. Even when given opportunity to 
distance himself from the Mufti, Khalil Totah instead defended him, as it happened 
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during a townhall meeting in 1946.583His defense of the Mufti weakened the public 
diplomacy effort and only strengthened the argument of the American Zionists that the 
Arab enemies of Zionism were anti-Semites and Nazi collaborators.584  
The Arab propagandists operating in Western countries generally believed that they 
were fighting an uphill battle against Zionism. They also showed a certain obsession 
with the idea of Jewish power and money. In this vein, their impression of the political 
atmosphere in the US was one of overbearing Zionist and Jewish influence. Thus, the 
head of the Arab Offices, Musa Alami, was convinced that the Arabs were the 
underdogs in the propaganda battle against their Zionist adversaries: “We were just 
visitors sitting in an hotel, with no pressure groups at our disposal, no money to buy 
space in the press; but by dint of perseverance, and all the objectivity we could muster, 
we gradually won the confidence of the press, of some Members of Parliament and 
Congressmen, and above all of the officials of the Foreign Office and State Department 
who dealt with the Middle East, because they heard from us viewpoints which they 
received from no other source. We defended Arab interests all over the world, for 
example those in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and had sections of our Offices run at 
our expense by people from those countries: Habib Bourguiba, later President of 
Tunisia, was one of our colleagues in Washington.”585 Like his colleagues in the Arab 
Office, Totah was equally convinced that the fight against the Zionist lobby in the US 
was a fight against Goliath, with the Arabs being David. After the US recognition of 
Israel, Stephen Penrose criticized the decision in a letter to the New York Times. Totah 
seconded the criticism in another letter to the same newspaper, contending that “On 
the Zionist side in New York there are limitless funds for flooding the countryside with 
a partisan one-sided propaganda. When the sign is given by the high command, an 
avalanche of editorials, news stories, politicians' speeches, telegrams, mass meetings 
and parades are let loose upon the public. Commentators fill the air waves with 
favorable comment on the Zionist side. As for the Arabs, when they try to state their 
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side of the story they receive nothing but abuse. Rightly does Mr. Penrose state ’there 
has been no criticism yet directed at the Zionists.’”586 Of course, Totah must have been 
aware of the fact that there was plenty of criticism of Zionism in the US, since he was 
one of its most prominent articulators. However, the claim that the means of the pro-
Zionists were superior beyond measure to those of the pro-Arabs was one of the most 
powerful figures of speech the anti-Zionists had at their disposal, in no small part 
because it seemed to confirm widespread beliefs about Jewish power. The association 
of Jews with money and power also constantly occurs in Totah’s autobiographical 
account of his years working for the IAAA. Speaking about an anti-Zionist 
advertisement in the New York Times by the IAAA for instance, he laments that “Even 
that half-page was paid for by a Jew,” meaning his collaborator, Benjamin 
Freedman.587 Totah’s views were shaped by anti-Semitic imagery.  
The financial situation of the IAAA meanwhile looked increasingly bleak. In 1946-47, 
the Institute had a yearly budget of roughly 36’000 dollars.588 In May 1948, an income 
of 28’000 still outweighed expenses of 25’000 with 15’000 savings. However, the 
establishment of Israel seems to have dealt the Institute a deadly blow, from which it 
never recovered.589 In December 1949, Hocking and Gildersleeve sent a letter to the 
Institutes’ members to call attention to its dismal financial situation and to ask for 
donations. Short of funding, the Institute even tried to solicit money from Aramco, but 
the oil giant failed to deliver – for reasons of fear, Khalil Totah believed, as he 
expressed in a letter to William Hocking. In vain, Hocking tried to convince Totah that 
the Institute’s mission to communicate to the US public and to the Arab world was now 
more urgent than ever. In January 1950, the Executive Committee decided to disband 
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the Institute.590 However, this would not be the end of pro-Arab activism in the US. 
Leaders of the Institute like Virginia Gildersleeve, Georges Barakat and Kermit 
Roosevelt had already established new organizations, which would carry on. Khalil 
Totah would die on February 24, 1955 in Whittier in California.591 
4.3 Benjamin Freedman and the League for Peace with Justice in Palestine 
According to an NSANL informer who entertained friendly relations with Benjamin 
Freedman, Freedman had first considered taking action against Zionism in early 1946. 
After donating money to the anti-Zionist Council for Judaism, he had lunch with its co-
leader, Lessing Rosenwald. Freedman made the offer to finance a public ad campaign 
against Zionism, but Rosenwald rejected it. He explained to Freedman that although 
the Council’s secular and liberal base objected to Zionism, this did not mean that it 
endorsed Arab demands. Instead, Rosenwald advised Freedman to get in touch with 
the Institute of Arab American Affairs, which he did. Freedman had a meeting with 
Khalil Totah, Habib Katibah and Ismail Khalidi. Khalil Totah however was suspicious 
and at first rejected Freedman’s offer to finance the campaign, fearing that Freedman 
was a Zionist spy. At last however, Habib Katibah agreed to support the creation of a 
new anti-Zionist body, the League for Peace with Justice in Palestine.592 Between May 
and August 1946, the League for Peace with Justice in Palestine bought five full-page 
advertisements in the Herald Tribune, the latest of which featured quotations from 
mainly Jewish personalities against Zionism. The campaign was greeted by the 
Institute of Arab American Affairs as a sign that public opinion was tilting in a pro-Arab 
direction.593 
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From its configuration, it can be assumed that the League was initially planned as an 
organization uniting Arab, Jewish and Christian anti-Zionists. Habib Katibah signed the 
League’s newsletters as “representing cooperating persons of Arab ancestry”, while 
Freedman claimed to represent members of the Jewish faith. A certain R.M. 
Schoendorf, who was later revealed to be Freedman’s wife, signed as the 
representative for Christians. The propaganda tone was shrill. A newsletter from June 
1946 warned that “World War III may burst upon the world if an attempt is made to 
transplant into Palestine, against the wishes of the Arab, 100,000 displaced European 
Jews (…).”594 Despite his own Jewishness, Freedman personally harbored anti-Jewish 
prejudice. Thus, he was proud of the modest clothes of his wife, “who did not have to 
advertise that she is married to a Jew” and called on his “wealthy Jewish friends” to 
learn from “simplicity in which the wealthiest Christians in America are living.”595 During 
the course of 1946, Benjamin Freedman became increasingly obsessed with the idea 
that the modern Jews bore no kinship with the Jews of antiquity. The aim was obvious: 
Without a Jewish people, there was no foundation for Zionism. His research would 
“prove that the Jews are not a people and that Judaism is little else than a faith,” 
Freedman confided in a private conversation. 596  
Freedman even antagonized the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee. When the 
American Jewish Committee declared publicly that the League was representing no 
one but Benjamin Freedman himself, he filed a lawsuit against them with a claim for 
damages for the enormous sum of $5’000’000. A statement by the American Jewish 
Committee expressed confidence in the lawsuit, seeing it as “an opportunity to 
demonstrate the nature and character of the ‘League for Peace and Justice in 
Palestine’ and Mr. Freedman’s role in it.”597 The trial seems not to have taken place. 
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Freedman also threatened NSANL chairman, James H. Sheldon, with a lawsuit, as he 
felt unfairly treated by the organization. He told an NSANL informer that he was willing 
do anything possible to fight anti-Semitism.598 On August 29, 1946, his lawyer, Hallam 
Richardson, filed a complaint against Sheldon for violating the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, which obliged agents of foreign governments to disclose their 
affiliation, and further demanded damages of one million dollars for harming 
Freedman’s reputation. The bill of indictment accused Sheldon himself of being anti-
Semitic, stating that he was working “to further the interest of foreign political parties 
and/or pro-Zionist (…) terrorist organizations, committees and agencies whose 
totalitarian policies and activities are un-American, anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic, anti-
Christian (...).”599 Again, for whatever reason, no trial seems to have followed. This 
would change two years later. 
In these years, Freedman did not yet openly associate with the American extreme right. 
Still, Freedman was often accused of frequenting extremist and anti-Semitic circles. 
According to an NSANL investigator, Freedman was in touch with a young woman by 
the surname of Maher, who had worked as the secretary for the anti-Semitic activist, 
Eugene R. Flitcraft.600 Flitcraft had founded the Gentile Cooperative Association in 
1944, an organization that promised “to halt the growing Jewish power” and “to help 
businessmen who might otherwise have to sell out to Jewish interests.”601 She was 
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further associated with Gerald L.K. Smith and his American First Party.602 In July 1947, 
the NSANL presented a memorandum to the Congress in which the pro-Arab lobby 
was accused of collusion with the far-right and the Mufti faction.603 The accusations 
were repeated in a brochure by the NSANL in November 1947 for the UN.604 
The brochure claimed that Hallam Richardson, the League’s attorney, had “long been 
known in the halls of the pro-Fascist propaganda”.605 In response, Richardson had filed 
a libel complaint against Henry Atkinson, then chairman of the NSANL board. The trial 
took place in New York in May 1948. The defense focused on the League for Peace 
and Justice in Palestine and Freedman’s activities. By giving proof of their anti-Semitic 
and anti-Zionist character, the defense sought to validate the statement. Freedman’s 
testimonies made over a three-day cross-examination invariably incriminated the 
League. Freedman claimed to have spent more than $100’000 in his anti-Zionist 
campaign. The NSANL defense attorney confronted him with a statement he had 
written in a newsletter, in which he called on the US population to stop being the “tool 
of a small but ruthless and unscrupulous minority of a minority people.”606 Questioned 
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by the defense as to whom he meant by this statement, he named several leading 
Jewish businessmen and politicians and IBM CEO Thomas J. Watson, whom 
Freedman may have believed to be Jewish as well.607 
The defense sought to demonstrate that the League was coordinating its activities with 
Arab anti-Zionists at home and abroad. It presented the court with a telegram 
Freedman had sent to a certain Ahmad Hussain in Cairo, in which Freedman asked 
Hussain “to extend his eminence wishes for continued (…) struggle (on) behalf of 
justice (for) his people (by) giving here fullest cooperation (…).”608 In an article in an 
Egyptian newspaper, the same Ahmad Hussain had called Freedman a holy warrior 
for the Arab cause.609 The defense saw the telegram as evidence that Freedman was 
in direct contact with the Mufti, a charge he denied.610 Freedman’s correspondence 
further hinted at the possibility that he was also involved in efforts to break the arms 
embargo for Palestine. In autumn 1947, a certain A.A. Jalil from the Three Oceans 
Trading Company in Bombay asked Freedman for the provision of 500’000 rifles and 
the setting up of arms factories “for defence purposes”.611 Possibly, the arms were 
meant for the upcoming war against the newly established Jewish state. Responding 
to the request in a telegram, Freedman spoke cryptically of the difficult market 
conditions for “coal”, “jute” and “sugar”, probably codewords for arms. In clearer 
language however, Freedman claimed in the same telegram to “have negotiated 
immediate establishment Pakistan Thompson submachine gun factories 
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equipment.”612 Freedman denied having been involved in the arms trade but refused 
to elaborate on the telegram’s unequivocal message. NSANL leader James H. 
Sheldon thereupon informed the UN delegate of India, from where the Three Oceans 
Company was operating, on the situation.613 Still, considering Freedman’s colorful 
personality, it is not possible to take the truthfulness of the telegram for granted. It may 
be just as likely that Freedman was falling victim to his own pretentious claims.  
Phone records also showed that Freedman was in regular contact with the Saudi 
Arabian Ministry and the Egyptian Embassy in Washington.614 Furthermore, the 
defense demonstrated that Freedman had been involved in drafting a memorandum 
together with Habib Katibah, which an Arab delegation then presented to 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson on May 10, 1946.615 Thus, the evidence was 
conclusive that the League was connected to Arab anti-Zionist activists, many of them 
former or current sympathizers of the Mufti, and that Freedman harbored anti-Semitic 
feelings. The verdict was pronounced on May 26, 1948, clearing the NSANL of any 
wrongdoing. The wording could hardly have been harsher. The judge declared that the 
accusations against Richardson were “prompted by a sincere desire to champion 
human rights, to combat racial and religious discrimination and prejudice (…).” 
Moreover, “when he starts to associate with a crack-pot like Freedman, who is just an 
international meddler, he becomes his companion and collaborator.616  
                                             
612 Ben H. Freedman, “Telegram to Triocean Company,” October 17, 1947, ANLP 
286.8. 
613 “Mufti Mentioned at Libel Hearing.” 
614 “ANTI-ZIONIST LISTS POLICY ‘DICTATORS’; Lehman, Baruch and Warburg 
Named as Among Those Who Influence U.S. on Palestine.” 
615 “WITNESS ADMITS AIDING ARAB CAUSE; Freedman, Testifying in Libel Case, 
Cooperated on Note to State Department,” The New York Times, May 7, 1948, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9804E0DF1630E03BBC4F53DFB36
68383659EDE&legacy=true. 
616 “ANTI-NAZI LEADER CLEARED OF LIBEL; Magistrate Rejects Charges of H. M. 
Richardson Against the Rev. Dr. H. A. Atkinson.” 
 
192 
 
The trial had several consequences. It generally weakened the position of the anti-
Zionists, both in the civil society and in the government. In the aftermath of the trial, 
the Department of Justice contemplated investigating the network around Freedman 
for colluding with a foreign government in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act.617 The irony was that Freedman had himself accused the NSANL of violating this 
law in August 1946, as mentioned above. During the libel trial, it was also revealed that 
Ben Freedman had repeatedly called Loy Henderson, the unpopular NEA chief. It was 
however unclear whether Henderson accepted these calls. Still, on May 3, 1948, New 
York congressman, Arthur G. Klein, called for Henderson’s resignation in a telegram 
to President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall, writing: “This is but the 
last in a long series of disclosures of Henderson’s bias in favor of the member States 
of the Moslem bloc, the murderous Mufti of Jerusalem Amin El Husseini, and the 
Arabian American Oil Company (…), demonstrating his unfitness to administer 
American policy in accordance with his instructions.”618  The trial left Freedman 
discredited and he was no longer involved in the different anti-Zionist endeavors which 
continued to operate after the establishment of Israel on May 14, 1948. In the month 
of Israel’s declaration of independence, Freedman finally reported that he was in the 
process of converting to Catholicism.619Henceforth, Ben Freedman became an iconic 
figure of the extreme right in the US.620 
4.4 The Arab League’s Campaign against Zionism and the Arab Offices 
In December 1944, the Arab League worked out a preliminary plan for a 
comprehensive propaganda campaign regarding the Palestine issue. A substantial 
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part of the document was dedicated to the US, which the Arabs considered to be the 
major arena of the future struggle over public opinion. The draft stated that previous 
propaganda efforts in the US had failed. American sympathizers had advised the Arab 
League to recruit people both knowledgeable on the issue of Palestine and familiar 
with American culture. While Arab-Americans could be of help in these efforts, the bulk 
of the work would fall on the Office. Unlike in Britain, where the Arab Office preferred 
backdoor lobbying, the draft recognized the need to engage in a public relations 
campaign to counter the Zionists, a campaign which would employ all modern means 
of communication, including cinema and radio.621 An undated preliminary concept, 
which was probably drafted in 1945, recommended that the Office should not associate 
with anti-Jewish and anti-British elements. The Arab Office would communicate the 
modern aspects and general issues of the Arab region. Its main aim however was to 
counter the Zionist movement. The document listed four central pro-Zionist arguments 
which needed to be challenged. First, that Zionism was beneficial to the US and 
England, second and third social and economic as well as religious and ethnic 
arguments in favor of Zionism and lastly, the Arab behavior during the war, i.e. the 
collaboration of influential elements of the Arab national movement like the Mufti with 
the Third Reich. The concept budgeted the immense sum of 300’000 British pounds a 
year for the project, an amount of almost 12 million British pounds in the currency rate 
of 2016, one third of which was to be consigned to the Arab Office in the US.622 
At first, the Egyptian diplomat, Mahmoud Fawzy Bey, was proposed to take up the post 
of director of the Arab Office in the US.623However, Ahmed Shukairy was later chosen 
for the post of the director. Shukairy would rise to notoriety in the 1960s for his bellicose 
statements as the chairman of the PLO. He was born in Lebanon in 1908, where his 
father had been detained by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, to a family of notables from 
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Palestine. Returning to Akko in 1916, he was trained as a lawyer. In his youth, Shukairy 
gathered some experience in public and press relations. From 1929 until 1930, he 
worked as co-editor together with Akram Zuaiter of the newspaper Mirat al-Sharq. Its 
editorial line was close to the Nashashibi-led opposition to Amin al-Husseini and 
advocated a conciliatory stance toward the British. However, in the 1930s, he became 
active in the nationalist Istiklal party, working as a lawyer for the party’s leader, Awni 
Abd al-Hadi, in Jerusalem. In this function, he defended Arabs implicated in the Arab 
Revolt in the British courts. During the early 1940s, he still counted among the Mufti’s 
critics. However, after the war, he was politically active alongside Musa Alami, an 
association which certainly helped him to get the post at the Arab Office.624 
Shukairy arrived in the US in late July 1945. After discussing the location of the future 
Office with the Arab ministers already present in the country, they agreed to open it in 
New York. However, the Central Office in Jerusalem overruled their decision in favor 
of opening the Office in Washington. It took Shukairy more than two months after his 
arrival before the Office became operational and was able to address the broader 
public, in the meantime missing many important events.625 Shukairy registered the 
body on September 21, 1945 as a foreign agent for the seven member states of the 
Arab League. Between July and October, the Office received 55’000 dollars from the 
Syrian and Iraqi legations. The bulk of the money came from the Syrians, who donated 
40’000 dollars. At the start, Shukairy was assisted by five staff members: Khulusi 
Khairy, Dr. Nejla Izzedin, Awni W. Dajani, Raja W. Hourani and Omar Abu Khadra.626 
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Arab public diplomacy also extended to Canada. However, unlike in later years, there 
was initially no public diplomacy push by the Arab League in South America.627 Since 
around 1943, a Canadian-Arab Friendship League led by two Syrians had been active 
in the country. They wrote press releases and letters, organized public events and 
invited American anti-Zionist activists, like Philip Hitti or Faris Malouf, to tour the 
country. They also published a monthly circular called the Canadian Arab.628 
The young Lebanese Nejla Izzedin was the most active and the most brilliant among 
the Washington staff members. Izzedin was a product of the Middle East elite, which 
had profited greatly from the missionary educational projects. She was descended 
from a distinguished Druze family of landholders and grew up close to Beirut. She 
enjoyed a high school education at the American School for Girls in Beirut, a 
missionary establishment, before leaving for Paris where she received her 
baccalaureate in 1927. She then continued her career in the US, first at Vassar College 
and then at the University of Chicago, where she graduated with a PhD in Arab history 
in 1934 on ‘The Racial Origins of the Druzes’. The next eleven years she spent in the 
Middle East, teaching and researching at different colleges and universities in Beirut, 
Damascus and Iraq. During this time, she also collaborated with Constantine Zurayk 
to publish a multivolume study on the medieval Egyptian historian Ibn al-Furat.629 At 
the time, Zurayk was also staying in the US capital, where he worked for the Syrian 
embassy in Washington until 1947. Philip Hitti had been Zurayk’s mentor since his stint 
at the AUB in 1924 and they maintained contact in the US. Thus, Zurayk asked Hitti to 
help the Arab Office reedit a pamphlet with the title “Why Palestine?”, which Zurayk felt 
was of insufficient quality. Later, Zurayk would become one of the foremost nationalist 
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thinkers of the Arab world. After his time in Washington, he joined the AUB as a 
professor of history, before serving as its president from 1954 until 1957. In his 1948 
book ‘The Meaning of Disaster’ (Arab. Maana al-Nakba) he analyzed the causes for 
the Arab defeat in the Israel War of Independence and simultaneously coined the Arab 
term for the event.630  
The Syrian embassy in Washington, where Zurayk worked, also handled the affairs of 
Saudi Arabia, which had no office of its own. In mid-October 1945, the Syrian 
ambassador to Washington, Nazim al-Kudsi, held a reception dinner for an Arab 
League delegation at the Mayflower hotel in Washington, with the diplomatic staff of 
Arab and Muslim countries in Washington and Arab-American dignitaries attending the 
event.631 On October 3, 1945, a delegation of the Arab League made up by the Arab 
ministers in Washington visited the State Department to protest president Truman’s 
support for admitting 100’000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. They met with 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Director of the Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs Loy Henderson, the latter a known opponent of Zionism.632 That same 
day, the Arab Office released a statement to the press signed by Shukairy, protesting 
Truman’s plans and demanding a return to the White Paper policy of 1939. The 
statement argued that with the defeat of Nazi Germany there was no longer a need for 
a “Jewish haven” in Palestine. Instead of a Jewish state, the statement promised the 
establishment of an Arab democratic state, in which the rights of the minorities would 
be protected.633 
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One of the first actions of the Arab Office was to address the Arab-American 
community in advertisements published in the country’s Arab language newspaper. 
This was in line with the 1944 Arab League draft proposal. The ads described the 
mission of the Arab Office as promoting understanding between the Arab world and 
the US, calling on Arab-Americans to support their home countries, also for the good 
of the US. Palestine was not yet mentioned.634 The negative stance towards Zionism 
was not shared by all in the Arab-American community. There was significant support 
for Zionism among the Lebanese Maronites.635 In the fall of 1945, shortly before the 
arrival of the Arab League delegation, the Patriarch’s delegate Antoun Aqel toured the 
US, warning that an expanding Arab League and Syria posed a threat to the 
independence of Lebanon. He expressed sympathy for Zionism, drawing parallels 
between the situations of the Christians in Lebanon with that of the Jews in Palestine. 
636  The Lebanese government reacted harshly to such statements, which broke the 
façade of Arab anti-Zionist consensus. When it withdrew the passport of the Patriarch’s 
delegate, it caused a scandal within the Lebanese community. At the Conference of 
Lebanese Organizations in New York on September 15 and 16 1945, the delegates 
denounced the withdrawal as an action against the freedom of speech. The delegates 
also resolved to establish their own propaganda office in the US to publicize the view 
point of the Lebanese community. The plan seems not to have been realized. The 
resolutions were subsequently published in the Arabic language newspaper al-Hoda, 
which was popular in the Lebanese community.637 The Jewish agency also considered 
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a collaboration with Maronite Americans to counter pan-Arab nationalist propaganda 
in the US.638 
The official inauguration of the Arab Office eventually took place on October 4, 1945, 
when it organized a press conference and a cocktail party at the luxurious Wardman 
Park Hotel. Shukairy dodged tough questions form the press regarding the Mufti by 
insinuating that the Jews were exaggerating the situation of the Jewish refugees in 
Germany to score political points.639 Some in the press however seemed to be more 
impressed with Shukairy’s attire than with his statements: “Anybody expecting to see 
the head of the Arab office dressed up like those Saudi Arabian princes were at San 
Francisco – all ready to hop on a camel and hump it across the desert – would have 
been disappointed. Mr. S. turned out to be a young lawyer, dressed in a natty blue suit 
and a little mustache, with his black hair slicked back over a high forehead. He spoke 
English better than most Americans – only one split infinite – and he is a smoothie.”640 
Interestingly, when asked why the Arab League invested so much effort into Palestine 
despite the country’s smallness, he underlined its religious importance in Islam,641 
calling it a “sacred, living museum of Arab history.”642 Such religious and nationalist 
themes were rare in the Arab propaganda abroad. Frankness seemed to be one of 
Shukairy’s traits. Vis-à-vis the journalist, he unapologetically declared himself to be a 
propagandist tasked “to put out information to counteract the propaganda of the 
Zionists.”643 
At first, the Arab Office staff believed that the press was boycotting them because of 
the alleged Jewish dominance of the trade. To prove their observation, they reported 
to Jerusalem that “a great number of editors (…) are members of the Jewish faith” and 
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that “a great part of (…) advertisements (…) originate from Jewish firms and 
organizations who of late have been exercising tremendous influence on all publicity 
sources to have them refrain from printing any new item that does not fall in harmony 
with the Zionists’ ambitions.”644 When Khulusi Khairy succeeded in November 1945 in 
placing his first article in the magazine Asia, the Arab Office looked more optimistically 
to the future. Asia’s editors, the couple Richard J. Walsh and Pearl S. Buck, offered its 
pages to other anti-Zionist thinkers such as William E. Hocking. In the following 
months, the Arab Office staff participated in several debates and published its opinion 
through articles and letters in America’s leading newspapers, including the New York 
Times, the Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, the Jewish Chronicle and many 
others.645 The refugee question remained a recurring theme in these publications. In 
one article titled ‘From an Arab Spokesman’, which appeared in the New Republic on 
28 January 1946, Samir Shamma demanded that the Jewish refugees in Europe be 
resettled elsewhere than Palestine. In a letter to the editor on 5 August 1946 in the 
same newspaper, Cecil Hourani made the same demand.646 The Arab Office displayed 
zealous activity in the first half year of its existence. It bought advertisement space in 
the New York Times to challenge the ads of the Zionists, who allegedly had 
“unrestricted command of financial and material resources” at their disposal.647 
Moreover, it edited a bulletin sent to 3’000 opinion leaders and institutions, distributed 
press releases, held lectures and sought to socialize within Washington’s political and 
media circles. They were motivated by their correct belief that the Zionists ascribed 
paramount strategic importance to gaining US support for their movement: “It is 
obvious that the Zionists have pinned all their hopes on the United States. The 
importance which they attach to the winning of the American public opinion cannot 
possibly be exaggerated. To achieve this, the Zionists have organized a tremendous 
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campaign which penetration into every nook and cranny of the country and reaches 
almost every publication. Their tactics are largely based on capitalizing the sentiments 
of the Americans towards the refugees and displaced persons in Europe, as well as 
on the resentment with which the average American views the persecution inflicted by 
the Nazis. In addition, the Zionists have to a great extent succeeded in mobilizing 
Jewish influence in the United States – financial and otherwise. What non-Zionist 
Jewish element exists, which might be large in number, is nevertheless hardly 
articulate.”648 
From the beginning, the Arab Office also paid great attention to academic circles. 
Charles Malik, the pro-Western Lebanese minister to the United States and the UN, 
who was a graduate of both the AUB and Harvard, approached US universities in order  
to organize a lecture tour of the country’s universities in the winter of 1945 and 1946. 
Shukairy, Izzedin and Dajani, who spoke better English than the rest of the staff, were 
selected for the tour.649 This tactical move was not surprising. The campus was an 
important battlefield and both detractors and supporters of Zionism were already 
active. Moreover, many in its network of non-Arab and Arab activists and sympathizers 
worked in academic positions or had good connections to academia, providing the pro-
Arab lobby with a firm foothold at the universities. Among those were Virginia 
Gildersleeve, the dean of Barnard College, and the Rev. Henry Sloane Coffin, the 
former president of the Union Theological Seminary. Opposition to Zionism was 
particularly strong at Oriental Studies departments, with prominent Orientalists Philip 
Hitti at Princeton, John Hazm of City College or John Wilson at the University of 
Chicago being active in the movement. Harvard philosophy professor William Ernest 
Hocking was another influential voice against Zionism. In 1945, he penned the article 
‘Arab Nationalism and Political Zionism’. Arguments against the establishment of a 
Jewish state also resounded among those who were outside the anti-Zionist circles at 
the universities. William Yandell Elliott for instance, Professor of Government at 
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Harvard and an influential intellectual figure in post-War America, warned in a lecture 
that the Eastern European Jews would bring Communism to Palestine.650 
However, Ahmad Shukairy’s stint at the Arab Office lasted only a short while and he 
left the US on November 28, 1945.651 Two years later, Shukairy published a 92-page 
booklet in the form of a diary about his trip from Palestine to the United States and his 
stay in the country, carrying the title ‘From Jerusalem to Washington’. The account 
contained mostly personal reflections and revealed little about Shukairy’s mission in 
Washington. A Jewish agency report dismissively commented: “More than teaching us 
about the activity of the Arab offices and about their attitude towards the United States 
and the Jews, the booklet is testament to the limited capability to direct modern 
propaganda.”652 
There were also several indications that the propaganda campaign was not going as 
well as they had expected. In November 1945, A.H. Tandy, First Secretary of the British 
Embassy in Washington, spoke with the second director of the Arab Office in 
Washington, Khulusi Khairy, and two of his colleagues, Radia Afnan and Dr. Izzedin. 
In their conversation with the British diplomat, the Arab delegates seemed to be 
exasperated by the high costs of their propaganda effort, having just spent $800 for an 
advertisement in the New York Times, complaining that the Zionists had superior 
means. Tandy was not entirely convinced, remarking in his notes: “(…) unless they are 
discreetly playing down their backing, I think they somewhat underrate the 
potentialities of their own fairy godmother, the oil companies.”653 The Arab 
propagandists, using anti-Semitic imaginary, generally overestimated Zionist influence 
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in the US and saw Zionism as a function of Jewish greed: “Jews (…) with their flair for 
profit and ambitions for financial and economic power, foresaw the coming importance 
of the Middle Eastern area (…).”654 Nor were the Arab propagandists clear on their 
goals apart from preventing the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus, the 
British diplomat noted that the Arab delegates were not advocating an independent 
Arab Palestinian state, but a Greater Syria.655 
The disappointment is also palpable in the correspondence between the Washington 
Office and the Central Office in Jerusalem. Four months after the opening of the Office 
in Washington, the center planned to open a branch office in New York. Khairy advised 
against this, arguing that New York was dominated by the Zionists and that the Arabs 
enjoyed no access there to the newspapers. Khairy suggested more investment in the 
conservative areas in the US, especially the “Middle-West, an area considered to be 
especially favorable for an anti-Zionist viewpoint.”656 Khairy mentioned that unspecified 
British and Americans experienced in the field of propaganda shared his opinion that 
the Mid-West was the most promising region for anti-Zionist propaganda. Despite his 
reservations, together with Francis Kettaneh and the Syrian Consul, Rafik Ashy, they 
looked for suitable premises to host a second office in New York.657 The American-
Lebanese entrepreneur Francis Kettaneh was the scion of one of the leading industrial 
families of Lebanon. The Kettaneh family (also written as Kittaneh) enterprise acted as 
the agent of more than fifty US companies in the Middle East and was heavily involved 
in import-export trade with the US. It also owned stocks of companies in Egypt, 
Palestine and Iraq. Through Francis Kettaneh’s marriage with the niece of the 
Lebanese president, Bechara el-Khoury, the family also enjoyed access to the political 
leadership of the country. Francis Kettaneh enjoyed access to the highest political and 
business circles in the US. Thus, from 1947 to 1951, he sat on the Council of Foreign 
Relations, which was then chaired by Allan Dulles. Along with Charles Malik, he lobbied 
for closer US-Lebanese ties and a deeper involvement of the US in the region, as 
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successor to Britain.658 Dulles and Kettaneh also maintained contact after the former 
had become the chief of the CIA in 1951. In their publicly available correspondence, 
which runs from 1951 to 1964, there is evidence that Kettaneh sometimes acted as an 
informer on Middle Eastern issues for Dulles. Allan Dulles thanks Kettaneh several 
times for information he provided, although the exact nature of the information is 
unspecified.659 In another letter from 1963, he reported on “a rather interesting 
development in atomic research as between the French and Israeli government.”660 
However, this is not evidence that Kettaneh was supported by American Intelligence 
services during the debate on Zionism in the crucial years 1945 to1947. 
In the summer of 1946, the English-Lebanese Cecil Hourani was appointed as 
secretary of the Arab Office in Washington. When Hourani arrived in the US, the Arab 
Office had been suffering from a leadership crisis for some time. Ahmed Shukairy had 
already departed, and Khulusi Khairy was experiencing personal and professional 
troubles. His wife, who had only recently arrived, was apparently unhappy with their 
life abroad and urged him to return to Palestine.661 The problems of the Arab Office 
were not only of a personal nature. In the opinion of Hourani, the Office under Khairy’s 
leadership had failed to produce the desired results. This was due to Khairy’s over-
ambition to compete with Zionist propaganda in the US. When Khairy discovered that 
this goal was difficult to achieve, he “almost reached the stage of a nervous 
breakdown” and had to be sent back to Palestine, as Cecil Hourani told Epstein in 
January 1947.662 The affair around Khairy and Nashashibi’s alleged links to the far-
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right probably added to the frustration, as Cecil Hourani intimated to private NSANL 
investigators operating incognito. He had been sent to Washington to correct their 
mistakes.663 Hourani agreed with Musa Alami and Edward Attiyah, the head of the 
London Office, to limit the task of the Office to the distribution of information and to 
drop the more ambitious schemes to challenge the Zionists. 664 
Together with his brother Albert, Cecil had worked for British Intelligence in Cairo 
during the war under Brigadier Clayton, enjoying access to both the circles of British 
policy making in the Middle East and to the Arab nationalist leadership.665 Cecil 
Hourani was a markedly more balanced figure than his colleagues, and entertained 
friendly relations with Jews. When Cecil Hourani travelled from Jerusalem to 
Washington, Ben Gurion took a seat next to him. Ben Gurion wrongly believed Hourani 
to be a chalutz, a Jewish pioneer. In the process, a friendly conversation ensued 
between the two representatives from opposing camps. This was typical for Cecil 
Hourani, who was a consummate pro-Western moderate, free of personal acrimony 
towards Jews and Zionists.666 He would also regularly engage in exchanges of opinion 
with Eliahu Epstein. Epstein had become acquainted with the Hourani brothers when 
they had served under Clayton in Cairo and kept in touch with them when they later 
joined the Arab Office in Jerusalem.667 Cecil regularly met with Epstein during his time 
in Washington, complaining to him about the lack of manpower to complete his task. 
Besides him, only Awni Dajani and Nejla Izzedin were working full-time at the Office. 
Izzedin carried the bulk of the work, giving 75 public speeches and appearing three 
times on radio during the six-month period from September 21, 1946 to March 21, 
1947. Continuing their previous strategy, many of their appearances took place on the 
nation’s campuses, with a particular focus on the Ivy League universities. In February 
and March of 1947, Hourani addressed audiences at Harvard and Georgetown. 
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Epstein was apprehensive about the Arabs’ intensive focus on academia: “Although 
not a spectacular or much publicized item, this is one of the most useful, from the long-
range point of view of Arab propaganda efforts in this country and at the same time 
one of the most dangerous to our interests.”668  
According to Hourani, the Arab Office only received limited support from the Arab 
legations located in Washington, except for Radia Afnan from the Iraqi legation. 
However, he held the Lebanese minister Charles Malik in highest esteem, claiming 
that “nobody has contributed as much to the Arab cause in this country as Mr. Malik”.669 
Hourani also had good connections to the State Department, which was eager to listen 
to the Arab point of view. William Eddy, an adviser to Roosevelt on Arab Affairs, was 
a personal acquaintance. Eddy’s grandfather had served as a missionary in Lebanon, 
where he converted Cecil Hourani’s grandfather to Protestantism.670 Cecil Hourani also 
collaborated with Ben Freedman, though they were careful not to publicize this fact.671 
Cecil succeeded in bringing the Arabists Garland Hopkins and Kermit Roosevelt 
together with Benjamin Freedman. They formed the Committee for Peace and Justice 
in the Holy Land. Later, Cecil Hourani came to regret the cooperation with Freedman, 
when he realized that he was primarily motivated by his hatred for Eastern European 
Jewry.672 Benjamin Freedman’s activities provoked anti-Nazi and Zionist 
organizations, which opposed the Arab propaganda effort. 
The Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League (NSANL), a group which monitored and infiltrated 
pro-Nazi groups under the chairmanship of professor James H. Sheldon, is particularly 
noteworthy. The NSANL sought to prove the connection between the domestic anti-
Semitic and far-right scene and the foreign propagandists. On May 7, 1946, the NSANL 
submitted a petition to President Truman, which was presented to Congress by 
representative Emmanuel Celler from New York. The memorandum urged the 
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president to launch an investigation into the activities of the Arab Office, alleging that 
its anti-Zionist campaign was inciting religious and racial hatred in order to advance 
foreign political goals. The memorandum accused Arab Office director Khulusi Khairy 
and Anwar Bekir Nashashibi of having cooperated with the far-right activist Gerald L.K. 
Smith and the anti-Semitic Blue Star Mothers group. Through its institution of an anti-
Jewish boycott in November 1945 and in appointing the Mufti as the rightful 
representative of the Arabs in Palestine, the Arab League had revealed itself as an 
“anti-democratic and authoritarian body,” the petition continued.673 The memorandum 
further stated that the Arab Office was coordinating with the Institute of Arab American 
Affairs, which it correctly identified as a successor organization of the Arab National 
League. The ANL, it reminded its readers, had itself collaborated with the German-
American Bund and had been praised by Nazi newspapers. The propaganda of these 
pro-Arab organizations was anti-Semitic and “bears many of the most obvious 
ideological criteria of fascism or Nazism – for example, in its insistence of an ultra-
nationalism based on religious and racial lines, and in its demand for a total Arab 
hegemony even in areas such as the Lebanese Republic where the Christian 
population constitutes a definite numerical majority.”674  
The NSANL’s accusations were based on facts. The connection to the Mufti ran even 
deeper than was known at the time; Musa Alami, the head of the Arab Offices, formally 
reported to the Mufti, despite the fact that the two did not get along. According to Cecil 
Hourani, the Mufti was plotting with Arab League Secretary, Azzam Pasha, against 
Musa Alami, persuading all Arab governments except for Iraq to cut their financial 
donations to the Arab Offices.675 However, the extreme right was hardly the main target 
of the Arab Office propaganda effort, as the Arabs and foremost Cecil Hourani were 
aware that contacts to open anti-Semites were pernicious to their efforts. He insisted 
in his autobiography that the Arab Office strove “not to associate with the fringe groups 
                                             
673 Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, “Memorandum Concerning Propaganda 
Activities of the Arab Office in the United States,” Congressional Record - Appendix 
(Washington, May 7, 1946), CZA S25/4153. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Hourani, An Unfinished Odyssey, 60–65. 
 
207 
 
of American political life (…) although some of them were anxious to get in touch with 
us and to demonstrate their ‘sympathy’ for our cause.”676 Vis-à-vis the British embassy, 
Khulusi Khairy also maintained that he had left a meeting when he became aware of 
the presence of anti-Semitic groups.677 However, despite the accusations, even the 
new Arab Office chief, Cecil Hourani, was not careful to maintain a distance from the 
native far-right. When private investigators, who worked for the NSANL, broke into the 
Arab Office in September 1946, they found no incriminating material. But in a 
subsequent conversation with Hourani, they posed as Italian anti-Semites soliciting the 
support of the Arab League, which he granted.678 On the morning of March 10, 1947, 
FBI agents raided the premises of the Arab Office in Washington. Musa Alami, who 
was then sojourning in Washington to meet with State Department officials, cancelled 
his appointments immediately.679 The FBI raid, which did not result in an arraignment, 
did not damage the Arab cause in the United States. On the contrary, because of the 
publicity caused by the affair, contacts with civil society, churches, schools and 
universities multiplied.680 
Still, Cecil Hourani’s mission to Washington had barely lasted a year, when in summer 
1947 he was already preparing his return to England. In a conversation with Epstein in 
June 1947, a disillusioned Cecil Hourani called the Mufti “the greatest menace to Arab 
interests in Palestine and to the Arab League.”681 He blamed him and AHC 
representative to the UN, Emil Ghoury, for the failure to gain sympathy and support for 
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their Arab cause. Despite his opposition to the Mufti, Musa Alami refrained from 
criticizing him in public for fear of harming the Arab cause. Hourani indicated that there 
was growing opposition to the Mufti among the Arabs in Palestine and that their 
empowerment might eventually lead to a compromise with the Jewish national 
movement. However, he warned that both the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states 
would never accept a Jewish state and would fight it until it is “physically crushed.”682 
The last staff addition to the Arab Office was Charles Issawi (1916-2000), a political 
science professor at AUB.683 According to his own account, he still worked tirelessly to 
spread the Arab viewpoint in the US: I lectured, I toured the country, I brought out the 
Arab News Bulletin (…). I was very active in trying to persuade Americans that their 
policy would lead to disaster”684, although these efforts apparently had little effect. The 
UN partition resolution on November 29, 1947, seems to have had a negative effect 
on the morale of the Arab propagandists.  
Despite his earlier intentions to return to England, Hourani stayed on as secretary of 
the Arab Office. On December 2, 1947, he called a press conference to announce the 
liquidation of the Washington Office. The Office in New York had already been closed 
and plans for an additional Office in San Francisco were abandoned.685 In May, the 
Office was finally closed, ending the Arab League’s propaganda campaign against the 
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establishment of a Jewish state for the time being.686 In his 1984 memoirs, Cecil 
Hourani defended his moderate propaganda approach against the Arab nationalist 
hardliners: “Looking back at our efforts in Washington to present a reasonable case for 
an independent Palestinian state (…), it is clear to me that we were in fact following 
the only realistic method of conducting propaganda, which later generations of Arab 
propagandists have abandoned for more aggressive, more brazen methods which tend 
to produce exactly the opposite effect to that intended. (...) I loved America and the 
Americans I was meeting (…). Later Arab propagandists regarded America as the 
enemy, every American as a pro-Israeli, and every Jew as a Zionist, and with this 
attitude it is not surprising that they have had no impact on either public opinion of 
official policy, and that such support for the Palestinian cause as exists today is the 
product only of commercial and financial interest, or of anti-Israeli feeling, or of the 
efforts of American Jews who feel that Israel, in its own interests, should be more 
understanding and flexible in its treatment of the Palestinians.”687 In the six-month 
period between September 1946 and March 1947, the Office reported expenditures of 
roughly 100’000 dollars.688 The Office operated from late July 1945 until mid-May 1948, 
more than 33 months. If we assume that the Office was fully operational until the 
partition decision in September 1947, and thereafter expended only half of its usual 
budget, we can estimate that the expenditures for the entire period amounted to 
492’000 dollars, equivalent to 5.4 million US dollars in 2017.689  
Secretary Ahmad Shukairy (1945), Khulusi 
Khairy (1945-46)), Cecil Hourani 
(1946-48) 
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Collaborators Samir Shamma (1945-1946), Awni 
Dajani (1945-1947), Nejla Izzedin 
(1945-1947), Omar Abu Khadra 
(1945-1947), Anwar Bekir 
Nashashibi (1945-1946), Radia 
Afnan, Charles Issawi (1947-48) 
Table 1: Staff of the Arab Office 
4.5 The Arabs at the UN 
With the end of the war, Jewish paramilitary groups started waging a guerilla war 
against British troops in Palestine. To reestablish calm, Britain was forced to station 
100’000 servicemen in Palestine, further burdening the struggling economy.690 On 
February 14, 1947, the British cabinet eventually had had enough and decided to 
relegate the Palestine question to the UN. The first special session of the UN, which 
was scheduled to take place from April 28 to May 15, 1947, would be dedicated to the 
Palestine issue.691 The Arab League made several preparations for the upcoming 
session in order to improve its standing at the UN. In early 1947, the Arab League 
commissioned the IAAA staff member, Omar Haliq, to investigate the situation of the 
Arab representatives at the UN. After speaking to the Syrian Delegate, Constantin 
Zurayk, as well as the British and the Syrian delegates, he learnt that no one had 
received any instructions on how to present the Palestine issue to the UN. There were 
only five Arab states in the UN in 1947, too few to prevent the creation of a Jewish 
state in Palestine. In a report he sent to the Arab League, Haliq concluded that the only 
way to a majority would be through appealing to Muslim and friendly states: “The Arab 
chances to success in the session of the General Assembly depend a lot on the extent 
of their activities in the spreading of propaganda in the corridors of the (…) UN and in 
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the exploitation (…) of the creation of political blocs with the countries which are 
interested in the friendship of the Arabs (…)”.692 Omar Haliq ascribed special 
importance to Latin America, which had voted with the Arab bloc in the General 
Assembly in the past. He therefore advised that a Christian delegation be sent to Latin 
American countries. In the words of Haliq, it was “to make use of the Catholic hate of 
the Jews on the entire planet for the good of the Arabs.”693 
It is likely that, as a result of the recommendations of the Haliq-report, in April 1947, 
the AHC sent a team of senior members, many of them experienced in the field of 
propaganda, to the US. All of them were men loyal to the AHC leader Amin al-Hussein, 
the Mufti. The selection included Rasim Khalidi, a former leader of the Islamist Young 
Men’s Muslim Association and a cousin of Ismail and Hussein Khalidi, who had 
followed the Mufti from Bagdad into his German exile during the war. For this reason, 
the US did not grant him a visa. The final team consisted equally of three Christians 
and three Muslims: Senior propagandist Emil Ghoury, Henry Kattan and Issa Nakhla, 
both prominent lawyers from Jerusalem, as well as the Muslims Akram Zuaiter, Khalil 
Budayri and Rajai Husseini. Budayri was a leftist politician and doctor from Jerusalem. 
Rajai Husseini, a relative of the Mufti, had worked in the propaganda office in London. 
In the conflict between Musa Alami and the Mufti, he sided with the latter and therefore 
resigned from his post in April 1947.694 
The Arabs sought a debate in the General Assembly on the immediate independence 
of an Arab majority Palestinian state, but the majority chose to wait for the results of 
UNSCOP. They were also defeated when they tried to separate the Palestine question 
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from the issue of the Jewish DPs in Europe. 695 Still, the UN special session on 
Palestine resolved to set up a Special Committee to investigate the conditions in 
Palestine, which came to be known under its acronym UNSCOP. The UNSCOP report 
was to be presented at the autumn session of the UN in the same year (September 16 
– November 29, 1947).696 Despite the setback, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General 
of the Arab League, looked optimistically towards the next session: "On the whole, we 
feel we are departing from this special session in a better position than when we 
arrived. Our views are now better understood throughout the world. It is the Zionist 
objective to have political power and a Zionist state. The way in which the Jewish 
Agency explained this made the situation clear to everyone on the outside."697 
The AHC chose to boycott the UNSCOP, accusing it of being pro-Zionist, while the 
Jewish Agency paid great attention to it, attaching three officials, including the later 
Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, to it. This certainly contributed to their conclusions. 
When the committee members visited Palestine, they were struck positively by the 
achievements of the Zionist movement in developing the country. The Arab inhabitants 
on the other hand failed to impress even those UNSCOP members from the Middle 
East. Moreover, their visit to Palestine coincided with the arrival of the Exodus, an affair 
which illustrated the plight of the Jewish refugees in Europe and British intransigency. 
The Arabs, to whom UNSCOP spoke despite the AHC boycott, made an 
uncompassionate and radical impression. To illustrate, AHC member and Jerusalem 
mayor, Hussein al-Khalidi, stated that the Jews had no historical rights in Palestine. In 
order to make up for the lack of an official AHC representation, UNSCOP also 
consulted Arab officials from Lebanon, Jordan and from the Arab League. For the most 
part, these officials expressed the Arab consensus that no Jewish refugees should be 
admitted to Palestine and that an independent Arab state should be established on its 
soil. But there were dissenters. In private meetings, Maronite figures expressed 
support for partition and a Jewish state. Likewise, King Abdullah supported partition, 
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wishing to occupy the Arab parts of Palestine. After visiting the DP camps in Germany, 
UNSCOP returned to Geneva to write its report, where it was subjected to lobbying 
efforts from all sides. This included Musa Alami, who sought to influence the British 
liaison officer to UNSCOP. UNSCOP eventually decided to recommend the partition of 
the country along demographic lines, signing the report on August 31, 1947. Between 
late September and November 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine prepared a 
resolution based on the recommendation of the UNSCOP report. During its course, the 
State Department, the Foreign Office and the Arab states successfully lobbied the Ad 
Hoc Committee to have the size of the Jewish state reduced to 55% of Palestine, the 
bulk of it being infertile Negev desert.698 The Arab side reacted harshly to the UNSCOP 
report. Jamal Husseini warned that “(…) blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East,” 
while Arab League president Azzam compared the nascent Jewish state to the 
Crusaders’ kingdoms.699 Like the former, the Jewish state will be destroyed by the 
Arabs in time, he prophesized.700 
Despite the AHC’s refusal to work with UNSCOP, the AHC and the Arab League were 
aware of its importance for the future of Palestine. This is shown by their efforts to 
influence public opinion in both North and South America. After the end of the UN 
spring session, the Arab League set up its own special committee in New York to 
oversee its diplomatic and propagandistic activities in North and South America to gain 
a favorable decision in November. The special committee was staffed by the Arab 
representatives at the UN and the functionaries of the AHC. The Syrian, Fares el-
Khoury, acted as chairman and Mahmud Fawzi as secretary. The committee further 
included the Lebanese Charles Malik, the Iraqi Awni al-Khalidi, the Saudi Asad al-
Faquih as well as the AHC representative, Wassif Kamal. The Jewish Agency reported 
that a budget of 100’000 dollars was at the committee’s disposal to lobby on behalf of 
an independent Arab Palestine in the UN. To the frustration of Arab League president, 
Azzam Pasha, the special committee was reportedly under the sway of AHC delegate 
                                             
698 Morris, 1948, 40–52. 
699 Ibid., 50. 
700 Ibid. 
 
214 
 
Wassif Kamal und thus the Mufti. 701 According to the Jewish Agency, Wassif Kamal 
had spent World War II in Turkey and Italy, and was close to the Germans.702  
Latin America, the largest voting bloc in the UN, was especially contested between the 
Zionists and the Arabs. The dominance of the Catholic Church, which generally 
rejected Zionism, as well as the presence of sizable Arab and German communities all 
worked against Zionism. According to the Zionists, the South American countries 
tended to move progressively into the anti-Zionist camp in the course of 1947. They 
also blamed an “intensive campaign” by the Arabs for this development, which involved 
“commercial pressure, diplomatic pressure, bribery”.703 Indeed, in accordance with 
Omar Haliqs recommendations, the Arabs dedicated great attention to Latin America. 
Issa Nakhla and Akram Zuaiter acted as roving ambassadors in North and South 
America during 1947. Nakhla had already gathered experience in public diplomacy 
during his study years in London prior to World War II, where he worked at the Arab 
propaganda office under Izzat Tannous. Zuaiter was a hardliner and militant who had 
joined the Arab Revolt. After fleeing the country, he allegedly worked as a liaison for 
the Mufti with the Germans. In 1941, he was involved in the pro-German Iraqi coup of 
Rashid al-Gaylani, forcing him to flee to Turkey, where he spent the rest of the war.704 
As already mentioned, upon his arrival in the US, Nakhla toured the East Coast and 
the Mid-West to meet with Arab-Americans and pro-Arab groups. The special 
committee was also responsible for organizing a propaganda campaign in South 
America, for which 25’000 dollars had been set aside. To this purpose, the special 
committee produced material in the local languages and dispatched two delegations 
to Latin America, one chaired by Akram Zuaiter and the other by Mustafa Khalidi, an 
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AUB professor. Moreover, an Arab Office was established in Rio de Janeiro.705 In 
Brazil, Zuaiter’s delegation attended the Pan-American Conference and met with 
notable figures of its society. They also held a rally for the Arab community in Brazil, 
where they promised to conserve the Arab character of Palestine.706  
The Arabs also placed their hopes in the Catholic countries of Europe. The Greek 
Catholic Archbishop, George Hakim, was dispatched in summer 1947 on a tour of 
Catholic Europe. His first station was Italy, where he met with the pope. He then 
proceeded to France and Belgium.707 They especially hoped to gain the vote of France 
with its sizeable Muslim population in the colonies. If they succeeded, they also had a 
high chance of winning the votes of the Benelux states.708 In October 1947, the AHC 
therefore opened the Political Mission of the AHC (Fr. Mission politique du Comité 
Suprême Arabe à Paris) under the leadership of Yakoub Khoury. Khoury regularly met 
with French dignitaries and edited a bulletin during his time in France. The Jewish 
Agency however deemed him to be a “poor defender of the Arab cause.”709 By 
nominating three Christians as delegates to the UN autumn session, the AHC again 
pursued its established strategy to co-opt Christian anti-Zionism and allay fears of 
Muslim persecution. Arab Christians had played an important role in the Palestinian 
national struggle, especially on its international front. They constituted a small, 
cosmopolitan and highly educated class. Emil Ghoury had served as the leading 
international propagandist for the AHC since at least 1936, as discussed above. Both 
Henry Kattan, a lawyer from Jerusalem who commuted between Paris and the AHC 
propaganda office in the US as well as Issa Nakhla were prominent Jerusalemite 
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lawyers of Christian origin. The strategy however was not successful. Most of Latin 
America and Catholic Europe voted for the UN resolution 181 on November 29, 1947 
at the UN session in Lake Success. Issa Nakhla stayed in the US after the end of his 
mission. In 1956, he was elected as the head of the newly opened Arab League Office 
in Buenos Aires, which was said to coordinate its activities with the Arab League 
Information Center in New York. The Office in Buenos Aires complemented the existing 
Offices in Geneva, London, Bonn, Ankara, Rio de Janeiro and New Delhi.710 
4.6 Last Stand: The Committee for Peace and Justice in the Holy Land and the fight 
against Partition 
The Holocaust had a deep impact on American Protestant attitudes towards Jews and 
Zionism. Both mainline and evangelical American Protestants began to confront the 
problem of anti-Semitism in their teachings, while interfaith initiatives, exemplified by 
the National Conference on Christians and Jews, broadened their public appeal and 
activity. Some preached that through supporting the Jews and fighting anti-Semitism, 
Christians could repay the debt that they owed to the Jewish people for their teachings, 
which had given birth to Christianity. Meanwhile, the mainline American Christian 
Palestine Committee urged the US government to push for the admission of Jewish 
refugees in Palestine and for the persecution of the Nazi crimes. The ascendancy of 
pro-Zionist Evangelism further increased popular sympathy for Zionism.711 
However, anti-Zionism was still popular in certain parts of American Protestantism – 
especially in its missionary circles. The anti-Zionist ACJ sought to co-opt this feeling. 
On April 30, 1944, the ACJ published an editorial in several newspapers, which 
explained the Reform Jewish anti-Zionist position to Christian readers. While they were 
supportive of settling the refugees in Palestine, they rejected Zionism and considered 
Judaism to be solely a religion. The editorial excoriated the Zionists for having led the 
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Christians astray into supporting Zionism, as they “were led to believe that friendship 
for the Jews necessitated the acceptance of the Zionist formula; and so they made that 
acceptance, although with misgivings.”712 Subsequently, the ACJ sent the editorial to 
hundreds of Christian representatives and solicited their responses. The 150 mostly 
positive responses the ACJ received were then printed in a brochure titled ‘Christian 
Opinion on Jewish Nationalism and the Jewish State’. Among the responders were 
such figures as Richard Niebuhr, the brother of Reinhold, Merle Davis of the American 
Friends Board of Missions, and Henry Sloan Coffin, the president of the Union 
Theological Seminary in New York from 1926 till 1945, who charged that the Jewish 
state “would seriously complicate Jewish-Christian relations in this country and in other 
lands.”713 The co-optation of Christian anti-Zionism by the ACJ was a win-win game for 
both sides. On one hand, it helped the ACJ to escape its isolation in the Jewish 
community and reach a broader audience. On the other hand, it shielded Christian anti-
Zionists from the accusation of being anti-Semite. It was a strategy which would prove 
itself in the following years.714 
In 1944 and 1945, the Foreign Mission Conference issued two documents on the 
Palestine issue, which were marked by their critical view of Zionism. In April 1944, the 
Foreign Mission Conference’s Committee on Work Among Moslems published an 
analysis of the Palestine issue, which was written by secretary, Gloria M. Wysner, and 
which unreservedly advocated the Arab point of view. Another statement was 
published by the Foreign Missions Conference of North America in October 1945. The 
publication centered on the critique of Jewish nationalism, warning that it risked the 
disfranchisement of Jewish communities in the West. The theme had been prominent 
in the Christian Century, as we have seen, and in the Reform Jewish critique of 
Zionism.715 In the years 1947 and 1948, the pages of Christian and Crisis also offered 
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a platform to debate the Palestine issue. Henry Sloan Coffin repeated the standard 
Protestant anti-Zionist argument that the Jews had lost the right to a Jewish nation The 
Land of Israel had been promised to the Jews on the condition that they followed divine 
law, but “Israel notoriously failed to fulfill this condition. 716” He further claimed that the 
US had risked its good relations with the Muslim world in exchange for Jewish votes. 
The debate continued after the acceptance of partition in the UN on November 29. 
Then current president of the Union Theological Seminary, Dr. Henry Van Dusen, 
shared Coffin’s analysis, arguing that support for Zionism did not result from 
humanitarian concerns for the Jewish refugees, but from “shrewd calculation of the 
voting strength of their American kinsmen (…)”.717 AUB president Bayard S. Dodge, 
who was at the time on a fundraising tour in the US, warned that if the American Jews 
were more loyal to Israel than to America, “it will increase anti-Semitism in America.” 
718 Garland Hopkins, a member of the Methodist Board on Missions, was another 
discussant of missionary background who criticized the partition decision in the pages 
of Christian and Crisis. Many of the voices cited here would join the anti-Zionist 
Protestant groups, which became active in 1948 and will be discussed below. That the 
Protestant missionary circles almost unanimously tilted to the Arab side was also 
observed by contemporaries like Reinhold Niebuhr. While the Protestants had failed to 
convert the Muslim and even the Christian Arabs to Western Christianity, Arab 
nationalism had succeeded in raising understanding, if not sympathy, among the 
missionaries.719 
The Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land, which was constituted in early 
1948, was a product of the missionary concern with Zionism. It lobbied to have the US 
revise its support for the partition resolution from November 29, 1947. The new group 
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recruited its members from among the same Protestant missionary and Arabist circles 
which had already formed the bulk of the membership of the American Friends of the 
Arabs in the late 1930s. Among those were Paul Hutchinson and Garland Evans 
Hopkins, board members of the Christian Century journal, and Henry Sloan Coffin of 
the Union Theological Seminary in New York. Bayard S. Dodge, AUB president, Kermit 
Roosevelt and Daniel Bliss, the nephew of the AUB founder, were associated with the 
missionary circles.720 Some were employed by the government, such as the Secretary 
of Defense James Forrestal and Harald B. Minor from the NEA. With Terry Duce and 
William Eddy, the former US minister to Saudi Arabia and now consultant for Aramco, 
the oil lobby was also well represented in the Committee.721 The board reflected the 
fact that the Committee was not solely representative of the anti-Zionist missionary 
element, although it was an important constituent, but stood on a far broader footing. 
Kermit Roosevelt and Virginia Gildersleeve were the leading personalities behind the 
formation of the Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land. Both were also 
sitting on the board of the IAAA.722 Roosevelt was the nephew of Theodore Roosevelt. 
During the war, he had served for the OSS in the Middle East. From 1945 to 1947, he 
was officially commissioned to write an history of the OSS record in the Middle East. 
However, he spent most of his time travelling the Middle East with his wife, meeting 
dignitaries and experts on their way and writing articles on the region for US 
newspapers. The experiences of these years were later turned into his book ‘Arabs, 
Oil and History’, which was published in February 1949.723 The book was sharply 
critical of the role the British had played in the Middle East. On the other hand, he 
believed in the soundness of the American-Arab friendship, the base of which had 
been laid in the missionary enterprise. Kermit Roosevelt heaped praise on the class of 
young Arab nationalists, many of them educated at Western institutions like the AUB. 
This was the group that Roosevelt met in his travels in the Middle East and in 
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Washington, where they staffed the Arab legations and the Arab Office. Co-opting 
these ‘young effendis’, as Roosevelt called them, adopting a term coined by British 
Arabist, Freya Stark, was the best safeguard against both Communist intrusion in the 
Middle East and the Islamic extremists of the sort of the Muslim Brotherhood, he 
advised.724 However, he believed that the US was doing the opposite of his prescribed 
policy by supporting Zionism, which was estranging the Arabs from the West and its 
values. Roosevelt cited an example from the UN, where an Arab delegate had told 
him, that “If it is possible for less than a million Zionists to lead more than 140 million 
peoples into an act which is contrary both to their principles and to their interests, there 
must be something wrong with democracy”.725 Roosevelt warned that this 
estrangement from the West would riskencouraging “an isolationist, fanatically 
reactionary, and xenophobic force which will dominate an important segment of the 
world (…)”.726 It is noteworthy that support for the ‘young effendis’ became the policy 
of the Eisenhower administration in which Kermit Roosevelt served as a CIA chief for 
the Middle East.727 
Upon his return to the US from the Middle East in the fall of 1947, Kermit Roosevelt 
started a nationwide lecture tour under the title ‘The Arabs Live Here Too’. Already in 
June 1947, George Levison had expressed his interest in enlisting Kermit Roosevelt 
in their anti-Zionist campaigning in a letter to Elmer Berger. As noted above, the ACJ 
had an interest in co-opting Christian anti-Zionists to broaden their appeal. In 
November 1947, the ACJ chapter in Austin, Texas invited Roosevelt for a lecture at 
their chapter in Houston, defending him from accusations of anti-Semitism. The 
cooperation worked for both sides and would continue in the future.728 In the same 
period, Roosevelt also worked with the Arab and Arab-American bodies operating in 
the US, joining the board of the IAAA and Benjamin Freedman’s short-lived League for 
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Peace with Justice in Palestine. He was also in touch with Cecil Hourani, the head of 
the Arab Office.729 
In January 1948, Kermit Roosevelt published an article against Zionism in the Middle 
East Journal. Its title, ‘The Partition of Palestine – a Lesson in Pressure Politics’, 
already hinted at its main thesis. It argued that US political support for Zionism was the 
result of the lobbying of a small minority of American Zionists and a Democratic 
leadership that was all too willing to yield to their demands, repeating the standard anti-
Zionist arguments that excessive Zionist influence might result in an anti-Semitic 
backlash. He cited the events around the Anglo-American inquiry to support his thesis. 
The recommendations of the April report to admit 100’000 Jewish refugees to Palestine 
were rejected by the British. In a statement on October 4, 1946 however, President 
Truman defied the British and supported their admittance. Roosevelt claimed in his 
article that this happened due to domestic pressure. The two Democratic runners for 
the posts of Governor and Senator of New York, James M. Mead and Herbert H. 
Lehman, expected their Republican contender, Thomas Dewey, to make a pro-Zionist 
statement. They felt at risk of losing the pro-Zionist vote and therefore urged President 
Truman to forestall such an outcome by making a statement by himself. Roosevelt’s 
account was unoriginal and based on a newspaper report published by the New York 
Times on October 7, 1946.730 Truman’s support for Zionism, Roosevelt argued, went 
against the wisdom of the political experts. “Almost all Americans with diplomatic, 
educational, missionary, or business experience in the Middle East protest fervently 
that support of political Zionism is directly contrary to our national interests, as well as 
to common justice. How then is our policy to be explained? Parts of the explanation - 
perhaps the most interesting parts - are still well-kept secrets.”731 State Department 
officials had been warning since the 1920s that Zionism would strengthen 
Communism. This was also a central argument in Roosevelt’s article. According to his 
analysis, the Soviet Union was pursuing several goals by supporting Zionism and the 
partition of Palestine: Creating a military foothold in the region, spreading chaos, and 
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helping to mainstream the principle of partition which could help Middle Eastern 
minorities friendly to Soviet influence like the Kurds establish their own independent 
states. This was a grave danger because the Middle East was to be one of the central 
arenas of the Cold War due to its strategic location and the abundance of oil, which 
could not be lost: “If a position in the Middle East was essential to winning the war 
against Germany, we are now learning that it is equally essential to winning the peace 
against Soviet Russia.”732” 
Roosevelt’s interpretation of the events which led to the establishment of the Jewish 
state has invariably become authoritative for a branch of historiography which is highly 
critical of Zionism. It enjoyed high popularity from the start, also being published by the 
IAAA in a pamphlet in mid-1948.733 The British and the American foreign policy 
establishment shared Kermit Roosevelt’s opinion that Truman’s pro-Zionist policy was 
largely motivated by domestic interests. Truman may have been partly to blame for 
this perception. According to Arabist William Eddy, he had stated in a 1945 talk with 
the US Chief of Mission in the Middle East that he had “to answer to hundreds of 
thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism, I do not have hundreds of 
thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”734 Whether authentic or not, this was a 
sound democratic argument, as the foreign policy of a country naturally also had to 
reflect the views of its people. The problem was that for a great many foreign policy 
officials, American and Jewish American interests seemed to be inherent opposites. 
However, those who were close to the president in these crucial moments have 
contradicted Roosevelt’s narrative. Clark Gifford, then acting as the president’s advisor 
and a major pro-Zionist voice within the government, rejected it vehemently. Similarly, 
Dean Acheson, who can hardly be suspected of pro-Zionist leanings, asserted in his 
memoirs that Truman was driven by conviction and not by “political opportunism.”735 
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The narrative also ignores the existence of significant domestic and government 
internal pressure to refrain from recognizing the nascent Jewish state. 
Virginia Gildersleeve was the public face of the Committee for Justice and Peace in 
the Holy Land. Gildersleeve was not only a recognized advocate of women’s rights, 
but also a long-time anti-Zionist. She wanted to have her activity for the committee 
understood as a humanitarian gesture, criticizing Christian supporters of Palestine as 
the true bigots, and alleging that “some (…) advocated the project because it would 
relieve us of doing anything ourselves to help the exiles.”736 A review of her biography 
casts serious doubts on her humanitarian feelings for the Jews. Gildersleeve served 
as the Dean of Barnard College, a women’s liberal arts college associated with 
Columbia University, for more than thirty years (1911-47). Despite the college’s high 
percentage of Jewish students and her own claim that she always had an interest in 
Jews, her relationship with them was strained. During her tenure, Barnard introduced 
a holistic admission system which was discriminatory to Jewish students. Before World 
War I, Jews had represented forty percent of Barnard’s student body. Recruiting from 
outside New York and putting greater emphasis on ‘character’ instead of academic 
achievements, Barnard and Columbia reduced the quota of Jewish students to twenty 
percent in the next two decades.737 During the 1930s, she repeatedly stood out for her 
expressions of sympathy for national-socialistic Germany and fascist Italy. Returning 
from a trip to Germany in 1935, she defended Germany’s anti-Semitic policies to 
reduce the number of Jewish student enrollments, arguing that there was a lack of 
professions that the Jews were active in, as though this would help Jews to find 
employment in other professions. As the cofounder of the International Federation of 
University Women, she further defended the National Socialists’ record on women’s 
emancipation, although they had also capped the number of female students.738 
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Germany and Italy’s colonization projects in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean 
were also legitimate in her view, and she was convinced that “the world eventually 
would be forced to recognize” this.739 In sum, for sympathy, lack of information or both, 
she publicly misrepresented the actions and dangers emanating from national-socialist 
and fascist Europe. 
Gildersleeve became interested in Middle Eastern affairs mainly through the mediation 
of Charles R. Crane. In was also in his house that she made the acquaintance of Mary 
Mills Patrick, President of the American College for Girls in Scutari, in the early 1920s. 
For the next two decades (1924-44), she served as a member of the board for the 
institution, becoming its chairperson in 1944. She also served as a board member for 
the Near East College Association, which included the American Universities in Cairo 
and Beirut, a hotbed of Arab nationalism. Her association with the latter and its 
graduates exercised considerable influence on her thought. Given the fact that these 
missionary schools primarily served the Christian population before World War I, it is 
conspicuous that she never discusses the Armenian and Christian genocide in her 
autobiography. When speaking about the American College for Girls in Scutari, 
Gildersleeve notes that from the 1920s onward, the student body became increasingly 
Turkish and less multiethnic. Still she is full of praise for Atatürk’s state building project. 
Her seeming lack of sympathy with the region’s Christian inhabitants was more than 
compensated for by her admiration and support for the Arabs. She took pride in the 
American missionaries’ contribution to the development of the Middle East, subscribing 
to her personal acquaintance George Antonius’ thesis, that Americans had been 
instrumental in kindling Arab nationalism.740 
In late February 1948, Kermit Roosevelt, Virginia Gildersleeve and Garland E. Hopkins 
sent a telegram to many prominent persons to ask them to join the new organization. 
On March 2, the organization was officially established with Roosevelt acting as its 
executive director and Garland E. Hopkins as secretary. Apparently inexperienced at 
the task of organizing a new body from scratch, Roosevelt received coaching from ACJ 
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leader, Elmer Berger. Pursuing the goal to lobby for the rescission of American support 
for partition, Roosevelt organized for a committee delegation to meet with George 
Marshall in the first half of March 1948. During the meeting, Marshall apparently hinted 
at the fact that a decision to rescind partition was in the making, thereby delighting the 
visitors.741  On March 19, 1948, to the surprise of most observers, the American 
delegate to the UN, Warren Austin, declared in the Security Council that the US was 
backtracking from the partition resolution and instead recommended “a temporary 
trusteeship for Palestine (…) under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to 
maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine (…) further 
opportunity to reach an agreement.”742 Naturally, the pro-Arab lobbyists saw the policy 
change as the result of their efforts and felt boosted. The statement was however soon 
overturned by President Truman and on May 14, he recognized Israel just 11 minutes 
after the Israeli declaration of independence in Tel Aviv. The American anti-Zionists 
had lost a battle which had lasted a quarter century. But they did not give up their 
efforts to push policy in a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli direction.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Anti-Zionist activity in the US after World War II rested on the same pillars as before 
the war: Protestants, American-Arabs, Jewish anti-Zionists and the State Department. 
The last pillar was certainly the most influential one with regard to US policy. Here, the 
traditional enmity towards Zionism, which was also informed by anti-Jewish prejudice, 
as explained in Chapter Two, persisted. Moreover, geopolitical considerations weighed 
against the Zionists. The war had proven the strategic value of petroleum, petroleum 
existing in abundance in Saudi Arabia, which was ruled by the most reactionary and 
anti-Semitic ruler of the Arab states. US support for a Jewish state might risk this supply 
of oil to the US. Moreover, as was the case before the war, many warned that US 
support for a Jewish state might push the Arabs into the Soviet camp and facilitate 
Soviet penetration of the region. State Department Middle East experts like William 
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Eddy sought to stress these dangers, despite good counterarguments. They also did 
little to find solutions to counter them. As a result, the State Department often found 
itself in opposition to Truman’s pro-Zionist policy. At several instances, State 
Department diplomats personally interacted with and provided support for anti-Zionist 
Jewish and Arab-American groups working within the US, thus subverting the policies 
of the American government. 
After the adoption of the White Paper, it had become clear to most Zionists that the 
British would not support an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Hopes now rested 
on the US. With the destruction of East-European Jewry, American Jewry took the lead 
in the Zionist movement. The Biltmore conference, which demanded explicitly the 
establishment of a Jewish state and army, was an expression of this change. However, 
Reform Jewish anti-Zionists reacted to the Biltmore conference with the setting up of 
their own body, the AJC. AJC member Elmer Berger led a campaign against Zionism 
which made him one of the most criticized figures in the Jewish community, but also a 
popular figure among those opposed to Zionism. He extensively collaborated with the 
Arab-American anti-Zionists from the IAAA and used his stature as a rabbi to deflect 
criticism of anti-Semitism from anti-Zionist activists. The Arab League also started an 
international campaign against Zionism in 1945 and established propaganda bureaus 
in Jerusalem, London and Washington. Most resources were invested in the US. The 
reason for this was clear. The Arabs had come to the conclusion that the US was 
central for their struggle already before the war. With the Zionists now focused on the 
US and with the US overtaking the British as the leading international power in the 
Middle East for the foreseeable future, this view was strengthened. However, the rift 
between the different factions in the Arab League on the one hand and between Musa 
Alami and Amin al-Husseini on the other often undercut the propaganda campaign in 
the US. 
The impression of the Holocaust, even before its true extent became known after the 
war, increased sympathy for the Zionist cause enormously in both the Jewish and non-
Jewish population. The Arab public diplomacy fight against Zionism in the US was 
often tainted by accusations of anti-Semitism and of collaboration with the discredited 
AHC and its leader, Amin al-Husseini. Jewish and anti-fascist organizations considered 
Amin al-Husseini and his followers to be war criminals and therefore responded fiercely 
to their activity in the US. The Arab Office would usually deny such claims. However, 
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it was a fact that the Arab Office was nominally under the authority of Amin al-Husseini. 
Moreover, AHC members and Mufti loyalists like Emil Ghoury were directly involved in 
the campaign against UN plans to partition Palestine. Cecil Hourani considered the 
Mufti to be the worst hindrance to their PR effort. Indeed, through his intrigues, the 
Arab Office was weakened. On the other hand, his collaboration with the Nazis had 
compromised the Arab cause in Palestine for a lasting time, until it would pass out of 
collective memory. The deliberations at the UN proved that the AHC leaders were not 
ready to change their ways, exploiting anti-Semitism as a tool of anti-Zionist agitation. 
In his strategy to gain the upper hand in the upcoming vote in the UN in November 
1947, former IAAA member, Omar Haliq, proposed to mobilize Catholic hatred of Jews 
in Latin America although this strategy was to prove unsuccessful. In fact, the 
opponents of partition never suggested a viable alternative. By 1947, a Jewish state 
was already in existence in Palestine in all but name. The AHC and Arab League’s 
claims in the West that they would respect the Jewish community in Palestine were 
disproven by their actions at home. This was repeatedly an issue in the deliberations, 
as in the AACI. An Arab state in Palestine would have led to the destruction of this 
state and another massacre of the Jews, just three years after the Holocaust. For such 
high-minded politicians as Truman, this was no alternative to the partition, whatever its 
violent consequences eventually were.  
228 
 
5 The German-Arab friendship between the First World 
War and the Six-Day War 
Despite being defeated in two World Wars, the history of Germany’s Middle Eastern 
policy and the relevant actors in the period from 1914 until the first decade of the FRG 
is marked by continuity of concepts and ideology. The idea that there was a natural 
friendship between the Muslims and the Arabs on the one hand and the German 
people on the other hand informed it. Even if this German-Arab friendship had its up 
and downs, it was no mere slogan. Equally, many of the pioneers of the post 1945 pro-
Arab movement in Germany could trace their commitment to the Arab cause back to 
the era of National Socialist Germany, or even Imperial Germany, where they were 
involved in German Oriental policy as officials or propagandists. They sought to revive 
German-Arab friendship against Germany’s competing Western powers, an idea which 
had been developed before World War I by Max von Oppenheim. These circles were 
incensed by the FRG’s reconciliation policy with Israel and sought closer ties with the 
Arab states. An obscure movement from the days of Weimar Germany, National 
Bolshevism, was also revived in the period of post-War Germany. They believed that 
Germany, like the Third World, had been colonized by the West, and therefore sought 
an alliance with them. This ideology came to be known as Liberation Nationalism and 
inspired many pro-Arab activists and groups. Not only in Germany, but also in 
Switzerland. 
5.1 German-Arab friendship after World War II and its origins 
The idea of an alliance between Germany and the Islamic world under the banner of 
an anti-colonialism directed at Western colonial powers – not the Islamic Ottoman 
Empire – had been developed in the late nineteenth century by the German diplomat 
and adventurer Max von Oppenheim. Oppenheim identified the numerous Muslim 
subjects as the Achilles heel of the European empires. In the event of war with the 
Western colonial powers, France, England and Russia, a Jihad called out by the 
Ottomans, who had assumed the title of Caliph, would rally the Muslims on the side of 
Germany. Islamic insurrections, supported by the might of Imperial Germany, would 
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shatter colonial rule in French North-Africa, Russian Central-Asia, and British India and 
Afghanistan. This plan was implemented by Germany and its Ottoman ally during the 
First World War.743 A Jihad was proclaimed just three days after Enver Pasha had led 
the Ottoman Empire into War with the Entente: On November 14, 1914, the Ottoman 
Sheikh ul-Islam, the highest religious authority in the Caliphate, called for a holy war of 
all Muslims against Russia, France and England.744 This call to Jihad also marked a 
rupture in Muslim religious traditions, as it distinguished between friendly and hostile 
states of the ‘Kafirs’ – the infidels in the view of Islam. The proclamation on the other 
hand only called for a war against the enemies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire.745 
Thus, the proclamation realized Islam’s anti-imperialist potential, while at the same 
time subjecting it to the state interests of the equally imperialist German and Ottoman 
empires. The Germans were intimately involved in the planning of the Jihad: The 
Intelligence Office for the Orient NfO (Ger. Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient) headed 
by von Oppenheim and staffed with both German academics and Muslims was 
instrumental in spreading the proclamation and coordinating the Jihad. The German 
scholar Wolfgang Schwanitz summarized the strategy succinctly as “waging of an 
asymmetrical war by incitement to Djihad and by anti-imperial uprisings”.746 
Though this Jihad did not become a deciding factor in the war as its German instigators 
had hoped, the idea of an ‘anti-colonialist’ alliance between Germany and the Islamic 
world was far from dead, as the renewed alliance between Germany and Islamic 
leaders during World War II would prove. The role of the Caliph as a rallying point for 
the Muslims was this time filled by the figure of the Mufti of Jerusalem. The Germans 
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had formed an alliance with the Arab Higher Committee led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, 
supporting his faction financially and militarily during the Arab Revolt. The Mufti noted 
that the German support was crucial in continuing the struggle.747 The German 
department responsible for the Oriental policies of the Third Reich was the Referat Pol 
VII. Werner von Hentig who headed the department from 1937 until 1939 when he was 
succeeded by Fritz Grobba.748 Both Grobba and von Hentig had already played a role 
in Germany’s Jihad schemes during World War I. Von Hentig undertook an 
adventurous expedition to Afghanistan to conclude a pact between Germany and its 
emir.749 He also took personal care of the Mufti during his exile in Germany and 
assisted him in his eventual flight from Germany after the Third Reich’s defeat.750 In 
the aftermath of World War II, von Hentig would  also play an important role in the 
German and to some extent Swiss pro-Arab network, as shall be discussed later. 
While the First World War established the alliance between anti-imperialism and Islam 
at the behest of two empires, the Ottoman and the German, the Second World War 
added another ideological element to this conglomerate: anti-Semitism. Nazi 
propaganda material for the Middle East, which was created by both German and Arab 
employees, “displayed a synthesis of Nazism, Arab nationalism, and fundamentalist 
Islam. (…)” The propaganda relied on the existing tradition of Islamic anti-Semitism, 
which was radicalized – as the Mufti and his supporters had done during the previous 
two decades, as discussed in Chapter One: “Just as National Socialism represented a 
radicalization of already existing and long-held anti-Semitic tradition in Europe, so the 
pro-Arab exiles in Berlin reinforced and radicalized an already existing antipathy to the 
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Jews that had been a long-standing component of the traditions of Islam.”751 National-
socialist propaganda in the Middle East was not only anti-Semitic, but also anti-Zionist. 
Zionism was presented as the creation of British, American and ‘Jewish Imperialism’ 
and as the latest manifestation of the Jewish War on Islam. Despite the widespread 
sympathy for the Axis among the Arabs, National Socialist Germany failed eventually 
to enlist the official support of any single Arab state, apart from Rashid al-Gaylani’s 
short lived regime in Iraq.752 
Von Oppenheim, despite being a descendant of Jewish converts to Catholicism, was 
also involved in Nazi-German Oriental policy. He wrote a document titled 
‘Memorandum for the Revolutionizing of the Near East Middle 1940’ (Ger. Denkschrift 
zur Revolutionierung des Vorderen Orients Mitte 1940). Unlike in World War I, this time 
Russia was not targeted as a place for Muslim uprisings – the Soviet Union was after 
all still an ally of national-socialist Germany. France, which had already been defeated, 
was also missing. Instead, the Jews were added to the list of enemies of Germany, 
while Turks and Egyptians were referred to as Germany’s secret allies; the sympathy 
for National-socialist Germany was obviously taken for granted.753 The memorandum 
also discussed the situation in the British Mandate of Palestine. Oppenheim’s 
memorandum called for a resumption of the Arab Revolt by fighting against the Jews 
and the English, which would lead to the instalment of a government led by the Mufti 
involving all religious groups. Not all Jews however would be allowed to stay in 
Palestine: “Of the Jews, only those, who were there before the World War [I], shall be 
left there.” 754 For National Socialist Germany, which was bent on the murder of all 
Jewish populations, even such a plan would have been unacceptably moderate.  
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After its defeat in World War II, the Soviet Union to some extent took on the classic 
German role of a European, but anti-Western power. However, the idea that Germany 
should partner-up with the Arabs and Muslims to advance its interests remained 
popular. Both Arabs and Germans continued to evoke a supposedly traditional 
‘German-Arab friendship’ to describe the character of their relations. Lobbyists of Arab-
German relations sought to quickly re-establish their excellent ties in the region, having 
little time to reflect on their involvement in the Third Reich. Reinhard Hüber for instance 
had been the president of the Nah- und Mittelostverein NUMOV (Engl. Association for 
the Near and Middle East) during the Nazi period. In his writings at the time, he praised 
the Mufti as an exemplary Arab and warned of the fact that “international Jews are 
obviously trying to develop an imperialism of their own” from their base in Palestine.755 
In 1949, NUMOV reconstituted itself.756 Hüber again acted as its chair from 1950 until 
1958. Hüber believed that Germany’s political weakness and economic strength 
favoured it in its dealings with the Middle East. In his 1954 book with the programmatic 
title ‘Allahu Akbar – Nahost ruft uns!’ (Engl. Middle East is calling us) he summarized 
this belief as follows: „Und bald zeigte es sich, dass die deutsche politische Schwäche, 
nicht imperialistisch sein zu können, in Verbindung mit der Leistungskraft auf 
wirtschaftlichem Felde uns den Nahostpartnern besonders erwünscht machte, was 
immer die internationale Konkurrenz dazu sagen mochte.“757 Radical German 
Nationalist extremists also continued to embrace the vision of a German-Islamic 
alliance. In their grandest plans, they sought the creation of “a German-Islamic belt 
from Europe to the South China Sea.” 758 These Germans proposed an alliance with 
the ‘oppressed nations’, the losers of Yalta, among which they counted Germany. This 
                                             
755 “Morality and Business,” The Wiener Library Bulletin 7, no. 1–2 (April 1952): 12. 
756 “A ‘Near and Middle East Association’ in Hamburg,” The Wiener Library Bulletin 5, 
no. 1–2 (March 1951): 10. 
757 Reinhard Hüber, Nahost Ruft Uns! (Übersee-Verlag, 1954); via Lothar Rathmann, 
Stossrichtung Nahost: 1914-1918 ; zur Expansionspolitik des deutschen 
Imperialismus im 1. Weltkrieg (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1963). 
758 Kurt P. Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945, vol. 
2 (Wesleyan University Press, 1967), 230. 
 
233 
 
mix of German nationalism and anti-imperialism was translated into widespread 
sympathy in German post-war radical nationalist circles for anti-colonial heroes like 
Nasser, Sukarno or Castro. 759 Through an alliance with the Third World, German 
nationalists sought to punish Germany’s former enemies. 
The FRG also quickly gained popularity in the Arab world after World War II, especially 
among the Arab nationalist regimes. There were good practical reasons for this. 
Germany was considered a partner that could provide the advantages of Western 
know-how, economic power and influence without seeking to be politically involved in 
the region. This was especially true after the growing antagonism between Britain and 
Egypt in the 1950s, when Nasser played on fears that Egypt’s participation in a British-
dominated military alliance would constitute imperialism.760 As a result, Nasser sought 
to distance Egypt from Britain and drew closer to Germany. Then, there was the 
tradition of German-Arab friendship, which some have dismissed  as “irrational feeling 
(…), that the two nations were natural allies.”761 But there was a deeper idea of Arab 
friendship with Germany beyond practical considerations. Bassam Tibi referred to this 
Arab idea as “Germanophilia”.762 This Germanophilia was grounded in the common 
concepts of nationhood in German and Arab nationalism.  
This commonality was especially evident in the teachings of Arab nationalism’s leading 
thinker, Sati al-Husri. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs found 
themselves distributed over a number of states. In the absence of political unity, French 
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and English nationalism with its converging concepts of state and nation were of little 
appeal to Arab nationalism. Husri compared the contemporary situation of the Arabs 
to Germany’s political fragmentation before unification in 1871. He also adopted the 
German cultural nationalism of Herder, Fichte and Ernst Moritz Arend with its emphasis 
on language and shared history as the basis of the nation.763 But, like his German idols, 
Husri neglected the importance of liberal values. Liberty was not understood as an 
individual right, but only as a collective one, applying to the freedom of the nation from 
foreign domination: Freedom is not an end in itself but a means toward a higher life. 
(…) The national interests which could sometime require a man to sacrifice his life, 
must by definition require him, in some case, to sacrifice his freedom. (…) He who 
does not sacrifice his personal freedom for the sake of his nation’s freedom, when the 
situation requires, may forfeit his own freedom along with the freedom of his people 
and his country (…).And he who refuses to sublimate (…) his individual self into that 
of the nation, may in some cases, be compelled to expire (…) in a foreign nation which 
may one day conquer his fatherland. Because of this, I say unhesitatingly and 
continuously: patriotism and nationalism above all and before all (…) even above and 
before freedom.”764 This anti-liberalism cemented the proximity between the European 
far-right and Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s and between the far-left and 
Arab-Palestinian nationalism later. All these movements were united by the emphasis 
on collective rights, often to the detriment of the individual. 
5.2 The Opposition to the Luxembourg Agreement 
The first crisis in German-Arab relations after the war occurred as a result of the 
negotiations for a German-Israeli restitution agreement, which started in March 1952. 
Until their conclusion on the 10th of September the same year, they were accompanied 
by regular protests by Arab governments: Jordan declared that the negotiations 
endangered the “century-old good relations between Germany and the Arab east”, 
while Syria threatened economic boycott and, together with Lebanon, demanded a 
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share of the restitution for the Arab refugees who had fled Palestine. This demand was 
joined in August by the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) in Egypt, whose head the Mufti 
called Adenauer in his usual manner a “tool of world Jewry”. Tensions mounted after 
the conclusion of the negotiations on September 10, 1952. The AHC sent a letter to 
the Bundestag, warning of a Muslim boycott against Germany.765  
The terms of the settlement included that Germany was to compensate Israel for the 
murder and destruction of Jewish lives and properties it had inflicted during the 
Holocaust. The signing of the agreement vitally strengthened the fledgling Jewish 
state, but it angered both German far-rightists and Arab nationalists and prompted 
them to seek cooperation. The aim behind this campaign was to prevent the ratification 
of the agreement. In summary, the Arab states criticized that the agreement was a 
breach of German neutrality towards the conflict, which was bound to entail an 
intolerable strengthening of Israel and thereby disrupt the balance of power in the 
region. Furthermore, they called for reparations for the Arab refugees of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in return, and disputed Israel’s right to be the receiver of compensation 
for the victims of the Holocaust.  
Both Arabs and Germans, whether in support or in opposition to the agreement, 
repeatedly spoke of “traditional friendly relations of Germany to the Arab World”, an 
allusion to the imperial and national-socialist alliance with large segments of the Arab 
and Muslim world.766 Thus, one day after the conclusion of the negotiations, on 
September 11, 1952 , thirty center and right-wing members of the Bundestag called on 
the government to heed the traditional “German-Arab friendship” when they protested 
the agreement. 767 The fiercest opposition to the Luxembourg agreement within 
Germany came from pro-Nazi circles and from those engaged in business with the 
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Middle East.768 Reinhard Hüber from NUMOV criticized that the Arab-Islamic voice had 
not been properly consulted in advance of signing the agreement.769 These economic 
fears were not groundless, as the Arab League threatened an economic boycott of 
Germany. The Arab League subsequently desisted from a comprehensive boycott but 
moved to create black lists of the companies that traded with Israel. Some German 
companies therefore pre-emptively informed Arab governments that they intended to 
follow the boycott.770 
German diplomats identified Joachim Hertslet as the leading figure behind the 
campaign. Hertslet had acted as an economic representative for Germany in Mexico 
during the war and afterwards settled in Eastern Germany, where he supposedly had 
contacts with Soviet authorities, before leaving for Western Germany. He maintained 
close contact to government agencies and successfully ran a business specialized in 
the export of cotton from Egypt. He also worked for the Foreign Office. In 1952, at the 
behest of the Arab Higher Committee, Hertslet asked the German government to 
establish a diplomatic mission for the Palestinians in Bonn. The request did not receive 
an answer. Instead, in a cabinet session on October 21, 1952, Hertslet was called a 
traitor and it was insinuated that he was not only an agent of the Arab League, but also 
of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Hertslet lost his privileged status at the government. 
As a result of this, he sued senior government functionaries, including Hallstein among 
others, and the suit was only discontinued in 1967.771 Hertslet cooperated with 
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Egyptian and Syrian representatives in Germany as well as pro-Arab activists such as 
the journalist Augustin Hoppe.772 Another prominent voice in the campaign was former 
president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht. Acquitted in the Nuremberg Trials, 
Schacht worked as a pro-Nazi publicist, private banker and financial counselor to the 
Arab states.773 Later, he would also figure among the founders of the first pro-Arab 
lobby group in Switzerland. 
Adenauer did not yield to the campaign. This was probably also due to his own 
convictions that the Jews were indeed very powerful. Speaking to the CDU leadership 
in early September 1952, he warned that a failure would risk the endeavour of acquiring 
foreign investments to Germany as “the power of Jewry in the economic sphere is still 
extraordinarily strong, (…) the reconciliation with Jewry is an absolute necessity from 
a moral (…) political (...) as well as an economic viewpoint for the Federal Republic.774”  
The Arab states themselves were convinced that Germany had acted under Jewish 
and Western pressure, but this seems not to have been the case. On the contrary, the 
US refused to intervene in the negotiations.775 In their deliberations with the Arab 
states, German officials nevertheless used this trope of Jewish power to mute the 
pressure. For instance, when the Egyptian Consul General spoke to Hallstein on 
October 14 in the Foreign Office, the latter affirmed that it was impossible not to ratify 
the agreement, as “seen through the Jewish lens in America and the US, Israel is much 
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stronger than one thinks. Especially the Cabinet of Germany cannot confront it.”776 In 
another meeting at the German Foreign Office in late October, these talking points 
were reiterated, convincing the Egyptian Consul General that the agreement had 
indeed not been grounded in German decisions, as he reported back to his superiors 
in Cairo.777 Whether these arguments were part of an intentional strategy to soften 
Arab pressure or not, they seem to have had this effect. 
The Arab states dispatched a delegation to Germany which arrived in Bonn on October 
20. Headed by the Lebanese ambassador in France, Ahmed el Daouk, it was 
prominently staffed, counting former prime ministers of Iraq, Syria and Egypt among 
its members.778 Hertslet was chosen as the delegation’s advisor, a decision which 
antagonized the German government.779 Despite meeting with numerous high-ranking 
officials, including four meetings with State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Walter 
Hallstein, and even shortly with Chancellor Adenauer, the delegation failed to convince 
the German government to abandon its plans to ratify the agreement.780 As a result, 
the delegation increasingly turned to addressing the German public directly, holding 
press conferences and meeting with sympathizers, among others, Hjalmar Schacht.781 
Eventually, the German government urged the delegation on October 29 to leave the 
country, but upon the protest of Egyptian President, General Naguib, backed down and 
allowed its members to stay as private persons until they eventually left in mid-
November.782 In the same month, the representative of the Arab League in Germany 
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and Egyptian and Syrian diplomats also met with Egon-Arthur Schmidt to discuss the 
idea of a German-Arab Friendship Society, which was eventually established in 
1953.783 Schmidt had worked as a senior official (De. Hauptstellenleiter) in Goebbels’ 
propaganda ministry.784 In January 1953, Wilhelm Voss, the economic counsellor to 
the Free Officers, also travelled to Germany to meet with pro-Arab and far right 
sympathizers.785 
But the Arab states had one last ace up their sleeves by threatening recognition of the 
GDR. This step greatly impressed the German government because it endangered the 
FRG’s exclusive mandate as the successor state of the German Reich, which 
underpinned its foreign policy and had motivated its restitution policy in the first 
place.786 Still, during the parliamentary consultation, Adenauer declared that “the 
protests from the Arab League cannot withhold us from fulfilling this moral obligation.” 
CDU and SPD supported the agreement, but the latter also criticized the government 
for not involving the Arabs at an earlier stage and further, hoped for a normalization of 
the “traditional friendship of our people”. FDP speaker and former NSDAP member 
Walther Hasemann on the other hand harshly criticized the agreement but declared 
neutrality. The only serious opposition came from the extreme fringes of the Left and 
the Right, with the right-wing Deutsche Partei, the pro-Nazi Deutsche Reichspartei and 
the Communist Party.787 But when the restitution agreement between Germany and 
Israel was eventually signed on March 18, 1953, threats by the Arab states did not 
materialize, as they were divided in their interests.788 Egypt, the leading power in the 
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Arab League, was particularly interested in German investments and know-how. Thus, 
the pro-German, Hassan Fakoussa, who later worked as the head of the Arab League 
office in Bonn, already warned the Egyptian Foreign Minister in September 1952 that 
“the severance of economic relations with Western Germany would cause us more 
damage than good.”789 Opposition to the Luxembourg agreement was also strong 
among the Arabists in the Foreign Office. 
5.3 The German Arabists and the Arabs 
How much the Arabist circles of the Third Reich shaped the Middle East policy of the 
early FRG is contested among historians. Conze et al. speak of the Middle and Near 
East section in the Foreign Office as “the sole department with an almost unbroken 
personnel continuity.”790 Berggötz on the other hand relativizes this assessment, 
emphasizing that only a few former Third Reich diplomats held influential positions.791 
Moreover, some did not fit the profile, like the later ambassador to Egypt Günther 
Pawelke, who was blocked in his career path because, as a faithful Catholic, he had 
not joined the NSDAP.792 Still, when the Foreign Office collected opinions on a possible 
upgrading of the diplomatic relations with Israel in late 1955, the answers from the 
diplomatic missions in Arab and Muslim countries were with few exceptions extremely 
negative.793 Hermann Voigt, who had succeeded Melchers in 1953 as the head of the 
Middle East Department, mused that the repercussions would be greater than in the 
case of the restitution agreement two years earlier, because at that time the Arab 
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reactions had been muted by their conviction that the agreement was concluded under 
foreign pressure. The ambassador to Iraq warned that the British were ready to exploit 
the deteriorating relations with the Arabs. The assessment that the Arabs were serious 
about their warnings to recognize East Germany as a retaliatory measure and thus 
undermine the Hallstein doctrine had certainly the biggest effect.794 
The leading Middle East expert of the German Foreign Office, Wilhelm Melchers, was 
conspicuously and maybe deliberately bypassed in the negotiations for the restitution 
agreement.795 Like many Middle East experts in the Foreign Office, he could look back 
on an illustrious career in the Third Reich. After having served as the German consul 
in Haifa, Melchers followed Werner Otto von Hentig in 1939 as the head of the Foreign 
Office’s Oriental Section, also known as Office VII (Ger. Referat Pol. VII) or Orient 
Office. In this function, he was  responsible for among other things producing the 
extensive German radio propaganda to the Middle and Far East, drawing on the advice 
of the two most famous Muslim defectors to Germany, the Mufti and Rashid al-
Gaylani.796 After the war, he falsely presented himself and his colleagues from the 
Foreign Office as central figures behind the plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944, and 
escaped punishment, becoming instead an HR officer for the Foreign Office in 1949 
and then in 1951 the head of the Middle East Bureau (Referat Pol V Mittlerer und Naher 
Osten), a function he exploited to recruit among his former colleagues. As a result, 
nowhere else in the Foreign Office was the staff continuity as great as in this section.797 
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Melchers’ predecessor at the Third Reich’s Orient Office, Werner Otto Hentig, also 
continued his career in post-war Germany where he assumed the post of ambassador 
to Indonesia. Behind the backs of his superiors, Hentig tried to sabotage the 
negotiations. In June 1952, Hentig met with Alim Idris, a former collaborator from the 
Foreign Office who now worked as an Arab League representative in Port Said. Alim 
(or Alimjan) Idris (b. 1887) was a longstanding colleague of Hentig from the days at the 
Third Reich’s Orient Office. He was a Russian Muslim Tatar who had studied in 
Bukhara and Istanbul. There, Idris had been active as a Young Turk journalist and as 
an advocate of pan-Turkism. During the war, he had also worked for the German 
funded al-Jihad magazine, before Max von Oppenheim, the driving force behind 
Imperial Germany’s World War I Oriental foreign policy of instigating Jihad against the 
enemies of Germany, hired him to recruit among Muslim prisoners of war.798 Idris was 
an ardent anti-Semite, who found it difficult to cope with the co-existence of pro- and 
anti-Jewish passages in the Coran.799 With the ascent of National Socialism, Idris was 
again employed by the German Foreign Office, where he worked with Hentig and 
Melchers. In 1941, he wrote a report on Tatars in Russia, advocating an independent 
Tatar state and the co-optation of Tatar prisoners of war.800 Idris was an intimate 
acquaintance of Amin al-Husseini, who chose him to head the school for educating 
field imams for the Muslim SS units, where he developed the programs in coordination 
with the German Orientalist, Richard Hartmann.801 After the war, Idris apparently 
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served as a liaison between the German and Arab opponents of the Luxembourg 
agreement. 
Hentig continued his campaign against the Luxembourg Agreement after its signing on 
September 10, 1952. Melchers initially was not aware of the meeting between Hentig 
and Idris but he approved of it tacitly in its aftermath. Two weeks after the signing of 
the Luxembourg Agreement, Hentig delivered a letter to the Egyptian ambassador in 
Indonesia. It encouraged the Arab states to continue their protests against the German 
restitution policy in order to undermine Adenauer, and accused Israel and the “Jewish 
controlled press in America” of slandering the German People by making them 
responsible for the Nazi’s crimes.802. While this letter was not discovered by German 
officials until 1955, Hentig’s superiors did not fail to notice his efforts to derail the 
Luxembourg Agreement. Thus, the German ambassador to Egypt, Günther Pawelke, 
warned the Foreign Office that Hentig was conducting a counter diplomacy in the 
Middle East. In early February 1953, Idris informed Pawelke that Hentig was to meet 
the Mufti in Cairo. In response, Hallstein ordered Hentig to cancel the meeting and 
reprimanded him. After leaving the Foreign Office, Hentig became the personal 
councilor to King Saud of Saudi Arabia.803 In December 1956, Hentig took part in the 
inaugural meeting of the Association Internationale des Amis du Monde Arabe Libre 
(Engl. International Association of the Friends of the Free Arab World), which was 
headed by the Swiss National Socialist, François Genoud. The group will be discussed 
further below. 
The Arab League also established contact with Fritz Grobba, the former ambassador 
to Iraq from 1932 until 1941. Grobba had been one of the main advocates of an alliance 
between the Third Reich and Arab nationalism, a sensitive subject due to Italian claims 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since December 1936, Grobba was in touch with the 
AHC president, Amin al-Husseini. The latter – eventually successfully – asked for 
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German support for the Arab Revolt in Mandatory Palestine.804 During his Iraqi years, 
Grobba had been instrumental in inciting hatred against the Jews. A British report 
concluded that the German embassy in Baghdad worked “to maintain among the Iraqi 
people the hatred and dislike for Jews and induce the government to promulgate laws 
which limited Jewish activities, to nationalize transport and to establish new Arab banks 
to circumvent financial control by Jews.”805 Spending eleven years in Soviet captivity 
after the war, upon his return he contributed to the study ‘Die deutsche Ausnutzung 
der arabischen Eingeborenenbewegung im Zweiten Weltkrieg’ for the Americans, in 
which he criticized the Foreign Office for not adequately supporting Arab nationalism 
during the war.806 In 1957, the Saudi envoy and former collaborator of the Mufti, Mihdat 
al-Arab, met with Grobba in Berne to discuss the establishment of a German-Arab 
Friendship society. Thereafter, he travelled to the Middle East to find sponsors for this 
undertaking but without success.807  Although Grobba did not return to the Foreign 
Office after the war, he was still an accepted member within the circle of German 
Middle East experts, joining the Nah- und Mittelostverein (NUMOV) as the person 
responsible for Arab affairs. 
5.4 The Ideological Roots of the Rapprochement between Arab nationalism and the 
German Far-right after the War 
The interests of the Arab League in Germany were represented by the Egyptian, 
Hassan Fakoussa. Fakoussa and the Arab League could count on the support of an 
extensive, far right milieu. In post-war Germany, activists had established several 
groups that sought to revive the national-revolutionary tradition, the ‘Third Way’ of the 
National Bolshevists in Germany, which had been suppressed by the National 
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Socialists. These groups opposed both ‘Western imperialism’ and Bolshevism and 
instead advocated an international alliance of nationalist movements, which were to 
maintain a neutralist position towards the Cold War. The German scholar on right-wing 
extremism, Richard Stöss, has described this position as “Liberation Nationalism” (Ger. 
Befreiungsnationalismus). In fact, this Liberation Nationalism can also be understood 
as a renaissance of the ideology of pre-World War II National Bolshevism. The National 
Bolshevists, a movement of adherents of both extreme German nationalism and 
socialism born in the inter-war years, were advocating an alliance with the Soviet Union 
during the years of the Weimar Republic. National Bolshevist ideology was later 
influential in the NSDAP. National Bolshevism’s most important theoretician was Ernst 
Niekisch. Niekisch had participated in the Bavarian Soviet Republic (Ger. Münchner 
Räterepublik) in a leading role as head of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council. After the 
defeat of the revolution, he was sentenced to two years in prison. Niekisch left the SPD 
in 1926 and became a member of the Old Social Democratic Party of Germany (Ger. 
Alte Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), a nationalistic splinter party. Niekisch 
was a friend of the Soviet Union. Together with other prominent figures close to 
National Bolshevism such as Ernst Jünger and Friedrich Hielscher, but also with 
Marxists like Georg Lukács who knew them both, Niekisch was a member of ARPLAN 
(Association for the Study of the Russian Planned Economy) and visited the Soviet 
Union in 1932.808 He was truly a man of both the left and the right. 
Niekisch’s ideology was fundamentally anti-Western and anti-Semitic, but its main foe 
was Christianity or ‘Rome’, as he called it, which had colonized the German mind. He 
drew a sharp distinction between a liberal, humanistic and democratic Germany that 
was part of the West and a militaristic and brutal Germany which belonged to the East. 
This Germany, the real Germany in his opinion, had historically been a victim of the 
West and was in a decisive battle with the other Germany, which it could only win by 
forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. Niekisch believed that “Germany will regain 
its freedom only when it revolts against Europe; Germany will be free only if it joins the 
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gathering Russian-Asiatic assault against Europe.”809 Niekisch himself was probably 
influenced by Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical theories, which were similar to his own.810 
As the leader of the National Bolshevist movement in Germany during the Weimar 
Republic, Niekisch exerted considerable influence on the left-wing of the NSDAP led 
by Gregor Strasser. Several prominent NSDAP members were under the spell of 
National Bolshevism. This group included the young Goebbels, the Strasser brothers, 
Ernst Röhm, Ernst Jünger,811 and the Nazi and later Egyptian propagandist, Johann 
von Leers. In the course of the bloody Röhm-Putsch in 1934, both Gregor Strasser, 
Ernst Röhm and other left-wing National Socialists were murdered. Hitler’s decision to 
invade the Soviet Union in 1941 also meant a rejection of National Bolshevist thinking. 
Despite these setbacks, National Bolshevist thinking would actually survive Hitler. 
Niekisch himself had opposed National Socialism and Hitler, whom he attacked as “the 
last hope of the bourgeois world.”812 Therefore, his magazine ‘Widerstand’ was banned 
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and he himself put in jail in 1937, where he remained during the entire war.813 After 
World War II, he joined the Communist Party of Germany, the KPD.814  
To a significant extent, the post-war German far right rejected Hitler’s geopolitics, 
embracing that of Haushofer and of Niekisch instead. The successor ideology to 
National Bolshevism, Liberation Nationalism, was developed and advocated by several 
far right thinkers in the 1950s.815  The German far right activist Karl-Heinz Priester 
succinctly summarized his own Liberation Nationalist convictions in the following 
words: “While Russia is trying to bolshevize Europe, the West is colonizing us. We who 
have been defamed for years because of our soldierly stand against Bolshevism are 
being asked to defend a foreign world as dishonored mercenaries! This the front-
generation is not in the least inclined to countenance. In order to offer resistance to the 
oppressors of Europe and Germany the front-generation is holding out its hands to the 
nationalist forces of all countries to work together to make Europe a third great force 
in the world. To do this the front-generation in all countries must destroy the barriers of 
parochial nationalism and of alien interpretations of democratic principles. This will to 
work and fight and sacrifice for a Nation Europa on a folkish, nationalist basis will not 
be side-tracked by the Strasbourg efforts.”816 This was hardly a departure from 
Niekisch’s philosophy. Liberation Nationalism expressed itself in numerous initiatives 
by the far right for closer collaboration with the Third World. Its adherents were 
especially well disposed to form an alliance with the Arab and other Third World 
national movements for several reasons. First, they were sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union, which became the champion of Arab nationalism and other national movements 
in the Third World in the 1950s. Second, they perceived Germany as being part of the 
East, and were therefore strongly anti-Western and anti-imperialistic oriented. Third, 
anti-Semitism and consequently anti-Christianism were essential pillars of the National 
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Bolshevist worldview. They were therefore supportive of all anti-Jewish movements, 
including Soviet and Arab anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. Moreover, as Germans, 
given the alliances with Turkish and Arab-Islamic players discussed above, the idea of 
an alliance with Third World national movements certainly was not alien to the National 
Bolshevists. It is therefore no coincidence, that at this time, after the war, leading 
partisans of the movement would take the lead in German organizations in support of 
the struggle against the Western powers and Israel.  
In October 1950, representatives of far-right Liberation Nationalist groups from 
Western Europe met in Rome. These groups looked favourably on the Arabs, whom 
they saw as allies against the West.817 On May 14, 1951, several hundred delegates 
met in Malmö to found a pan-European post-fascist union, the European Social 
Movement (Ger. Europäische Soziale Bewegung). Some prominent far-right activists, 
such as Otto Skorzeny or Oswald Mosley, wished to attend but did not receive a visa. 
At the conference, the delegates embraced a new ideological foundation, distancing 
themselves from Mussolini and Hitler as their ideological progenitors. The board 
included Maurice Bardèche, Karl-Heinz Priester, Augusto de Marsanich from the Italian 
MSI and, as chairman, the Swede Per Engdahl. The ESM maintained contact with 
more than 40 organizations in Europe, the neo-Nazi network in Argentina and the pro-
Arab friendship leagues.818 During a meeting of the ‘Germanic Sections’ (Scandinavia, 
Germany, Austria and Benelux) of the ESM on March 5 and 6 ,1955, they decided to 
improve the group’s relationship with the Arab League, in particular its member states 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by establishing European-Arab chambers of commerce and 
political and cultural study commissions.819 A leading figure in the rapprochement 
between the ESM and the Arabs was Karl-Heinz Priester. In 1951, Karl-Heinz Priester 
had established the Deutsch-Soziale Bewegung (Engl. German Social Movement) as 
a local ESM branch. During the German-Israeli negotiations, Priester allegedly worked 
as an advisor to the Arab side. He also edited the magazine Die Europäische 
Nationale, which had an enthusiastically pro-Arabic editorial stance. Priester was 
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especially infatuated with Nasser. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal, he 
congratulated him in his newspaper. These activities led to suspicions that Priester 
was funded by the Arab states. Indeed, files seized in 1960 by the Frankfurt attorney 
general reportedly confirmed the close collaboration between Priester’s Deutsch-
Soziale Bewegung and the Egyptian state.820 
The circle around Otto Strasser also engaged in this kind of National Liberationist 
politics. Otto, together with his murdered brother Gregor Strasser, was the former 
leader of the left-wing of the NSDAP. In 1954 the organization Europe-Africa (EURA), 
which had the goal to push for closer collaboration between both continents, was 
founded by Harald Stössel, a member of the Association for the German Knowledge 
of God (Ger. Bund für Deutsche Gotterkenntnis), commonly referred to as the 
Ludendorff-sect. EURA was situated in the milieu of Otto Strasser and enjoyed his 
support.821 Strasser himself returned to Germany in 1955. It was the time of significant 
political changes in the Third World. In April 1955, the representatives of twenty-nine 
countries from Africa and Asia met in the city of Bandung in Indonesia, laying the 
ground for what would eventually became a third block next to the Western and Eastern 
bloc: The Non-Aligned Movement. These events inspired Otto Strasser to put forward 
a plan of a European-African alliance instead of the emerging African-Asian one in the 
Non-Aligned Movement. This alliance was to be based foremost on economic 
considerations:  All of Europe is a factory, the powerhouse of which is Germany. 
Without adding a guaranteed raw-materials supply and a protected market (…), that 
‘factory Europe’ (…) is doomed. (…) It is therefore of vital importance that the people 
of Europe and their government recognize those great vital connections and oppose 
to the Asia-Africa conference of Java a natural Europe-Africa conference which would 
gain and assure for the people Europe and Africa their economic, political and cultural 
autonomy (…), independent from Wall Street and Moscow.”822 It was not the first time 
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Otto Strasser had concerned himself with colonial politics. He had dedicated his 1938 
book ‘Germany and the Colonial Problem’ to the same issue.823 Otto Strasser dreamed 
of Germany as an independent power, aligned with the Third World rather than with 
the Soviet Union and the US. This would also pave the way for German reunification. 
824 The Third World and in particular the Middle East held a great fascination for the 
German far-right.  
5.5 Nazis in Egypt 
After the establishment of the FRG, the Egyptians urged Germany to take a greater 
role in the economic affairs of the country.825 This was met with suspicion in Britain. 
The British press lamented that Germany was exploiting the downturn in Egyptian-
British relations caused by the dispute of the British controlled Suez Canal zone for its 
own political and economic gains.826 However, the contribution of German emigrants 
in military matters, propaganda and intelligence would soon prove more controversial 
than Germany’s resurgence as an economic superpower in the Middle East. 
Recruitment of German military experts had already started under King Farouk in 1948 
and continued after the Free Officers Revolution in 1952. Some were recruited from 
the pool of war prisoners who stayed in Egypt after the Axis’s defeat, while others fled 
there to avoid judiciary prosecutions.827 Other Arab regimes, like Syria, also sought to 
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recruit German experts.828 The recruitment continued under the new regime of the Free 
Officers Movement, which came to power in Egypt after a coup d’état on July 23, 1952. 
Initially, the new regime was enthusiastically welcomed by the Arabists in the State 
Department because it was considered pro-Western and ready to negotiate peace with 
Israel.829 Information on the FRG involvement in the recruitment is ambiguous. At first, 
the recruitment seems to have taken place without the knowledge of German 
authorities, as was affirmed by General Fahrmbacher, the highest-ranking military 
official in Egyptian services.830 The West-German Bundesnachrichtendienst BND 
(Engl. Federal Intelligence Service), headed by the former head of the Third Reich’s 
intelligence service for Eastern Europe, Reinhard Gehlen, clearly played a role in 
facilitating the transit after receiving an official Egyptian request “to inject life and 
expertise into the Egyptian secret service.”831 Among other things, Gehlen helped 
recruit Otto Skorzeny, a famous German commando, who partook in the liberation of 
Mussolini in 1943: He became an advisor to the Egyptians on guerrilla warfare. How 
much the CIA knew about Skorzeny, including whether  he even supported Gehlen’s 
actions at all, remains contested among historians.832 
These German emigrants were liable to come into direct conflict with Britain, which 
was feuding with Egypt over the future of the British military presence in the Canal 
Zone. During the British-Egyptian negotiations, Egyptian guerrilla operations continued 
to be launched by Zakaria Muhi al-Din, Nasser’s director of military intelligence, 
although on a lower scale.833 These guerrilla units were trained by a German, Major 
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Gerhard-Georg Mertins, who had come to Egypt as a military advisor in 1948.834 British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill was incensed by the support of ex-Nazi personnel for 
the Egyptian military, warning the German government that their actions might impact 
negatively on the relations between both countries. 835 But this assessment was about 
to change. On October 19, 1954, Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser and the British 
Minister of State signed an agreement, arranging for the evacuation of the British Canal 
Zone. The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Egypt was now given higher 
priority. Confronted with the arrival of Soviet advisors and arms, the ex-Nazis suddenly 
turned into a Western asset. Thus, neither the Americans nor the British raised 
objections to the dispatching of German military advisors, when Egypt made such a 
request to Bonn in early 1956. On the contrary, they encouraged this step.836 
Egypt attracted not only military experts, but also became a safe haven for far-right 
and pro-Nazi activists. Otto Ernst Remer, the leader of the Sozialistische Reichspartei, 
a pro-Nazi party in post-war Germany, fled there after the party’s banning in 1952.837 
He was one among many: Third Reich finance minister Hjalmar Schacht, who 
maintained excellent contacts to the Middle East, earning him the nickname of ‘Schacht 
of Persia’, also arrived there in September 1952. At a press conference, he suggested 
to the freshly installed Free Officers that they introduce a labour service based on the 
National Socialist model. 838 The far-right German press, like the Deutsche 
Soldatenzeitung also started to give Arab nationalists heralding the revival of the 
German-Arab friendship a platform in its pages since the early 1950s.839The German 
émigrés in Egypt did not seek to isolate themselves from German politics, but on the 
contrary sought to influence current affairs in their home country and therefore 
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maintained numerous contacts to the far-right in Germany, especially to the so called 
Naumann circle. The secret network, led by prominent former Nazi functionaries, 
sought to take over the FDP party and turn it into a rallying point for the extreme right, 
before being blown by the British in early 1953. Besides Schacht and Skorzeny, also 
Wilhelm Voss, a former economic leader of the Third Reich’s armament industries, 
who now worked as an unofficial advisor to the Free Officers’ regime, maintained 
contact to the Naumann circle. The Naumann circle also seems to have enjoyed some 
sympathies in the highest ranks of the Egyptian military and, before the revolution, the 
royal house. In autumn 1952, Colonel Omar met with Werner Naumann and two other 
leading members of the circle in Germany. Naumann himself considered the support 
of the German émigrés in the Arab countries as essential for his plans in Europe. But 
plans put forward by sympathizers to establish a counter government to Bonn in Egypt 
or the Argentine were opposed by Naumann.840 
The new regime  invested heavily in propaganda. At first, it enjoyed considerable 
material support from the CIA. Propaganda was just another arm of Egyptian militancy, 
being closely coordinated between the security apparatus and the Egyptian 
broadcasting agency. The radio station Voice of the Arabs, which was set up in July 
1953, inveighed against the Arab rivals of Egypt. It proved a resounding success and 
was instrumental in establishing Egypt’s leadership of Arab nationalism. It was 
Zakariya Muhi Al-Din, the organizer of the guerrilla raids against the British in the Canal 
Zone, Fathi al-Dib, and Izzat Soleiman who had come up with the idea of founding a 
radio station to appeal to the Arabs in the first place, underlining the intertwining of 
propaganda and violence.841 Al-Dib would later assume the role of ambassador to 
Switzerland, where he worked with the Nazi and pro-Arab activist, François Genoud. 
The Egyptian preoccupation with propaganda also transcended into academia. A Dr. 
Hassanein Abdel-Kader taught a course on public opinion at the University of Cairo, 
authoring a book on the issue titled ‘Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Freedom of the 
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Press’, which was published in 1957.842 The book’s content reflected the Arab 
consensus on Jewish power encountered earlier in this study, claiming that the Jews 
controlled the US press and that it was therefore biased in favour of Israel and against 
the Arabs.843 
Contrary to the short-sighted expectations of the Arabists at the CIA, Egyptian 
propaganda quickly turned against its Western sponsors and their allies in the region. 
Anti-Semitism became central to its message. One of its main purveyors was the 
Egyptian, Mahmoud Saleh. Saleh had allegedly studied in Paris and Berlin in the 
1930s. After World War II, he worked for the anti-Semitic magazine Weltdienst, which, 
supported by the Amt Rosenberg, at its peak in 1944 had reached a circulation of 
300’000 copies and was translated into 19 languages. After being interned by the 
British in Mandatory Palestine, he returned to Egypt in the early 1950s. In 1952, he 
received funding from the government to establish the Anti-Zionist Association, which 
was headquartered in a building where government employees were also schooled in 
anti-Zionism. His task was to organize campaigns against “Zionists in America and 
Jewish capitalists.” 844 The Anti-Zionist Association acted as an umbrella organization 
for anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist groups in the US, France, the UK and especially 
Germany. Jean Bauverd’s Centre Eurafricain d’Etudes et de Réalisations (Engl. Euro-
African Center for Research and Production) as well as Hans Morgenbrod and Kar 
Düpow’s Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft (Engl. German-Arab Society) were among 
its member organizations.845  
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Saleh started to correspond with anti-Semites from all over Europe, seeking to collect 
material on “Jewry and Zionism from antiquity until modern times” and lauding himself 
vis-à-vis his correspondents for having worked for 20 years “to hunt down this wicked 
enemy of humanity”.846 In 1955, Saleh sought to re-establish the Weltdienst as an 
international anti-Semitic magazine. On the background of these activities, official and 
semi-official bodies in Egypt, foremost in the sphere of the Arab League and the Mufti, 
sought to recruit Nazi propagandists.847 One foreigner who worked for Egyptian 
broadcasting was the Swiss fascist, Georges Oltramare.848 In 1956, Johann von Leers 
also arrived in Egypt. Fritz Rössler, the former NS district official of Saxony, joined him 
one year later. After the war, he assumed a cover name and sat in the German 
Bundestag for the extreme right Deutsche Reichspartei, until his real identity was 
exposed. After his release from prison in 1957, he left for Egypt, where he joined the 
community of German Nazis. Like von Leers, he converted to Islam, taking on the 
name of Achmed Rössler .849  
Von Leers had spent the years from 1950 until 1955 in the Argentine, where he 
contributed to the National Socialist German language magazine Der Weg. 850 The 
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magazine pursued a pro-Arab line during its existence. It had also interviewed the Mufti 
Amin al-Husseini twice, in 1953 and 1956. In the latter interview, Al-Husseini 
complained about the pro-Israeli attitude of the Protestant church in Germany. The 
interviewer joined Husseini in criticizing this “new anti-Islamic tendency” of the 
church.851 The magazine served temporarily as the organ of the Fascist International, 
which had coalesced around the ESM in 1951. This helped von Leers establish 
contacts to the leading thinkers and activists of the extreme right in Europe. Since 
1954, von Leers had considered moving to Egypt from his exile in South America. 
Several Egyptian officials had tried to recruit the Nazi propagandist into Egyptian 
services. Mahmoud Saleh, who had been in contact with Johann von Leers for many 
years, was one of them.852 According to a CIA source within the German far-right 
scene, it was however Hassan Fakoussa, the Arab League representative in Bonn 
since August 1956, who was mainly responsible for von Leers’ move to Cairo.853. Von 
Leers had already worked for the Egyptian embassy in Buenos Aires, organizing an 
anti-Jewish campaign in the country. 854 He was therefore the ideal person to liaise 
between the Egyptian propaganda infrastructure in Cairo and the far-right in Europe. 
Since 1955, the Arab League had opened propaganda offices in New York, Bonn and 
Rio de Janeiro.855 The CIA saw von Leers’ recruitment as an additional sign of the 
expansion of the Egyptian propaganda campaign beyond the Middle East. A CIA report 
from October 1956 noted that “there are various indicators (…) which lead us to believe 
that the regional foreign policy objectives of Egypt, including the activities of the Arab 
League as an organ of expression of Egyptian/Arab policies, may no longer be 
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negative regionally; but may be in process of taking the offensive both regionally and 
internationally.” The CIA was especially afraid that the Arab League was seeking to 
expand its influence in South America: “The arrival of Johann von Leers (and possibly 
others of lesser reputation) from South America, each of whom may have accumulated 
many years of experience and extensive contacts in Latin America which the GOE 
[Government of Egypt] can use to any possible scheme to take aggressive action in 
the Western hemisphere (…).”856 
In Egypt, von Leers was working with Mahmoud Saleh, translating writings for the Anti-
Zionist Association, writings which were then sent to a list of far-right sympathizers. 
Von Leers also collaborated with the Egyptian Ministry of Information and the Arab 
League. Tawfik Bakri, an Arab League official and a friend of Fakoussa, acted as von 
Leers’ sponsor in Egypt.857 Probably the first work von Leers translated for Saleh was 
an anti-Zionist work called ‘Frieden im Orient’ (Engl. Peace in the Orient).858 The book 
had been authored by Ahmed Moawad, a literary historian and German philologist 
living in Cairo.859 Von Leers wrote an anti-Semitic preface to the work. The preface 
also advocated an alliance between Arabs and Germans, who both had been “stabbed 
in the back by Zionism.”860 In 1957, von Leers also continued to publish in Der Weg, 
producing his flow of often bizarre anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist articles. In one of them, he 
accused the Zionists of having infiltrated the Nazi state in order to execute the 
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Holocaust.861 He also praised Egypt’s military performance in the Suez War and 
proselytized for “Islam, the religion of national liberation.”862 In another article, he 
sought to revive the Madagascar plan, proposing that France evacuate the southern 
part of the island for the resettlement of Israelis.863 The Swedish journal Nordisk Kamp 
(Engl. Nordic Struggle), the newspaper of the so-called National-Socialist Fighting 
League, also printed von Leer’s articles. The group claimed to be in contact with the 
Egyptian ministry of information, having received propaganda material from them.864 
Although von Leers proved useful to the Egyptians through his knowledge and his 
contacts, whom he sought to convince of his pro-Arab line, he did not have access to 
the highest echelons of power and wielded little influence.865 One year later, in 1958, 
his stature in the Egyptian regime seems to have significantly improved. He frequently 
visited several leading personalities, including Mohammed Abdul Khalek Hassouna, 
secretary general of the Arab League, the Mufti Amin al-Husseini, and the German-
friendly president of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, Anwar al-Sadat, who later 
became president of Egypt.866 The Arab League remunerated him with a generous 
monthly wage.867 Von Leers not only maintained contact with Germany’s Nazi scene, 
but also to its nascent Muslim community. He established contacts with the German 
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Muslim League (Ger. Deutsche Muslim-Liga), which had been founded in 1952 in 
Hamburg and “intends through this society to start an anti-Semitic movement in the 
[German] Federal Republic.”868 With Karl-Heinz Priester, a leader of the European 
Social Movement, ESB, he published a book with the title ‘The Truth about the 
Palestine Question’, which he penned together with al-Husseini and his secretary.869  
It is worthwhile to take a look at Johann von Leers’ worldview during his Cairo years. 
After arriving in Egypt, von Leers converted to Islam, adopting the name of Omar Amin 
von Leers, and became increasingly more religious. 870 The conversion to Islam was 
not owed to mere opportunism. Von Leers had long been an Islamophile, a worldview 
which was not altogether rare among National Socialists. Already in 1942, von Leers 
had argued in his essay ‘Judaism and Islam as Opposites’ that both religions 
represented worldviews which were mutually exclusive and that Islam and National 
Socialism were bound by their shared hatred of Jews.871  Von Leers’ new name, Omar 
Amin, was informed both by his friendship to the Mufti of Jerusalem Amin al-Husseini 
and his deep-rooted anti-Semitism. He now envisioned the formation of a pan-Islamic 
block against both East and West. 872 To the dismay of some of his far-right German 
colleagues, his pro-communist stance became even more pronounced in his Cairo 
years. He pleaded with the German far-right to negotiate with the Soviet Union to 
restore the German areas lost to Poland.873 He also advocated the conquest of 
Germany by the Soviets, thus permitting the installation of the Fourth Reich.874. 
Moreover, he defended far-right activists who took money from the GDR. Communism, 
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he argued, presented no danger to the Near East, “because the Mohammedan religion 
protects the Arabs against a foreign ideology.”875  
This was no isolated sentiment, but congruent with von Leers’ larger Weltanschaung. 
Due to its anti-Semitic tendencies, its anti-Zionist and pro-Arab policy, the Soviet Union 
became a viable partner for many on the far-right in the 1950s. In 1957, when the anti-
Semitic publisher Karl-Heinz Heubaum fled to Eastern Germany in order to avoid a 
prison term, Johann von Leers, commented on the incident: “The flight of Heubaum to 
East Germany is somehow symptomatic. The brutal Jewish tyranny in Western 
Germany, backed by the American government, forces more and more patriots either 
to emigrate, mostly to Islamic countries, or to search refuge in the Communist part of 
Germany. Heubaum is in no way a Communist or a fellow traveler, but only anti-Jew. 
Therefore he has been condemned and – to avoid jail in Western Germany, where the 
treatment meted out is horrible – he went East. The monkey-love of the USA 
government for the Jews isolates the Americans both in Germany and in the Near East. 
On the other hand, the Russians are clever enough to appeal to the sound anti-Jewish 
feeling of the peoples.”876 Sympathy and cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
the far-right was not a phenomenon confined to Europe but is also documented in the 
US.877 Interestingly, this was a configuration which had already existed during the 
years of the Weimar Republic in Germany, as was discussed above with regard to 
National Bolshevism.  
It is not difficult to see these views only as the latest expressions of his National 
Bolshevist convictions. They are also compatible with the Liberation Nationalism 
popular among the far-right in his native Germany. It seems that von Leers was 
convinced in his later years that his world-view was prevailing. In 1958, he wrote an 
enthusiastic letter to a fellow fascist, the American, H. Keith Thompson: “One thing is 
clear – more and more Germans join the great Arab revolution against beastly 
imperialism. In Algeria, half a company of German soldiers (…) have gone on the side 
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of the Algerians and have embraced Islam. That is good! To hell with Christianity, for 
in Christianity’s name Germany has been sold to our oppressors! Our place as an 
oppressed nation under the execrable Western colonialist Bonn government must be 
on the side of the Arab nationalist revolt against the West.”878 The Nasser regime did 
not simply co-opt the Nazis to further its foreign policy goals but was itself not free from 
anti-Semitism. Thus, Nasser would deny the Holocaust and contend that “Europe was 
in the hands of three hundred Zionists”.879 This love affair between the German far-
right and Nasser would persist into the next decade. 
5.6 The Impact of the Suez Crisis on far-right pro-Arabism 
During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the mainstream press in Germany was sharply critical 
of the actions of Britain and France. They were however more understanding of Israel. 
The consensus was that the West, especially the US, had not done enough to protect 
the security of Israel.880 The overwhelming majority of the German public also opposed 
the war. According to polls, only nine percent expressed support for Britain and France, 
the lowest number in any Western country.881 NUMOV chief Reinhard Hüber seized 
the opportunity to criticize the FRG foreign policy as being too focused on Israel and 
neglecting the wider Middle East in an article in the Übersee Rundschau, a journal of 
foreign trade associations.882 Dislike for France and Britain and sympathy for Egypt 
was even more pronounced among the nationalist-minded elements of Germany. 
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Already before the Suez Crisis, the nationalist and far-right press had been staunchly 
pro-Arab. Eberhard Fritsch, the editor of the German-speaking Nazi newspaper Der 
Weg criticized the German government for risking the friendship with the Arabs for “a 
few screaming Jews”.883 The July 1956 issue of Nation Europe was dedicated to the 
Arab world, featuring articles by three Egyptian writers. One of them was written by the 
anti-Semitic agitator, Mahmoud Saleh, who declared that Europe was controlled by the 
Jews, “the supranational and international race (…), whose God, according to its own 
greatest son Karl Marx, is the gold.”884  Now, there was a wave of enthusiasm for 
Nasser and Arab nationalism in the far-right. In its April 1957 issue, a Nation Europe 
article called on the Germans to support the Arabs, who had been loyal friends of 
Germany during the past two World Wars. Those who opposed him were accused of 
facilitating Communist penetration of the Middle East. Interestingly, there was also a 
small pro-Israeli article in the issue, which asked why the far-right press was so inimical 
to Israel despite the fact that it was a Western bastion of freedom and a bulwark against 
Communism.885 It remains an interesting question to this day. Anti-Semitism and anti-
Westernism seem to have played a more important role in post-WW II far-right ideology 
than anti-Communism. 
The neutralist, far-right party Deutsche Gemeinschaft, DG (Engl. German community) 
of August Haussleiter shared the pro-Arab enthusiasm. The DG adhered to the 
Liberation Nationalist consensus among the post-war German far-right.886  After the 
Suez War, the DG called on the FRG to stop paying restitution to Israel. The step was 
praised by the Mufti, whose congratulatory message was printed in the DG’s party 
newspaper. In the eyes of DG chairman Haussleiter, the Arabs and the Germans were 
united by having experienced a similar refugee catastrophe: "Hundreds of thousands 
of Arabs have been expelled from their homes just as have been millions of Germans 
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(…). This fact establishes a profound community of destiny."887 The parallel between 
the Arab refugees of Palestine and the German refugees of Eastern Europe would 
become a common theme among far-right pro-Arabs. The Egyptian embassy was also 
not afraid to maintain contact with the far-right. Thus, the Egyptian ambassador wrote 
a letter to the German Reich Party, thanking them for their support for his home 
country. The letter was published in the party’s press organ, Reichsruf, in February 
1957.888 
The enthusiasm for Nasser soon translated into the establishment of several pro-Arab 
organizations by far-right activists.  A central figure of the pro-Arab German scene was 
DG member, Erwin Schönborn. Schönborn, an anti-Semitic activist and a promoter of 
Third Reich movies, founded the Deutsch-Arabische Gemeinschaft, DArG (Engl. 
German-Arab Community) on November 9, 1956 as a branch of the DG. 889 The far-
right activist Horst Morgenbrod also established the Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft 
(Engl. German-Arab Society) in November 1956. Karl Düpow, a member of Otto 
Strasser’s Deutsch-Soziale Union (Engl. German Social Union) and an advocate of 
Liberation Nationalism, later joined. 890  The wave of pro-Arab sympathies among the 
far-right, which followed the Suez Crisis, also extended to Switzerland. On December 
11, 1956, the Association Internationale des Amis du Monde Arabe Libre (Engl. 
International Association of the Friends of the Free Arab World) was established in the 
Swiss capital of Berne. The inaugural meeting assembled National Socialist 
sympathizers and former officials of the Third Reich: Besides Werner Von Hentig, the 
list of attendants included German treasury minister Hjalmar Schacht, German senior 
civil servant (Ger. Regierungsrat) Hans Rechenberg, and Francois Genoud. The Swiss 
police ascribed a leading role in the association to a certain Haidar Bamatte, a member 
of the Afghan Delegation in Paris, and his son Nadjm oud-Dine Bamatte (also written 
as Nadjnouddin, Najumuddin, Najmeddim), who was allegedly working for the UN in 
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Geneva.891 Despite its prominent composition, the association never stood out for its 
activism: Apart from publishing the magazine Les Nouvelles du Monde Arabe and map 
of the Near East, no public activities have been recorded. The Swiss authorities only 
noted that the map ignored the presence of Israel and redrew the Turkish-Syrian 
border, apportioning the province of Alexandretta to Syria. In the name of the group, 
Genoud sent several letters to Arab officials, including to Nasser.892  
Another Swiss, the National Socialist Jean Bauverd, created the Centre Eurafricain 
d’Etudes et de Réalisations (Engl. Euro-African Center for Research and Production) 
in the Moroccan city of Tangier in 1956. Its goal was to propagate the message of 
Liberation Nationalism and counter French influence in Africa.893 Genoud and Bauverd 
had been friends since their youth in Lausanne, when both were active in the National 
Front, the pendant of the fascist movement in Switzerland. In 1936, they set out for a 
two-year trip to the Orient, where they met with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed 
Amin al-Husseini. The encounter was to have a lasting influence on the 
Weltanschauung of both men.  During the war, Bauverd worked for the Germans, 
setting up Radio Monte Carlo in 1943, which broadcasted German propaganda to the 
Middle East. After the German defeat, he escaped imprisonment by fleeing to Syria, 
where he became active at Radio Damascus. He also distributed synchronized copies 
of Nazi propaganda movies like ‘Jud Süss’. After 1949 he was responsible for the 
establishment of Islamic press offices in Rome, Paris and Buenos Aires. Bauverd also 
introduced Genoud in Tanger to Ben Bella, the founder of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front, FLN (Fr. Front de Libération Nationale).894 Genoud would later 
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become an important base of support for the FLN through his banking operations. The 
German Branch of Bauverd’s center was headed by Karl Düpow, who also published 
the Afrika und Orient Information (AFROR), which regularly featured articles by far-
right liberation nationalists and pro-Arabs, such as the well-known Johann von Leers 
or Fritz Rössler.895 
Horst Morgenbrod and Karl Düpow of the Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft invited 
twenty-five pro-Arab groups to meet at a German-Arab congress in Weinheim in 
October 1957. However, only ten groups attended. An observer from the Egyptian 
embassy, probably the Arab League representative Hassan Fakoussa, a member of a 
certain Secretariat of Arab Students as well as Arab and Algerian sympathizers were 
present as well. As a result of the congress, a German-Arab Council was founded to 
coordinate the activities of the various member organizations.896 However, the far-right 
love affair with the Arabs was not always repaid with the same fervor by the Arabs. 
Already in September 1957, Hassan Fakoussa had distanced himself from these 
organizations in the pages of the Arabische Korrespondenz: “Neither official Arab nor 
official German quarters were concerned in the launching of these societies, but only 
purely private circles which sometimes pretended to have the support of the Bonn 
Delegation of the Arab League it is categorically stated that neither the Arab League 
nor the Arabische Korrespondenz has anything to do with those circles.”897 This was 
probably a tactical move, as Fakoussa continued to frequent “those circles”. Still, hopes 
for closer collaboration between the far-right pro-Arab groups and the Arab League did 
apparently not work out as planned, prompting Morgenbrod to conclude bitterly just 
two months after the pro-Arab congress and the establishment of the German-Arab 
Council: “The organizations which united in the Council are disappointed that their 
good intention to work together for German-Arab friendship has met with passivity in 
the Arab embassies accredited to Bonn.”  
The only organization which experienced anything resembling a lasting existence was 
Erwin Schönborn’s Deutsch-Arabische Gemeinschaft DArG (Engl. German-Arab 
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Community). When the DG distanced itself from its former Liberation Nationalist 
position in 1957, Schönborn quit the party and moved into the circles of Otto Strasser. 
In 1961, Schönborn formed his own National Bolshevist party, the Freie Sozialistische 
Partei (Engl. Free Socialist Party).898 The DArG remained moderately active until the 
1960s, sporadically publishing manifestoes and organizing events.899 In its events, it 
often worked with the growing Arab student community in Germany. On January 11, 
1962, the DArG held an event in Mainz, its home city, about ’Fascism and Zionism’. 
The invitation letter showed obvious signs of Liberation Nationalist conviction, stating 
that both fascism and Zionism were the “dangerous side products” of “Western 
Colonialism and Eastern Soviet Imperialism”. Moreover, it warned that by 
“excessiveness of Zionism anti-Jewish feeling will be provoked”.900 As an anti-Semitic, 
far-right activist, Schönborn was certainly not concerned about either fascism or anti-
Semitism. But he was certainly aware that the accusation that Zionism was essentially 
Fascism and that it was fostering anti-Semitism was a powerful rhetorical trick, 
especially in post-war Germany. It allowed anti-Semites to attack Jews while seemingly 
distancing themselves from fascism and anti-Semitism. Besides Erwin Schönborn, a 
certain Adnan Abu-Ghanimeh, the Arab spokesman of the DArG and a student in 
Germany, as well as Hans Schulz, a board member of the DArG and a representative 
of a far-right youth group, spoke at the event. After receiving information on the event 
from Karl Marx, the editor of the Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland, 
the German Ministry of Interior considered banning the event based on its anti-Semitic 
message. One official argued that harsh judgements against the anti-Semitic 
perpetrators during a wave of anti-Semitic acts in 1961 provided legal grounds for such 
an approach. Schönborn had already been convicted several times in the past.901 Still, 
the event eventually proceeded as planned.  
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However, it was attended by two agents of the German domestic intelligence agency, 
the Verfassungsschutz, who left us with reports of it, which clearly bear evidence of its 
anti-Semitic content. It started with a short lecture by Hans Schulz, the youth 
representative, who claimed that General Franco was a converted Jew. Abu-
Ghanimeh followed, alleging that the Zionists had gained possession of Palestine 
through their control of England. Unlike in Germany where only a small clique had 
committed war crimes in secret, the Zionists did so openly. Schönborn was the last to 
speak, alleging that “Churchill, Roosevelt and their Zionist counsellors did everything 
to push Germany to war.”902 Moreover, he accused the Jews of adhering to “master 
race theory” (Ger. Herrenrassentheorie) by calling themselves the chosen people.903 
The event was attended by about 40 persons. About half of them were Arab students, 
while the German attendants included members of the left-wing Socialist University 
Association SHB (Ger. Sozialistischer Hochschulbund). After the event, there was a 
lively debate. The left-wing German students criticized the speakers as anti-Semites, 
while the Arab students supported the speakers, declaring that Israel was an 
illegitimate state. The National Bolshevist activist, Karl Düpow, who frequented the 
same circles as Schönborn and had shared the ideology of Liberation Nationalism, 
disagreed with the far-right consensus against Israel. He stated that the conqueror of 
a country had the right to this country. The Arabs had also gained the rights to their 
countries through conquest. In this sense, he proclaimed, he was a fascist. The Arabs 
should therefore come to terms with the existence of Israel. One of the 
Verfassungsschutz agents attending the event observed that anti-Zionism had become 
an outlet for anti-Semitic sentiment: “Die Funktionäre des DArg und ihre Anhänger 
erklären zwar, dass sie jeden anti-Semitismus nachdrücklich ablehnen. Man wird aber 
das Gefühl nicht los, dass sie, da man mit anti-Semitismus in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland sofort mit der öffentlichen Meinung und mit den Strafgesetzen in Konflikt 
gerät, ihre antisemitischen unterschwelligen Gefühle subversiv in Antisionismus [sic] 
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abreagieren.“904 He also worried that the Arab students in Germany were drawn to the 
extremist movements of the far-right and far-left and avoided the established parties.905 
Arab students in Germany continued to work with the far-right in order to advance their 
agenda. In 1965, Erwin Schönborn spoke at another university meeting on ‘The Middle 
Eastern Crisis: Judaism and Zionism’, which was organized by the student branch of 
the NPD. An Egyptian speaker by the name of Khoury blasted the “the murderous 
horde of Zionists who, forming an international conspiracy, had long since forfeited the 
trust of peace-loving Arabs...One cannot co-exist with them.”906 
The Arab diplomats in Bonn maintained visible relations with the German far-right. 
Thus, advertisements by the UAR embassy were published in the Deutsche National-
Zeitung, flanking other advertisements of the far-right and pro-Nazi press.907 Hassan 
Fakoussa, the Arab-League representative in Bonn, pursued a policy of co-opting the 
German far-right. Fakoussa regularly wrote for such far-right newspapers as Gerhard 
Frey’s Deutsche National-Zeitung or Das Deutsche Wort. He used the pages of the 
latter to threaten the German government in 1963 that the Arab states would recognize 
the GDR if the FDR improved its relations with Israel.908 In 1964, Fakoussa published 
the booklet ‘Israel verfolgt deutsche Wissenschaftler’ (Engl. Israel persecutes German 
Scientists). The booklet extensively cited from the far-right press, in particular Gerhard 
Frey’s Deutsche National-Zeitung, the successor publication of the Deutsche 
Soldaten-Zeitung, and from the Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung, the party organ of the 
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NPD.909 In 1963, Gerhard Frey travelled to the Middle East, interviewing both the Iraqi 
and the Syrian president on behalf of his newspaper, which he advertised as being 
“very sympathetic to the Arab countries”.910 On his trip to Egypt, he further managed 
to interview Nasser confidant, Mohamed Heikal, the editor of the semiofficial Al Ahram 
newspaper. He also met with Johannes von Leers, now a sickly old man, and Hans 
Eisele, a convicted German war criminal and former KZ physician, who escaped a 
second trial through his flight to Egypt in 1958.911 The Deutsche Nationalzeitung acted 
as Nasser’s unofficial German organ. In its May 1, 1964 issue, he granted an interview 
to the far-right newspaper, proclaiming that he was not seeking a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict with Israel and expecting its destruction “within a generation – if Allah 
willed it so.” Nasser lamented German restitution money going to Israel. When Frey 
remarked that this was because of the Holocaust, Nasser denied its historicity: “But 
the lie of the six million murdered Jews is not taken seriously by anybody.”912 Frey 
consented. He may well have felt slightly embarrassed that this Egyptian stateman had 
overtaken him in his extremism. In the course of the conversation, Frey furthermore 
drew parallels between the German expellees and conveyed the wish that Nasser 
would support Germany in regaining their lost territories in the East. Nasser replied 
that the Arabs were friends of the Germans and had been sympathetic to Nazi 
Germany during World War II.913 The pro-Arab line of the Deutsche National-Zeitung 
remained consistent. It featured interviews with the acting Secretary of the Arab 
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League in its March 12, 1965 issue and ran such headlines as “Justice for Nasser!”.914 
The language of the journal thereby often imitated that of Nazi propaganda during the 
Third Reich by using expressions like ‘Weltjudentdum’ (Engl. World Jewry). Thus, the 
headline of the February 19, 1965 issue read: “Does World Jewry declare boycott on 
Bonn? The background of the German-Israeli conflict.”  The close relations between 
the far-right and the Arab states in Germany in the 1950s and the 1960s is however a 
chapter largely forgotten today. 
5.7 Liberation-Nationalism in Switzerland: Hans Fleig and Ahmed Huber 
Liberation Nationalism also had its adherents in Switzerland. Although it never grew 
into a movement like in Germany, several individuals can be considered to have 
belonged to this school of thought. The earliest pro-Arab activists in Switzerland took 
positions which cannot easily be placed in stereotypical conceptions of Left and Right. 
Worth mentioning are François Genoud and the journalists, Ahmed Huber and Hans 
Fleig. While Genoud’s life and activities have been amply studied in several books and 
articles, Ahmed Huber and certainly Hans Fleig are less known. Hans Fleig was a 
prolific Swiss journalist in the 1950s and 1960s, who sought to raise sympathy for 
Nasser’s pan-Arabism in Switzerland. Hans Fleig was born in 1916 in Basel, studying 
law and literature in Basel, Freiburg and London. There are several rumors about his 
political activities during his study years. As a student in Basel, he allegedly frequented 
the circles of the Frontisten, Swiss National Socialist and fascist groups, and 
anonymously wrote for one of their newspapers. Upon the exposure of his identity, he 
was expelled from his student association915 During World War II, Hans Fleig came 
under the influence of National Bolshevism. In 1944, Fleig attended a public lecture by 
a fellow student named Armin Mohler, who was soon to become his close friend. 
Mohler, after having temporarily held communist sympathies, volunteered for the SS 
in 1942. His lecture bore the enigmatic title ‘The German National Bolshevism’ and 
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discussed the ideas of Ernst Jünger and Ernst Niekisch. Especially the latter’s ideas 
had a considerable influence on Fleig’s thought. Both Fleig and his friend, Mohler, 
placed hope in Niekisch’s collaboration with the KPD/SED after the war, which would 
help, as they hoped, to turn Germany into a power of international status again. Hans 
Fleig adapted the same hostile attitude towards Christianity, baptizing his first daughter 
in a pagan rite, as he wrote to his friend, Mohler.916 
After travelling to Germany and witnessing the last days of the war, an experience 
which greatly satisfied him, Fleig returned to Basel to form a private group called Basel 
Trias together with Mohler and the journalist and photographer, Erhard Hürsch. Their 
goal was to support leading right-wing intellectuals in Germany, including Ernst Jünger, 
his brother Friedrich Georg Jünger, Carl Schmitt and Gottfried Benn. The funds for this 
undertaking were provided by the chemist, Albert Hofmann, the discoverer of LSD, 
who was a strong admirer of Jünger. Also associated with the circle were the Indologist 
Jakob Wilhelm Hauer and another National Bolshevist thinker, Friedrich Hilscher.917 
From 1948 to 1961, Hans Fleig worked as journalist for the Swiss daily newspaper Die 
Tat, first as its correspondent from London, and then as its foreign affairs editor. In this 
function, he provided a platform for his colleagues from the Basel Trias. Mohler worked 
as the French correspondent for Die Tat. Ernst Jünger also ran a few articles and the 
former German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Rudolf Nadolny, wrote a front article 
heavenly criticizing the post-war policy of the Allies.918 Each time, Fleig would then 
formally denounce the ideas of his friends in public, while endorsing them in secret. 
This brought him into conflict with Armin Mohler, who criticized his moderate behavior 
in public, while his inner convictions were actually much more radical than Mohler’s 
own.919 Without the knowledge of his superiors, Fleig had turned the once strongly anti-
fascist newspaper Die Tat into an organ of National Bolshevist thought. 
Fleig was also connected to the Strasser circle. In 1955 Hans Fleig met Otto Strasser 
at least twice in Zurich. It is not difficult to discern the fingerprint of National Bolshevist 
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thinking in Fleig’s articles during this period. Like Strasser, he advocated a National 
Neutralist policy for Germany; i.e. a Germany which neither adheres to the Eastern nor 
to the Western block.920 Fleig did not always succeed to dissimulate his convictions. 
Thus, he was not only repeatedly accused of being too pro-German and of having 
fascist leanings, but also of harboring strong sympathies for the Soviet Union and the 
Arab states. Moreover, the party organ of the Swiss Social Democrats Volksrecht 
noticed, then still staunchly anti-communist and a far cry from the ideology of the New 
Left, the double standards in Fleig’s writing: While he harshly criticized the Western 
leaders, he showed leniency towards Nazi war criminals, regularly writing “war 
criminals” with quotation marks. Furthermore, Fleig blamed the Anglo-Saxon powers 
for the creation of Israel, calling Israel a “political calamity”. Fleig was generally 
sympathetic to Nasser’s pan-Arabism and to Islam. When the mayor of New York, 
Robert F. Wagner, refused to receive the Saudi King Ibn Saud in 1957, because he 
was a slaveholder. Fleig raged, calling Wagner pejoratively a “petit bourgeois” and then 
president Eisenhower together with his foreign minister, John Foster Dulles, 
“Asphaltmenschen” (Engl. city slickers), an expression commonly used by the National 
Socialists to designate Jewish city dwellers. In sharp contrast, Fleig would refer to the 
Saudi King Ibn Saud respectfully as a “spiritual puritan”.921 After mounting criticism of 
the political leanings of his articles, Fleig was forced to quit Die Tat in 1961. His next 
station was the Zürcher Woche where he continued to cover foreign affairs. He 
produced another scandal when he allowed Carl Schmitt, who was shunned and 
isolated in Germany as “Hitler’s lawyer”, to publish a front article on Rousseau. 922 
Hans Fleig however became famous, or rather infamous, for his defense of Nasser at 
a time when most of the Swiss population still sympathized with Israel in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Already during the Suez Crisis in 1956, Fleig took sides with Nasser 
and against his enemies, foremost the French. This was in line with the reaction of 
most National Bolshevists and German rightists, as shown above. This stance brought 
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Fleig harsh criticism from his fellow Swiss journalists.923  Fleig’s pro-Nasser attitude 
did not escape the notice of the Egyptian embassy in Berne. In March 1959, its 
ambassador considered inviting him to Egypt along with half a dozen other Swiss 
journalists.924 There are no records whether the journey ever took place. But not much 
later, in August 1959, Fleig was employed by the Egyptian embassy, when he was 
asked by Hamdy Abdel Wahab, cultural attaché of the Egyptian embassy, to translate 
articles dealing with the Near East from German to English.925 The relationship with 
the Egyptians continued in the following years.  
In 1964, Fleig’s career was shattered by the Frühschoppen affair. On October 31, 
1964, Fleig appeared on German television in Werner Höfer’s widely watched show, 
Internationaler Frühschoppen, to discuss the relations between Germany, Egypt and 
Israel.926 Fleig took a position for the Nasser regime, arguing that in fact it was not 
Nasser who was threatening Israel, but rather the other way around. Under these 
circumstances, Egypt’s arms build-up was entirely justified. Moreover, he claimed to 
have studied all the speeches of Nasser, wherein he “only” called for the removal of 
Israel, not for the destruction of the Jewish people.927 Indeed, Nasser had repeatedly 
called for the annihilation of Israel. For instance, in a speech in Alexandria held on July 
26, 1959, Nasser proclaimed: “I announce from here, on behalf of the United Arab 
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Republic people, that this time we will exterminate Israel.” 928 During the show, Fleig 
also questioned the legitimacy of the state of Israel and called for a resettlement of the 
Israeli Jews in the lost Eastern German territories (Ger. Ostgebiete) in order to remove 
this ‘stumbling block’ of the Arabs. Such a resettlement, he argued, would be feasible 
without much economic difficulty.929 These comments raised a storm of protest in the 
press and Fleig was accused of anti-Semitism. In response, Fleig purported that he 
had not called for a resettlement of the Israeli Jews, but for a second Jewish state on 
formerly German soil and argued that criticism of Israel was not to be equated  with 
anti-Semitism, the standard defense of anti-Zionists.930 In allusion to the many former 
Nazis who had found refuge in Egypt, the Zurich ‘Weltwoche’ commented ironically on 
the affair: “And because the Jews (…) erringly had turned the desert into a blooming 
garden, the German refugees from the East (Ger. Ostvertriebene) were quite 
agreeable to the bargain. The more so, as many among them were now able to visit 
their relatives, acquaintances and friends, who had moved to Egypt many years 
ago.”931 
It is interesting to note that probably by accident, the man sitting next to Fleig in the 
show, Hassan Sayed Kamil, was much more than a simple protractor to Egypt (Ger. 
Ägyptenlieferant), as he was announced to the audience of the TV-show. On the 
contrary, he played a crucial role in Nasser’s war plans. 932 Kamil, a Swiss-Egyptian 
engineer and arms dealer, had been instructed by his friend Nasser himself to set up 
a network of front companies in order to procure replacement parts and equipment for 
Egypt’s military, thereby circumventing the arms embargo imposed against the UAR. 
Two of these front companies, the MTP and the MECO had been registered in Zurich 
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in 1952 and in 1960, respectively. They were involved in supplying Egypt with material 
for its aviation and rocket program as well as in putting German and Austrian scientists 
and technicians, many of them with a National Socialist background, in contact with 
their Egyptian counterparts.933 In June 1962, Kamil barely escaped what was 
suspected to be an assassination attempt by the Israeli secret service, when an 
airplane chartered by MECO crashed in Germany, killing Kamil’s German wife.934 The 
role of Kamil became clear to the public in May 1964, five months prior to his TV 
appearance alongside Hans Fleig, when two Swiss employees of MECO, who 
furnished the Israeli secret service with internal documents, were arrested by the Swiss 
police and subsequently put on trial.935 
The Frühschoppen affair had revealed Fleig’s true feelings. As a result, he was officially 
dismissed as the foreign affairs chief at the Zürcher Woche.936  Still, Fleig remained 
dedicated to the Arab cause. On December 2, 1964, Fleig was supposed to speak at 
a public lecture at the University of Zurich entitled “Is Nasser preparing genocide?” 
Fleig cancelled his appearance, maybe in light of the scandal his recent appearance 
on German television had caused, but he was replaced by his colleague and fellow 
anti-Zionist journalist, Ahmed Huber, the controversial anti-Zionist and convert to 
Islam.937 Soon thereafter, he stood behind the creating of two pro-Arab bodies. First, 
he established the Swiss-Arab Documentation Centre (Ger. Schweizerisch-Arabisches 
Dokumentationszentrum), editing its bulletin Arabische Welt (Engl. Arabic world).938 
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Moreover, in autumn 1965, Fleig established the Swiss-Arab Society with the support 
of the Arab League office in Geneva.939 
Far from becoming a pariah, after the Frühschoppen affair Fleig continued to work for 
various newspapers and magazines. He was helped by the ascendancy of the New 
Left, which found his National Liberationist views increasingly acceptable. Despite his 
dismissal, Hans Fleig would continue to contribute to the Zürcher Woche’s content as 
a freelancer.940 Another contributor to the newspaper was the anti-Semitic and pro-
Arab journalist, Ahmed Huber, who penned his articles under the pseudonym, Georges 
Berner.941 In 1967, he started writing for the Neue Politik of former NSDAP member 
Wolf Schenke, who used the magazine to voice his National Neutralist stance, like 
Fleig had done earlier with Die Tat. Though the magazine was generally considered to 
belong to the far-right, it also published articles by authors belonging to the New Left. 
Schenke himself wished for a society based on councils and was a member of the 
group, The Third Front, the ideological roots of which hearkened back to the Weimar 
National Bolshevists.942 Later, Fleig found employment as the US correspondent of the 
Zurich Neue Presse, a boulevard newspaper published by the left-wing liberal Zurich 
Tages-Anzeiger and the Basel National-Zeitung from 1967-1969, where he was again 
employed alongside Ahmed Huber. Both – expectedly – used these positions to agitate 
intensively against Israel.943 He was professionally rehabilitated. 
Apparently Fleig also felt increasingly drawn to the New Left, which shared his hostility 
towards the US and his affinity for the Third World. The New Left in Switzerland also 
seems to have seen him as one of their own. For instance, the New Left journal 
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Neutralität, „the first address of non-conformist journalism in Switzerland,”, printed an 
article by Mario Cortesi in which he defended Fleig against his critics and branded him 
as a victim of Swiss anti-communist “McCarthysts.”944 In 1968, Fleig was invited to take 
part in a panel discussion by the Social Democratic Party Zurich on the war in Vietnam. 
Fleig used this opportunity to condemn the American actions in Vietnam.945 The line 
between far-right Liberation Nationalism and the New Left’s anti-imperialism was 
blurry. 
5.8 Ahmed Huber – Social Democrat and National-Socialist Muslim 
In 1994, the well-known Swiss journalist Ahmed Huber was expelled by a close vote 
from the Social Democratic Party, after a home story revealed that he admired National 
Socialism and was collaborating with neo-Nazi circles. This was only one last episode 
in a remarkable career which is populated by Communist agents, left-wing activists, 
Islamists, Arab nationalists and Holocaust deniers. Before his death in a calm suburb 
of Berne in 2008, Huber had also made his way onto the US terror list. His 
contemporaries were both fascinated and confused by Huber’s politics, which defied 
any clear divide between the Left and the Right. However, Ahmed Huber’s politics 
suddenly become understandable when we understand him as a modern National 
Bolshevist or National Liberationist. 
Albert Armand Huber, the future Ahmed Huber, was born on March 25, 1927, to a 
wealthy Protestant family in the Catholic conservative canton of Fribourg.946 After 
passing his school leaving exam in 1947, he commenced studies in law and national 
economics. Despite claiming otherwise, he never seems to have graduated from his 
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studies.947 During his student years, he became a member of the liberal fraternity, 
Zofingia, from which he was expelled after publishing allegedly slanderous articles 
against his fellow members in the Social Democratic newspaper Berner Tagwacht.948 
In the 1950s, he frequented the progressive Kerzenkreis in Berne, a circle around 
Reform pedagogue Begert, which held weekly lectures and discussions.949 The circle 
was a predecessor of the Nonconformist movement, “a mix of 1960s counterculture 
activists, poets, painters, and New Leftists.”950 Throughout the 50s and 60s, Huber 
would be very active at the heart of the Nonconformists movement. From 1952 until 
his exclusion in 1994 for collaboration with neo-Nazis and repeated Holocaust-denial, 
Huber was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland. He worked as a 
journalist for several newspapers, mainly as a correspondent at the Federal Palace of 
Switzerland. 
In his younger years, Huber was known for his communist sympathies and was 
suspected of collaborating with the Eastern Bloc. He was therefore investigated. Police 
surveillance indeed confirmed that Ahmed Huber repeatedly consorted with diplomats 
from the Eastern Bloc.  On November 9, 1961, Huber had dinner with the Soviet 
cultural attaché, Vyacheslav (Dmitriyevich) Semenov, at a restaurant in a suburb of 
Berne. Parts of the conversation were overheard by a female officer of the municipal 
police of Berne and concerned Swiss politics and the army. The dinner was paid for by 
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the Soviet official.951 After this first encounter, the connection with Semenov continued 
and both would meet regularly or talk on the phone.952 Albert Huber evidently also 
carried out small tasks for the Soviet embassy: When posters advertising the shows of 
a Georgian dancing group were banned in Berne in September 1962, Semenov asked 
Huber to find out who was responsible for the ban. Subsequently, Huber provided the 
information and penned an article for the Social Democratic newspaper Tagwacht on 
September 10, 1962, ridiculing the decision of the municipal authorities in Berne.953 
Not everyone in the Social Democratic party agreed. Fritz Marbach, a member of the 
non-socialist wing of the party, who penned a reply in the same newspaper, expressed 
understanding for the ban by pointing to the propagandistic intent the Soviets placed 
in sending their best artists abroad.954 In addition to his journalistic advocacy for the 
Eastern Bloc, Huber would also send public governmental reports to Semenov, among 
others those of the Swiss Department of Economy (Ger. 
Volkswirtschaftsdepartement).955 Since early 1962 Huber was also in contact with 
another Eastern Bloc official, Lajos Rac. Rac was the second secretary (Ger. 
Legationsrat) at the Hungarian embassy in Berne and – as the Swiss were informed – 
also a member of the Hungarian secret police, the AVH.956 These regular contacts with 
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officials from the Eastern Bloc aroused suspicions in the Swiss Army, in which Huber 
served as a militia officer. The Army therefore started its own investigation.  
Interviews with some of Huber’s acquaintances drew a complicated picture of Huber. 
Since gymnasium, he was convinced of an eventual Soviet victory and opposed anti-
communism. Huber was a colorful character. He evidently had charisma and was quite 
charming, exerting a great fascination on many. But he also had a great craving for 
recognition, expressed in a tendency to gossip and to brag. He and his adherents 
would gather in the Café Madrid in Berne. There, Huber would flaunt his intensive 
contacts with Eastern and Arab officials. Huber also had a streak of eccentricity, once 
dressing up as Adolf Hitler for a whole evening. Meanwhile he earned a reputation as 
a provocateur in the army, where he held the rank of a senior lieutenant. In one 
instance, he discussed the question of refusal of army service in a positive way with 
his subordinate soldiers. 957 Two superiors of Huber characterized him in similar terms. 
They described him as a braggard lacking in competence. But they admitted that he 
was a great entertainer, who had mastered Russian, Arabic and African accents and 
was a gifted actor. His great admiration for Nasser and his United Arab Republic did 
not escape their attention. Perhaps surprisingly, they nevertheless commended him 
on a talk he had held for his soldiers on the dangers of communism.958 As a result of 
the investigation, Huber’s access to confidential files was cancelled in late April 1962, 
but he was not expelled from the army.959 In 1963, he was transferred to another unit 
and in 1964 was eventually granted special leave from the army. Huber was re-
admitted to the Swiss Army in 1968. Promptly, Huber caused unease among his officer 
colleagues, with whom he attended a military education class in the same year. Huber 
decorated his room with portraits of Mao and openly expressed his communist 
sympathies. Despite the investigation, Huber continued to maintain contact with the 
Eastern Bloc representatives. The Swiss police counted occasional meetings with 
                                             
957 EMD, “Testimony on Albert Huber” April 25, 1962, CH-
BAR#E4320C#1995/392#135. 
958 Office of the Attorney General, “Testimony on Albert Huber by His Superiors.” 
959 Office of the Attorney General, “Measures Concerning the Causa Huber” April 30, 
1962, CH-BAR#E4320C#1995/392#135. 
 
281 
 
diplomats and no less than 29 visits to the Soviet, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, 
Chinese, Cuban and Yugoslavian embassies in the period of 1962 until 1968.960 It is 
unlikely that Huber was ever a professional spy, but he certainly worked as an informer 
and supported the Eastern Bloc through his journalistic work. More than that however, 
Huber seems to have enjoyed his provocations. 
More than his friendship with the Eastern Bloc, his infatuation with Arabs and Islam 
determined his future career. Towards the end of 1959, Ahmed Huber was asked by a 
friend to hide three members of the Algerian national movement, Front de Libération 
National (FLN). In the late 50s and early 60s, Switzerland and especially Geneva was 
a center of activity for both the Algerian national movement and French security 
services. This meeting seems to have left a profound impression on him. In an 
autobiographical text published in 1987 in the widely-circulated Swiss magazine 
Schweizer Illustrierte, Huber described how the three Algerians in hiding introduced 
him to the teachings of Islam while “criticizing some teachings not originating from God 
in the Jewish-Christian bible; The doctrine of the chosen people led in the end to the 
Western racism as well as to the Arian cult of Adolf Hitler and to the proletarian cult of 
Karl Marx; the teaching of the promised land has produced colonialism, the church has 
been secularized to the one party state and the doctrine of a plan of salvation 
comprehensible to humans has resulted in the murderous west-eastern ‘ideologies of 
progress.”961 As we can see, Huber blames the Jews and their teachings for the 
development of racism, National Socialism and Communism, as well as for “the 
murderous west-eastern ‘ideologies of progress’”. This short anti-Semitic credo is a 
good summary of the lifelong convictions of Ahmed Huber. The argument that the Jews 
are to blame for the development of racism seems central to Huber’s thinking: One 
finds it also in another story of his conversion to Islam, told in Péan’s biography of 
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François Genoud of 1996: “I worked, I informed myself on Islam. I had answers for 
concrete questions: For example, the conception of God, the contradictions between 
faith and reason, the notion of a chosen people (profound reason for racism…). When 
I realized that Allah was also the creator of evil, I had peace in me, I finally found 
unity.”962 It is notable that Huber’s attribution of the invention of racism to the Jewish 
people themselves is an ancient topic in anti-Jewish literature. For instance, it was 
rampant in Spain during the persecution of Jews and Jewish converts to Christianity 
starting in the 14th century. So-called ‘purity of blood’ laws against Jewish converts to 
Christianity were justified by asserting that the Jews themselves were the original 
inventors of such laws.963 Huber’s Islamophilia was always closely connected to his 
anti-Semitism. 
After his conversation with the Algerians, Huber was, according to his own words, 
confused as well as deeply impressed with the teachings of Islam. In early 1961, he 
finally converted to Islam in the Islamic center of Geneva.964 He must have been one 
of the first converts there, as the mosque was only founded in 1961 by the Muslim 
Brotherhood theoretician and leader, Saïd Ramadan, who, after an odyssey through 
several countries of the Middle East whence he was repeatedly expelled, settled in 
Geneva in 1958. There he published his magazine ‘Al muslimoon’ and became 
instrumental in the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood network in Europe.965 
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Geneva was then contested ground, as the city hosted not only the Islamic Center of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been outlawed and brutally repressed in Egypt 
since 1954 but was also the site of the Arab Information Office, which was entertained 
by the Arab League and engaged in spreading pro-Nasser propaganda. Interestingly, 
Huber soon changed to the camp of the Nasserists. Since at least 1962, Huber 
frequented Arab diplomatic circles. During this period, Switzerland and Nasser’s Egypt 
were involved in negotiations over the financial compensation for Swiss property 
nationalized by Egypt. As in the case of the Georgian dance group for the Soviet 
embassy, Huber used his influential position as a journalist to spread the Egyptian 
viewpoint in the Swiss media. In July 1962, in a phone call to the first secretary of the 
Egyptian embassy, he informed him of an article he had penned in the Tagwacht 
defending Arab socialism. He asserted that his next article on the Swiss-Egyptian 
negotiations would equally “mainly explain your position.”966 In the course of this 
conversation, Huber suggested to the diplomat that he should link the Swiss call for 
restitution of Swiss property in Egypt with the existence of Swiss property in Israel 
during the negotiations, implying that the Swiss would only receive restitution when 
Swiss Jews where banned from investing in Israel. Huber told him: “Do you think that 
the problem of Jewish property in Switzerland plays a role therein [in the negotiations]? 
Because your government tells the Swiss government we agree to negotiate with you 
(…), but you also have to do everything that Swiss money does not go to Israel.”967 
The two questions were obviously not related.  Even the Egyptian diplomat reacted 
reticently to Huber’s enthusiastic suggestions. Still, Huber was invited to the embassy 
of the UAR in Berne, where he met with ambassador Fathi al-Dib.968 The exact 
chronology is not known, and it is not clear whether this invitation took place before or 
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after Huber’s conversation with the first secretary, but Al-Dib was to play an important 
role in Huber’s path to his second conversion to Islam. 
Al-Dib was in fact no simple diplomat, but the chief of Egypt’s secret services. He had 
played a crucial role in organizing the arms supply for the FLN, whereby he enlisted 
the help of German National Socialists. This had also brought him into contact with 
François Genoud. 969 In 1961, Nasser sent al-Dib to Switzerland, where he was tasked 
with supporting the Algerians at the peace negotiations in Evian between the French 
and the FLN. In this endeavor, he again counted on the help of his collaborator 
François Genoud.970 The same al-Dib convinced Huber to distance himself from the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which sought to topple the Egyptian regime of General Nasser. 
Instead, he asked him to repeat his conversion in Egypt. In January 1963, Huber was 
invited by the Ministry of Information to Egypt. There he converted for the second time 
at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo and adopted the Muslim name, Ahmed 
Abdallah Ramadan El Swisseri. Henceforth, he would call himself Ahmed Huber.971 
Underlining the importance his Egyptian hosts placed in the conversion, the man who 
accepted Huber’s shahada, the Islamic confession of faith, was a man of the highest 
religious stature: Mahmud Shaltut, the Grand Imam of the Al-Azhar University from 
1958 until 1963.972 Upon his return to Switzerland, born again Ahmed Huber paid a 
visit to the Egyptian embassy, where he met his future wife, Zeinab el Biali, the 
secretary of Fathi al-Dib.973 It was truly a life-changing visit. 
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Huber’s conversion was a media event in both Egypt and Switzerland and also 
received significant political attention. Federal councilor Wahlen was informed of the 
details with a special memorandum and several Swiss newspapers reported on 
Huber.974 They were not alone: Egyptian media celebrated the convert from 
Switzerland like a pop-star. The magazine ‘Images’ dedicated a richly illustrated two-
page report to Huber’s conversion. The attention and Huber’s own statements made it 
clear from the beginning that his conversion, far from being a simple change of religion, 
carried an explicit political message. When talking to the magazine ‘Images’, he 
expressed his strong sympathy for Nasser before even mentioning Islam: “I was 
profoundly moved by the renaissance of the Arab people of Egypt after 2500 years of 
foreign domination. President Nasser was the awakener of these feelings of 
independence and of the march towards progress.”975 According to the interview, 
Huber saw himself as a lonely fighter against ‘Zionist Propaganda’ in Switzerland: “I 
always took the position of the Arab world in Switzerland, where a Zionist movement 
makes itself felt more and more. The Swiss who are sentimental are convinced that 
the Jewish people who have been longtime persecuted, in the end by the Nazis, have 
a right to find peace again in Israel. The Zionist propaganda is becoming more cunning 
and is gaining ground. […] one injustice – the plundering of Arab Palestine – does not 
make good other injustices committed against the Jewish people. This attitude and the 
fight of the Arab people as well as the reforms have pushed me to the opposing view 
of this Zionist propaganda in my country.”976 It was the familiar picture of Jewish power 
that Huber evoked in these lines. 
Besides anti-Zionism and Arab nationalism, Huber pledged to make the defense and 
propagation of Islam another cornerstone of his journalistic work. In the magazine 
‘Mimbar el Islam’ he related the story of his conversion to Islam. Again, the political 
background of his conversion became evident. He cited the start of the French-Algerian 
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war in 1954 and the Suez War of 1956 as being the origins of his eventual conversion 
to Islam. A passionate speech on his new religion marks the climax of the article: “I will 
start to dedicate my feather to defend Islam. I will set out to refute the mendacious 
slanders which the occidentals try to attribute to Islam. I will convert my feather into a 
torch to enlighten the way for all [the] undecided. I will be the first to write about the 
truth of Islam in my country because I have come to know it and I was convinced by 
it.”977 Between 1963 and 1965, Huber would return several times to Cairo to meet with 
the National Socialist, Johann von Leers, who now worked for Nasser’s propaganda, 
as discussed above. 978 Leers’ ideas, like Huber, a man with a mixed history of far right, 
left-wing and pro-Soviet activism, had a crucial influence on Huber’s thinking.  The 
convergence of Islam and National Socialism advocated by von Leers fascinated 
Huber. Until then, Huber told a journalist in 2004, he had known little about the Third 
Reich and “believed in all Zionist propaganda […] and now I heard from Von Leers, 
that Islam was the only religion, which was respected by the Führer and that he tried 
to forge an alliance between crescent moon and swastika. This was all completely new 
to me.” 979 At the intercession of von Leers, Huber was also awarded the chance to 
meet Haj Amin al-Husseini, the doyen of Arab-Palestinian nationalism and former Nazi 
collaborator, in Beirut in 1965.980 It was in this period that Huber formed a 
comprehensive world view: The ideologies of anti-Semitism, Arab nationalism, anti-
imperialism and militant Islam formed the base for Huber’s activism. It was these 
convictions which informed his anti-Zionist activism. 
Huber’s open plans to act henceforth as a propagandist for the anti-Zionist, Arab 
nationalist and Islamic cause were critically commented on by the Swiss press. The 
NZZ wrote incisively: “With the political-journalistic intent [of Ahmed Huber] the 
conversion of Ahmed Huber moves from the private level to the level of public interest. 
Foremost one is permitted to raise the question, what stand the […] leadership of the 
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Social Democratic Party of Switzerland will take on the unconditional dedication of an 
employee of its federal press agency to a man like Nasser […]. Furthermore, it would 
be of interest for broader circles, whether the party fellows of Ahmed Abdallah […] also 
are of the opinion, that Zionist propaganda is being spread, to which has to be put a 
stop immediately by an Islamic emissary from the Arab world.”981 Huber, who seems 
to have been devoid of any self-criticism, must have only felt emboldened by such 
criticism. 
Coinciding with his ideological maturation, Huber became a leading figure in Swiss 
anti-Zionist circles, both in his function as a regular speaker at anti-Zionist events and 
as a journalist. Together with the similar-minded Hans Fleig, he wrote for the Zürcher 
Woche, where both stood out for taking sides with Arab nationalism. Under his 
pseudonym, Georg Berner, for instance, Huber penned an article on the boycott 
measures of Arab states vis-à-vis Israel and companies involved in trade with Israel. 
Therein, he compares the Arab boycott of Israel to the Allies’ boycott of Nazi Germany 
and the US boycott of communist states in his own time. Implicitly, he recommends to 
Swiss companies to abide by the boycott due to the greater economic weight of the 
Arab states in comparison to Israel’s.982 Huber’s stance and open propaganda 
eventually became intolerable for the still pro-Western and pro-Israeli Social 
Democratic Party. On September 30, 1967 the party’s board decided to dismiss him 
immediately from his post at the Social Democratic press agency in Berne. In the New 
Left magazine, Neutralität, Huber commented on his dismissal with the words: “My 
policy towards the Near East was the final straw for our bigwigs. Qui vivra, on verra 
[Engl. who will live, we will see].” Huber’s words would prove ominous. 
After his dismissal in 1967 as correspondent for the Social Democratic party press on 
the grounds of his Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist propaganda activity, Huber 
continued to be a member of the party. In fact, he succeeded in making friends among 
the Far and New Left, despite his repeated Islamist and anti-Semitic positions during 
those years. In an article published in 1967 with the title of ‘Koran und der israelitische 
Staat’ [Engl. Koran and the Israelite State] in Neutraliät, Huber interprets the Arab-
Israeli conflict as a religious conflict: For the Arab Muslims, it is foremost understood 
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in religious terms and its peaceful resolution is therefore impossible. He argues, that it 
is “(…) the religious aspects (…), which control the Near-East conflict (at least from the 
Arab-Islamic side) and are the decisive reason for the fact that for Israel (…) there is 
no recognition and peace.”983  Huber sees the Muslims involved in a holy war against 
the intruding Israeli Jews: “(He, who) settles in the realm of Islam with cunning and 
violence and besets or expels Muslims, against him God commands in the Koran the 
holy defense war of Islam.”984 For Peter Woog, head of the Swiss Jewish community’s 
intelligence service, JUNA, the concept of “realm of Islam” was reminiscent of the 
völkisch ideas of Lebensraum in Nazi-Germany: “The Arab claim on this strip of land 
rests on bare expansion policy, which is disguised with – lent from the Koran by Huber 
on his own responsibility - völkisch theses. These only too familiar geopolitical slogans 
brought forth by a socialist Journalist from Switzerland are only different in their origin 
from the Hitlerlian catchphrases of Germanity (Ger. Deutschtum) and Lebensraum.”985 
In another article ‘Plädoyer für Rassenmischung’ [Engl. Plea for Racial Mixing] 
published in ‘Neutralität’ in 1968, Huber tries to prove that the teachings of the Old 
Testament are the source of racism. According to Huber, these concepts entered the 
mind-set of the West, while they remained alien to the religions of Asia and Africa, in 
particular Islam.986  
The changing political landscape and the ascendancy of the New Left would turn 
Huber’s positions, hitherto considered on the extreme fringe of the political spectrum, 
increasingly mainstream. Theo Pinkus in Zurich, a prominent member of the Swiss 
Communist Party PDA and of Jewish origin, was especially close to Huber. The two 
would regularly call each other to discuss matters of politics. For the Zeitdienst, a 
weekly publication edited by Theo’s son, Marco Pinkus, the leader of the Communist 
Party of Labor Youth (Ger. Partei der Arbeit) in Zurich, Huber penned articles on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, in which he denied Israel’s right to exist. Huber’s collaboration was 
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not approved by everybody. The newspaper’s editor in chief, Dr. Hugo Kramer, 
reproached him for producing Arab propaganda, which bore no connection to socialism 
or peace work.987 In June 1967, Marco Pinkus invited Huber to speak on the subject 
of foreign aid. In this talk, Huber underlined the importance of Hitler and the Japanese 
in the anti-colonial fight, as they had proved that the imperialist powers could be 
beaten. While financial foreign aid was ineffective, there was a need for political foreign 
aid. He furthermore confessed that he was no Marxist.988  Meanwhile, Huber, also 
continued to be very active among the Nonconformists, especially within the frame of 
the Junkere 37, a meeting point for adherents of the New Left and progressives in 
Berne. There, he gave several talks and participated eagerly in the discussions. Other 
stations of Huber in the New Left included the anti-nuclear movement, the Peuple et 
Culture association in Geneva and the Forum Politicum in Berne, a student group 
founded in 1966, which turned into an umbrella organization of the New Left in Berne 
and was active in the Vietnam solidarity movement.989 Huber, who was a sharp critic 
of the Swiss armaments policy during the Cold War, served as a political advisor to the 
group.990 During the 1970s, he continued to write for the left-liberal newspaper 
Nationalzeitung, which became the Basler Zeitung in 1977, and in which he was one 
of the defining voices. Nobody seems to remark upon his obvious anti-Semitism, 
although he occasionally cites Hitler when attacking his political enemies.991 Despite 
his various engagements, Huber struggled financially after his dismissal from the 
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Social Democratic press. From 1970 onwards, Ahmed Huber was therefore provided 
with money and work by the Arab League Office in Geneva.992 
How can Huber’s renewed integration into the Left be explained? In the course of the 
1960s and early 1970s, the anti-colonial struggle started to define the ideology of the 
Swiss Left in general and the New Left in particular, while class struggle and the 
advocacy of native worker’s rights began to lose importance. This was anachronistic, 
as most former colonies had already gained independence by this time. In the eyes of 
the New Left though, the Third World was dominated by the neo-Imperialism of the 
West led by the United States, which exploited its people. Thus, class struggle was 
largely replaced by national struggle against an oppressive West. The Israeli-Arab 
conflict played – and continues to play – an important role in this world view. For various 
reasons, which cannot be expounded here in detail, it came to be seen by the Left as 
an anti-imperial struggle. Israel was identified as an imperial power, bent on expanding 
its territory and acquiring new commodities, while the Arab-Palestinians were their 
oppressed subjects. The New Left as a matter of fact rehabilitated nationalism, at least 
in its non-Western form. The extreme Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism which had led 
to Huber’s marginalization from the Old Left, consequently became his entry ticket into 
the New Left. Elevating anti-Western politics and support of Third World nationalism to 
its sine-qua-non-principle, the politics of the New Left became in fact very close to that 
National Liberationism, which had strongly influenced Arab solidarity circles in the 
1950s and 1960s, although without the component of German nationalism. This 
blurring of the Right-Left divide cannot only be observed in Switzerland, but is a general 
mark of the times. In France, parallel to the New Left, a new movement called the 
‘Nouvelle Droite’ (Engl. New Right) emerges after 1968. It is steeped in the same 
intellectual tradition as National Bolshevism. Its leader, Alain de Benoist, would draw 
on the writings of the German national revolutionary thinkers of the interwar period: 
Jünger, Moeller van den Bruck or Oswald Spengler. The New Right argues that secular 
Western ideologies like liberalism or socialism are products of the Judeo-Christian 
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tradition. They share its universalistic, materialist and egalitarian spirit and are bent on 
homogenizing different cultures. Therefore, they are condemned by the ‘Nouvelle 
Droite’ as racist and totalitarian. Their opposition to the West is not restricted to matters 
of thought. Rather, they share the New Left’s visceral hatred of the US and avidly 
support Third World nationalist movements.993 In fact, there are good arguments to 
make a case that the New Left transcended the old Right-Left divide like National 
Bolshevism and National Liberationism had done before.  
5.9 Conclusion 
Both Germany and the Arab states sought to revive the German-Arab friendship after 
World War II. Adenauer’s policy to seek friendly relations with Israel and provide limited 
restitution for the victims of the Holocaust was seen by both the Arabs and by several 
local Orientalists, who had determined Germany’s Middle East policy during the past 
decades, as a challenge to this friendship. German and Arab opponents of Israel 
therefore cooperated in order to sabotage the German-Israeli restitution negotiations. 
These efforts were unsuccessful. However, the Arab world and in particular Egypt 
became a place of yearning for the German far-right, where several of them settled in 
the following years. Just a few years later, in 1956, the Suez Crisis led to the creation 
of multiple pro-Arab organizations in Germany. These developments also affected 
Switzerland, where the first pro-Arab association was founded by the National 
Socialist, François Genoud in 1956. All of the leaders of these groups belonged to the 
far-right scene. Most however were under the influence of Ernst Niekisch’s National 
Bolshevism, or rather, how it became to be known, National Liberationism. The basis 
of Niekisch’s anti-imperialism was his conviction that Germany was not part of the 
West, but itself had been a victim of Western colonialism. Niekisch was also an anti-
Semite, although he considered Christianity his main foe. These two elements of his 
ideology inspired his followers’ politics. His adherents therefore tended to express 
solidarity with the Soviet Union and the Third World, in particular Egypt, while they 
abhorred the US and Israel. Niekisch’s geopolitics, rather than Hitler’s, inspired a 
significant element of the German far-right in the 1950s. It was this milieu where 
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Johann von Leers, the Nazi propagandist working for Nasser, hailed from. The Arab 
diplomats in Germany, in particular Arab League representative Hassan Fakoussa, 
were eager to collaborate with this pro-Arab German far-right. During the 1960s, 
Gerhard Frey’s Nationalzeitung worked as a non-official organ for Nasser, singing his 
praise. 
Liberation Nationalism also influenced two journalists in Switzerland, Hans Fleig and 
Ahmed Huber. They were united by their sympathy for Nasser and the Soviet Union, 
their anti-Semitism and their hatred of Israel. Both can be counted as pioneers of anti-
Zionism in Switzerland and collaborated with officials of the Arab League and Arab 
diplomatic staff. Huber’s pro-Arab sympathy was at the origin of his conversion to 
Islam. While drawn to the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood at first, he soon 
converted to the official Islam of Nasser’s Egypt. This was not coincidental: For Huber, 
Islam had a strong political note and served to underpin his anti-Zionism and Arab 
nationalism. He declared Israel not only to be Arab land, but also to be Islamic land, 
therefore making any peace with the Jewish state impossible. Huber was probably the 
first native Islamist in Switzerland. Both Ahmed Huber and Hans Fleig produced 
several scandals in the 1960s with their anti-Israeli and pro-Nazi statements, resulting 
in their marginalization. But in the second half of the 1960s, both were recognized by 
the New Left as one of their own, ignoring their anti-Semitism and far-right sympathies. 
To a significant degree, New Left Anti-Imperialism and National Bolshevist Liberation 
Nationalism were compatible in their politics.  
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6 The Arab League Propaganda Infrastructure and its 
Partners 
The Arab propaganda institutions had suffered a crushing defeat at the UN in 1947. It 
would take several years for them to recover. Egypt, which had been led by the 
charismatic strongman, Gamal Nasser, since 1952, turned the Arab League into an 
instrument of his pan-Arab foreign policy. Since the 1950s, the Arab states established 
a propaganda network covering five continents but concentrated on the US and later 
Europe. They profited from the support of various anti-Zionist groups and activists of 
different political hues. The development of Arab propaganda networks is clearly 
related to political events in the Near East. The relaxation of inter-Arab rivalry after 
1964 and the defeat in the Six-Day War led to a dramatic expansion of pro-Arab 
networks. Increasingly, Arab League propaganda no longer sought to address the 
majority, but sought to collaborate with fringe elements of society like the New Left. 
The workings of such collaboration are analyzed in a case study at the end of this 
chapter, which deals with the propaganda campaign for three PFLP terrorists in 
Switzerland. 
6.1 The Expansion of the Arab League Propaganda Activities 
This subchapter deals with the Arab League public diplomacy effort from 1948 until the 
late 1960s. Although the Arab states carried out their own and often congruent public 
diplomacy effort, most of the activity was organized within the framework of the League 
of the Arab states. A public diplomacy department within the Arab League was first set 
up in April 1946.994 However, after the disbanding of the Arab Office in Washington in 
1948, Arab League propaganda activity in Western countries ceased for some years. 
Under the dictatorship of the Free Officers, Egypt pursued an aggressive and costly 
foreign policy. In fact, all tools of foreign policy, including propaganda and subversion, 
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were put in the service of realizing Egypt’s primary foreign policy goal of attaining 
regional dominance and cementing Egypt’s claim to the leadership of pan-Arabism. On 
the payroll of the Egyptian state since the mid-1950s, legions of educators and 
professionals were seconded to Arab nations where they not only provided 
development aid, but also spread pro-Egyptian and pan-Arab propaganda.995 As 
already discussed earlier, partly with German and American help, Egypt also set up 
and operated the radio station, Voice of the Arabs. 996 It quickly became a highly 
efficient propaganda tool against Egypt’s regional rivals. Thus, Egyptian propaganda 
was instrumental in inciting the Jordanian populace in winter 1955/56 against the 
government’s decision to join the military alliance of the Baghdad Pact. Under the 
pressure (?) of violent protest, the Jordanian government eventually withdrew from its 
earlier decision, providing Egypt with a spectacular triumph.997  
Egypt had dominated the Arab League since its foundation. Egypt, then still a relatively 
wealthy state, carried half of the financial burden of the Arab League until the mid-
1960s. Cairo harbored the Arab League’s headquarters. Its first three Secretary 
Generals were all Egyptians, as was an overwhelming majority of their staff, including 
that of the Arab League Information Offices abroad. General Secretary Abdul Khalek 
Hassouna, who headed the Arab League for 20 years from 1952-1972, had been 
directly selected by the Egyptian government to fill the job. Under Nasser, Egypt’s 
dominance grew even stronger, turning the Arab League de facto into a tool of Egyptian 
foreign policy. After all, the foreign policy goals of the Arab League and Egypt, Arab 
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unity, were largely overlapping.998 The Arab League’s inclination toward the extensive 
use of international propaganda, which mirrored that of the Nasser regime, should 
therefore also be understood as a function of Egypt’s influence. At first, Arab 
propaganda was concentrated at the UN in New York and designed to convince other 
nations of their viewpoints, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this 
purpose, the Arab League installed a Permanent Observer at the UN in 1952.999 Only 
in 1953 did the Arab League establish a Department for Information and Publication, 
which assumed responsibility for foreign propaganda.1000 Again, the US took the center 
stage. Out of the Arab League presence at the UN grew the Arab Information Office, 
which was opened in New York in 1955. This was followed by a rapid expansion of 
Arab Offices on all continents except Australia. Most Offices were located in Western 
Europe and the US, underlining the importance the Western public played in the Arab 
states’ foreign policy calculations. The Arab League representatives did not enjoy 
diplomatic immunity in the Western European countries. They were therefore usually 
attached to the embassy of an Arab country.1001 The activities of the Arab League 
Offices in the United States, Germany and Switzerland will be analyzed in detail in the 
course of this chapter. 
As mentioned, the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s was marked 
by the rapid expansion of the Arab Office network. During their April session in 1956, 
the political committee of the Arab League decided to open propaganda offices in 
Geneva, Brazil and Argentina.1002 In November 1957, an Arab Information Congress 
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took place in Cairo under the auspices of the Arab League. The attendants decided to 
conduct an international propaganda campaign designed to push back “misleading 
Zionist propaganda.”1003 For this purpose, the congress resolved to set up the fund for 
the financing of Arab propaganda in foreign countries and to establish propaganda 
offices in another sixteen countries in addition to the four already existing in New York, 
Buenos Aires, Geneva and Karachi, which were also to be strengthened. The recently 
established Arab Information Office in Geneva was also selected to be the center for 
Arab propaganda activities in Europe.1004 For the purpose of combating Israeli activities 
in South Asia, the opening of an Arab League office in New Delhi was agreed on in 
1960.1005 During its session in Cairo in December 1964, the Arab League decided to 
establish Offices in Far-Eastern and African capitals. This was a response to increased 
Israeli activities in Africa, mostly in the form of exchange programs and economic aid. 
Another means of spreading support for Arab viewpoints was the establishment of Arab 
friendship societies in these strategic regions. This also followed central planning. 
Thus, at the same session in December 1964, the UAR embassy in Japan and its 
attached information center were commissioned to help establish an Arab-Japanese 
Society.1006 In 1965, the Arab League decided to open an Arab League Office at the 
European Economic Community in Brussels, which was inaugurated one year later.1007 
By 1966, the Arab League had established a world-wide propaganda network. 
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Figure 1: The foreign offices of the Arab League1008 
Location Year of establishment 
New York 1955 
Bonn, Rio de Janeiro 1956 
Chicago, San Francisco, Buenos Aires, 
Geneva 
1957 
Washington 1958 
Dallas 1960 
Coral Gables (closed in 1964), London, 
Rome, New Delhi  
1961 
Ottawa 1965 
Paris, Tokyo, Nairobi, Dakar, Lagos, 
Madrid, Brussels, Santiago de Chile 
1966 
 
The international propaganda was organized in a coordinated way through a 
sophisticated and hierarchical bureaucracy. First, there was the Department for 
Information and Publication, which went through several renamings and was later 
known as the Board of Information. It determined the plan of action for the offices and 
their respective budgets. The Department for Information and Publication reported to 
the Arab League Secretary General and was headed by one of his assistants. This 
prominent status within the Arab League’s bureaucracy indicates that public diplomacy 
was considered a field of the utmost importance. The Department for Information and 
Publication had three central tasks: First, strategic planning in consideration of the 
recommendations and resolutions of the superior bodies of the Arab League. Second, 
the production and distribution of propaganda material, including the organization of 
events and exhibitions, and third, the supervision of the Arab League Offices.1009 
Besides the Department for Information and Publication, the Arab League put several 
strategic instruments in place to coordinate the propaganda effort. In 1959, the 
Permanent Committee on Information was formed, which consisted of the heads of the 
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Arab Offices and met twice a year. Its work was supported by the staff of the Permanent 
Bureau of Arab Propaganda. Since 1964, the Permanent Committee on Information 
reported to the Council of Arab Ministers of Information, a body which had been formed 
in the same year and oversaw the strategic planning of propaganda. Yearly 
conferences of the Council of Arab Ministers of Information determined the broader 
strategy of Arab League propaganda. The first conference of the Council of Arab 
Ministers of Information took place in Cairo on March 7-10, 1964. The conference 
resolutions determined several themes of Arab propaganda that were primarily 
concerned with Israel. The resolutions characterized Israel as an expansionist, 
aggressive country, which was acting as an agent of Imperialism. It had expelled the 
Arabs and discriminated against them. Therefore, armed struggle by Palestinian 
paramilitary and terrorist organizations was justified. The Arab states supported the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and their fight to establish a 
Palestinian nation state. Other resolutions claimed that anti-Semitism was solely a 
Western and not an Arab phenomenon. Moreover, the Zionists had deliberately tainted 
the image of the Arabs in the West. There was therefore a need to improve the image 
of Islam and the Arabs in the West.1010 These were the themes of Arab propaganda in 
the following years. 
The Arab embassies were also involved in propaganda work. One constant concern of 
the Arab League was therefore the improvement of coordination between the Arab 
Offices and the Arab embassies to achieve tangible results. Arab League resolutions 
repeatedly stressed this aim. The 1964 conference of the Council of Arab Ministers of 
Information again urged Arab diplomats “to cooperate with the League's offices in 
administering information activities; to contact public opinion leaders, including 
members of political parties, mass organizations, unions, professors, students, as well 
as financial circles that have interests in the Middle East; to support and encourage 
the Organization of Arab Students; and to encourage community civic and religious 
leaders, as well as those who help form public opinion (e.g., journalists), to visit the 
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Arab world.”1011 Monthly meetings between the Arab diplomats and the Arab Office 
directors were set up to help facilitate this coordination. They had the negative effect 
that they also increased the already considerable burden of bureaucracy.1012 There 
was a constant tendency to shift responsibilities to the management level and limit the 
freedom of action of the Arab Office staff. It is therefore not too surprising that the staff 
at the Arab League Offices often complained about the inefficiency and lack of 
independence. 1013  
The activities of the Arab Offices were also clearly delineated in accordance with 
Resolution 17 of the Secretary General from 1966. Resolution 17 recommended five 
principal fields of Arab Office activity: Lobbying by maintaining contact with parties and 
their leaders; maintaining a presence in the media through  written publications, press 
conferences and the participation in radio and television broadcasts; exhibiting Arab 
cultural achievements through the presentation of Arab television broadcasts and 
movies, and the organization of cultural exhibitions and religious events; Strengthening 
the pro-Arab community by capitalizing on the capabilities of the Arab emigrant 
community, foremost Arab university students, and sympathizers; and lastly the 
organization of delegations of parliamentarians, professionals, journalists and youth to 
the Arab states.1014 Another activity which was not covered by Resolution 17, was the 
promotion of Arab national movements recognized by all the states of the Arab League 
by allowing their representatives to work at the Arab League Offices in attached 
positions, first that of the FLN and later that of the PLO.1015 The Arab League 
propaganda apparatus was financed through the budget for the General Secretariat 
and through the Joint Arab Information Fund. The fund had been set up in 1960 but 
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only received significant donations from Arab League member states after 1967, when 
the Arab Gulf sheiks donated $300’000. Through the 1960s, the budget of the 
Department for Information and Publication grew disproportionally in comparison with 
the general budget. While in 1963, it made up 25 percent of the general budget, it 
averaged 45 percent in the second half of the decade.1016 The Department for 
Information and Publication was headed by Zoher Kabbani, the former head of the 
Arab League Geneva Office, since 1964.1017 The increase in the propaganda budget 
reflected the fact that the Arab states considered the information area a vital battlefield 
in their escalation of the conflict with Israel. After 1964, inter-Arab rivalry diminished, 
allowing for a strengthening of military and political cooperation among the Arab states 
against Israel, a development which culminated in the Six-Day War. 
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Figure 1:Organizational structure of the Arab League propaganda apparatus1018 
 
 
6.2 The Re-Establishment of the Arab League Propaganda Network in the US and the 
Native anti-Zionist Network 
Before analyzing the role of the Arab League in the US in the 1950s, it is worthwhile to 
take a look at the developments within the anti-Zionist scene in the US since Israel’s 
establishment in May 1948. With the closure of the Arab Office in Washington in 1948 
and the disbanding of the IAAA in 1950, the anti-Zionist movement lost its two main 
organizations. However, the Protestant and missionary circles opposed to Zionism and 
the newly established state of Israel quickly resumed their activities, establishing the 
short-lived Holy Land Christian Committee in 1949 with the stated purpose of helping 
the Christians in Palestine. It represented an ideological continuation of the missionary 
anti-Zionist Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land, which had been active 
in the first half of 1948 in their efforts to turn back American support for partition, as 
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discussed above. Like its predecessor, the Holy Land Christian Committee had close 
connections to the State Department, but also to the CIA, with future CIA director, Allen 
Dulles, and CIA officer, William ‘Billy’ Eddy, who also worked as a consultant for 
Aramco, among its members.1019 The committee was chaired by James Shepherd 
Freeman, a Navy admiral, and the Palestinian Christian, Yusif Bandak, who presented 
himself as a Christian delegate from Bethlehem, and worked as the committee’s roving 
ambassador. Bandak was the son of Issa Bandak, the mayor of Bethlehem. During the 
war, he was in London, where he worked for the BBC and as the Arab liaison for the 
anti-Zionist Anglo-Arab Association. Bandak toured Christian parishes, being 
especially active in California. His activities worried the pro-Zionist American Christian 
Palestine Committee led by Karl Baehr, who warned of him in a circular letter. 
According to the letter, the controversial, anti-fascist journalist, Walter Winchell, had 
allegedly discovered several disconcerting facts about Bandak. He was a follower of 
the ex-Mufti, who had been active in the paramilitary Arab underground in Palestine 
and had been in British custody for some time. He had also written an anti-Semitic and 
anti-American article in the February 15, 1946 issue of the newspaper Sawt ash-
Shaab. Through the support of British anti-Zionists, he received a visa to the USA in 
1948, which had initially been denied. There, he consorted among others with the anti-
Semitic politician, Merwin K. Hart. The letter accused Bandak of double speech: “In his 
contacts with the Arabs as well as with Americans of the Merwin K. Hart type, he is 
violently anti-Semitic, whereas in his presentation to American Catholics and 
Protestants, he is idealistically religious.”1020 According to Reverend William Lindsay 
Young, the vice-president of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, who 
attended a meeting on September 3, 1950 in Los Angeles, Bandak’s message 
concentrated on inveighing against Israel: “I heard no discussion of ways and means 
to help the unfortunate Christians in Bethlehem, the avowed purpose of Bandak's 
organization.” Among the audience was also Gerald K. Smith, a well-known anti-
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Semitic activist.1021 The Holy Land Christian Committee however shared the short life 
span of the Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land. It seems to have ceased 
its activity after 1950, soon to be replaced by an organization with much firmer 
grounding. 
The leading pro-Arab organization in the 1950s in the US was the American Friends of 
the Middle East (AFME), which had a similar Protestant, missionary pedigree. In 
November 1949, the Arabist, Kermit Roosevelt, who had headed the Committee for 
Justice and Peace in the Holy Land together with Virginia Gildersleeve, assumed the 
post of deputy chief of the Near East and Africa Division (NEA) in the State 
Department. Roosevelt used his influence to promote the Arab cause in the US. At 
first, he sought to provide his friend Elmer Berger of the anti-Zionist ACJ with a job in 
Washington. In January 1951, Berger started to work as a consultant for the CIA. Elmer 
Berger and Dorothy Thompson, a prominent American journalist who had originally 
been sympathetic to Zionism but had become increasingly critical of it in the late 1940s 
and had started to frequent the anti-Zionist circles of the ACJ, were instrumental in the 
establishment of the AFME. In March 1951, both met with Kermit Roosevelt and CIA 
officers in Washington. On May 15, 1951, the AFME was established in New York. The 
organization made little progress until October 1951, when the CIA assigned a case 
officer to it. The case officer, a certain Mather Greenleaf Eliot, put the AFME on a more 
professional basis and recruited the services of experienced anti-Zionist activists, like 
Garland Evans Hopkins. Through several front organizations, the CIA provided the 
AFME with ample funding. In 1957, the AFME reported assets of about 1.5 million 
dollars. Under the professional management of Garland Hopkins who ran the 
organization despite acting only as its vice president, the AFME quickly expanded. It 
set up branch offices in the whole country and since 1953 also in the Middle East. The 
AFME consisted of four departments: Intercultural Relations, Research and 
Publications, Public Relations, and Student Affairs. The AFME was active in a range 
of cultural and informational activities. One of its main focuses was the establishment 
of exchange programs for Middle Eastern students and the support of Arab students 
in the US. AFME messaging emphasized the common bond between the Middle East 
and the US as well as between Christianity and Islam. Anti-Zionism stood not at the 
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center of its message, but inherent to its agenda. Israel and Judaism were absent from 
its vision of the Middle East and there were often references to “special interests”, 
which were manipulating US foreign policy.1022  
The establishment of the AFME signaled a pro-Arab turn in the US foreign policy, which 
became manifest under President Eisenhower, whose administration sought to correct 
the Truman foreign policy that it perceived as having been too pro-Zionist. State 
support for the AFME can also be understood as part of the growing importance of 
public diplomacy as a tool of US foreign policy in the late Truman and the Eisenhower 
administration. Truman’s Campaign of Truth program had already extended 
propaganda activities abroad. Under Eisenhower, the International Information 
Administration (IIA) was established in 1952. It was replaced by the US Information 
Agency (USIA) one year later, which, working under the authority of the State 
Department, was to coordinate US propaganda activities.1023 The major goal of US 
foreign policy in the Middle East remained the prevention of Communist penetration of 
the region. US foreign policy makers considered Islam and Arab nationalism as 
powerful allies against communism and therefore sough to co-opt them. They were 
however worried by neutralist tendencies in the region, like that advocated by Nasser. 
The State Department maintained its generally hostile attitude to Israel, considering 
past US support for partition still as the main stumbling block for the image of the US 
in the Middle East.1024 US information policy therefore sought to foster a climate of 
friendship between the US and the Arab and Islamic countries. IIA chief, Reed Harris, 
announced the creation of a Working Group on Special Materials for Arab and other 
Moslem Countries on March 14, 1952 in a letter to several public diplomacy officials. 
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The working group assembled both public diplomacy and Middle East experts from 
several branches of the State Department. The program proposal that was attached to 
the letter, observed “that the West is considered by most Arabs to be a more immediate 
and dangerous threat than Communism or the Soviet Union.”1025 The blame for this 
hostile climate towards the West in the Middle East, which was considered a “great 
threat to United States interests”, fell also on the West itself, the program analyzed: “A 
deep seated [Arab] inferiority complex, for which the traditional attitude of the West 
towards the Middle East must bear a heavy share of responsibility, further complicates 
the situation.”1026 The group was designed to “direct a program for countering mistrust 
of the United States” in order to remedy this precarious situation.1027 The program 
proposal however emphasized that US information policy could not hope to succeed 
in convincing the Arabs that the US was not pursuing a self-interested policy in the 
Middle East. Instead, the IIA would strive to create the impression that it had a genuine 
and sympathetic interest in Islam and the Arabs. To this end, the IIA would advertise 
the range of scholarly, educational and cultural engagement with the region and Islam 
within the United States. This was evidenced by the abundance of language courses, 
research, even textbooks and children books dealing with these topics. The project 
proposal drafted a list of 18 smaller projects, which were scheduled to be discussed 
on the founding meeting on March 25, 1952. The list suggests that although US 
information policy was designed to help US foreign policy, most projects were directed 
at a domestic audience, seeking to gain understanding and sympathy for the Arab 
countries and Islam.1028 State support for the AFME must be understood in this context 
as one measure of a general US information program. 
In the early 1950s, alongside the state-sponsored AFME, the Arab League and the 
AHC also sought to rebuild their propaganda network in the US, which had become 
dysfunctional in early 1948. They seem to have enjoyed some support from pro-Arab 
                                             
1025 Reed Haaris, “Memo: Working Group on Special Materials for Arab and Other 
Moslem Countries,” March 14, 1952, RG 59, NACP. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 Ibid. 
306 
 
American far-right activists in this endeavor. According to research by the ADL, the 
American advertiser and far-right activist Allen Zoll approached Omar Haliq in summer 
1952 with the offer of publishing Arab propaganda material. On November 14, 1952, 
he had a meeting with Arab League general secretary Abdul Khalek Hassouna and 
several high-ranking Arab officials at the UN. He advised them that president elect 
Dwight Eisenhower would pursue a more pro-Arab foreign policy and that it was 
therefore the right moment to open a propaganda office in the US to fight Jewish 
influence there. Simultaneously, he offered to work for this new office. After receiving 
information on Zoll’s questionable character, Hassouna seems not to have pursued 
Zoll’s job offer any further. Still, the Egyptian foreign ministry extended an invitation to 
Zoll to visit Egypt. During Zoll’s stay in Egypt in 1953, he met with several notable 
figures, including the ex-Mufti, and advertised foreign investments in the country during 
a press conference.1029 Far-right activists continued to seek the proximity of the Arab 
propagandists in the US during the 1950s, occasionally discomforting the latter, as will 
be discussed below.  
Izzat Tannous, a veteran of the AHC, which had lost much of its influence after the 
Israeli war of independence, also resumed his propaganda activities in the US. Izzat 
Tannous had served as a foreign spokesperson and propagandist for the AHC in 
Britain and the US since the 1930s. After the first Arab-Israeli War, he remained in the 
camp of the ex-Mufti, using the latter’s funds to build the AHC’s Arab Palestine Office 
in Beirut. According to the CIA, the ex-Mufti however felt challenged by Tannous’ self-
proclaimed title of “spokesman for the refugees” and sought to undermine his 
position.1030 The ex-Mufti alleged that Tannous was paid by British and American 
money through the intermediary of the Iraqis.1031 In his function at the Beirut Arab 
Palestine Office, Tannous produced the first, albeit excessive, estimates of the 
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possessions that Arab refugees had left behind when they fled Palestine.1032 Perhaps 
because of the tensions with the ex-Mufti, Tannous left for the US in 1954, there 
establishing the Palestine Arab Refugee Office in New York.1033 The body advocated 
the interests of the Arab Palestinian refugees at the UN and also engaged in public 
campaigning. The propaganda material published in the years 1955 until 1960 focused 
on criticizing the Zionist ideology, Arab dispossession and Israeli policies towards its 
Arab population. The fate of Arab Palestinian refugees in other countries was not 
discussed and compassion for the refugees was primarily used as a means to 
undermine sympathy for Israel. Most of the booklets were authored by Izzat Tannous 
and Sami Hadawi, who had worked as an expert on Arab land ownership for the United 
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine until 1956.1034 
The leading spokesman for the Arab Cause in the 1950s, however, was Fayez Sayegh. 
In 1959, he claimed to have lectured on about 150 campuses and to have appeared 
on more than 200 radio and television shows.1035  The accuracy of these numbers 
notwithstanding, Sayegh certainly was highly productive. In addition to his speaking 
engagements, Sayegh also authored dozens of books and articles. Sayegh, who was 
born in 1922 in Syria, was the scion of a prominent Protestant family, which had settled 
in Palestine during the British mandate period. He was a graduate of AUB and 
Georgetown.1036 Fayez and his older brother Yusif had been active in leading positions 
in the Palestine branch of Antoun Saadeh’s Syrian Socialist National Party (PPS) 
during the 1940s, with Fayez chairing the Culture and Propaganda Committee. The 
party sought to spread Saadeh’s pan-Syrian ideology. By the 1940s, Pan-Syrianism 
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had by now lost the popularity it had enjoyed in Palestine twenty years before and the 
party apparently met little success, as recounted by Yusif: “There was not a great deal 
of readiness to accept the ideas of the PPS because it emphasized the Syrianness of 
Palestine; that Palestine was Southern Syria. The Palestinians always call themselves 
‘Arabs’, and they thought of the Palestine problem as an Arab problem rather than a 
Syrian problem.”1037 In late 1947, the PPS organized military training for its members 
and was involved in military action against the Yishuv. During the conflict, Fayez’s 
brother Yusif became a prisoner of war.1038 It is possible that Fayez was involved in 
military action as well, although he did not mention this in his later career. In the late 
1940s, Fayez moved to the US to work with the Lebanese diplomat, Charles Malik. 
Cecil Hourani, who collaborated with Fayez in 1949 at the UN for the Lebanese 
delegation, described him in ambivalent terms, having “an encyclopedic knowledge of 
every phase of the problems, and a sharp logical mind, but also a streak of 
intransigence and bitterness which with time, and frustration as the faith he had put in 
the capacity or the willingness of the Arab regimes to solve the Palestinian question in 
the way he wanted faded away, overshadowed his other more human qualities.”1039 
As a member of the Lebanese legation, Sayegh networked with the existing anti-Zionist 
advocacy network. In 1952, he published the booklet ‘The Palestine Refugees’ as a 
response to a memorandum. The AFME’s Department of Research and Publication, 
which was headed by the AUB graduate and missionary of German origin Erich 
Bethmann, published its own version of the pamphlet, with AFME board members 
Virginia Gildersleeve and William Hocking writing a preface.1040 The pamphlet was 
widely distributed and reprinted. The printing costs for 5’000 copies of the second 
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edition and their distribution were funded by a wealthy Lebanese businessman and a 
group of Lebanese supporters.1041 The booklet was part insightful academic treatise 
on the situation of the Arab refugees from Palestine, and part pamphlet against 
Zionism. Among the more controversial things, the pamphlet claimed that the Zionist 
movement, including moderate leaders like Chaim Weizmann, had always been bent 
on the destruction and expulsion of the Arab community in Palestine. It claimed: “The 
grand strategy of Zionism—which follows inevitably from the ultimate objectives 
thereof—involves the dispossession of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.”1042 This was 
a caricature of Zionism which ignored the complex history of Zionist thought on the 
Palestinian Arabs. In fact, the traditional approach of the Zionists, including Theodor 
Herzl, was marked by the somewhat naïve conviction that the local Arabs, as equal 
citizens, would embrace Zionism after realizing the economic benefits and general 
progress it brought to Palestine. This was how the literary figure Rashid Bey described 
the effects of Zionism in Herzl’s novel ‘Altneuland’.1043 In fact, even Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, the leader of the more militant Revisionist Zionists, had favored an 
understanding with the local Arabs and continued to reject their resettlement during 
the discussion on the Peel partition plan in 1937.1044 Sayegh also raised doubts about 
whether Jews in the Arab countries had suffered discrimination and violence after the 
establishment of Israel.1045 A private letter suggests that Sayegh was also not entirely 
free from anti-Jewish prejudice. In a letter from 1952, Fayez Sayegh considered 
cheating his employer by declaring that he was currently staying in Lebanon and not 
in Washington. This way, he could spend a few weeks’ vacation in Beirut, with his 
employer paying for his trip back to the States from Lebanon. “Why not out-Jew the 
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Jew?”, he asked rhetorically.1046 Although certainly a gifted scholar, Sayegh’s sense of 
mission and his prejudices affected his work. 
Although the responses to the brochure were mixed, it successfully established 
Sayegh’s claim as the leading Arab propagandist in the US. Among the brochure’s 
critics was the liberal journalist Freda Kirchway. In a letter to Gildersleeve, she 
expressed the view that the brochure showed a lack of compassion for the Arab 
refugees and offered no solution for their plight. Resettling them in Israel would lead to 
the destruction of Israel and therefore to war.1047 The anti-Zionist Jewish activist Elmer 
Berger of the ACJ however wrote to Sayegh to congratulate him for his “brilliant and 
compelling” booklet on the Arab refugees from Palestine and suggested a meeting.1048 
It was the beginning of an enduring and rewarding collaboration between the men. 
Both men pursued distinct interests. The ACJ had helped gentile anti-Zionists since its 
founding to shield themselves from accusations of anti-Semitism. Berger sought the 
proximity of the Arabs in the US, appearing for instance at the conference of the Arab 
Students. Sayegh on the other hand was convinced that the Jewish anti-Zionist 
position was of special interest to the Arabs. He therefore quoted from Berger’s works 
in his Arabic writings and sought to familiarize the Arabic world with the work of the 
ACJ, as he told Berger in 1954.1049 Through the mediation of Berger, Sayegh was also 
afforded a chance to get an article published in the anti-Zionist Jewish journal 
Menorah.1050 Berger was so enthusiastic about the article that he had the draft 
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distributed to his colleagues, including ACJ president Lessing Rosenwald, who 
responded similarly.1051 Through the collaboration with gentile anti-Zionists, Berger 
and the ACJ could escape their increasingly isolated position within the American 
Jewish community and increase their influence beyond their numbers.  
Arab League plans to establish an Arab Office in the US had progressed substantially 
in the meantime. On February 17, 1955, the State Department consented to the plans 
of former Egyptian ambassador Kamil Abdul Rahim to establish an Arab Information 
Office in New York, which would combine the information activities of the different Arab 
missions at the UN. From the State Department’s understanding, the new Office would 
be mainly concerned with work at the UN.1052 In late 1954 or early 1955, Egyptian 
ambassador to the US Karim Rahim offered Fayez Sayegh a job as chief of research 
at the new Arab States Delegations Office. At the time, Sayegh was on a lecturing tour 
in the Middle East, where he had suffered a minor heart attack.1053 Besides his 
academic background and work experience, Sayegh’s good relations with US anti-
Zionists, in particular from the AFME, qualified him for the job. He seems therefore to 
have also fulfilled the function of a liaison officer for the Arab States Delegations Office. 
In 1956 for instance, when Sayegh was preparing a pamphlet titled ‘Questions and 
Answers on the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, he solicited the opinion of the AFME on his 
project proposal.1054 The AFME supported the project, wishing to use Sayegh’s 
                                             
1051 Elmer Berger, “Letter to Fayez A. Sayegh,” December 28, 1954, FSAC Mid001 
Bx 239 Fd 8, https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=842916. 
1052 Mr. Dorsey and Office of Near Eastern Affairs, “Memorandum on Arab 
Infomation” April 5, 1947, NARA RG 59, entry 1301 box 41. 
1053 Fayez A. Sayegh, “Letter to Elmer Berger,” January 17, 1955, FSAC Mid001 Bx 
239 Fd 8, https://chttps://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=845388. 
1054 “Letter from Fayez A. Sayegh to Friends on ‘Question and Answers,’” April 6, 
1956, FSAC Mid001 Bx 293 Fd 5, https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=845361. 
 
312 
 
pamphlet as a handbook for students and speakers, which could be used in discussion 
groups.1055 Sayegh continued to stay in touch with the AFME. 
In January 1955, the ADL alledged that the new Arab Information Office was consorting 
with well-known anti-Semites. The accusations were based on an exchange of letters 
between Omar Haliq, the alternative representative of the Saudi Delegation, and Kamil 
Rahim, which the ADL had received. In the exchange, Omar Haliq reported that 
members of the AFME had advised against working with the far-right. However, he 
contended that the Arab League should not to follow this advice, because the interests 
of the far-right and those of the Arabs were overlapping. Still, he recommended to 
Rahim to collaborate with anti-Semitic activists in the US only in secret to minimize the 
risk of public exposure. Rahim consented.1056 How credible were these allegations? In 
a letter to the State Department, Rahim declared that he had never been in touch with 
Haliq, nor had the intention of knowingly working with anti-Semites. On the contrary, 
he accused his detractors of equating “a pro-Arab position or any criticism of Israel with 
‘anti-Semitism’.”1057 Rahim’s assertions that he did not know Haliq were not credible. 
Moreover, Rahim did not avoid the company of Haliq after the accusations had been 
leveled. Thus, Omar Haliq, Fayez Sayegh and Kamil Abdul Rahim were among the 
speakers of the AFME annual conference in January 1956.1058 Nor was Haliq unknown 
to the Arab League. As mentioned earlier, in 1947, when Haliq was working for the 
Institute of Arab American Affairs, the Arab League had tasked him with designing a 
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strategy for the partition vote at the UN. Then, Haliq had suggested to co-opt anti-
Semitism in Latin American countries to gain the necessary votes. 1059 It was therefore 
not altogether surprising that he would advise the same strategy in 1955. Nor was the 
US exceptional in this regard. The Arab League representatives in Switzerland and 
Germany also consorted with the far-right. Lastly, files from the FBI confirm that 
extreme rightists sought to collaborate with the Arab League. All this suggests that the 
exchange of letters between Haliq and Rahim was authentic. 
Still, accusations of anti-Semitism were not likely to bother the State Department. The 
dual character of the Arab States Delegation Office as both a research center for the 
Arab missions at the UN and as a foreign agent conducting propaganda in the US 
however presented problems for it. UN employees enjoyed diplomatic status while 
foreign agents did not. 1060 Moreover, in an interview with the New York Times, Rahim 
had asserted that the Arab States Delegation Office would strive “to deepen 
understanding between American and Arab peoples and to further their common 
interests.” 1061 The State Department felt that even this innocuous statement 
overstepped the terms for the opening of the Arab States Delegation Office agreed on 
in February, because it made clear that Rahim intended to engage in public activity. 
The US Mission to the UN also raised concerns about the public activities of the new 
office. It was however assured by the State Department “that a large portion of the 
employees’ duties would be devoted to research and writing in connection with 
presentation of the Arab cause before the UN.”1062 Unconvinced by its own 
declarations however, the State Department pressed the Arab League to disassociate 
work for the UN and public diplomacy and sought to gain assurances from the Arab 
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League in this direction..1063 As a result, the propaganda of the Arab States 
Delegations Office was published under the name of the Arab Information Center. 
Like in Germany, sympathy among the ranks of the American far-right for Egypt and 
Arab nationalism ran strong. The anti-Semitic activist, Gerald L. K. Smith, who reported 
to have been received by the Egyptian ambassador in 1954, remarked admiringly: 
”There are Jews in Egypt, but the Jews are not running Egypt.”1064 Smith was not free 
from self-interest. Thus, he offered the pages of his magazine The Cross and the Flag 
to Arab propaganda against payment. Izzat Tannous submitted one article. The 
writings of the anti-communist Jack B. Tenney, a collaborator of Gerald K. Smith, who 
accused the Zionists of seeking world domination, were also promoted by the Arab 
League and Arab diplomats located in the US. His conspiratorial and anti-Semitic book 
‘Zionist Network’ was allegedly bought by the Arab League for distribution in the US 
and in the Middle East.1065 It is not difficult to see the reason for his appeal. Tenney 
paradoxically argued that Israel was destined to be destroyed by its Arab neighbors 
and that the Zionists were on their way to world domination: “Israel, as a state, is a 
forlorn hope in any event. Wrested from the Arabs by chicanery and violence. It will 
again be conquered and reconquered. Like an ant hill in the center of a great 
intersection It must be trampled by the restless hordes that move to and fro in a 
seething world. The Great Design of its network centers in the United Nation and World 
Government. Its continued existence depends on its ‘back·stair’ diplomats, and its 
hope for dominance is geared to the rapid decline and destruction of Western Christian 
civilization.”1066 This was a confirmation of the worldview held by many anti-Zionist 
agitators; that they were the underdogs who fought against immense powers, but who 
would ultimately prevail. 
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James Madole, the head of the racist and anti-Semitic National Renaissance Party 
(NRP), was another prominent figure of the far-right who sought to work with the Arabs. 
The NRP’s ideology was similar to that of Liberation Nationalism in Germany. The NRP 
identified with Nasser and the Arab nationalism against the Jewish state. It also 
sympathized with the Soviet Union because of its turn towards nationalism and its 
liquidation of the “’Jewish Bolshevik’ leadership”.1067 Madole distributed and sold pro-
Arab and anti-Zionist literature, which he had collected during a visit at the newly 
opened Arab Information Office and the Egyptian Consulate in New York in early 1955. 
The literature included the controversial ‘The Zionist Espionage in Egypt’, ‘Questions 
to a Moslem’, ‘The Christian Legacy in Egypt’ and the ‘Egyptian Revolution’ by Gamal 
Nasser. Abdul Mawgoud Hassan, the information officer of the UAR delegation to the 
UN, also agreed to address a meeting of the National Renaissance Party in June 
1955.1068 Like in Germany, contacts to the Extreme Right eventually boomeranged, 
weakening the Arab propaganda campaign. In summer 1958, Abdul Mawgoud 
Hassan, the information officer of the UAR embassy, appeared on the television show 
Nightbeat, where he denied ever having spoken to a gathering of the National 
Renaissance Party. A picture of the event with Hassan sitting next to Madole was then 
shown on television, proving his claims to be lies. As a result of the scandal, Abdul 
Hassan was temporarily recalled to Egypt. Moreover, an article published in 1959 also 
made Madole’s contacts to the Arab diplomats public. The Arab diplomats denied the 
existence of the contacts, as they had done in the past. Indeed, an investigation by the 
FBI failed to establish that James Madole was acting as an agent of the Egyptians or 
the Arab League or was receiving money from them. In an interview with the FBI, 
Madole confessed that he was purely acting out of pro-Arab sympathy and anti-Jewish 
conviction.1069 After all, his National Renaissance Party only had a few hundred 
supporters and it would have made little sense for the Arab diplomats to employ such 
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a marginal figure in their service. Still, there was a quasi natural attraction between the 
Arab representatives and the far-right scene. 
Opinions on how to deal with local pro-Arab anti-Semites were divided on the Arab 
side. Rather than following the directives of the Arab League, it was an individual 
decision. In 1954 and 1955, Izzat Tannous and Omar Haliq consulted both with the 
mainstream anti-Zionists of the AFME and anti-Semites like Benjamin Freedman, 
Gerald K. Smith or Allen Zoll on the best strategies to conduct propaganda in the US. 
They were aware of the importance of keeping these contacts secret, in order – as 
Izzat Tannous expressed it – to “avoid accusations by strong Jewish organizations, 
like the Anti-Defamation League (which is called here the Gestapo of the Jews).”1070 
Still, Jewish and Zionist organizations did repeatedly succeed in exposing these 
connections during the 1950s. This was not without consequence. Tactical, rather than 
principled, considerations led Rahim and his colleagues to make an effort to keep a 
greater distance from anti-Semitic activists thereafter. According to an FBI report from 
1959, James Madole was by then no longer welcome at the office of the UAR 
delegation to the UN.1071  In a 1967 letter to Fayez Sayegh, Benjamin Freedman 
complained that Rahim had been ignoring his calls for a long time and, as a result, he 
felt treated unfairly: “Considering what I did in this fight since 1945, in concert with the 
United Nations representatives since 1946, and the Washington Embassies of many 
of them, the indifference of the Arab Office to my existence pained me, but did not 
deter me in continuing in the fight. However, I felt persona non grata except in the 
cases like yours.” 1072 When Freedman pleaded with Arab League General Secretary 
Abdel Kahlek Hassouna to collaborate with the Arab League Offices, the latter 
declined, saying: “We do not want to be regarded as ‘anti-Semitic’.”1073 This shunning 
of the anti-Semitic Right might have been one factor in the tendency of Arab 
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propagandists during the 1960s to progressively look for new allies from the political 
Left.  
In the late 1950s, the amount expensed by Arab propaganda in the US constantly 
increased. In 1957, the Arab Information Office had a budget of $106’000 und almost  
double that figure one year later.1074 A 1960 US government report found that the Arab 
Information Center had spent $183’000. The UAR spent an additional $84’000, mostly 
for tourist advertisement. Two new branches in Dallas and in Coral Gables were 
opened in the same year, increasing the number of branch Offices to five. The center 
was editing several publications, which were received by 26’000 people. In 
comparison, the report mentioned that Israel had spent $168’000 for political 
propaganda and $212’000 for tourist advertisement in 1960.1075 Still, the expenses of 
the Arab Information Office were only a fraction of the Arab propaganda budget in the 
US. At the Arab Information Congress (Arab. Mutamar al-ilam al-arabi) in Cairo in 
February 1959, Kamil Abdul Rahim complained that the comprehensive budget of 
$600’000 for Arab propaganda in the US was too low, given the amount spent by pro-
Israeli propaganda and the geopolitical importance of the US. He further attacked the 
Jewish organization Bnai Brith, which had recently published two booklets on the 
activities of the Arab League in the US. Rahim also mentioned the numerous 
associations of Arab students in the US that worked to familiarize the Americans with 
the Arab view point. He warned that the Zionists wanted these organizations to register 
as foreign agents, which would have meant their end.1076 In the late 1950s, the Arab 
League operated propaganda offices in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and 
Austin.1077 In 1960, an Arab Information Center under the leadership of Sami Hadawi, 
the former head of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office in New York, was opened in 
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Dallas.1078 The Arab propaganda strategy in the 1950s still mirrored that employed 
during the debate over partition. The permanent delegate of Lebanon intimated to the 
Swiss observer at the UN that the Arabs’ information circles put their hopes on “some 
republican circles, certain exponents of ‘big business’, the Aryan upper class and 
foremost the oil companies.”1079 It therefore focused its activities on regions barely 
populated by Jews, while avoiding those with a sizeable Jewish population like “Jew 
York”. 1080 
After years working in public diplomacy, Fayez Sayegh felt the urge to return to 
academia with a research project under the title ‘Survey of Proposals for Peaceful 
Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’. He discussed the idea of conducting this 
research project with the sponsorship of the Council for Foreign Relations or the AFME 
with his friend Elmer Berger. The latter advised against it, arguing that “(…) both you 
and I know enough of the strategy of the Israeli-Zionist operations to realise any such 
sponsorship will, itself, become the issue, rather than the findings of the research and 
study.”1081 Instead, Elmer Berger suggested to Sayegh that he conduct the project 
under the auspices of a university and offered to make use of his connections to 
William Yale at Boston and some contacts at universities in California. 1082 Indeed, after 
little more than a month, Berger had secured the support of Christina David Harris at 
Stanford University for the project. Harris was an historian specializing in the Middle 
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East who had worked for the Division of Near Eastern Affairs after WWII.1083 She 
promised that Sayegh would find a sympathetic and congenial working environment at 
Stanford, as the Political Science Department was “becoming very Middle-East-
minded.”1084 Sayegh felt ready to start the project after another lecture tour in the 
Middle East in 1960. After Stanford agreed to host the project, considering it a possible 
basis for a future Middle East research center, there was still the question of funding. 
Stanford demanded that half of the funding for the project be provided by Sayegh.1085 
For this purpose, Sayegh solicited a grant of $5’000 from the AFME, which he 
received.1086 It is one of the ironies of history that the CIA through the AFME thus 
indirectly contributed to the funding of the career of a future PLO official, as in 1964, 
Sayegh joined the Executive Committee of the PLO. While his propaganda and 
academic work in the US has been largely forgotten, Fayez Sayegh’s most lasting 
contribution was certainly the establishment of the Palestine Research Center of the 
PLO in Beirut in 1965.1087 Sayegh would stay in the Middle East until his return to the 
US in 1970. 
In 1960, the Arab League propagandists in the US received more precise instructions 
from the General Secretariat on how to work in the US. Mostly, the instructions 
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reflected established practices. They included the recommendation to undermine 
Israel’s existence by arguing that Zionism was based on a false understanding of the 
Bible. This was essentially what Protestant critics of Zionism had done since the 1920s, 
as discussed above. Moreover, the Secretariat recommended liaising with different 
anti-Zionist segments of the US, including anti-Zionist Jews and anti-Zionist 
organizations and fostering the identification of Arab-Americans with their homelands. 
The conference of the Council of Arab Ministers of Information, which took place in 
Cairo in 1964, emphasized another element of Arab propaganda, that of anti-
Imperialism. It urged Arab propagandists to expose “the aggressive, expansionist 
nature of the Zionist-Israeli existence (…) and its role as imperialist agents in Africa, 
as well as its alliance with the forces of reaction in the world.”1088 Thus, non-Zionist and 
anti-Zionist Christians and Jews, anti-Imperialist leftists and Arab Americans became 
the principal target audience for Arab propaganda in the US even before 1967, but that 
tendency grew even more acute thereafter. When the Six-Day War broke out in June 
1967, many Arab diplomats in the US greeted the news with enthusiasm, expecting a 
rapid Arab victory. When Cecil Hourani met Izzat Tannous of the Arab Palestine Office 
at the UN premises, the latter told him that this was the “happiest day” of his life.1089 
However, Egyptian reports of a military triumph were soon proved to be false and 
enthusiasm gave way to shock. The Arab states reacted to the military defeat with an 
intensification of their economic, diplomatic and propagandistic efforts to isolate Israel. 
At the Arab Information Conference in the Tunisian city of Bizerte in November 1967, 
the information ministers of the Arab League countries decided to set up a new 
propaganda fund.1090 Emulating the discourse on Vietnam, Arab League propaganda 
stressed that the Palestinians were engaged in a fight for national liberation. 
The effects of this shift in targeting and messaging, especially after Bizerte, were soon 
felt in the US. Jewish activists and organizations were worried about what they 
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considered to be an intensification of the Arab propaganda effort in the US in the late 
1960s. Their activity concentrated on the strongholds of liberal thought in the university 
and the church.1091 Suggestions by an American public relations firm to concentrate 
the Arab League’s public diplomacy in the US on the elite, notably on decision makers 
in politics, business and academia, were rejected by the Arab Information Office.1092 
While the American’s PR specialist had suggested greater moderation, Fayez Sayegh, 
who returned to the US in 1970 to head the Arab Information Office in New York, 
steered the Arab propaganda in the opposite direction. He authored an internal report 
on the Arab propaganda strategy in the US. The report posited that the US was 
basically an enemy country and that all efforts to sway general American public opinion 
in a pro-Arab direction were therefore fruitless. The only achievable goal was 
obstruction. Therefore, he proposed mobilizing marginal groups in the American 
society, including the American New Left, left-wing churches and Black Americans, “to 
create and activate in the United States an internal opposition toward the American 
government's policy in the Middle East. The object of this opposition is first and 
foremost, to develop obstacles which would deter or delay execution of the American 
policy favoring Israel.”1093 Rather than an original proposal, Sayegh’s report merely 
summarized what had become the modus operandi of Arab propaganda in Western 
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Europe and the US since the second half of the 1960s. This will be discussed in the 
following sub-chapters.  
6.3 The Arab League Office in Geneva, the PLO and the Arab Boycott 
Switzerland was the first European country in which the Arab League planned to open 
an Arab Office. On August 19, 1955, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that 
the director of the education department of the Arab League had suggested the 
establishment of an Arab Office in Switzerland. On September 12, 1955, Al-Akhbar 
printed a letter by Kamal El Dine Galal, the former press attaché of the Egyptian 
legation in Berne. Galal’s letter enumerated several factors which made Geneva an 
important location for the fight against Zionism and therefore an ideal site for the new 
Arab Office. The Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency had an office in the city, 
which, as the letter mentioned, had organized the Jewish emigration from Europe to 
Israel. Moreover, Geneva was just a three-hour ride away from Basel, where the World 
Zionist Congress had been established in 1897, which, the letter alleged, continued to 
control Israeli policy. Moreover, according to the letter, the Israelis entertained a liaison 
office to the ECC in the city. Geneva was just as important in the fight against Zionism 
as the US, the letter further argued. Whereas American Jews supported Israel openly 
with the US government, which made it easy for the Arabs to fight them, the Zionist 
activities in Switzerland remained hidden from the public. They were therefore much 
more dangerous. We see that Galal ascribed importance to Switzerland both for 
strategic and historic reasons. Given his erstwhile position at the Egyptian legation, 
one can assume that his considerations may have juxtaposed those of the Arab 
League officials. The Israeli foreign ministry assumed that Galal was recommending 
himself for the position of the head of the new Arab League Office in Geneva by 
authoring this letter.1094 
In 1956, a secretary at the Egyptian embassy in Berne approached the Federal Political 
Department, the Swiss department of foreign affairs, with the Arab League plans to 
open a propaganda office in Geneva. The Swiss authorities consulted the Americans 
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to learn how they were dealing with the Arab Office. The Americans replied that they 
had insisted on a written agreement on the activities of the Arab Office before 
authorizing its establishment. The Swiss chose to adopt the same procedure.1095 The 
Arab League’s Geneva Office was eventually opened in 1957, with Zoher Kabbani and 
not Galal becoming its director. Kabbani served both as the observer of the Arab 
League and as the permanent Syrian delegate to the UN. To the outside world, the 
Arab League Office branded itself as the Arab Information Office (Fr. Centre 
d’Information Arabe), claiming to be mainly concerned with tourism and the 
dissemination of information on the Arab states. Kabbani emphasized this aspect by 
promising to the Swiss authorities that his office would not engage in propaganda 
activity.1096 The Arab Information Office edited two magazines intended for the public: 
The glossy magazine Le Monde Arabe and a bulletin named Nouvelles du Monde 
Arabe. Despite Kabbani’s earlier promises, much of its content was political and critical 
of French policies in Algeria and Israel. They therefore gave constant cause for protest 
foremost by the French and Israeli ambassadors. After each protest, the Swiss would 
invite and reprimand the Office’s head, Zoher Kabbani, threatening him with 
consequences. But this was to no avail: The Arab League continued its propaganda 
efforts in Switzerland. 1097  
At first, the Office staff consisted of four persons. Besides Kabbani, it included assistant 
observer Dr. Moukhtar El-Wakil, secretary Atef Danial and the attaché André Baladi. 
As the delegation received no diplomatic recognition, it was attached to the Yemenite 
mission at the UN. 1098 The Arab Office quickly liaised with the pro-Arab circles in 
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Switzerland. Thus, Zoher Kabbani and Atef Danial, a Ba’athist studying in Switzerland 
at the time, entertained relations with François Genoud.1099 Atef Danial was further 
known by Swiss authorities to have been active in a leading role on behalf of the 
FLN.1100 Considering the connection between Atef and Genoud, it is only fair to assume 
that it was not a mere coincidence that the founding of Genoud’s ‘Banque Commerciale 
Arabe’ (Engl. Arab Commercial Bank) was so prominently announced on the back-
cover of one of the magazines published by the Arab League in Geneva.1101 In winter 
1960, Kabbani was replaced as head of the Office by Abdel Moneim Moustafa, the 
former Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League, but it is not clear whether he 
ever took up the post.1102 Instead, the Egyptian Moukhtar El-Wakil became the 
dominant figure in the Office. El-Wakil was a gifted socializer, who easily buildt a 
rapport with the Geneva society. He was holding regular press conferences, where he 
would relay the Arab view to the Swiss media. These activities ran counter to the initial 
agreements with the Swiss authorities and aroused unease among his hosts but were 
nevertheless tolerated.1103 El-Wakil also turned the Arab Office into a venue for cultural 
events on topics related to the Arab world. Exhibits and social events succeeded in 
drawing various influential personalities. Such illustrious figures as the president of the 
IKRK, federal councilor Max Petitpierre and many others honored the Arab Office with 
their presence during El-Wakil’s tenure.1104 These accomplishments were eventually 
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rewarded by his superiors, who made him the permanent delegate of the Arab League 
to the UN in Geneva in 1963.1105 
From their beginnings, the Arab League Office and the Arab embassies were trying to 
impress their view point upon the public. In the mid-1960s, however, they adopted a 
new strategy by fostering the build-up of a ‘native’ network of pro-Arab groups. The 
general pattern was that such groups were nominally headed by Swiss activists but 
funded and coordinated by the Arab League and the Arab embassies. These efforts 
led to the establishment of the Swiss-Arab Society, the first group to fit this pattern. In 
February 1965, Arab diplomats in Switzerland, including the United Arab Republic’s 
ambassador Mohammed Tewfik Abdel Fatta, met in Berne to discuss the 
establishment of a Swiss-Arab friendship group. They hoped to assemble leading 
Swiss politicians and other personalities together with the members of the Arab 
diplomatic staff within the group, as El-Wakil reported to the magazine Le commerce 
du Levant. During the meeting, the officials also discussed the handling of the Arab 
boycott vis-à-vis Swiss companies engaged in trade with Israel and the establishment 
of additional “Arab cultural centers” in other Swiss cities besides Geneva.1106 When 
these plans however came to the knowledge of the Swiss authorities, they reprimanded 
Arab League representative El-Wakil for his involvement in boycott and propaganda 
activities, as “[…] such a proceeding is in contradiction to our liberal convictions and 
our notion of freedom, which has to prevail in our country. An action on Swiss soil 
would be an infringement of our sovereignty.”1107  Despite this harsh reprimand, the 
Swiss refrained from preventing the realization of El-Wakil’s plans.  
In June 1965, the Swiss NationalBolshevist journalist Hans Fleig and Dr. Hans 
Ellenberger eventually founded the Swiss-Arab Society (Ger. Schweiz-Arabische 
Gesellschaft, Fr. Association Suisse-Arabe) with the support of the Arab diplomats 
Moukthar El-Wakil and UAR ambassador Mohammed Tewfik Abdel Fatta. Hans Fleig 
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hinted at the fact that money was further provided by Kuwait. In Fleig’s words, the 
rational for establishing the group was because the Arab cause “was misunderstood 
in Switzerland and crushed by the overwhelming Zionist propaganda.” 1108 The group 
aspired to change this. It organized several public events, usually hosting speakers 
affiliated with the Arab League. The first such event was held in Zurich in October 1965, 
with the roving ambassador of the Arab League Nashashibi holding an emotional 
speech on the situation of the Arab refugees.1109 Moukhtar El-Wakil and Fleig also 
spoke at the event. The latter asserted that the media in Switzerland was biased with 
regard to the “Arab problem”. Therefore, the aim of the new organization was to correct 
this and provide comprehensive information on the issue.1110 The second Swiss 
organization with a clear anti-Zionist and pro-Arab leaning after Genoud’s abortive 
Association Internationale des Amis du Monde Arabe Libre however soon fell into 
passivity. In 1968, Fleig finally dissolved its post office box, burying the Swiss-Arab 
Society for good. 1111 
Another aim of the Arab Office was to promote the goals of the nascent Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and gain acceptance for its local presence. The PLO 
had been founded in June 1964 under the auspices of Egyptian strongman, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser. Egypt pursued several goals with the establishment of the PLO. The 
organization was meant to prevent the integration of the Palestinian Arab refugees in 
the Arab society, which would have removed pressure from Israel, and fostered their 
national identity as Palestinians. Up until now, it had been common, also in Arab 
propaganda literature, as cited in this study, to refer to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine 
as Palestinian Arabs. The PLO Charta defined as a Palestinian every Arab who had 
lived in Palestine until 1947 or was descended from an Arab Palestinian father. The 
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establishment of the PLO permitted Egypt to exert control on Palestinian 
nationalism.1112 Egypt’s predominance was also manifested by the election of Ahmed 
Shukeiri, who was an intimate of Nasser. He was selected as the Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO.1113 In the same vein, the PLO was also integrated in 
the Arab League propaganda network, which was dominated by Egypt.  
On February 17, 1965, the Syrian Dr. Saadi Bississo, a former law professor at the 
University of Aleppo who was born in Gaza in 1908 during the Ottoman rule, entered 
Switzerland: He was in possession of a diplomatic visa from the Swiss embassy in 
Damascus and a Syrian diplomatic passport.1114 Bississo’s mission had been 
announced by a Cairo press agency in its publication Nouvelles du Moyen-Orient and 
was therefore known to Swiss authorities in advance. According to the publication, 
Bississo arrived in Geneva to serve both as the permanent delegate of the PLO at the 
UN and to work for the Geneva Office of the UNRWA, the UN organization responsible 
for the Arab Palestinian refugees. To the Swiss embassy in Damascus, Bississo 
explained the details of his mission. He would be attached to the Arab League Offices 
in Geneva.1115 His intention was to launch – in collaboration with the Arab League staff 
in Geneva – an “information campaign on the Palestinian problem” in Switzerland, 
which was part of an international propaganda campaign by the PLO designed to 
provide “a better understanding of the Palestinian problems and the goals it [the PLO] 
is pursuing.”1116 The Swiss authorities were eager to prevent Bississo from carrying 
out his mission, as they considered the move to be another Arab affront to Swiss 
neutrality. Moreover, they were wary of a potential politicization of the UNRWA Office 
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in Geneva.1117 Both the Yemenite delegation to the UN in Geneva and the Syrian 
embassy in Berne applied for an inclusion of Bississo in their diplomatic staff.1118 
Mukhtar El-Wakil also tried to receive a diplomatic visa for his prospective collaborator, 
Bississo.1119  
In response to a Swiss diplomatic intervention, El-Wakil promised to the Swiss officials 
that Bississo had been tasked by the Arab League with discussing the problem of the 
Palestinian refugees with several international organizations in Geneva in the function 
of “councilor for refugee affairs” but that he would not engage in propaganda. The 
Swiss doubted these promises, both because they contradicted Arabic press articles 
and because of their experiences with past promises which had been made but not 
held by representatives of the Arab League to the Swiss authorities concerning its 
propaganda activity in Switzerland. They believed that El-Wakil was duplicitous but 
hoped that their forceful attitude had deterred the Arab League official from his plans 
to carry out a pro-Palestinian propaganda campaign in Switzerland: “On the honesty 
of these [El-Wakil’s] statements we are not deceiving ourselves, but we could hope for 
that our intervention would be effective at least for a certain time. It seems well to have 
been the case.” 1120 However, the Swiss failed to sustain their opposition to Bississo’s 
nomination for long. In addition to the pressure exerted by the Arab states and the Arab 
League, the director of the UN in Geneva, the Italian Peer Pasquale Spinelli, urged the 
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Swiss to find a solution for Bississo. 1121 The Swiss eventually gave in and in October 
1965 they authorized the inclusion of Bississo in the diplomatic staff of Yemen.1122  
Besides propaganda and liaison, the Arab Office in Geneva was also involved in the 
Arab boycott of Israel. The activities were directed by the Central Boycott Office of the 
Arab League in Damascus, which was heavily pressurizing Swiss companies to 
abandon their trade with Israel.1123 The Arab embassies supported this effort, 
conducting research in Switzerland to assemble not only lists of Swiss companies 
engaged in trade with Israel, but also of Jewish citizens and Israeli residents in 
Switzerland. Despite El-Wakil’s assertions vis-à-vis Swiss authorities that they would 
not join these boycott activities, the Arab League Office was involved in collecting 
information on behalf of the boycott.1124 All this was in clear violation of Swiss law, as 
was noted in a report for the Federal Department of Justice and Police. Swiss law 
explicitly prohibited political and economic intelligence activity by foreign states. 
Despite this, no consequences seem to have followed these illicit Arab activities. In 
October of 1965, the Swiss were considering the issuing of a diplomatic demarche to 
the roving ambassador of the Arab League Nashashibi, or to the Arab League’s 
Secretary General Abdel Kahlek Hassouna in protest against the Arab boycott of Israel, 
which also affected major Swiss companies like the retailer Migros. “This demarche,” 
noted General Secretary Michel of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, “would 
pursue the purpose to make clear to Nashashibi, how much his efforts to promote 
understanding for the Arab cause in foreign countries, is paralyzed by his harassments 
of Swiss companies with boycott difficulties. “1125 The wording is ambiguous. Did the 
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Swiss threaten to curtail Arab propaganda in Switzerland if the Arab boycott against 
Swiss companies continued? In the same month, the Swiss eventually acceded to the 
installation of PLO representative Bississo in Geneva. Did the Arabs promise in return 
to exclude Swiss companies from the boycott? There are strong indications but no 
conclusive proof for this suspicion. However, this was not the only event where the 
Swiss seem to have used the Arab propaganda network in Switzerland as a bargaining 
chip in negotiations.  
One of the officials organizing the Arab boycott in Switzerland was Mohammed Said 
Fadl, who had been appointed as economic councilor to the delegation of Yemen and 
the Arab League at the UN in 1967.1126 His role became clear to Swiss authorities when 
he commissioned a commercial agency in Geneva to collect information on “Swiss 
enterprises which were headed by persons of Jewish descent, of Israeli nationality or 
in commercial relations with Israel.”1127 After Fadl had received the information he 
sought, these enterprises were added to the Arab black list. Again, although Fadl’s 
activity was illegal, Swiss authorities refrained from taking legal action due to his 
diplomatic status. Mohammed Said Fadl was replaced by Michel Issa Madanat in 
December 1969 in this function.1128 One of his close collaborators was Siba Nasser (b. 
15.03.1941), the former attaché of the Syrian embassy in Berne before becoming the 
attaché of the permanent Syrian delegation at the UN. Nasser was also working on 
behalf of the Arab boycott in Switzerland.1129 Madanat and Nasser not only spied on 
Swiss companies, but on Swiss Jews and Israelis as well, to whom they generally 
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referred to as “Zionists”. In a phone call between Nasser and Madanat on July 27, 
1970, Madanat reported on his activities: “Besides, I found here the names of four Levi 
families, all of them Zionists, but unfortunately, I did not find anything on the one that 
interests us.”1130 The extent of the spying activity by Arab states and the Arab League 
on the Swiss Jewish community has never been properly investigated. 
6.4 Germany: A special case 
In January 1956, the German Foreign Office became aware of articles in the Egyptian 
press reporting that the Arab League was planning the establishment of a propaganda 
office in Germany. The Arab League proclaimed that the German public was being led 
astray by “strong Israeli propaganda” and that the Israelis were planning to intensify 
their activities in Germany.1131 In April 1956, the Secretary General of the Arab League 
Abdul Khalek Hassoua contacted the German Ambassador in Cairo to probe the 
possibilities of opening an Arab Information Office of the Arab League in Germany. 
The Germans reacted negatively to the plans, believing the prospective office to be 
tasked with enforcing the Arab boycott of Israel in Germany and putting pressure on 
German companies. Moreover, the Germans distrusted the Arab League’s assertion 
that the Arab Office would stick to its official agenda.1132 The German ambassador in 
Egypt however warned that a German rejection would be perceived by the Arabs as 
an affront.1133 Still, there was no official request by the Arab League, when deputy 
secretary Raif Bellema informed the press in June 1956 that the German authorities 
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had permitted the establishment of the office on their soil.1134 By presenting the 
Germans with a fait accompli, he probably sought to make it more difficult for them to 
deny the request for fear of causing an international scandal. Still, the Germans 
announced that they had not dealt with such a request by the Arab League and were 
opposed to boycott activities on their soil. Fakoussa disclaimed reports in the German 
press that he was sent to Bonn to enforce the Arab boycott. Bellema also 
accommodated the German concerns and claimed to have never spoken to the press 
to prematurely announce the opening of the Arab Office. Despite the small irritation, 
the Germans did not see any legal grounds for preventing the establishment of the 
Arab Office and did not wish to do so to avoid angering the Arabs.1135 Moreover, the 
Germans thought that the opening of the Arab Office provided them with leverage in 
case the Arab states were considering recognizing the GDR.1136 This was in line with 
the ‘Hallstein-Doktrin’, which stipulated that the FRG was the only legitimate German 
state.  
Since April 1956, the Egyptian journalist Hassan Awas Fakoussa was expected to fill 
the position as the head of the Arab League Office. The German ambassador in Egypt 
described him as a moderate, who was respected by the embassy. He was well 
acquainted with Germany and married to a German woman.1137 Fritz Grobba, who 
knew Fakoussa, considered him to be friendly to German interests, but alleged that he 
wrongly pretended to hold a doctoral degree.1138 Interestingly, the AA reports on 
Fakoussa only mentioned his activities after the war, when he briefly worked for a 
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lawyer in Bonn.1139 They however chose to omit his history in the Third Reich. In the 
late 1930s, Hassan Fakoussa had been working as a correspondent at the League of 
Nations in Geneva for the Egyptian newspapers Al Mokattam and Al Muktataf.1140 In 
1938, he earned a degree from the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies 
with a work on ‘The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance’.1141 During the war, Fakoussa 
resided in Germany, allegedly working for German propaganda for the Middle East.1142 
He regularly wrote on Middle Eastern subjects for the Nazi press. In an article in the 
Zeitschrift für Geopolitik in 1940, he claimed that Britain was engaged in a “war against 
Islamic nationalism and the religion of Islam”.1143 In the same year, he also authored 
an article titled ‘The struggle in Palestine’ for the periodical Der Weltkampf.1144 In 1942, 
he wrote an article for the scholarly periodical Europäischer Wissenschaftsdienst, in 
which he challenged National Socialist pseudo-scientific theories, which claimed that 
“Aryan” immigration was the origin of Egyptian civilization. Fakoussa instead defended 
the African origins of Egyptian civilization and thus offended Fakoussa’s nationalist 
feeling. 1145 Sometime after the war, he left Germany for Egypt. 
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Hassan Fakoussa returned to Germany in late August 1956 to launch the Arab 
Office.1146 In a conversation with the AA in September 1956, he claimed that he was 
neither interested in Israel nor the Arab League, but solely in Germany’s interests and 
would work to promote German-Arab friendship.1147 It was difficult to distinguish 
whether he was working for the Arab League or Egypt or for both. Fakoussa and the 
Egyptian embassy in Bad Godesberg, a suburb of Bonn, closely collaborated with the 
Arab Office located in the same building.1148 During the Suez Crisis in October 1956, 
a wide segment of the public and the press sympathized with Nasser against 
Germany’s Western allies. Reflecting on this, an AA memorandum expressed concern 
that a further increase in pro-Arab propaganda in Germany as a result of the activities 
of the Arab League might be harmful to Adenauer’s pro-Western foreign policy. To 
counter this tendency, the memorandum raised the possibility of intensifying 
governmental public diplomacy efforts concerning the Middle East.1149 As it soon 
became clear, Hassan Fakoussa did not wait for his agreements with the German 
authorities to be put in written form, but started his propaganda activities right away, 
intent on creating facts on the ground. Instead of coordinating with the AA and 
promoting German-Arab friendship, he published material critical of Israel and sought 
to strengthen the pro-Arab network in Germany, being involved in the establishment of 
the Deutsch-Arabischer Verein in December 1956. Moreover, he sought to collect a 
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list of Arab students in Germany.1150 He probably sought to exercise political influence 
and a measure of control over them, as the Egyptian embassy in Switzerland did.  
Feeling irritated by Fakoussa’s activities, the AA proposed several measures to 
restrain them.1151 In 1957, the Egyptian Embassy in Bad Godesberg made its first 
attempts at public diplomacy. It started publishing the Cairo-Brief (Engl. Cairo letter), a 
periodical that regularly reported on economic news related to the Middle East and 
Egypt. In the same year, Fakoussa also launched the magazine Arabische 
Korrespondenz, which added to German irritation. Many of its articles criticized  the 
German government. They were also marked by conspiratorial and Arab nationalistic 
thought. The AA was therefore considering taking steps to make Fakoussa leave 
Germany without attracting too much attention.1152  In conversations with the Egyptian 
embassy and its ambassador Ahmed Razek, the Germans urged the Egyptians to 
exert a moderating influence on Fakoussa. The latter however defended Fakoussa’s 
polemics as an act of self-defense against propaganda emanating from the Israeli 
embassy and the Jewish newspaper Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in 
Deutschland. In reply, the Germans intimated that they were also ready to advise the 
Israelis to tone down their rhetoric. In the aftermath of the demarche, the Germans 
believed that Fakoussa moderated his voice. For this reason and because the German 
ambassador to Egypt Walther Becker advised against expelling Fakoussa to avoid a 
scandal with the Arabs and for lack of a more moderate alternative Arab League 
representative, no further steps were taken.1153 There was another reason for the 
Germans to tread with care in the matter. In January 1958, Arab League General 
Secretary Abdul Khalek Hassouna informed the German ambassador in Cairo, Walther 
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Becker, that the idea of moving the Arab Office to the GDR had been discussed during 
one of the League’s recent sessions. From there, Arab propaganda towards the 
German public could be carried out unhindered.1154 Such a step would have afforded 
the GDR further legitimacy, which the AA sought to prevent. Thus, contrary to initial 
considerations, when the Germans hoped to gain leverage against the Arabs by 
allowing the opening of the Arab Office in the German capital, the Arabs now used 
their leverage to secure the continuation of Arab propaganda in the FDR. 
The next episode also showed that Germany was susceptible to Arab pressure 
regarding the tolerance of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda on its soil. In early 
May 1959, the German police confiscated an Arab League booklet titled ‘Palästinas 
Schicksal’ (Engl. Palestine’s Fate), that contained a foreword by Hassan Fakoussa. In 
the anglophone world, the booklet was distributed under the title ‘Palestine Destiny’. 
The German police decided to confiscate the magazine after an article appeared in the 
Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland written by a certain Mr. 
Kaufmann, which claimed that parts of the publication were copied from a 1957 anti-
Semitic booklet published in Cairo with the title ‘The Secrets of Zionism’ (Arab. Asrar 
al-Sahyuniya). Arab propaganda sought to exploit the incident, with Radio Baghdad 
reporting that the German government had banned all Arab propaganda against 
Zionism.1155 The Egyptian Foreign Office protested the confiscation and the Moroccan 
ambassador in Bonn personally intervened with undersecretary Herbert Dittmann. As 
a result of the intervention, an indictment against the printing-house responsible for 
printing the booklet was halted.1156 After the affair, Fakoussa continued to reprint anti-
Semitic articles from the Arab press in his Arabische Korrespondenz. For instance, it 
peddled one of the favorite themes of Arab and Islamic propaganda, the Jewish war 
against religion. Thus, an article in 1963 alleged that Israel was distributing falsified 
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Coran books in the US and Africa, which offered a pro-Zionist interpretation of the 
Islamic scriptures. This was part of Israel’s plan to gain favor among the new African 
states. The article also accused Zionists of falsifying Christianity by asking the Catholic 
church to remove material characterizing Jews as the murderers of Christ.1157 
Given his experience in the Third Reich, it is not surprising that Fakoussa showed a 
greater tendency to work with pro-Nazi and far-right circles to lobby Arab interests in 
Germany than his Arab League counterparts in New York and Switzerland. In his 
function as the Arab representative in Bonn, he was advised by Johann von Leers, 
whom he went to see in Cairo.1158 Fakoussa also contributed regularly to the far-right 
Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung.1159 One of the more bizarre episodes was Fakoussa’s 
collaboration with the German Sudeten committee, which represented ethnic German 
expellees from Czechoslovakia. He helped put one of its leaders, Rudolf Hilf, in touch 
with diplomats and notables of the Arab world residing in Bonn. Hilf subsequently 
travelled to Egypt, where he met with former allies of the Germans like the Mufti, former 
SS-Handschar imam Haris Korkut and Anwar el-Sadat. Hilf strove to gain the support 
of the Arab state to introduce a “right to homeland” in the UN. He assumed that there 
was common ground between the Germans and the Arabs, as the latter would be 
interested in such a right because of the Arab-Palestinian refugees. But eventually, it 
would also serve the interests of the German expellees.1160 Fakoussa’s Arabische 
Korrespondenz maintained that Germany was suffering from a “Hitler complex”, which 
prevented Germany from pursuing its natural alliance with the Arabs. This “Hitler 
complex,” as the editor in chief of an Egyptian newspaper implied in an article reprinted 
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by the Arabische Korrespondenz, was fostered by Israel.1161 The article claimed, “that 
the FRG had become the most important area of this kind of Israeli propaganda”, which 
sought to cultivate a feeling of collective guilt within the Germans and thereby exploit 
them economically, through restitution, and politically, by gaining diplomatic 
recognition.1162 Fakoussa seems to have realized at some point that his collaboration 
with pro-Nazi and fascist elements like Priester’s Deutsch-Soziale Bewegung had 
become a liability and that he had to reach out to larger segments of the German 
population in order to make a difference: “[I] had come to Germany to promote 
German-Arab relations in all areas. Were I to found a German-Arab Institute, it would 
be in the general interest of the German-speaking peoples and of the Arab people and 
states, and not in the interest of individuals, parties, or circles. The Arabs are fighting 
against foreign interference in their politics and consequently would never think of 
supporting a group in some other country against its government.”1163 Colluding with 
the far-right was certainly not a winning strategy to convince the German public of the 
justness of the Arab cause. Moreover, anti-Semites barely needed any convincing to 
feel sympathy for the Arabs and hatred for Israel. Thus, the German far-right continued 
to strongly sympathize with Arab nationalism throughout the 1960s, as discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5.  
Instead of the far-right, Arab League representatives increasingly sought to move 
closer to the New Left and the nascent student movement during the 1960s. Fakoussa 
had been interested in the presence of Arab students in Germany since the beginning 
of his propaganda activity. This was in line with the policy of Egypt and other Arab 
states of instrumentalizing their students studying in the West as propagandists, for 
which there is evidence from different countries. According to secret information 
received by the Swiss government, an experienced Egyptian propagandist, who 
masqueraded as a student, had established the European branch of the Union of Arab 
Students (Ger. Union Arabischer Studenten) in 1956 as a front organization to secure 
                                             
1161 “Arabischer Kommentar zur deutschen anti-arabischen Propaganda,” Arabische 
Korrespondenz 8, no. 6 (April 7, 1964): 2. 
1162 Ibid. 
1163 Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, 2:236. 
 
339 
 
the loyalty of Arab students to Nasser and spread his view-points.1164 A Jerusalem 
Post article from 1959 likewise found that here was a system of tight political control of 
the Arab students in the US, which were organized in the Organization of Arab 
Students. The Arab students received propaganda material from the Arab embassies 
and the Arab League Offices. Those who did not participate in anti-Israel campaigning 
faced difficulties when returning home.  According to the article, the Arab students had 
the advantage that they were more sociable and had more time at their disposal than 
the Israelis, making it easier for them to conduct propaganda. The main target of their 
activities was not Americans, but foreign students from Asian and African countries.1165 
In Germany, there were plenty of foreign student groups active in the late 1950s and 
1960s, that advocated on behalf of the Third World. One such group was the Afro-
Asiatische Studenten-Union (Engl. Afro-Asiatic Student Union). Along with many other 
guests, Fakoussa was hosted by the group at the celebration of its five-year 
anniversary in 1962.1166 The Arabische Korrespondenz however provided no evidence 
that Fakoussa ever tried to further co-opt this group. The most important Arab student 
organization in Germany was the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), 
which had operated there since the early 1960s. Its activities were first directed at the 
numerous Arab students located in West Germany. Between 1962 and 1964 alone, 
873 events were held in Germany.1167 This group will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter. There is no information on whether the Arab League provided any 
support to them. In sum, one gets the impression that Fakoussa invested little effort in 
recruiting the student and New Left political movements into the fold of the pro-Arab 
scene in Germany and remained fixated on the traditional friends of the Arabs.  
The conference of the Council of Arab Ministers of Information in Cairo in 1964 and 
the establishment of the PLO in May of the same year resulted in an emphasis of Arab 
propaganda on the Palestine issue and the topic of anti-Imperialism, appealing to the 
                                             
1164 “Report on the Union of Arab Students” 1959, E4320C#1994/120#781*. 
1165 Vacca, “La Propaganda Araba e Quella Israeliana Negli Stati Uniti.” 
1166 “Repräsentanten ferner Kulturen und Kontinente,” Arabische Korrespondenz 6, 
no. 5 (March 10, 1962): 1–2. 
1167 Zelkovitz, Students and Resistance in Palestine, 36–37. 
340 
 
political Left. Arab students were thought to be important purveyors of these themes. 
Thus, Nasser sent an address to the yearly conference of the Arab Student Union in 
the US in 1964, exhorting them: “The Palestine cause is no race or religious matter, 
but the regaining of freedom for a people und restoration of its legitimate right, to life 
with honor in its own country. (…). Brothers, it is our duty, to call to the attention of all 
peoples, that they should not be deluded by Zionist propaganda or distorted fact. It is 
your difficult responsibility to be in a struggle with Zionism. You can confront it, if each 
one of you represents his country in its struggle and aspirations with resolve and high 
ideals.”1168 In line with the greater focus on Palestine, Fakoussa and the Arab League 
in Germany started a new magazine in 1964 titled Palästina Nachrichten (Engl. 
Palestine News). In a 1965 article on the Deir Yassin, the author remarked that while 
the Germans were very aware of the Holocaust, they had no knowledge of the Jewish 
crimes in Palestine. The events at Deir Yassin were presented as an indictment of 
Jewish character. The Jews still followed the commands of the Book of Joshua in the 
Old Testament, when God had ordered the Israelites to conquer Canaan through brutal 
means. The Arab mentality on the other hand, the author claimed, was free from 
brutality. After ten years in Germany, in mid-1966, Hassan Fakoussa was recalled to 
Egypt to work for the oil department of the Arab League. His interim replacement was 
Hamdy Azzam.1169 Perhaps his limited efforts and success in engaging with the New 
Left were responsible for this decision. In February 1967, the former head of the Arab 
League Office in Geneva and current Arab League propaganda responsible Zoheir 
Kabbani, became the Arab League representative in Bonn.1170 The Six-Day War, which 
would break out five months later, would be a watershed moment for Germany’s 
relations with Israel. 
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6.5 Development of the Arab propaganda strategy after 1967 
Arab public diplomacy was a function of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As inter-Arab rivalry 
between Egypt and Iraq diminished after 1964, while the Arab-Israeli conflict escalated, 
particularly over the use of the Jordan river water, so did the propaganda battle. At the 
third summit of the Arab League in Casablanca in September 1965 for instance, the 
final declaration called on everybody to “use newspapers, radio and other means of 
publishing and media, to serve the Arab cause”,1171 which meant foremost – as noted 
in the preamble – “the struggle for the liberation of Palestine (…) and the need for 
harmony and reconciliation among Arab countries (…).”1172 The summit further 
stipulated increased control of the press in order to strengthen inter-Arab relations.1173 
Likewise, the Six-Day War in 1967 had a significant impact on the organization of public 
diplomacy within the Arab League. As a result of their defeat against Israel, the Arab 
regimes found themselves heavily compromised. After all, the Pan-Arab dictatorships 
in both Syria and Egypt had legitimized their rule also by the promise of the near 
destruction of Israel. Now, in order to secure his continued rule, Nasser’s regime’s 
public communication emphasized the message that the catastrophic defeat was far 
from final, but only a temporary setback.1174 Egypt’s propaganda during the war had 
falsely claimed that Israel had received military aid from the US and the UK.1175 After 
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the end of the war, such allegations of Western collusion were construed to deflect 
from the Arab defeat. 
The Western public widely perceived the Arab states as aggressors during the 1967 
war and granted Israel enthusiastic support. This general mood incensed the Arab 
states, which chose not to distinguish between public support and government policy. 
In an internationally concerted approach, Arab diplomats lodged their protests with 
Western governments, warning them that the pro-Israeli mood among the public 
represented a burden for their relations. Thus, on June 6, 1967, the second day of the 
war, ambassadors of eight Arab countries called on Swiss Federal Councilor Willy 
Spühler. They accused Spühler of partisanship in the conflict because he had 
expressed understanding for Israel’s position in a speech in parliament on June 5, 
1967. Moreover, they demanded an intervention from the Federal Council to halt the 
manifestations of pro-Israeli sentiment, or, as the Arab diplomats understood it, “anti-
Arab tendencies”, in the public and in the media. Spühler rejected these demands, 
insisting on the freedom of the press and opinion. A few days later, Arab 
representatives also filed a complaint against Switzerland with the UN in Geneva. They 
claimed that the pro-Israeli manifestations in Switzerland were of a racist and religious 
character and that they had been the victims of anonymous threats. As an EDA report 
noted, the Arab states however failed to provide evidence for these claims.1176  
The approach in Germany was similar to that in Switzerland. Arab League 
representative in Bonn Zoheir Kabbani complained to the AA that the German press 
and television were too pro-Israeli and offensive to the Arabs. The AA responded that 
the Arab media were censoring reports of German help to the Arabs and rejected 
accusations that the government was pro-Israeli. It further asked Kabbani to stop the 
Office’s propaganda against friendly states, meaning Israel and Germany’s Western 
allies.1177 The Arab states did not content themselves with diplomatic protests, but also 
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called for an economic boycott of Western Germany, the UK and the US. Occasionally, 
Swiss enterprises were also affected by individual actions of boycott. The Arab states 
also discussed even harsher measures, such as an oil embargo. They would 
eventually follow through on this threat during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. For now 
however, the  Arab states decided to cancel their plans of economic sanctions because 
they were economically dependent on the West. Switzerland also expected a quick 
improvement of its relations with the Arab world after the end of the war.1178 Arab 
threats of a deterioration in diplomatic relations still had a long-term effect. Western 
governments became convinced that they had to invest in the improvement of their ties 
with the Arab world. As a result, they showed a certain tolerance for Arab propaganda 
campaigns on their soil after 1967, allegedly to balance Zionist propaganda. 
Additionally, under the threat of terrorism, Switzerland embraced a policy which sought 
to gain distance from Israel and move closer to the Arab states. One element of this 
policy was the start of direct negotiations with the PLO in 1970.1179 
After the Arab states had shunned a political solution at the 4th Arab League summit in 
Khartoum in September 1967, they instead decided to escalate the conflict with Israel 
on military, diplomatic and economic levels. After the Khartoum summit, an 
extraordinary session of the Council of Arab Information Ministers was held in the 
Tunisian city of Bizerte from November 28 to 30. In his speech, the Lebanese 
information minister Michel Eddeh criticized the Arab propaganda effort for its failure 
to gain support among the moderate Left: “The theme of violence in Arab propaganda 
is almost always ineffective; The propaganda that we have developed is not a 
propaganda intended to convince the Zionists of the groundlessness of their claims, 
but a propaganda intended to conquer the solidarity of the outside world and to 
convince it of justness of the Arabic theses. It must be recognized that Zionist 
propaganda has succeeded in obtaining from time to time the support of the 
international financial circles and of the non-communist left, and in fact often the 
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communist [Left], of Western Europe, by highlighting according to the circles to be 
convinced on the one hand that Israel is the forward base of the West, and on the other 
hand that it is the only socialist country in the region threatened by feudal states and 
retrograde.”1180 The Lebanese information minister identified the capacity of Israel to 
gain sympathy among the Left by presenting it as a socialist and progressive country 
as the pillar of its support in the West. The right Arab propaganda strategy was 
therefore to undermine these perceptions.  
In Bizerte, the Arab information ministers agreed on the establishment of a new fund 
designed to finance a “project aimed at addressing the consequences of Zionist 
colonial aggression on Arab lands.”1181 The conference also worked out a long-term 
strategy for propaganda within Arab countries.1182 After 1967, a clear shift in the 
content of Arab propaganda has been observed by May Abdallah-Sinno. She found 
that before 1967, 75% of the articles in the Arab Office publications had dealt with 
issues relating to culture, tourism and the economy. After 1967, these magazines 
became much more politicized in their content with 75% of their articles now dealing 
with the Palestinians.1183 This finding is in line with the thesis that a “Palestinization of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict” took place after 1967.1184 While before the war the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was primarily perceived as a conflict between states, it now came to be seen 
as a conflict between two peoples, the Palestinians and the Israelis. An Israeli report 
from 1969 estimated that the Arab states were expending 50 million dollars a year on 
their anti-Israel campaign. These efforts were remarkably successful, especially in 
educated circles and among the Left, a target of Arab propaganda efforts after 
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1967.1185 The focus of Arab propaganda on the Palestine issue was reaffirmed at the 
conference of the information ministers in February 1969 in Cairo.1186 In 1973, the 6th 
Arab League summit in Algiers passed three resolutions relating to public propaganda: 
It was decided to raise an additional 5 million dollars for the Arab propaganda fund. 
The member states would also continue to contribute 3 million dollars annually to 
propaganda. Another resolution stipulated the establishment of commissions of Arab 
ambassadors in foreign countries designed to prepare action plans relating to public 
diplomacy.1187 At the next summit in Rabat in October 1974, it was decided to raise 
another 30 million dollars for the Arab propaganda fund.1188 These investments in 
public diplomacy paralleled a clear shift in Western public opinion regarding the Arab-
Israeli conflict after 1967. To what extent this shift was caused by Arab propaganda is 
impossible to assess. However, while it is important to emphasize that it is not likely 
that this public opinion shift was only caused by Arab propaganda, it is equally unlikely 
that it did not play any role at all. 
This shift in public opinion contrasted sharply with the public euphoria for Israel during 
and after the Six-Day War, which was palpable in most countries in Western Europe. 
Contemporaries, both pro-Israeli and pro-Arab, were keenly aware of the shift in public 
opinion. During the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the director of the pro-Israeli 
Centre d’Information et de Documentation in Geneva observed in a letter to the Israeli 
Prime Minister, Golda Meir: “For days and weeks the front pages of the European 
newspapers have been monopolized by the Arabs. […] The erosion of morale has to 
be stopped.”1189 The Jewish umbrella organization Schweizerischer Israelitischer 
Gemeindebund SIG (Engl. Swiss Federation of Israelite Communities) used even more 
drastic terms, speaking of “euphoria” which had turned into an “apocalyptic 
                                             
1185 Cummings, Israel’s Public Diplomacy, 97. 
1186 P. G. D., “Conferenza Dei Ministri Arabi Dell’Informazioni,” Oriente Moderno 49, 
no. 1/3 (1969): 21. 
1187 Sinno, 152f 
1188 Sinno, 155 
1189 Kreutner, 116 
 
346 
 
depression”.1190 The reversal of opinion was also registered by newspapers of the far-
left, which approvingly noted the difference between the media reporting during the 
war in 1967 and during the current conflict. While then the majority of the media had 
characterized the Arabs disparagingly as incompetent and unorganized and had 
shown mistrust towards them, they had now changed their attitude, especially 
regarding the invincibility of Israel.1191 Besides these observations, we also have 
empirical evidence of this shift in public opinion. This Jewish umbrella organization SIG 
regularly monitored the attitude of the Swiss public towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
the discussed period. A survey conducted in 1970 revealed that support for Israel in 
Switzerland was still overwhelming: 64 percent of those asked were sympathetic to 
Israel’s conquests of formerly Arab-governed territories. Even more, 80 percent, 
supported the statement that Israel should only exchange the West Bank, Gaza and 
the Golan in return for a real peace with the Arabs. A series of questions asked both 
in the 1970 survey and again in a similar survey in 1975 allows us to track the change 
of opinion. 
 1970 1975 
Arabs are to blame for the conflict 37% 14% 
Israel is to blame for the conflict 4% 4% 
Each side is to blame 46% 61% 
Opinion of the Arabs changed 
favorably during the last three years 
5% 16% 
Table 2: Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Switzerland 1970 - 19751192 
 
We can see from Table 2 that the attitude towards Israel did not change remarkably 
during those five years. The numbers of those who blamed Israel for the conflict 
remained stable. But what indeed changed during this time span was the attitude 
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towards the Arabs: The number of those who blamed the Arabs for the conflict was 
reduced by 23%, while the neutral camp, those who blamed both sides, grew by 15%. 
In the same time, if one assumes that some of those who answered the question twice, 
between 16% and 21% of the Swiss populace changed their opinions toward the Arabs 
favorably from 1967 until 1970 and from 1972 until 1975 – a central goal of the Arab 
public diplomacy effort, as we have seen. Based on this data, we can conclude that 
the reversal of opinion with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict is a matter of fact. While 
public opinion did not necessarily become more anti-Israeli during this period, it 
certainly became more pro-Arab. An intensive campaign organized by the Arab 
League on behalf of a group of PFLP terrorists contributed to the shift of public opinion. 
This campaign will be discussed in the next section. 
6.6 Case Study: Terrorism against Switzerland, the Arab League and the PLO 
The events of 1969 – 1970, when Switzerland became the target of Middle Eastern 
terror groups, offer an excellent case study into the workings of the Arab League after 
1967. These years have recently become the focus of intensive public interest. A book 
by a Swiss journalist claimed that Switzerland had concluded a secret deal with the 
PLO in the wake of hijacking of five airplanes, including one from Swissair, in 
September 1970.1193 A special governmental commission, which was set up after the 
book’s publication to investigate these claims, however disputes this.1194 While this 
chapter does not address the issue directly, it provides a background to these events, 
a background that is currently missing from the discussion. The terror campaign, which 
first struck Switzerland in February 1969, was engineered by Wadie Haddad, a leader 
of the paramilitary group Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and a 
Lebanese Christian of Palestinian origin. Haddad was convinced that Israel was 
unbeatable through conventional military means. From the beginning, the campaign 
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had a dual purpose. On the one hand, Haddad sought to attack Israel’s soft underbelly, 
which he identified as Israel’s line of communications to Western Europe and the US. 
On the other hand, the staging of sophisticated and effect-seeking terrorist attacks was 
meant to capture the attention of the Western public with the purpose of raising 
awareness for the Palestinian cause. In many ways, Haddad’s approach recalled the 
propaganda of the deed, a strategy which had been pioneered by anarchist 
movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the PFLP’s propaganda of 
the deed was complemented to a significant degree by traditional, non-violent 
propaganda of the word. 
Terrorist organizations’ endurance is shaped by three factors: The strength of their 
supporter base, the effectiveness of the counterterrorism response and outside 
sponsorship.1195 Since the late 1960s, activists from the European New Left provided 
essential support to the PFLP. Propaganda of the deed and of the word was important 
to gain this support. As I will show, the trial against the PFLP terrorists, which was held 
in late 1969 in the Swiss city of Winterthur, is exemplary in this regard. A public support 
campaign was organized by the Arab League and Fatah, which was active both 
domestically and abroad. It sought to raise sympathy for the accused PFLP terrorists 
and their cause while also building up pressure on Switzerland to release the terrorists. 
The campaign co-opted anti-Zionist actors and groups from within Switzerland, many 
of them from the New Left. The establishment of these organizations was the result of 
a concerted strategy to engage the European public and in particular the New Left.  
While literature on state support for terrorist groups pays some attention to diplomatic 
support,1196 the issue of propaganda is seldom addressed. However, states can play 
a critical role in raising support for a terrorist organization via propaganda – as they did 
in the case of the PFLP. The Arab League Office, which was attached to the Yemen 
diplomatic mission, funded and organized the campaign to a large degree. Single Arab 
states, like Algeria or Libya, further involved themselves in the campaign, hoping to 
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gain prestige from their support for the Palestinian cause. The events of 1969 -1970 in 
Switzerland thus offer an interesting case for studying the interaction between states, 
terrorist organizations and propaganda networks during this critical period in Swiss 
history. 
The PFLP, which was responsible for the terror wave in 1969-1970, was a product and 
agent of the militarization of Palestinian politics after the Arab defeat in the Six-Day 
War. In December 1967, the Palestine Liberation Front merged with two offshoots of 
the Arab Nationalist Movement to form the PFLP. The new organization was chaired 
by George Habash, a Christian Orthodox Palestinian.1197 The PFLP opposed the 
takeover of the PLO by Fatah in late 1968 and moved from Nasserism to Socialism. 
The ideological and political confrontation with Fatah contributed to the PFLP’s 
radicalization in these years.1198 In 1968, Wadie Haddad established the commando 
branch of the PFLP and assumed its leadership. Unlike the PLO, which organized an 
abortive military insurgency in the West Bank in 1968, the strategy focused on Israeli 
soft targets abroad. In line with the propaganda of deed approach, these attacks would 
advertise the Palestinian cause to the world public. In a meeting of the PLFP leadership 
in December 1967, Haddad had set out the details of his strategy:1199 
“What do I mean by that? I mean spectacular singular actions. These will direct the 
attention of the world towards the Palestine question. The world will ask: ‘What’s the 
Problem in Palestine? Who are the Palestinians? Why are they doing this? At the same 
time, these operations will be very painful for the Israelis. With prominent, sensational 
actions (…) – that is how we need to hit the neuralgic points. In the end, the world will 
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be fed up with the problem. She will end up with the conclusion that something must 
happen with Palestine. She will need to give us justice.”1200 
Barely half a year after this statement, on 23 July, the PFLP launched an 
unprecedented campaign against Israeli civilian targets abroad, when three members 
of the PFLP hijacked an El Al Boeing 707 airplane on its route from Rome to Tel Aviv. 
They force the crew to fly to Algiers where they and the passengers are held hostage. 
Israel is compelled to free Palestinian prisoners in exchange for their release – a first 
big success for Haddad’s strategy.1201 Only five months later, on 26 December 1968, 
two PFLP terrorists arriving from Beirut conduct another operation at Athens airport. 
They attack an El Al airplane parked on the tarmac, killing one passenger. Before their 
arrest, they distribute PFLP leaflets.1202  
A similar attack is planned for February 1969 in Zurich. A team of four, three men and 
a woman, Mohammed Abu El Heiga, Ibrahim Yousef, Amena Dahbor and Abdel 
Mehsen, is preparing for the attack scenario during a three-week course in a PFLP 
military camp in mid-January 1969 in the Nablus region. They learn the use of rifles 
and explosives, training the exact sequence of the operation. The first group, Abu El 
Heiga and Ibrahim Yousef, arrive in Zurich on 8 February after a complex itinerary by 
plane from Damascus via Beirut, Rome and Paris. They carry grenades, petards and 
9.3 kilograms of explosives. The second group, Abdel Mehsen and Amena Dhabor, 
arrive from Amman via Vienna on the same day. Their suitcases hold two soviet-
produced Kalashnikovs and ammunition as well as a stack of PFLP flyers. The next 
days are spent with preparing the attack and reconnoitering the airport. They are 
assisted by a certain Fuad Saad Zhaglul, possibly the fifth PFLP operative, who 
provides the group with a rental car. On 18 February, they decide to attack El Al flight 
LY432 from the parking lot. Two members of the team of four open fire on an El Al 
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airplane before take-off, wounding the co-pilot fatally. Another one throws a grenade 
in front of the plane to bring it to halt. The next step has Haddad’s handwriting all over 
it: They plan to blow up the airplane after its evacuation. However, since the first attack 
in July, Israeli airplanes are accompanied by air marshals. This particular air marshal, 
a young Israeli named Mordehai Rahamim, descends from the airplane and pursues 
the attackers, killing Abdel Mehsen.1203 The three surviving PFLP attackers and 
Rahamim are subsequently tried in the city of Winterthur north of Zurich. 
Judicial scandals and an atmosphere of intimidation marked the second half of 1969. 
This climate was the product of a concerted campaign which was coordinated by 
Fatah, the Arab League and several Swiss anti-Zionist organizations. The groundwork 
for the campaign had been laid in the years before the terror attack when networks of 
Fatah, the leading Palestinian nationalist organization, penetrated Western Europe, 
including Switzerland. Since 1963, Fatah had dominated the major Arab student 
association in Germany, the Generalunion Palästinensischer Studenten GUPS. The 
German GUPS served as a model of the expansion of Fatah networks in Europe.1204 
Although there was no official GUPS chapter in Switzerland, Fatah established an 
active presence in there in the late 1960s. In 1968, Fuad al-Shamali, a Christian 
Orthodox Syrian, settles in Geneva as its representative, revealing his function two 
years later to the public. Shamali is a former student leader of the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party, a far-right party, and is married to the daughter of the party’s founder, 
Antun Saadeh. After a failed coup attempt and his subsequent flight from Syria, he 
becomes close to the Palestinian cause in his exile in Paris.1205 Shamali can count on 
the services of other Arab activists, who make Switzerland their home in the late 
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1960s.1206. The main partners for this network were the Arab League, the nascent New 
Left and a selection of anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi activists, like the notorious Nazi 
publisher François Genoud, whose role in the campaign shall be discussed later. 
The Fatah network in Switzerland was also actively supported by the infrastructure of 
the Arab League in Switzerland. The nature of the relations between the Arab League, 
the PLO and Fatah necessitates some explanation. The Arab League had opened an 
office in Switzerland in 1957 in the city of Geneva. As Switzerland did not grant 
diplomatic status to the Arab League and its representatives, they were attached to the 
Yemeni diplomatic mission.1207 In 1964, the PLO is founded under the auspices of 
Egypt, which is then the leader of Arab nationalism and largely controls the Arab 
League. The destiny of both organizations is therefore strongly entwined and their 
cooperation explicitly stipulated in the 1964 Palestinian national covenant.1208 After the 
organization’s founding, the Arab League seeks in vain to gain approval for a PLO 
representative in Switzerland by the Swiss authorities, which opposed the step. After 
its defeat against Israel in 1967, Egyptian dominance of Arab nationalism was 
significantly weakened. This forms the background of Fatah’s takeover of the PLO in 
1968. The PLO which settled in Switzerland in the late 1960s was therefore very 
different from the earlier PLO. Still, it maintained its close cooperation with the Arab 
League. 
While the Fatah network in Europe at first directed the bulk of its activities towards the 
Arab diaspora, after 1967 it sought to reach out to the nascent student movement and 
the New Left. The latter’s attitude towards Israel was much more hostile than that of 
                                             
1206 “Union des Etudiants arabes,” 10 May, 1968, CHBAR#E4320C#1994/120#782*; 
“Contrôle téléphonique de El-Shamali, 17.07.1969-31.10.1969” (Service Politique du 
Corps de Police Genève, 26 November, 1969), CHBAR#E4320-05C#1995/234*137*. 
1207 “Letter by Zoher Kabbani to Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre,” 25 June, 1957, 
CHBAR#E2001E#1970/217#2388*. 
1208 Harold M. Cubert, The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East (London, 1997), 
53. 
 
353 
 
the moderate, Social Democratic Left, a fact which facilitated the rapprochement.1209 
This development was also reflected in Switzerland where Fatah officials and the office 
of the Arab League in Geneva collaborated with the scene of Swiss anti-Zionist 
organizations. The most active organization in the campaign was the Comité de 
Soutien au Peuple Palestinien (Engl. Committee for the Support of the Palestinian 
People), which had been established in early 1969, right after the attack. It was headed 
by Pierre Louis Claude (b. 1937), a functionary of the communist Party of Labor,1210 a 
party which received financial support from Moscow during the Cold War.1211 Fatah 
representative Fuad al-Shamali became active in the committee in a leading role in 
September 1969 before the start of the trial.1212 Shamali and the Arab League Office 
in Geneva counseled the Comité in its propaganda strategy, with the Office also 
organizing public events and printing and editing its propaganda. The secretary at the 
Office, who was of Syrian nationality, proved to be responsible for these activities. 1213 
It is no overstatement to conclude that the Comité de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien 
was as much a project of the Arab League Office and of Fatah as it was one of its left-
wing members. 
Fatah propaganda and militant networks in Europe were overlapping. During the Six-
Day War, the GUPS had recruited Arab students in Germany to partake in a guerilla 
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war against Israel.1214 Most members of the New Left were young and fascinated by 
the adventurism associated with guerilla warfare. Fatah peddled this feeling by inviting 
young Leftists to its military training camps in Jordan. In mid-July 1969, New Left 
activists from all over Europe travelled to Jordan to receive military training and attend 
a congress by the General Union of the Palestinian Students. The GUPS was by then 
under control of Fatah and effectively turned into the youth branch of the PLO.1215 The 
approximately 200 European volunteers were joined by a Swiss contingent of several 
Palestine Committee members, including its leader, Pierre Claude,1216 which were 
selected by Fuad Shamali. Meanwhile, Shamali, who used the pseudonym Abu Said, 
was suspected of being involved in terrorism in Europe. A confidential source alleged 
him, inter alia, to be responsible for a bomb attack on the El Al office in Brussels on 8 
September 1969.1217 Furthermore, after his death in 1972, it was widely reported in 
European and Arab media that he had played a major role in planning the terror attacks 
of Black September, including the Munich massacre, underscoring Swiss 
suspicions.1218 Shamali’s case illustrates the blurred boundaries in Fatah’s European 
network strategy propaganda and militancy. 
Besides Palestine Committees, the Arab League also supported other anti-Zionist 
groups which did not fall into the camp of the New Left. Among those was the Lausanne 
branch of the Comité de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien, which eventually split from the 
movement. It was headed by the Frenchman and known anti-Semite, Roger Henry. 
Henry was a colorful figure who had volunteered to help the German occupying forces 
in France during World War II and was later active for the OAS, an underground 
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paramilitary organization which opposed Algerian independence.1219 Another such 
group was the more moderate Swiss-Arab Society, which was established in May 1969 
and chaired by Hans Ellenberger. It was entirely dependent on the Arab League, which 
paid its secretary’s wage. Its offices moreover were housed in the building of the Arab 
Commercial Bank.1220 François Genoud was one of the bank’s directors, which he had 
co-founded in 1958 with funds provided by wealthy Arabs, in particular from Saudi 
Arabia.1221 Why did the Arabs proceed to establish and finance anti-Zionist front groups 
with Swiss leadership? Certainly, the Swiss leadership provided them with greater 
credibility towards their Swiss audience. Perhaps more importantly, Swiss law 
prohibited political activity by foreigners. The Arab League Office in Geneva had run 
into problems with the Swiss authorities several times in the past because of their 
propaganda activities against Western powers and Israel. Setting up Swiss front 
groups alleviated this problem. State support for propaganda networks offered similar 
gains to those received from supporting terror networks: “(…) plausible deniability, the 
possibility to project power despite little geopolitical significance, and the enhancement 
of their image as fighters for the cause of the 'oppressed’.”1222 
The investigation of the February attack and the subsequent trial took almost a year, 
lasting until December 1969. It pitted the Arab states, the Palestinian national 
movement and their sympathizers against Israel, the Jewish community and the 
majority of the Swiss population. Both sides invested significant prestige and energy 
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in the trial, underlining its character as a proxy battle for the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Georges Brunschvig, the head of the Swiss Jewish community and a famous lawyer, 
defended the Israeli security officer Mordehai Rahamim, who was accused of 
manslaughter. Brunschvig had gained prominence through the Berne Trial in which he 
proved the falsity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.1223 He was assisted by Gabriel 
Bach, Israel’s state attorney and former prosecutor in the Eichmann trial. On 22 
December, the three Arabs were convicted to twelve years in prison, while the Israeli 
was acquitted. After the delivery of the judgement, Gabriel Bach expressed his hope 
that the sentence would set a precedent for future trials against terrorists. The team of 
Arab lawyers, which consulted the defense lawyer, however warned that “the Swiss-
Arab relations were at the beginning of a long winter.”1224 The second statement would 
prove more accurate in the coming years. 
The investigation and the subsequent trial was overshadowed by a campaign against 
the Swiss judiciary, which started in June 1969. It sought to disrupt the investigation 
and subvert the credibility of the Swiss judiciary by insinuating that it had a pro-Israeli 
bias.1225 According to Peter Woog, the head of JUNA, the intelligence service which 
the Swiss Jewish community had set up in the 1940s during the Nazi threat, the first 
phase of the campaign was deliberated at a meeting of Roger Henry’s Palestine 
Committee on 11 June. The disturbances were meant to prepare the ground for a 
second phase in the campaign, in which the Arab states would step in to pressure 
Switzerland.1226 At a press conference on 14 June 1969, Roger Henry made serious 
allegations against the investigating authorities. Henry presented the journalists with 
parts of the investigation file against Mordehai Rahamim, claiming that the documents 
had been sold to a Palestinian organization for 5’000 dollars by someone inside the 
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office of the principal investigator. The Swiss defense lawyers also lodged a complaint 
against the principal investigator, asking him to abandon the case. 1227 As a result of 
these charges, Zurich’s Director of Justice opened an investigation into the charges 
against the principal investigator, but speculated that Henry had probably gained 
access to the documents through the Arabs’ defense lawyers.1228 These however 
claimed to have had no connection with the campaign, but admitted to having been in 
touch with the Arab Lawyers Union.1229 In a phone call between Henry and Shamali, 
which was tapped by the Geneva police, it was revealed that part of the documents 
had been photocopied by Shamali himself.1230 Obviously, the alleged spy within the 
principal investigator’s office was the Arab Lawyers Union itself, which had passed on 
the documents to Shamali. This was not the only effort to disrupt the investigation. The 
Arab interpreter, a Syrian refugee, was the repeated target of insinuations and 
accusations of pro-Israeli bias by the Arab side. In September 1969, the Syrian 
embassy demanded his removal from the trial.1231 This call was joined by the pro-Arab 
organizations Comité de Soutien et d’aide au Peuple Palestinien and Centrale Suisse 
d’Assistance à la Palestine a few days later in a public letter, wherein they also 
demanded the release of the PFLP terrorists.1232 The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram 
meanwhile incited its readers by telling them that the interpreter was an Israeli. 1233 
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After the resignation of the two Swiss defense lawyers, the Arab Lawyers Union (ALU) 
agreed to convene a meeting at the end of September in Cairo to discuss the defense 
of Palestinian terrorists in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece with 
representatives from the ALU, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan and the PLO.1234 It is likely 
that not only the trial in Switzerland was discussed in this context, but the larger 
strategy for the defense of Palestinian terrorists in Europe. The strategy, which shaped 
the defense in Switzerland and other defenses organized by the ALU was 
characterized by public campaigning and the disruption of the regular trial process. 
Swiss authorities thus observed the use of the same tactic in a trial against PFLP 
terrorists in Greece in October 1969.1235 This tactic is generally known by its French 
expression as ‘défense de rupture’. Jacques Vergès, a Franco-Algerian lawyer and a 
member of the ALU, pioneered the tactic in a trial against FLN operative Djamila 
Bouhired in 1957. Besides disruption, the tactic seeks to invert the roles of prosecutor 
and defendant. The courtroom is turned into a public stage on which the state stands 
accused for its alleged crimes. After the Cairo meeting, Vergès is made a member of 
the defense team for the PFLP operatives in Switzerland, which also includes the 
Moroccan lawyer Abderrahmane Youssoufi, a friend of François Genoud.1236 However, 
to the disappointment of his supporters, he is only allowed to attend the trial as an 
observer and not as a regular defense lawyer.1237 The Swiss Nazi and pro-Arab activist 
François Genoud may have had a role in bringing Vergès to Switzerland as he had 
known him since the 1960s, when his Arab Commercial Bank managed the funds of 
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the FLN.1238 François Genoud’s role in the campaign is murky. After speaking with the 
defendants and the president of courts, he explains to the press that he is simply an 
“uninterested, voluntary aide to the defense of the Palestinians”.1239 Unsurprisingly for 
such a mysterious figure, this seems to have been an understatement. Rather, he 
worked as an intermediary between different Middle Eastern actors. According to his 
biographer, during 1969 Genoud maintained regular contact with PFLP external 
operations chief Wadie Haddad in Beirut, the chef of the Libyan secret service, and 
Fuad Shamali in Geneva, travelling to the Middle East at least four times in 1969. 
Possibly, he acted as an informant. His presence at the trial however was a strategic 
mistake. It exposed the PFLP to accusations of harboring National Socialist and anti-
Semitic sympathies.1240 
Some Arab states, in particular Libya and Algeria, directly interfered in the trial. Libya 
sent two delegations in late November and early December to speak with the 
defendants.1241 The court expressed concern, noting that the defendants became less 
cooperative after the first Libyan visit. However, the stance of the Swiss Department of 
Foreign Affairs prevailed; they hoped that the Libyans would act in “a calming manner 
on the Arab countries”.1242 In the same period of time, Algeria also intervened. On 28 
November, the Algerian foreign minister Bouteflika criticized the trial harshly and asked 
Secretary General U Thant to have the UN intervene on behalf of the defendants. 1243 
Three days later, on 1st December, a prominent Algerian delegation met with U Thant 
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to reemphasize their demands.1244 As mentioned above, Algeria was also strongly 
represented in the ALU defense team with Jacques Vergès and Amar Bentoumi, then 
the president of the bar in Algeria. What was the reason for Algeria and Libya’s 
involvement? After Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War, its claim to leadership of the 
pan-Arab movement was significantly weakened and other Arab states vied for this 
position, among them Algeria. Besides an expression of the authentic feeling of 
solidarity with the Palestinians, this tactic also had the useful effect of increasing one’s 
prestige in the Arab public opinion. Algeria had exploited this effect since the mid-
1960s, when it played a pioneering role in supporting the PLO diplomatically and 
militarily. 1245 Libya did not count among the most radical Arab regimes before 1969. In 
September of this year however, the monarchy was overthrown. The military junta 
under Colonel Gaddafi, which succeeded it, was one of the most radical Arab 
nationalist and anti-Western in the Middle East. Like Algeria, it co-opted Palestinian 
nationalism to increase its standing vis-à-vis its Arab competitors.1246 The Arab League 
summit in Rabat on 20 December 1969 gave further impetus to Algeria and Libya to 
style themselves as the defenders of the Palestinians, something the Swiss 
ambassador in Algiers was very aware of. He therefore advised the Swiss authorities 
not to call out the Algerians publicly and increase the tensions, but to collaborate with 
them, as “we have an interest (…) to play the game, although we know, that sometimes 
a false card slips in.”1247 Rather than fighting the interference of Arab states in domestic 
matters, the Swiss authorities did their best to accommodate their demands in order to 
cushion the blow of the campaign. 
Both the domestic and the external campaign were meant to discredit the Swiss 
investigative authorities in the public eye and to paint the picture of a Swiss judiciary 
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biased in favor of the Israelis. Arabic media contributed to this acerbic climate. Many 
had sent special correspondents to cover the trial in Winterthur. One of them, a 
journalist for the Syrian newspaper al-Baath, designed a conspiracy theory obviously 
inspired by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to explain the alleged Swiss 
discrimination against the Arab defendants: Following the June War 1967 [Six-Day 
War], when a congress of about 70 international billionaires took place in Jerusalem to 
examine the possibilities to finance the new ‘Israeli Empire’ and when talk was there 
of about 1’500 billions of old French francs, the Swiss delegations came as 5th among 
the 14 capitalist countries represented at the congress.”1248 The Iraqi newspaper Al-
Jumhuriya called for reprisals against Switzerland to “make them understand that the 
Arab nation cannot be despised (…).”1249 Swiss pro-Arab activists, acting in a role of 
‘native informants’, helped stoke this deleterious climate. On October 2 1969, Hans 
Ellenberger and Roger Du Pasquier of the Swiss-Arab Society travelled to Egypt to 
meet with senior figures. Among others, they spoke to the editor in chief of the Egyptian 
newspaper Al Ahram, to whom they gave advice on the Swiss mentality and how best 
to convince the Swiss public. Writing about this encounter one day later, the editor in 
chief reported that the Swiss had asked him for support, because “the influence of 
Zionism is efficient in the Swiss sphere of information, which, while concealing the Arab 
point of view, supports forcefully the Israeli point of view.”1250 These newspaper articles 
were registered by the Swiss authorities and added to the feeling of being under siege. 
The local and the external actors worked together to increase the pressure on 
Switzerland and prevent the normal course of the investigation. One of the external 
actors was the PFLP, which continued to intimidate Switzerland to secure the release 
of the terrorists. A letter on 24 August made exactly this demand. The letter, the content 
of which revealed that the organization had intimate knowledge of the events in 
Switzerland and was closely monitoring the situation, accused the Swiss authorities of 
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being involved in a “Zionist complot.” 1251 It is likely that François Genoud played a role 
in informing the PFLP on the situation in Switzerland. He had been in touch with Wadie 
Haddad since early 1969 and occasionally travelled to Beirut to meet with him.1252 
Since mid-September 1969, signs were increasing that the PFLP was preparing a new 
round of violence against Switzerland. The authorities first received a credible warning 
of an imminent hijacking of a Swissair machine. 1253 Then, on 19 September, the PFLP 
in Amman issued a communique calling for an improvement of prisoner conditions in 
Switzerland and warning of possible revenge.1254 In early October, PFLP spokesman 
Ghassan Khanfani proclaimed to the press that the group was considering the 
abduction of a Swiss ambassador to create a “climate of understanding” with the Swiss 
authorities.1255 The next PFLP terror attacks however did not target Switzerland, but 
Athens on 27 November. In early December, the authorities received another warning 
of a terror attack, this time on Swiss soil,1256 possibly on the trial in Winterthur. Then, 
on 21 December 1969, hardly by coincidence just one day before the passing of 
judgment, an attempt to hijack a TWA machine in Athens failed.1257 This was just a 
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small foretaste of what was to come for Switzerland in 1970. Unbeknownst to the 
public, Switzerland was already preparing for the next emergency.  
6.7 Conclusion 
When the Arab League started reviving its propaganda apparatus in the early 1950s, 
it first concentrated its activities on the US. This reflected the fact that the Arabs still 
considered the US to be the prime arena of the fight against Zionism. They also 
enjoyed a wide range of sympathizers there, many of them from the far-right, a fact 
which the Arab League often sought to downplay. In addition, the Eisenhower 
administration had created a fertile atmosphere for pro-Arab activism, given its policy 
to improve relations with the Arab world. Nevertheless, the Arab propaganda activities 
in the US achieved no lasting impact. This was certainly a factor for the Arab League 
to expand its activities in Europe and the Third World. 
The Arab League opened its first Offices in Europe in Bonn and Geneva in 1956 and 
1957, respectively. The Geneva Arab Office served as the headquarters in Europe. 
This underscored the relevance of these countries in the Arab League strategy. Unlike 
in the US, Hassan Fakoussa fostered collaboration with the far-right. The same 
procedure was followed in Switzerland, were the Liberation Nationalists established a 
pro-Arab group with the money and support of the Arab League. The primary concern 
for these Offices was always to spread awareness on the Palestine issue. Since the 
mid-1960s, PLO representatives were attached to the Arab Offices. Still, before the 
Six-Day War, Arab propaganda failed to appeal to the general public and pro-Arab 
sympathies ran low. This changed only after the Six-Day War, when Arab League 
functionaries like Fayez Sayegh realized the need to address other elements of the 
public, in particular the New Left. The case study has shed light on this new strategy. 
The Arab League was instrumental in establishing, funding and maintaining an anti-
Zionist network in Switzerland. Without this support, domestic pressure on Switzerland 
to change its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict would expectedly have been much 
more limited. 
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7 The PLO Network in Europe and Palestine Solidarity 
The following chapter describes the networks of pro-Arab activism in Germany, the UK 
and Switzerland in the 1960s and 1970s, concentrating on the period from 1967 
to1974. Other European countries, including France, Italy and Belgium, are also 
discussed. The defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War weakened Arab 
nationalism. In an unexpected turn of events, it did however embolden the Palestinian 
National movement led by the PLO and its chairman, Yasser Arafat. Its military and 
political struggle against Israel culminated in the recognition of Palestinian national 
rights and the PLO by the UN General Assembly on November 23, 1974 and six years 
later by the European Community. This chapter will contribute to the understanding of 
this success. In the early 1960s, the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) 
and Fatah built up their presence in Europe. The Palestinian cause underwent a 
revolution in this period. Their main base was Germany. From there, they not only 
recruited Palestinian and other Arab students for the struggle against Israel, but also 
soon exerted influence on the nascent New Left movement and its attitude towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. After 1967, there developed a de facto alliance between the 
different Palestinian paramilitary groups which were part of the PLO and the European 
New Left. This alliance gave rise to a ramified Palestine solidarity movement, which 
lobbied for Palestinian national interests in Europe. Some of these groups were funded 
by Arab bodies and acted as front groups. Many radical leftists would also join the 
military struggle of the Palestinian nationalists or support their terrorist operations in 
Europe. Besides the wave of New Left activism, there was also a diplomatic offensive 
by the PLO in European capitals. By pushing for the opening of official representations 
of the PLO, the PLO and the Arab League sought to normalize the PLO and achieve 
international recognition. The Swiss and the British governments, the negotiations of 
which are discussed in this chapter, were open to accommodate these demands in 
principle, thereby seeking to prevent violence against their citizens and improving their 
ties with the Arab world. This comprehensive strategy, which encompassed 
propaganda, diplomacy, economic threats and violence, eventually brought the PLO 
to be recognized by the Europeans as an indispensable partner for achieving peace in 
the Middle East.  
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7.1 Fatah and the GUPS in Germany 
The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) organized the pro-Palestinian 
solidarity movement in Germany in the 1960s and the early 1970s. While GUPS later 
became the youth branch of Fatah, both started as independent organizations with 
similar outlooks. Like the GUPS, Fatah was established as a youth movement and to 
a significant degree remained so, recruiting its cadre primarily among the Palestinian 
student groups existing in the Arab and European diaspora. The oldest and most 
important one of these groups was the Palestinian Student Association, which had 
been established at Cairo University in 1944. Until 1952, it was headed by the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB). In 1952, the unaffiliated Yasser Arafat took it over as chairman. 
However, the influence of the MB remained strong. For one, Arafat’s deputy Salah 
Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, was associated with the movement. Arafat promised 
that he would promote the MB’s ideology and members in exchange for the MB’s 
support for his candidacy. On the other hand, Arafat also claimed kinship with the Mufti 
Amin al-Husseini, earning him the respect of the Islamists but suspicion from the Arab 
nationalists. Arafat’s takeover of the association and his crafting of alliances already 
hinted at his diplomatic genius, which would become even more evident later. Soon, 
Arafat expanded the association to other universities in the bustling Egyptian capital 
and beyond. But Arafat was also eyeing international status for the student association. 
In 1955, it gained admittance to the communist-controlled International Union of 
Students, recognition from the Arab League and the Arab states as an official 
Palestinian body. When Arafat moved to Kuwait in 1957, he left Palestinian student 
politics significantly strengthened. Arafat and his entourage from the Egyptian student 
days would form the core of the Palestinian national movement in the decades to come. 
Among those were Salah Khalaf, Farouk Kaddoumi and others.1258  
In 1959, Arafat and his colleagues established Fatah (Engl. victory, conquest). Many 
of its founding members were close to the Muslim Brotherhood. Though the 
organization made repeated reference to Islamic history in its propaganda, it adopted 
an ideology and language influenced by pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism. In Fatah’s 
view, Arab unity would not bring the demise of Israel, like Nasser thought, but to the 
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contrary, Arab unity would be achieved through the Arab struggle against and the 
eventual demise of Israel.1259 Their glorification of violent action as a means of 
unification marked them as true students of Frantz Fanon, the French intellectual, 
whose thought had a powerful influence on the anti-imperialist movement and the New 
Left. In violent-collective action “each one becomes the violent member of a big chain, 
the great organism of violence, which surges against the initial violence of the colonizer 
[…] and thus creates a nation of inseparable unity.”1260 Fanon ascribed a purifying, 
liberating quality to violence. Indeed, early Fatah propaganda material was directly 
influenced by Fanon, explicitly quoting from his work ‘Wretched of the Earth’. Fatah 
sought to prompt a new war between Israel and its Arab neighbors by staging guerrilla 
attacks against the Jewish state. Israel would react to these provocations against the 
Arab states, which would eventually lead to war. Fatah’s raids were indeed a trigger 
for the Six-Day War. But unlike Fatah had hoped, it did not result in a unifying victory, 
but rather a crushing defeat for the Arabs. While the Arab states did not, Fatah profited 
from the war. As the Arab armies lost their prestige, guerrilla-fighting and terror 
emerged as the winning strategies against Israel. Moreover, the weakened position of 
Egypt and especially Nasser allowed Fatah to take over the PLO, with Yasser Arafat 
being elected chairman of the executive committee in February 1969.1261 The Battle of 
Karameh, although a defeat from the military viewpoint, heightened Arafat’s prestige 
tremendously. Egyptian dictator Nasser met with Arafat and other leading members of 
Fatah and took Arafat on a state visit to Moscow. Fatah dominated the executive 
committee of the PLO. In the words of later PLO representative in Germany, Abdallah 
Frangi, the PLO was the vehicle but Fatah was the engine.1262 
Both GUPS and Fatah sprang from the same roots. In 1959, two years after Arafat’s 
departure for Kuwait in 1957, the various Palestinian Student Associations in Egypt 
united to form the GUPS, which was headquartered in Cairo. Soon thereafter, GUPS 
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established ties with other student associations in Beirut and Damascus. In the early 
1960s, GUPS expanded to Europe. The chapters in Europe would have an influential 
role in the further development of the GUPS. However, the leading chapter was 
undoubtedly the West German one, where GUPS was present since the early 1960s. 
Its activities were first directed at the numerous Arab students located in West 
Germany. Between 1962 and 1964 alone, 873 events were held.1263 GUPS was led by 
a group of Palestinians studying at German universities. In the 1960s, it was chaired 
by Hani Hassan, who was assisted by Hayel Abdel Hamid. In this period, Fatah 
planned to take over GUPS. Fatah senior member Abu Jihad therefore commissioned 
Abdallah Frangi, a young Palestinian medical student from Gaza at the Goethe 
University in Frankfurt, to recruit Hani Hassan in 1963. This was the start of the Fatah 
cell in Frankfurt, which Arafat called “the German gang”.1264 Besides Frangi and 
Hassan, it consisted of Amin al-Hindi, Hayel Abdel Hamid and Nabil Nasser, an Israeli 
born to a Jewish mother and an Arab Christian father. Apart from Nabil Nasser, all of 
them would later carve out brilliant careers in the ranks of Fatah: Hassan became 
Fatah’s chief of foreign policy, Hindi the head of the secret service, and Hayel Abdel 
Hamid a member of the Fatah Central Committee, while Frangi represented the PLO 
in Germany for more than three decades. The Frankfurt cell was instrumental in the 
expansion of GUPS, which soon counted 24 chapters of the GUPS and another 26 of 
the GUPA, the General Union of Palestinian Workers (Ger. Generalunion 
palästinensischer Arbeiter).1265 This was an impressive accomplishment.  
However, it was questionable whether these leaders really had ever been serious 
students. It was easy in these years to get admitted to a German university. Hayel 
Abdel Hamid or Fatah’s senior military officer Walim Nasir never seriously committed 
themselves to their studies.1266 Abdallah Frangi noted in his autobiography that he was 
mostly absent from his lessons and did not earn a degree.1267 This suggests that rather 
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than student activists, these figures were professional revolutionaries, Fatah officers 
who earned a living with their work. The German branch represented a crucial base of 
support for Fatah, a fact which was underlined by regular visits from Fatah’s senior 
members, including Abu Jihad and Mahmoud Abbas. It would also serve as a model 
for the set-up of GUPS chapters in other European countries. 1268 Among others, GUPS 
chapters were latter opened in Italy and in France, where a chapter was established in 
1965.1269 GUPS was a significant force behind the ascendancy of Palestinian 
nationalism in the 1960s. 
Growing militancy marked Palestinian nationalism. The third GUPS congress in 
February 1964 in Cairo was a major step towards the militarization of the student 
movement. The German GUPS representative Hayel Abdel Hamid was elected to the 
executive committee, the first Fatah member to do so. The congress resolution 
embraced armed fight against Israel as the only means to regain Palestine.1270 On 
December 31, 1964, Fatah announced the start of military operations under the label 
of al-Asifa (Engl. the storm).1271 Despite earlier declarations, the PLO headquarters in 
Cairo refrained from supporting the call.1272 Its decision certainly reflected Gamal 
Nasser’s apprehension of the military adventurism of the Palestinian Fedayeen, armed 
guerilla groups. He feared that they would lead him into a war with Israel, for which his 
army was entirely unprepared as it was bogged down in a costly war in Yemen.1273 
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The German GUPS on the other hand joined the military effort and in consequence, 
Germany became a major recruiting ground for the guerillas. Walim Nasir was Fatah’s 
senior military officer in Germany, reporting to Abu Jihad. Being stationed in Frankfurt, 
he assumed a cover name and pretended to be a regular student. Nasir recruited 
Palestinian students in Germany to fight for Fatah. The same procedure was followed 
in France, where students were directly recruited for military and other functions at their 
home universities. The volunteers were then trained in Fatah camps, where they learnt 
the use of live ammunition and explosives. 1274  
The Six-Day War saw a further explosion of militancy in the GUPS. At the war’s 
outbreak, Abu Jihad was staying in Frankfurt. On his incentive, the GUPS decided to 
send Arab volunteers from Frankfurt to participate in guerilla actions against Israel. 
Twenty volunteers from Germany, among them Abdallah Frangi, travelled to Algeria to 
undergo basic military training at a camp near Blida. They had not yet finished their 
training when the war ended on June 10, 1967. After two weeks in the Algerian camp, 
the group was transferred to Damascus, where they continued their training for another 
two weeks. The group met Arafat on July 28, 1967, before infiltrating the West Bank 
via Jordan.1275 Frangi’s group was not the only one. The German GUPS had organized 
the trips for volunteers from other European states as well. About 50 foreign fighters 
made it to the battle zone. These arrangements were overseen by Farouk Kaddoumi. 
Most of the European volunteers however were quickly arrested after they infiltrated 
the West Bank, including Abdallah Frangi, Walim Nasir, Ahmad Irshid from Karlsruhe 
and Ghazi al-Husseini from Cologne.1276 The Israelis eventually set Frangi free after 
four months.1277 GUPS chapters in the Arab world also participated in the campaign. 
Thus, GUPS in Lebanon fielded 120 volunteers with the same dismal results.1278 After 
the war, Fatah gained control over the GUPS and its members joined the armed 
struggle against Israel, and Arab students from Germany continued to volunteer for the 
                                             
1274 Zelkovitz, Students and Resistance in Palestine, 40–42. 
1275 Frangi, Der Gesandte, 106–19. 
1276 Zelkovitz, Students and Resistance in Palestine, 47. 
1277 Frangi, Der Gesandte, 106–19. 
1278 Zelkovitz, Students and Resistance in Palestine, 45–46. 
 
370 
 
Fatah guerilla war.1279  Two of those, Ribhi Muhammed Husayn and Muhammed 
Samaro, met their deaths at the iconic Battle of Karameh in March 1968. Although 
suffering heavy casualties, Fatah propaganda framed the military engagement as a 
victory over the Israelis, who had retreated after destroying a Fatah camp.1280 One 
month before, Abdallah Frangi had participated in a meeting of the Fatah Central 
Committee in Damascus, where he criticized the military preparations as insufficient. 
Moreover, he suggested the use of GUPS as a role model for building up an effective 
military organization.1281 While the military achievement of the GUPS leaders remained 
limited, they would prove to be much more successful in the field of propaganda. 
7.2 The GUPS and the New Left Student movement 
In the second half of the 1960s, GUPS activities in Germany increasingly targeted 
German students. They therefore came to the attention of the public. In 1965, the 
GUPS and the German branch of the Arab Student Union, which, according to Swiss 
information was an Egyptian front organization, planned to hold a conference on 
Palestine and the Arab word. After an intervention by Tunisia, which feared criticism of 
its policies, the conference was prevented by German authorities.1282 On July 1, 1966, 
130 persons, most of them Arab students from the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, 
took to the streets for a silent march in protest against the German-Israeli weeks 
starting on the same day. Behind the march stood the GUPS and the Arab Student 
Union. The slogans on the banners of the protestors were in German and designed to 
appeal to the public, such as “Jerusalem, Berlin: Wall, grief, injustice” or “Palestine 
was, is and will be Arabic.” 1283The Arab students received expressions of solidarity 
from the Afro-Asiatic Student Union and the Iranian Student Association. The march 
was however criticized as anti-Semitic in a letter to the editor in the pages of the local 
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newspaper Erlanger Volksblatt. In response, the editor received pro-Arab letters from 
Mahmud Sharif of the GUPS and two German students, who were obviously outraged 
at the charge. Their letter stated: “We have to fear that in our country political 
extremism is nowhere near going extinct, with the single difference, that the erstwhile 
anti-Semitism, which we condemn from the bottom of our hearts, has turned today into 
an equally extreme uncritical philosemitism.” 1284 
This was an argument often used later by the New Left. According to its reasoning, the 
real anti-anti-Semites were those who supported the enemies of Israel. This was an 
adventurous, but nevertheless popular argument among the anti-Zionist New Left, 
which can be encountered in various sources. Among others, the Marxist political 
scientist Wolfgang Abendroth would adopt it after 1967, as discussed in more detail 
below. Philosemitism in the FRG had been criticized in a 1965 article by the Jewish 
political scientist Eleonore Sterling in the reputed newspaper Die Zeit, that probably 
contributed to the popularity of the theme among the New Left. However, Sterling’s 
critique was very different from that of the New Left and did not target supporters of 
Israel. She criticized philosemitism as an inauthentic expression of sympathy for the 
Jews which actually had little to do with the existence of real Jews, and was adopted 
rather to improve the image and credibility of the young German democracy vis-à-vis 
its Western partners. Her critique was particularly directed at the representation of the 
Jew as a sufferer, as an “Auschwitz-Jew”, in German discourse, which mythologized 
the Holocaust.1285 In fact, it would be more correct to apply Sterling’s critique of 
philosemitism to the New Left: As seen in the letter of the two students at Erlangen-
Nurnberg, it expressed sympathy for the dead Jews of Auschwitz, but offered very little 
understanding for the living Jews, particularly in Israel, but also in other countries like 
the Soviet Union, where they suffered from oppression. 
The Arab defeat in 1967 led to intensive soul-searching in the Arab countries. As 
shown in the previous chapter, one reason for Israel’s strength, they believed, lay in 
Western public support for Israel. The Palestine Research Center in Beirut, a body of 
                                             
1284 Ibid. 
1285 Eleonore Sterling, “Judenfreunde – Judenfeinde,” Die Zeit, December 10, 1965, 
http://www.zeit.de/1965/50/judenfreunde-judenfeinde. 
 
372 
 
the PLO, equally came to the conclusion that the Arab cause was misrepresented in 
Western media.1286 The logical conclusion of this analysis was to step up propaganda 
in Western countries. Increasingly, this propaganda did not seek to sway the opinion 
of the majority, which was unwinnable, as Fayez Sayegh believed, but targeted the 
New Left and marginalized groups. Germany offers a particularly good example for this 
approach. GUPS clearly intensified its propaganda after 1967, seeking to establish 
links with the New Left.1287 Abdallah Frangi, who had returned to Frankfurt after his 
incarceration in Israel, was elected president of the GUPS in 1968. He further 
professionalized the GUPS and opened a central office in the center of the Frankfurt, 
the rent of which was paid for by the Arab League. Nabil Nasser started editing a new 
magazine called Resistanzia, which was later renamed Palästina-Hefte. The first name 
was deliberately chosen to evoke the memory of the French resistance against the 
German occupation. This was part of a concerted effort to align Fatah with the New 
Left, which defined itself as anti-fascist. The ‘German gang’ also established the 
Palästina-Komitees (Engl. Palestine committees) in many universities in Germany, 
recruiting its members among left-wing students and opponents of the Vietnam War. 
GUPS also joined the pacifist Ostermärsche, which were staged each year to protest 
against the dangers of nuclear war. Although Frangi feared that the militantly 
nationalistic Fatah did not fit well with the supposedly pacifist message of the event, 
this proved unfounded. The allegedly pacifist demonstrators quickly adopted the 
slogans of the movement and their symbol, the keffiyeh.1288 GUPS had made its first 
inroads into the German Left. 
The outreach of the GUPS towards the Left was facilitated by a significant change in 
the attitude of parts of the German Left during the Six-Day War of 1967, when the 
Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund SDS (Engl. Socialist German Student Union) 
broke with the hitherto dominant pro-Israeli consensus in the German Left. Agitation 
against Israel had until now mainly originated from groups associated with the far-right 
and National Bolshevism, as shown above. However, more than in other European 
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countries, the German pro-Palestinian activists had to come to terms with the 
Holocaust. A flyer authored by the Marxist professor Wolfgang Abendroth, which was 
circulated by the SDS in June 1967 offered a dialectic solution: German 
“philosemitism”, meaning that support for the Jews and Israel stemmed from anti-
Semitic attitudes. Ergo, support for Israel was in fact anti-Semitic. The U-turn of the 
far-left was laid down in a resolution, which was accepted at an SDS meeting in 
Frankfurt from September 4 to 9, which stated in language strongly reminiscent of the 
language of the Eastern European communist regimes that the conflict represented “a 
struggle of the Arab peoples against their oppression by Anglo-American 
imperialism.”1289 In accordance with Abendroth’s thesis, the SDS claimed that the 
reporting of the Springer Press, a publishing house friendly to Israel, applied anti-
Semitism to the Arabs. However, Jeffrey Herf, who studied National Socialist anti-
Semitic propaganda extensively, found no parallels. In fact, the two hallmarks of 
modern anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories and racialism, were entirely absent from 
the Springer reports.1290 On June 9, 1969, the SDS and GUPS protested in Frankfurt 
against a lecture by the Israeli ambassador Asher Ben-Natan at the university, 
silencing him by shouting abusive slogans such as “Zionists out of Israel.” Before he 
left, he remarked that “It would be an historic event, if you would make this discussion 
today impossible, as this has happened in Germany the last time 34 years ago.”1291 
These occurrences led to discussions in German newspapers on the anti-Semitic 
nature of the New Left and had Herbert Marcuse, whom many adherents of the New 
Left adored, fearing that the students were moving towards fascism.1292 For the GUPS 
however, the SDS position was a major success. 
The alliance between GUPS and the SDS was spearheaded by Amin al-Hindi, the 
GUPS leader in Frankfurt. In August 1969, about 50 SDS members joined their 
European comrades for a trip to Jordan, where they visited Fatah camps, received 
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military training and attended the Fifth Congress of the GUPS. 1293 Not only because 
of the attendance of European volunteers was the congress a success for Fatah. Amin 
al Hindi was elected GUPS chairman and Fatah expanded its majority in the GUPS 
executive committee.1294 Fatah now controlled both the GUPS and the PLO. The 
German pro-Palestinians were joined by leftists from all over Europe. Among them 
were forty-eight young Britons, many of them from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign. 
Arguments between Maoists and Trotskyists, who were critical of Fatah and tended to 
identify with the PFLP, soon led to a split in the movement.1295 Fatah representative in 
Switzerland Fuad El-Shamali also arranged for six left-wing students from Switzerland 
to be sent to Jordan.1296 These GUPS conferences and training camps were an ideal 
opportunity to link up with Europe’s adventure-seeking New Left. It was an experience 
which was filled with revolutionary romanticism. GUPS also used these events to link 
up with Irish nationalists. In 1970, Mairin de Burca from Sinn Fein, the political arm of 
the IRA, Sean Ryan, the head of the Irish-Arab friendship society and Jim Hamilton 
from the Union of Students were invited to attend the yearly GUPS congress from 
September 2 - 6 in Amman. Kuwait paid for their expenses. At every occasion, de 
Burca sought to link up the fight of the Palestinians with that of the Irish Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. The British embassy warned that Sinn Fein had exhausted all 
possibilities of peaceful protest against Israel and might therefore be tempted “to 
emulate the hijacking their Arab friends practise with such notorious impunity.”1297 One 
journalist called the event “a veritable guerrilla Disneyland”, since the congress was 
overshadowed by regular confrontations between the Fedayeen and the Jordanian 
army, a portent of the coming Jordanian Civil War.1298 After the conclusion of the 
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congress, the attendants had trouble returning back to Europe. Germany refused entry 
to one of the last machines departing for Frankfurt, and the flight had to be rerouted. 
The European attendants eventually arrived in Europe only after a long odyssey.1299  
In the years between 1967 and 1970, the German New Left’s Israeli enmity rapidly 
escalated. While the SDS had called for a pro-Arab-oriented neutrality in the 1967 war, 
only three years later, it openly advocated the destruction of Israel; it did so in a 
demonstration call by SDS Frankfurt on the occasion of the Israeli Foreign Minister 
Abba Ebban in 1970 in Bonn. On the one side, there was Israel, which was 
“economically and politically parasitic (…) with his imperialist function”, “chauvinistic 
and racist”, on the other side the Palestinian resistance, which was supported by the 
“Arab and peaceful people as well as the progressive and socialist forces in Europe 
and the US.”1300 This simple, Manichean world-view not only marked the German New 
Left but was internationally widespread. After 1967, the classification of Israeli Jews as 
an “oppressor nationality” vis-à-vis the “oppressed Palestinians” gained traction among 
the New Left, especially among Trotskyists. For instance, the thousand attendants at 
the national convention of the American Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party in 1971, the 
most influential socialist group in the USA, followed this line of thought and therefore 
decided that the Jews had no right of self-determination and their state was to be 
destroyed. The convention resolution declared: The struggle against anti-Semitism and 
the oppression of Jews in other countries is a progressive struggle directed against 
their oppressors. (…) The Israeli Jews form an oppressor nationality of a settler-
colonial character vis-a-vis the Arab peoples.”1301 The resolution defined anti-Semitism 
in the same anti-imperialist terms as the struggle between oppressor nations and 
oppressed nations. Consequently, it recognized the fight against anti-Semitism as a 
progressive cause. However, because the Israeli Jews allegedly formed an oppressor 
nation in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it denied the reality of anti-Semitism as 
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a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to conform to anti-imperialist theory. The 
German New Left was equally ignorant vis-à-vis the issue of anti-Semitism. Moreover, 
it showed a tendency toward a form of anti-Semitism which is widespread in Germany: 
Secondary anti-Semitism. After the protests against the visit of the Shah during which 
a student was shot by a policeman, the socialist student movement presented itself as 
the new Jews. An SDS press release after the manifestations identified the students 
as the “’Jews’ of anti-Communism.”1302 For the New Left, the ‘Jew’ was a metaphor for 
the victim of oppression. It paid little attention to the existence of the living Jew and 
even less to the Jew in his nation state, the Israeli. 
This anti-imperialist understanding of nationality or people is problematic in itself, 
merging the concepts of class and ethnicity. Whereas the imperialist metropolis, i.e. 
the Western states, are understood as complex, class-based societies, the societies 
of the peripheries are represented as a largely homogenous, oppressed body. Only at 
the price of enormous simplification and obfuscation can the clear distinction between 
oppressor nations and oppressed nations be upheld.1303 It is worth pointing out that 
similar concepts have informed the politics of genocide. Thus, the claim that non-
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were economic parasites led to the concept of the 
National Economy and its implementation by the Young Turks in 1913 – the economic 
disfranchisement then preceded the murder of the Empire’s Christian minorities.1304 
The Holocaust predicated on similar arguments. The German scholar Claudia Globisch 
has found a connection between anti-Western, anti-modern and anti-Semitic 
worldviews in anti-Imperialist New Left German writing. The national collective of the 
Jews, Israel, is associated with all the supposed vices of the West; racism, fascism, 
capitalism, colonialism and sexism. In contrast, anti-imperialist thinkers tend to portray 
the Arabs or Palestinians as a homogenously oppressed people, ignoring the social 
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and political tensions within these groups. Although the anti-imperialist Left generally 
tends to refrain from using the notion “Jewish”, it repeatedly refers to the Jewish identity 
of Israel and uses many of the stereotypes directly borrowed from anti-Semitic 
themes.1305 Thus, for instance, anti-Zionist left-wing groups have characterized Israel 
since the late 1960s as a frontier for capitalism, despite the country’s socialist heritage 
and its minor role in the World Economy compared to many Arab states, most notably 
the oil-rich Gulf states. Given this escalation of anti-Jewish rhetoric, it would come as 
no surprise that the radicalization of the New Left soon translated into violence. To a 
significant degree, this violence would be directed at Jews. Notable is the case of the 
far-left and anti-Semitic Tupamaros Group of Dieter Kunzelmann. On February 13, 
1970, arsonists set a Jewish home for the elderly ablaze, murdering seven people. 
Kunzelmann’s group was probably responsible for the attack. They had been 
instructed in the same Fatah military camps in Jordan in summer 1969 discussed 
above, which attracted so many New Left European activists.1306 The New Left’s anti-
imperialism was indeed inherently anti-Semitic. 
7.3 The Palestine Committees Network in Western Europe 
Since 1967, Arab and Palestinian officials as well as European sympathizers build a 
pan-European network to organize anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian activities. This 
network consisted of Palestine friendship societies, GUPS and Fatah representatives 
as well as the Arab League Offices. The existing GUPS and Fatah networks in Europe 
were the base of the pro-Palestinian network. In 1969, the ‘German gang’, Abdallah 
Frangi, Hani Hassan and Hayel Abdel Hamid set upon organizing GUPS chapters in 
other European countries.1307 A phase of rapid expansion followed. In September 
1970, the British acquired the list of all the GUPS representatives worldwide. In 
Western Europe, the GUPS had representatives in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the 
UK, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark. The most representatives were in the FRG 
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(25), reflecting the fact that the FRG was the main base. It was followed by Spain with 
8 representatives. The GUPS also possessed chapters in Eastern Europe in 
Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, with most of its representatives 
located in Yugoslavia. Moreover, there were GUPS chapters in Canada, Venezuela, 
Chile, China and Pakistan.1308 The GUPS’ importance in Fatah’s strategy cannot be 
overestimated. The organization provided access to Europe’s young elite, its 
intellectuals, lawyers and journalists. Most importantly, it forged an alliance with the 
nascent New Left.1309 Its domination of student politics and later the New Left’s 
influence on Social Democratic Parties, which were traditionally friendly to Israel, 
contributed to shifting the political climate in Europe towards the Palestinians. 
Since 1969, numerous Palestine Committees were established in Western Europe to 
coordinate anti-Zionist activities. In the FRG, the Maoist Sozialistische Palästina-
Komitee Heidelberg (Engl. Socialist Palestine Committee Heidelberg) was established 
in 1969. It identified with the left-wing Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP) and edited the magazine Die Front. The Palästina-Komitee in Bonn, which was 
established in 1971, took a pro-PLO position. It also edited its own magazine, titled Die 
Revolution (Al-Thaura). It took a lead in the pro-PLO majority of German PCs, which 
also included PCs in the German cities of Aachen, Bielefeld, Hamburg, Münster, Kiel 
and Göttingen. Often, the PC in Heidelberg and the one in Bonn would clash over the 
right line to take. Repeated endeavors, like at the Palestine Congress in November 
1973 in Bonn, to unite the pro-Palestinian solidarity scene in an umbrella group under 
the auspices of the PLO therefore failed. Only in 1975, the pro-PLO PCs could agree 
on editing a common press organ, the Freies Palästina. 1310 After the massacre of 
Israeli sportsmen at the Olympic Games in Munich, both the GUPS and the GUPA 
were banned in Germany on October 3, 1972. The German Federal Ministry of the 
Interior explained this step as a measure to prevent violent acts in Germany, although 
no GUPS members were proven to have been involved in the massacre, or were 
                                             
1308 “List of GUPS Representatives” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, September 
14, 1970), FCO 95/961. 
1309 Zelkovitz, Students and Resistance in Palestine, 43. 
1310 Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke, 85–87. 
 
379 
 
prosecuted. The Federal Ministry of the Interior estimated that at this point between 
800 and1000 persons were part of the GUPS. GUPS publications, such as the bulletin 
Resistenzia, were affected by the ban and closed down. Several leaders of the GUPS, 
including Abdallah al-Frangi and military recruiter Walim Nasir, were expelled. Nasir 
relocated to the University of Madrid, where he continued his recruiting activities.1311 
Abdallah Frangi would be readmitted to Germany after a few years. In response to the 
prohibition, the German PCs staged nationwide protests.1312  
A Palestine solidarity network was also established in Italy and France. In the late 
1960s, the Fatah representative in Rome, Wael Zwaiter, formed ties with numerous 
intellectuals, thereby laying the foundation for the Italian Committee for Solidarity with 
the Palestinian people (Ital. Comitato italiana per la solidarietà con il popolo 
palestinese), which is was set up in March 1969. The Communist Party and the Italian 
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity provided support for the committee. Numerous 
solidarity committees were also established in different Italian cities. They held a yearly 
convention. A group which called itself Arab Students Residing in Italy (Ital. studenti 
arabi residenti in Italia) and was associated with Fatah, appeared on the scene in 
November 1969, co-hosting with the Committee for Solidarity a public pro-Palestinian 
meeting in Rome. The Italian chapter of the GUPS was eventually created in this 
environment at a constitutive congress on May 14-15, 1971 in Perugia. After its 
establishment, the GUPS quickly assumed an important role in propagandizing the 
Palestinian cause at universities and in the general population. It also liaised 
intensively with left-wing organizations on behalf of pro-Palestinian activism.1313  
In France, the first PC was founded in June 1967, immediately after the war. In 1968, 
pro-Palestinian activists established the Association de Solidarité Franco-Arabe 
(ASFA). The group included not only members of the Left, but also adherents of De 
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Gaulle, moderate conservatives like Lucien Bitterlin and Louis Terrenoire, who were 
instrumental in the ASFA’s establishment. Lucien Bitterlin was notable for his proximity 
to the French state and intelligence service. During the Algerian War, he had been the 
head of the Mouvement pour la Communauté from 1960 until 1961 in Algeria. This was 
a clandestine group which supported De Gaulle’s policies in Algeria and was supported 
by the external French Intelligence Service, SDECE. Its mission was to infiltrate and 
combat the OAS, a paramilitary organization fighting against the independence of 
Algeria. Lucien Bitterlin’s involvement reflected the fact that De Gaulle had moved 
France’s foreign policy into a pro-Arab direction before the Six-Day  War.1314 Fatah 
members Mahmoud Hamchari and Muhammed Abou Mayer moved to Paris in January 
1969 to help organize the pro-Palestinian movement. They started publishing the 
newspaper Fedayeen and established Palestine Action Committees (Fr. comité action 
Palestine). In this endeavor, they collaborated with activists from the far-left. Unlike in 
other European countries, a significant number of French New Left activists were 
Jewish with the result that several far-left, Jewish anti-Zionist activists also played a 
role in the Palestine solidarity scene in France. The later scholar of Islam Maxime 
Rodinson or Benny Levy, Alain Geismar and Léo Levy from the Maoist Gauche 
Prolétarienne belonged to this group. The two latter later joined their European 
comrades in August 1969 to visit PLO camps in Jordan, where they were accompanied 
by Mahmoud Hamchari and Abou Mayer. Organized solidarity with Arab Palestinian 
nationalism by left-wing Jews dated back to the Six-Days War. Anti-Zionist Jews 
formed the Committee of Anti-Zionist Jews and reached out to their Muslim fellow 
students. The alliance would enter a crisis in 1972, when Jews faced anti-Semitism 
from their Muslim colleagues in the pro-Palestine movement and a series of anti-
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Semitic events occurred.1315 The discrepancy between its leader Benny Lévy, who 
condemned the Munich massacre, and its proletarian and Muslim base was a factor in 
the eventual dissolution of the Gauche Prolétarienne in 1973.1316 Both Fatah 
representatives in Rome and Paris were killed in 1972, probably by Mossad agents for 
their alleged involvement in the Munich massacre. 
Palestine friendship societies were also formed in smaller European countries like 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and Switzerland.1317 In 
Ireland, an Irish-Arab Friendship Society was founded in 1969. Initially, it was headed 
by Commandant Brennan-Whitmore, a veteran of the 1916 rebellion, but also a fascist 
activist and anti-Semite. Sean Ryan had him replaced after one year.1318 There was 
also the Irish-Arab Solidarity Committee, which was close to Sinn Fein. A chapter of it 
was active in London.1319 As discussed above, the Palestinians sought to co-opt the 
Irish struggle. In Belgium, later PLO representative Naim Khader was instrumental in 
building a pro-Palestinian network. His biography gives us a description of how 
Palestinian students in Europe joined Fatah and then went on to build advocacy 
groups. Originating from an Arab Christian village close to Jenin, Naim Khader studied 
in Beit Jala and Amman. In September 1966, Naim Khader traveled together with his 
younger brother Bichara to Belgium to study Law at the Catholic University of Leuven, 
which already harbored an Arab student community. Naim Khader became the 
president of the local Arab student association, trying to organize solidarity 
demonstrations for the Arab states during the Six-Day War, which were subsequently 
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banned by the University. He was also elected as the president of the association of 
foreign students, editing its Bulletin d’Information.1320 Among the members of the 
student association were also young Canadians from Quebec, who exposed a 
particular sympathy towards the Palestinian cause.1321 In the course of 1968, Khader 
joined Fatah. On September 30, 1969, he received the full authorization from Fatah for 
“collecting money to help the families of the resistance and the martyrs who die on the 
battlefield. Arab and free Palestine shall live!”1322 The collection of money for the 
bereaved had served as a codeword since the days of the Arab Revolt 1936-39 for 
fundraising activities, this time on behalf of the paramilitary struggle of Fatah. Khader 
had the feeling that the Europeans were suffering a ‘guilt complex’ because of the 
Holocaust, which was exploited by “the efficiency of the Zionist propaganda.”1323 It was 
his mission to change this. Out of different local Palestinian Committees, a national 
organization, the Association Belgo-Palestinienne, was formed on November 23, 1974, 
one day after the PLO’s recognition by the UN General Assembly. The Association 
edited the magazine Palestine and was headed by Jean Delfosse, the editor of the left-
wing journal Revue Nouvelle, which had published several of Khader’s articles in the 
past. The Libyans had been in close contact with Delfosse since the start and paid the 
whole budget of the new association, amounting to a million BEF in 1974. At this time, 
the close association with the political Left worried Khader, as it limited the public 
appeal of the PLO. However, projects to diversify the support base to form a new 
organization, despite being encouraged by the Arab ambassadors in Belgium, 
failed.1324 
There were repeated endeavors to commit the different pro-Palestinian organizations 
to a common platform. At the first European working meeting of the PCs in Vienna on 
March 26, 1971, they agreed on a common program. The program rejected any peace 
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between Israel and the Palestinians because the Israelis were not a nation. Instead, it 
mandated the “complete destruction of Israel” through “armed popular war”. 1325 The 
text also implied that the PCs understood themselves as a propaganda and political 
lobby group of the PLO.1326 The PCs were indeed a formidable instrument to advance 
the PLO agenda in Europe. In 1972, another umbrella group was established. The 
European Committee for the Coordination of Friendship Associations of the Arab 
World, CECAAMA (Fr. Comité Européen de Coordination des Associations d’Amitié 
avec le Monde Arabe) was established in 1972 by the French ASFA, The Council for 
Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and the Swiss Groupe d’Etudes sur le Moyen 
Orient (GEMO).1327 The Swiss were informed about the organization by an inside 
source, who provided them with a detailed view of the inner workings of the committee. 
The CECAAMA edited the bulletin Eurabia. One of the first actions of the CECAAMA 
was to pen a letter to President Nixon dated May 14, 1973. The letter called for the 
withdrawal of US support from Israel. It was also published by the Palestinian 
Liberation Army, an armed wing of the PLO, in its organ Arab Palestinian Resistance 
in July 1973, accompanied by anti-Semitic imagery. Taking up tested anti-Zionist 
claims, the letter alleged that US support for Israel was against the United States’ own 
interests and that it was controlled by a small minority of Zionists not loyal to the US 
state: “No American lives are at stake. You will be endangering no vital American 
interests — on the contrary, you will be protecting the real interests of the U.S. in the 
Middle East. The only disagreeable consequence will be that you will have to face 
violent protests from Israel and from Zionist pressure groups in the United States who 
put Israel’s interests above those of their own country. Is this too high a price to pay 
for peace in the Middle East?”1328 As we will see, the CECAAMA was better organized 
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and more influential than the PCs could ever be due to its establishment and moderate 
outlook. 
The CECAAMA organized one to two conferences each year, which were attended by 
the leading representatives of pro-Arab organizations from Western Europe and of the 
Arab League. Its aim was to coordinate the campaigns of different pro-Arab 
organizations both with each other and with the Arab League. After a smaller reunion 
on May 26, 1973, the committee gathered again for its first major conference on 
November 24, 1973 in London. Besides its founding member, the conference was also 
attended by the Irish-Arab Society, the French Conférence des Chrétiens pour la 
Palestine, the Swiss Aide Suisse aux Refugiés du Moyen Orient (ASRMO) and the 
Swiss-Arab Society, the Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft, DAG (Engl. German-Arab 
Society), the constitutive committee of the Associazione di Amicizia Italo-Araba (Engl. 
Italian-Arab Friendship Association), from Belgium the Cercle d’amitié Belgo-Arabe as 
well as the Comité Palestine-Belgique and finally the Netherlands–Arab Institute. The 
list of attendants includes prominent names like Lelio Basso, a Socialist Italian senator 
at the time of the conference and a member of the Russel Tribunal. Others were the 
French Gaullist politician Raymond Offroy and the British Labour MP Christopher 
Mayhew. Some of the initial participants are still active to this day. Harald Bock for 
instance, the representative of the German-Arab Society (DAG), still officiates as the 
group’s General Secretary. The Swiss representatives were Hans Ellenberger from the 
Swiss-Arab Society and Georges Vaucher from the Aide Suisse aux refugiés du Moyen 
Orient, who had already attended the first meeting in Paris.1329 Representatives of the 
Arab League Offices in London, Geneva, Paris and Brussels were also present at 
these conferences. The importance the Arab League placed in the CECAAMA was 
further underlined by the presence of Ibrahim Shukralla, the League’s Information 
Director. Another illustrious guest was Amin Gemayel, at the time a Christian Lebanese 
parliamentarian for the Phalanges Party and later president of Lebanon at the May 
1973 reunion.1330 His presence is somewhat surprising. After all, during the Israeli 
incursion into Lebanon in 1982, the Israelis were often accused by European pro-
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Palestinian activists of being fascists because they collaborated with the Christian 
Phalangist militias. 
Several decisions were taken at the November 1973 conference which concerned the 
future workings of the CECAAMA. The body was to be directed by an Executive 
Bureau, consisting of one representative each from CAABU, ASFA, DAG, ASRMO, 
the Irish-Arab Society, and the Netherlands–Arab Institute, as well as one 
representative from Italy and Belgium.1331 The conference also confirmed the French 
Lucien Bitterlin of ASFA as the Secretary General of the Committee, and the British 
John Reddaway, the director of administration of CAABU, as Treasurer until 1975. 1332 
The attendants also discussed a number of ideas to advance the Palestinian cause in 
Europe. Raymond Offroy informed the delegates on the creation of a group of French 
parliamentarians sympathizing with the Arab cause whose aim was to coordinate the 
policies of France with those of the Arab states. Together with the British Labour MP 
Christopher Mayhew, who was equally present at the conference, he planned to 
expand this group to the European level. 1333 Indeed, such efforts resulted in the 
creation of the Parliamentary Association for the Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC) not 
long afterwards, which will be discussed further below.1334 Another project, proposed 
by John Reddaway (CAABU), envisioned that the European Economic Community 
(EEC) would provide foreign aid for the Palestinian Arabs to foster their economic and 
social development. The plan was forwarded to the Executive Bureau for further 
discussion. With regards to media relations, it was suggested that a memorandum be 
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written for the Arab League and the Arab countries, in order to facilitate the exchange 
of information between the Arabs and their European supporters.1335 
The Executive Bureau met for the first time on January 26, 1974 in Paris to discuss the 
CECAAMA’s finances, propaganda and administration. Two weeks later, on February 
9, 1974, the Executive Bureau reconvened in Paris to discuss among other things  
future conferences and the expenses of the Committee. Besides the delegates from 
five countries, a member from the PLO was present at the meeting.1336 Other meetings 
of the Executive Bureau took place in March and on June 8, 1974 in Paris. At the 
meeting in June, the dispatchment of a delegation to the PLO was discussed. The 
purpose of the mission was to hear the PLO’s opinion on the future work of the 
CECAAMA. Upon the return of the delegation, documentation was to be prepared on 
the origins and aims of the Palestinian national movement and this was to be 
distributed to all journalists accredited at the Geneva Conference on the Middle East. 
Another agenda item concerned the establishment of contact with the Palestinian 
representatives in the US in order to coordinate with them on their activities. 
Furthermore, the CECAAMA planned to hold two talks, one of them in Geneva, on the 
Palestinian issue. 1337 The talk eventually took place on November 25, 1974 in Geneva 
under the auspices of Lucien Bitterlin and dealt with the situation in Lebanon and the 
Golan. During the talk, Israel was accused of the destruction of the Syrian city of 
Kuneitra and of planning to ‘exterminate’ the residents of Southern Lebanon in order 
to annex the area.1338 Two weeks before, on November 9 and 10, 1974, the Executive 
Bureau had reconvened in Paris. There, Lucien Bitterlin reported on the parliamentary 
action in the aftermath of the preparatory conference for the Euro-Arab Parliamentary 
Dialogue, which had taken place two months earlier in Damascus. Furthermore, he 
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notified the Bureau, that European volunteers for Palestinian guerrilla forces, which he 
euphemistically called “peace commandos”, would henceforth be refused from 
entering Lebanon for fear of Israeli reprisals. The members of the Executive Bureau 
were also tasked to write letters to their respective governments in order to influence 
them ahead of the debate on Palestine at the UN?, which was scheduled for November 
22, 1974. 1339 This debate eventually resulted in the adoption of UN resolutions 3236 
and 3237, which declared the “right to national independence and sovereignty” of the 
Palestinian people and granted observer status to the PLO, an immense victory for the 
Palestinian national movement.1340 
The reports of the French mole inside the organization also provide an insight into the 
funding of CECAAMA. In the beginning, the financial means of the Committee were 
humble. At the first conference in May 1973 it was planned that CAABU would finance 
the Committee for six months with an amount of £5’000.1341 As one might expect, the 
CECAAMA was financed predominantly by Arab sources, but additionally by the 
French. According to the anonymous source cited in a memo of the Swiss federal 
police, the CECAAMA’s expenses were covered by 60% to 65% by Arab states, 35% 
by France and 5% by the Arab League.1342 Part of the money allegedly came from 
ARAF, the Arab support fund for Arab friendship societies.1343In June 1974, it was 
announced to the Executive Bureau that Algeria would transfer five million dollars to 
the CECAAMA.1344 This seems an incredibly high sum, especially given that two years 
later, the CECAAMA appeared to be broke. At the time of another conference of the 
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Executive Committee on March 27, 1976 in Paris, it was noted that the expenses 
exceeded the income: the CECAAMA had only 170’000 francs left, about 37’000 US 
dollars at the contemporary exchange rate. A further 900’000 francs from Arab donors 
were promised to be transferred in the course of the next six months. 1345 Given these 
regular incomes, it is evident that the CECAAMA’s partners considered its work to be 
highly important. 
7.4 Establishment anti-Zionism: The CAABU in Britain 
In the UK, the pro-Arab anti-Zionism which harked back to that of the mandate era, 
had not disappeared after 1948. Edward Spears’ anti-Zionist group the Anglo-Arab 
Association, an umbrella group of British anti-Zionists founded in 1946, continued its 
existence until 1961, when it then regrouped as the Anglo-Arab Club.1346 Since the 
1950s, the Labour MP Margaret McKay had been the leading advocate of the Arab 
cause in Britain. In the 1960s, she was the chairwoman of the Anglo-Jordanian 
Alliance, a group of pro-Arab parliamentarians. Her pro-Arab advocacy met little 
success, apparently, as in 1967 she stated: “I have been doing my damndest in the 
House to try to get an understanding between the two sides. I have tried in the House 
to form Anglo-Arab associations because the Arabs are so bad at stating the case, if 
they have one.”1347 Like in other European countries, this was about to change. After 
the Six-Day War, both left-wing and mainstream anti-Zionism in the US gained ground.  
There were several factors contributing to this turn of the tide. One of them was the 
attitude of the British Foreign Office. Like the American State Department, the Foreign 
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Office had traditionally tended towards an antagonistic position regarding Zionism. 
After the Six-Day War, Foreign Secretary George Brown complained “that the Arab 
Case was hardly ever heard in this country” and that he was seeking to change this.1348 
This was hardly an accurate sentiment, but it was shared by many in Europe. They felt 
that European public opinion had tilted too much towards the Israelis during the recent 
war and they set out to change this. Moreover, the overwhelming Israeli victory for the 
moment overshadowed all internecine rifts such as that between the ‘revolutionary’, 
Nasserist and the conservative countries. On July 19, 1967, Labour MP Colin Jackson 
informed the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that he and Conservative MP 
Ian Gilmour were to set up a new organization with the goal of promoting further Arab-
British understanding, and invited the Minister of State to join its founding meeting on 
July 27, 1967. A great number of MPs, Arabists, scholars and other distinguished 
personalities had also been invited to attend the meeting.1349 The membership 
eventually included politicians such as Labour MPs Margaret McKay and Christopher 
Mayhew, the Arabists Anthony Nutting and John Glubb, the Orientalist scholars Albert 
Hourani, Kathleen Kenyon, Arnold Toynbee, John Allegro and many others. The 
founding MPs Colin Jackson and Ian Gilmour served as chairmen, while Elizabeth 
Collard served as joint honorary secretary. CAABU’s declared aims and objects 
expressed special sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs, and affirmed that Britain could 
not be indifferent to their situation in light of their former administration of the Palestine 
mandate.1350 
Colin Jackson was a member of the Anglo-UAR parliamentary group, and had met 
Nasser recently in January 1967 to discuss the improvement of bilateral relations, 
which was also a paramount goal for the FO.1351 Such efforts had been hampered by 
the war. In the beginning, the Foreign Office’s NENAD therefore welcomed the 
establishment of the new pro-Arab body "in the hope that it would lead to an 
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improvement in our relations with the Arab world as a whole." 1352 It was also expecting 
that the presence of respected personalities directing the organization would exert a 
“(…) moderating influence on those with extremist ideas on the Arab Cause.” 1353 The 
FO endorsed a proposal by CAABU to establish informal links, underlining the 
proximity between the FO and CAABU. Henceforth, CAABU activists and FO officials 
would regularly meet up.1354 Apparently, the rapprochement between the CAABU and 
the FO was motivated by concern about the pro-Israeli mood which reigned in the 
country – as in much of Western Europe – after the Six-Day War. The FO thus noted 
that CAABU might “(…) serve redress some of the balance now in favour of the number 
of Anglo-Jewish, Zionists and Israeli societies in this country.”1355 The opportunity to 
report on positive views via the Arab world was immediately seized on by British 
diplomats in the Arab world. Thus, the British representative in Sudan was looking for 
more information for the FO to publicize among the locals in order to foster Anglo-Arab 
friendship and improve Britain’s reputation, which was perceived as “rather cold-
hearted and unsympathetic.”1356 The establishment of CAABU was not only welcomed 
by the Arabists at the FO, but also by the Arab League Office in London.1357 
However, it soon became clear that CAABU would not have its message controlled by 
the FO. On November 2, 1967, CAABU planned to hold a counter event to a Balfour 
Declaration memorial event in London attended by the Israeli foreign minister Abba 
Eban, considering inviting the famous Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal, who was 
close to Nasser, to the event. CAABU member Elizabeth Collard chose to discuss the 
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event with Foreign Secretary George Brown in advance in an effort to get his 
acquiescence. She also expressed support for continuing the close links with the FO 
and offered her help. Extreme Arab nationalists like John Glubb, she reported on a 
positive note, were losing influence within CAABU.1358 Still, the Foreign Secretary 
George Brown did not approve of the event but did not dare confront Elizabeth Collard 
directly during their conversation, expecting that she would relay it to the Arabs with 
“discouraging effect”. Instead, he preferred to use other back-channels to relay his 
opinion.1359 CAABU continued to seek attendance by British officials at their events, 
but these refrained from coming due to CAABU’s pro-Arab point of view.1360 
In February 1968, CAABU held its first public conference. The speakers excoriated 
Israel’s treatment of the Palestine Arab refugees and the allegedly nefarious influence 
of the Zionist influence in the UK and in the US, while the “Arabs’ view had been 
neglected”. Through its activities, CAABU had “started to fill a gap,” the English-
language Egyptian newspaper Egyptian Gazette reported. Still the newspaper warned 
that CAABU had powerful enemies, as “In Britain, scarcely less than in the US, Zionism 
commands the power of financial control over large sectors of the economy.”1361 
Despite CAABU’s clear pro-Arab advocacy, there were also voices from the Arab press 
which felt that CAABU was not going far enough. A Lebanese newspaper even 
criticized Colin Jackson and Elizabeth Collard of being sympathizers of Israel, because 
Collard had allegedly expressed a positive impression of Israel during a trip to the 
country. Consequently, the newspaper called on Arab governments to cut their funding 
for CAABU.1362 In May 1968, Collard was planning a trip to the Middle East. She also 
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hoped to visit Jerusalem, but without getting in touch with Israeli officials, as she told 
the FO. She feared that such a contact might put her reputation as a pro-Arab activist 
at risk. She also solicited help from the British consulate in Jerusalem to travel from 
Jordan to Israel. Yet the consul declined to help, saying that her status travelling as a 
journalist did not justify the requested provision of services.1363 Upon Collard’s return 
to Jordan, she blamed the Israelis for having expelled Arabs from the areas of Latrun 
and Jabel Mukaber, creating space for Israeli settlements.1364 The British consul found 
no truth in these statements, writing to the Eastern Department: "There is no evidence 
at all that the Israelis are settling their people in the Latroun or that they have Arabs 
from the Jebel Mukabbir."1365 
CAABU was not totally independent from the wave of New Left anti-Zionism. The 
young activist Grania Birkett joined the CAABU office staff in July 1969.1366 Birkett also 
wrote for the magazine Free Palestine, which had been established by Fatah 
supporters in 1968.1367 In the summer of 1969, she travelled to the Middle East, 
authoring a report on the situation in the West Bank.1368 Michael Adams, a former 
Guardian journalist, worked as CAABU’s director of information and John Reddaway 
as the director of administration.1369 According to the Jewish Chronicle, CAABU had 
paid for a trip of Guardian journalist Michael Adams to the Middle East before he had 
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become its Director of Information, i.e. the person responsible for public diplomacy.1370 
When the CAABU General Meeting took place in November 1969, its director Michael 
Adams felt that the public mood was swinging towards the Arabs because articles 
critical of Israel began to appear in the mainstream press like the Times. This changing 
press coverage could be used “as a springboard to launch us in making some real 
headway in the coming year.”1371 Adams advised that they continue their public 
diplomacy work like they had done for the last two years successfully. Indeed, CAABU 
had displayed a diverse array of activities, which ranged from letters to newspaper 
editors to the staging of regular events. Adams also observed the activities of Jewish 
anti-Zionists with satisfaction, “because it emphasizes the fundamental distinction 
between the Jew and the Zionist, and that is vitally important.”1372 
CAABU had not been envisioned as a mass organization. Despite that, it grew during 
the first two years of its existence. In 1969, it had about 860 members, 200 more than 
one year before. However, it estimated that this bore no relation to “the amount of 
public sympathy we now command”.1373 It also succeeded in making no inroads. In 
1969, Christopher Mayhew established the Labour Middle East Committee to organize 
the pro-Arab voices in the party. More than twenty MPs joined the new body, the offices 
of which neighbored that of CAABU’s. CAABU also planned to build new regional 
branches and to establish a coordination committee with the other established pro-
Arab body in the UK, the Anglo-Arab Association.1374 The rapid and successful 
management of CAABU was also due to its competent management. Christopher 
Mayhew had had experience with propaganda work before. In 1948, as a parliament 
undersecretary, he had been instrumental in setting up the Foreign Office's Information 
Research Department, which was tasked with countering Soviet propaganda.1375 
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Margaret McKay also rode the wave of rising pro-Arab sympathy in the country – and 
Arab readiness to invest in it. In February 1969, Margaret McKay opened an Arab 
Centre in London. She received funds for this endeavor from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan 
Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi.1376 In October 1969, she acquired a building for 
£50’000 in London with the money donated by the Sheikh. In a public statement, she 
said provocatively that the building would serve as a “forward station for the 
Guerillas”.1377 After the statement led to criticism in the press, she declared that she 
was against the activity of the Fedayeen and that they would not be allowed into the 
building.1378  
A new Conservative government under Prime Minister Edward Heath came to power 
on June 19, 1970. Sir Alec Douglas-Home served as Foreign Secretary. The new 
government continued the Labour policy of seeking a rapprochement with the Arabs. 
On October 31, 1970, Sir Alec Douglas-Home spoke to the Conservative Party in 
Harrogate. The speech became a watershed moment in British Middle East policy. 
Douglas-Home called for a settlement on the basis of the truce lines of 1949. The 
Israelis felt that this was in contravention of UNSCR 242.1379 Moreover, he expressed 
support for Palestinian self-determination: “The need for a just settlement of the 
refugee problem is pressing, although it is unrealistic to suppose that a settlement will 
be reached before the other issues of which I have spoken are resolved. And we must 
not ignore the political aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs and their desire to be given 
a means of self-expression. We cannot support any political programme which would 
involve the disappearance of the state of Israel; this is what the Palestinian resistence 
[sic] organisations at present demand.” 
CAABU sought to push the government into an even more pro-Arab direction. On July 
14, 1970, Minister of State John Godber of the FCO met with Conservative MP and 
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CAABU member Dennis Walters. Out of this conversation seems to have grown the 
idea to draft a statement for the FCO, which amounted to a ‘mea culpa’ for British 
Middle East policy since the Balfour declaration. The statement would point out that 
the British mandate had sought to create a state within which both Arabs and Jews 
could live peacefully together. According to this declaration, it had never been Britain’s 
intention “that the Arab population of Palestine should be deprived of their homes and 
native land and forced to become either exiles or the unwilling subjects of a Jewish 
state.”1380 Britain would support a redress for the loss of the Palestinians, which was 
the central issue of the Middle East conflict.1381 Douglas-Home rejected the idea of 
putting out such a statement, but endorsed its substance to some degree. He 
responded that the British government was recognizant of the fate of the Palestinian 
refugees and had addressed them in his Harrogate speech. However, such an openly 
pro-Arab statement was liable to raise the hopes of the Palestinians beyond those 
expected in a future settlement. Douglas-Home also disagreed that all Palestinians 
had been expelled from Palestine, as many had found refuge in the West Bank, Gaza 
or had stayed in Israel. However, he agreed with Walters that “the Palestinians lie at 
the heart of the conflict in the Middle East.”1382 This realization would guide the policy 
of the Conservative government in Britain. 
7.5 Fatah, the Swiss Palestine Committees and International Terrorism 
As discussed above, the Arab League and Fatah worked together in Switzerland to 
promote the Palestinian cause during the 1969 trial against three PFLP terrorists. 
Fatah representative Fuad coordinated this campaign from Geneva. This network 
remained active after 1969, with Fuad Shamali still taking a central role in it. Shamali 
not only liaised with Swiss anti-Zionists, but also seems to have been responsible for 
Fatah operations in all of Europe, routinely meeting with Fatah-leader Arafat while 
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enjoying great autonomy in his action. According to Genoud’s biographer Pierre Péan, 
he was the center of a militant network which included other former members of the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP. This group consisted among others of Ali 
Hassan Salameh, Mahmoud Hamchari, and Daoud Barakat. Shamali also introduced 
the Nazi and Liberation Nationalist, François Genoud, to this circle. According to the 
latter, this group also constituted the core of Black September .1383 The Fatah presence 
in Switzerland was strengthened in April 1969 with the arrival of Abdel-Majid Zeinat, 
who was officially temporarily studying at the University of Geneva. In fact, she also 
worked for Fatah and assisted Shamali from that point onwards.1384 Zeinat had already 
been registered as a member of the Egyptian embassy in 1960.1385 It is uncertain 
whether she left the country in the meantime. 
As Shamali travels Europe extensively, one cannot fail to notice that his travel 
destinations mysteriously also happen to become the targets of terrorism. In a phone 
call with Zeinat on August 29, Shamali speaks cryptically of the ‘Luxemburg and 
Belgium question’, asking her when she could make it to Belgium. He announces that 
he will give her further information on the subject at a later time. On September 2, the 
Arab League secretary Simone Koueter asks Shamali what she should do with two 
packages which had arrived from Beirut. Koueter is obviously ignorant of their content. 
Shamali tells her to deliver the packages to his home before 13:00. At 14:05 on the 
same day, he takes a Swissair flight from Geneva airport to Brussels, where he stays 
until September 5, 1969.1386 Three days later, September 8, 1969, the El-Al offices in 
Brussels as well as the Israeli embassies in The Haag and Bonn are shattered by 
                                             
1383 ebd., S. 339 
1384 CH-BAR#E4320-05C#1995/234*137*, Contrôle téléphonique de El-Shamali, 
17.07.1969-31.10.1969, 26 November 1969 
1385 CH-Bar#E2001E#1976/17#4390*, Zeinab El Biali - Members of the Embassy of 
the United Arab Republic, 23 Dezember 1960 
1386 CH-BAR#E4320-05C#1995/234*137*, Contrôle téléphonique de El-Shamali, 
17.07.1969-31.10.1969, 26 November 1969 
 
397 
 
explosions. 1387 The events cited are indicative that Shamali was involved in the attack. 
Despite the PLO’s terrorist activities against Switzerland, the country seems to have 
served as a safe haven for the PLO during this period. Beside the presence of semi-
official Fatah members, it also witnessed regular visits by its senior staff. On March 25, 
1970 for instance, Shamali announced to the Arab League Office in Geneva the arrival 
of Mohammed Said Kamal on March 29.1388 M. Said Kamal was then unknown to the 
Swiss police. However, he was a senior PLO leader who had worked since 1970 as 
the Assistant to the Chief of Political Affairs in the PLO.1389 Zeinat took care of Kamal 
during his stay in Switzerland where he visited the Syrian embassy and four 
Palestinians in Zurich, Berne and Basel.1390 Shamali’s suspicious activities eventually 
occasioned an entry ban into Switzerland in 1970. In spite of this, he continued to visit 
Switzerland regularly on the grounds of medical treatment until his death of cancer on 
September 5, 1972. After the brutal murder of eleven Israeli athletes and one German 
police officer by a Black September commando during the Olympics in Munich 
Germany on September 5 and 6 1972, Shamali’s involvement in international terrorism 
came to the attention of the public. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Lebanese 
newspaper Al Moharrer (Engl. the Liberator) published a eulogy on him, terming him 
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the “hero of Munich”.1391 However, no public investigation ever revealed whether he 
really was the mastermind behind Black September. 
Daoud Amin Barakat, a young Fatah operative who was born in Jerusalem in 1942, 
arrived in Switzerland in 1970. Officially, he worked as the Palestinian delegate of the 
Red Crescent.1392 However, unofficially, he took over the duties of Shamali. Not too 
much is publicly known of Barakat’s background. The Swiss believed Barakat to have 
been living in Germany since 1965, where he had allegedly worked for Fatah. 
However, if this was the case, he did not fulfill a very prominent role, as he is not 
mentioned in Frangi’s autobiography or in the relevant literature on the period. In 
Switzerland, Barakat served in several functions. First, as an unofficial PLO 
representative, receiving a monthly wage of $250 from the Arab League, but also as a 
member of the Arab League Office which was attached to the Yemeni delegation at 
the UN. Barakat’s frequent travels to other European countries and to the Middle East 
indicated that he occupied a leading role in the European network of the PLO. He often 
visited Paris, Rome and Germany to meet with his contacts and with sympathizers of 
the Palestinian cause.1393 Barakat would soon enter into negotiations with the Swiss 
authorities on the opening of a PLO office in Geneva, as will be discussed below in 
more detail. 
Like his Fatah colleague Shamali, Daoud Barakat maintained close contact with the 
Swiss pro-Palestinian solidarity scene. In the early 1970s, Palestine Committees (PC) 
were established in Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich and Basel, succeeding the numerous 
pro-Palestinian friendship groups which had been formed in the period from 1967-69. 
The two major PCs in Switzerland were the one in Zurich and the one in Geneva. I will 
concentrate on the former to tell the story of the PCs. The Palestine Committee in 
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Zurich was established in 1972 as an umbrella group for pro-Palestinian left-wing 
groups active in the city and dominated by the communist party PDA (Ger. Partei der 
Arbeit). In the course of the first year of its existence, the PDA however progressively 
retreated from the PC. Instead, young New Left activists took over. This group included 
the couple Adriana Trezzini from the canton of Ticino and Sergio Mantovani from 
Grisons, who worked as journalists at the national television station. Other leading 
members were Gian Battista Bacchetta,  Lucien Leitess, Daniel Vischer, Thomas 
Heilmann and René Horlacher. The publishing house Eco Libro Verlag of Giorgio 
Bellini served as the postal address of the PC Zurich. These were the key persons of 
the committee. All of the members belonged to the Zurich scene of the New Left and 
most of them studied at the University of Zurich. The committee was in close contact 
with Daoud Barakat and the Geneva committee leaders, Antoine Guinand and his wife. 
But apart from the functionaries of the PLO and the Arab League, there was no Arab 
element in the group. The few local Arabs in Zurich seem not to have shown any 
interest in its work.1394 
The PC Zurich showed little activity until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. 
Energized by the war, the PC Zurich planned to raise awareness by the screening of 
movies on the Palestine issue in Switzerland. Barakat, who regularly attended the 
meetings of the PC Zurich, also in November and December 1973, helped acquire 
these movies and covered a part of the expenses for showing them.1395 The movies, 
which were shown in the following years in Switzerland, were part of what has been 
called “anti-Zionist cinema.” While the first such movies were realized by Jordanian 
Fatah members, French and Swiss directors close to the New Left soon took over, 
including such eminent figures as the iconic filmmaker Jean Luc Godard, who harbored 
strong anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic convictions. The production of these movies was 
not only ideologically inspired by Fatah, but also enjoyed the guerrilla movement’s 
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direct logistical and financial support. The first and most popular movie realized in this 
fashion was ‘Palestine vaincra’ by Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 1396 It was also 
repeatedly screened in Switzerland at the events of the Palestine committees.1397 With 
the Middle East again at the center of the political debate, far-left organizations also 
showed a greater interest in becoming active within the framework of the PC Zurich. 
The Revolutionäre Aufbau Zürich, the Progressive Organisationen Zürich (POCH) and 
the Lotta di Classe (Engl. Class struggle) all sent their representatives to the meetings 
of the PC Zurich. The communist PDA (Ger. Partei der Arbeit, Engl. Party of Labour) 
withdrew its representatives from the party after losing control of the PC Zurich.1398 
POCH was the most influential among these organizations. In the tradition of the 
German New Left, the POCH discourse on the Arab-Israeli conflict was extremely anti-
Zionist and in fact often anti-Semitic. Thus, even conspiracy theories claiming that 
Palestinian terrorism in Europe was organized by the “Zionists”, were reprinted in its 
official organ PO-CH.1399 
At their national meeting in September 1974 in Berne, the Palestine Committees 
established several ideological guidelines (Ger. Palästina-Plattform des Komitees), to 
which the POCH had to subscribe in order to qualify for collaboration. The POCH 
agreed. The document containing these guidelines was extremely violent and 
nationalistic. It was heavily influenced by conspirational thought and ignored all shades 
in the conflict. There was a clear dichotomy: On the one side, there was the oppressed 
nation of the Palestinian; on the other side, Zionist and imperialist oppressors that 
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colluded “in order to try denying the fact of a Palestinian nation.” The document 
declared: “We expose the direct link, which exists between the global Imperialism and 
the Zionist occupation. (…) We confront the propaganda of the Zionists and their allies, 
of which the Swiss bourgeoisie, the aim of which is to slander the struggles of the Arab 
and in particular the Palestinian people. (…) We expose the role of Switzerland in the 
Middle East, which very clearly stands by the side of the imperialist powers and against 
the oppressed people.”1400 This is not the place to evaluate the facticity of these claims 
in their entirety. Still, it is worth pointing out that at this moment, Israel was still 
governed by the left-wing Labor party and much of its economy nationalized. Support 
for Israel in the West never did rest on economic arguments, but on moral ones. On 
the other hand, the economic interests of Western states, including Switzerland, in the 
Arab world were substantial. Those who denied this had just been proven wrong by 
the recent OPEC boycott of countries perceived to be favoring Israel. In fact, those 
who did advocate Arab and later Palestinian interests on the government level had 
always done so on the basis of economic arguments. Claims made in the document 
seemed to be more inspired by anti-Semitic images of Jewish wealth and power, 
arguments which had fascinated, as described above, Arab propagandists in the West 
since the start, rather than by an honest analysis of the conflict in 1974. Unfortunately, 
this simplistic document is symptomatic for the discourse in the Swiss pro-Palestinian 
and far-left scene in the 1970s with regard to the topic. The level of discourse was 
surprisingly low, particularly in light of the fact that many of the PC’s activists had 
academic backgrounds. There was little interest in analyzing the conflict in depth, even 
from a pro-Palestinian perspective. The discourse relied heavily on the repetition of 
stereotypes and slogans. The lack of depth was covered up by the excessive use of 
catchwords like Zionism or Imperialism, which were usually filler-words for Jewish, 
Israeli, US or Western. There is no detectable effort to engage in independent or 
original thought. One gets the impression that the Swiss activists were merely 
interested in working as propagandists for the PLO. This intense activism came at the 
expense of intellectual depth. 
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The PC Zurich and the POCH organized a four-day Palestine information week on 
February 4-7 at the University of Zurich and the ETH. During this time, POCH member 
Daniel Vischer, later a prominent pro-Palestinian activist, was mentioned for the first 
time in the police reports, as he requested permission for Sami Mussalim, a Palestinian 
student from Bonn and a member of the local Palestine Committee, to speak at the 
event. The events, which were mostly attended by far-left activists, included 
discussions and the showing of five pro-Palestinian movies which had partly been 
acquired by Barakat. In his speech, Sami Mussalim called for the destruction of Israel 
by the PLO and its replacement by a state “without religious and state discrimination.” 
Only Jews of Palestinian origin would be allowed to remain in the state. 1401 After the 
successful organization of the event, the PC Zurich wrote a draft for a brochure “against 
the “Zionist propaganda lies”, summarizing its views about Israel and spreading 
knowledge on the PLO and its military struggle, which was set to be published. 
According to the draft, the brochure would characterize Zionism as a racist and 
imperialist movement of the “Jewish bourgeoisie”, which had gained control of 
Palestine through terrorism and collaboration with feudalist exploiters. According to the 
draft, French, British and US Imperialism were the midwives of Zionism and an 
independent existence of Israel without imperialist support was not feasible. The 
authors seem to have been unaware that the foreign policy goals of these countries in 
the Middle East had often been at odds with each other, also regarding Zionism and 
Israel.1402 
During 1974 until 1976, the PC Zurich organized regular events relating to the issue of 
Palestine: film screenings, photo presentations, and discussions. Allegedly Palestinian 
handwork, propaganda posters or Fatah memorabilia were usually sold at these 
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events. Still, the expenses for these events were usually covered by the Arab League. 
The PC Zurich therefore worked to some extent as a contractor of the Arab League 
and the PLO. Besides Barakat, Adan El-Amad, an employee of the Arab League Office 
in Geneva, liaised with the PC Zurich.1403 Despite this support, the PC Zurich found 
itself in financial trouble after a four-day exposition in June 1974 and the Arab League 
agreed to pay its debts.1404 Unlike the PC in Zurich, which was dominated by the New 
Left, there was a strong intersectional element within the Geneva PC. First there were 
the left-wing activists like Antoine Guinand. The bourgeois anti-Zionist Georges 
Vaucher also continued to be active within its ranks. Then there were the Arab 
representatives, including Daoud Barakat and his collaborators as well as officials from 
the Arab League. An event which was organized by Antoine Guinand on behalf of the 
committee in January 1974, which hosted the Lebanese lawyer M. G. Majdalani, was 
also attended by Soviet delegates. The Swiss authorities were more worried about the 
co-optation of the Palestine cause through the extreme Left than about the activities 
themselves. The inspector responsible for the surveillance of the Geneva group 
commented: “Although we believe that certain aspirations of the Palestinian people are 
without doubt legitimate, we need to remind ourselves that the ‘Palestine Committee’ 
is also a committee of political liaison and Leftism whatever the costs.”1405 Throughout 
1974, the committee was extremely active, organizing regular conferences and 
demonstrations. The committee also started a campaign to raise awareness for the 
fate of the Palestinian prisoners in Israel. In November 1974, the Palestine committees 
in Geneva and Lausanne organized events as part of the campaign. Souheil Natour, a 
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member of the PLO’s research center in Beirut, was invited as a speaker. However, at 
the end of the month, only 600 signatures for a petition were collected during the 
campaign.1406 
PC Zurich members also used their private networks to raise awareness. Thus, through 
his work for Swiss television, Sergio Mantovani tried to bring the view-points of the 
PLO to the attention of the Swiss public. Thus, in 1974 he repeatedly arranged for 
Daoud Barakat to be interviewed in the Tagesschau, the main Swiss news show. 
Daoud Barakat seems to have been inexperienced in dealing with the media and 
several times declined interview requests, for which he was reprimanded by Mantovani 
during a phone call in May.1407 This was not the last time PC Zurich members would 
criticize Barakat. The PC Zurich was internationally connected with the PLO network 
and most of its leading activists had travelled to Lebanon, where the headquarters of 
the PLO was. Its members would attend international conferences for sympathizers of 
the PLO. In July 1974, Daoud Barakat asked Mantovani whether his girlfriend Adriana 
Trezzini would be able to attend a congress for women in Beirut taking place in August 
1974. She could not, because both were set to take their holidays. However, he 
suggested that female members from other progressive organizations in Switzerland 
could attend it.1408 Whether there was a Swiss delegation is unknown. In October 
moreover, Sergio Mantovani participated in an international meeting of pro-Palestinian 
organizations in London. Besides him, two other activists from Switzerland, Georges 
Vaucher and Ahmed Mella from the PC Geneva, participated in the conference.1409 
For November 1974, the different Palestine Committees in Switzerland planned a 
solidarity week with Palestinians who had recently been imprisoned by Israel, with 
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events taking place in several Swiss cities. The campaign was coordinated and funded 
by Daoud Barakat on behalf of the PLO, with Christina Guinand collecting the bills.1410 
In its invitation flyer, the policies of Israel vis-à-vis the Arabs and in the areas 
conquered by Israel in 1967 was explicitly compared to that of the “German occupation 
troops in the Second World War” and to “the policy, which South-Africa is 
conducting.”1411 From the start, there seem to have been problems of coordinating the 
work of the different Palestine committees in preparation for the event. Only four of 
forty invitees attended a planning meeting.1412 The event in Zurich was advertised in a 
street campaign where information material on the situation of the Palestinian 
prisoners in Israel was distributed. During one of those distributions a brawl broke out 
between PC Zurich members and supporters of Israel.1413 The information evening, 
which took place on November 22 in Zurich, was further marred by several 
occurrences. On short notice, Barakat cancelled his speech at the event. He was 
replaced by the little-known Swiss far-left activist Gertrud Germann, who called for the 
conquest and destruction of Israel during her speech. Moreover, during a discussion, 
the PC Zurich activists were challenged by several pro-Israeli attendants. According to 
a police report, they made the impression of being well informed, while the PC Zurich 
activists seemed to be overwhelmed. Fewer people attended the solidarity week than 
the PC Zurich had been expecting.1414 The PC Zurich activists blamed Barakat for the 
disappointing results. A PC Zurich activist complained to Sergio Mantovani that “these 
people” – the Arabs – “are not at all a help to the cause. But doesn’t Barakat have 
nothing else to do? His principal task is supposed to be to help to us, to mount things 
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like this.” Mantovani agreed with the activist.1415 His dissatisfaction with Barakat may 
have pushed Mantovani to take the side of his opponents in the next conflict. 
There was a rift within the PC Geneva in late 1974, which led to its split. One faction 
was under the leadership of the Algerian Ahmed Mellah and the Sudanese Alain Bittar, 
renaming itself the Comité Suisse Romande. The other faction continued to be 
dominated by Swiss activists led by the Guinands, with Barakat siding with the latter. 
At this time, the PCs were involved in the planning stage for the next campaign in 
March 1975, which was set to celebrate the 10 year anniversary of the start of the 
armed struggle of the PLO. The conflict also had repercussions in the PC Zurich which 
supported a proposal to exclude Mellah’s group from working within the national 
committee on the next campaign. Sergio Mantovani was among the minority who 
opposed the step.1416 Sami Mussalam, a researcher at the PLO’s Institute for Palestine 
Studies in Beirut, was invited to speak at an event in Zurich on March 1, 1975.1417 The 
flyer advertising the event expressed unequivocal support for the military fight. It 
emphasized that the recent decision of the UN to recognize the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people would never have been possible without it, 
and declared further that “only through a continuance of this struggle can the political 
and diplomatic successes be secured”.1418 
Repeatedly, there were altercations with pro-Israeli and Jewish activists. In November 
1974, there was a physical confrontation between a Jewish passerby and the PC 
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Zurich activist Gertrud Germann at an info booth of the PC Zurich.1419 When members 
of WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organisation) held their traditional public sale 
of fruits to raise money for a Swiss agricultural school in Israel in March, they were met 
by PC Zurich activists, who distributed anti-Israeli flyers. The flyers criticized that those 
educated at the school may soon work in the settlements. “The land was called 
Palestine. The farmer and his countrymen were Palestinians. That was the case at the 
turn of the century and in the following years,” the text further asserted.1420 After a vivid 
discussion, one of the PC Zurich activists spat in a passerby’s face, after which he 
attacked her physically.1421 
The last public event of the PC Zurich was held on March 20, 1976, with the screening 
of the movie Revolution until Victory. The flyer for the event again caused controversy, 
and was reported to the police for its allegedly anti-Semitic content – with no 
consequences. Its text claimed that there was a clear distinction between anti-Zionism 
and anti-Semitism. The Palestinians and the anti-Zionists were fighting against all 
forms of discrimination, including anti-Semitism. It further asserted that the Zionists 
had always advocated the expulsion of the Palestinian native population (Ger. 
Urbevölkerung). Moreover, citing the recent UN resolution, the text stated that Zionism 
was a racist ideology. Like anti-Semitism, it supposedly upheld the principle that Jews 
could not live with non-Jews on the basis of equal rights. “The state of Israel is no 
“refuge for persecuted Jews”, but a tool of Imperialism.”1422 Despite the distribution of 
flyers beforehand, only 60 persons attended the movie screening, leaving Lucien 
Leitess, the main organizer, severely disappointed. The event was disrupted by a bomb 
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threat, which proved to be false.1423 Pro-Palestinian activism seemed to be in decline 
at this this point. Shortly after the event, the PC Zurich was disbanded with its members 
establishing the Zurich branch of the newly formed Gesellschaft Schweiz Palästina 
GSP (Engl. Swiss Palestine Association) on April 22, 1976. In a press release, GSP 
pledged its support to “the fight of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the 
political guidelines of the Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO – the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people.”1424 There was another change in the Swiss 
pro-Palestinian scene in 1976. Afif Safieh, a graduate of the Catholic University in 
Leuven and former GUPS activist, started his work as the PLO representative at the 
observer mission to the UN, staying for two years in the country. It was the beginning 
of an illustrious diplomatic career. He stayed in Switzerland for only two years but 
would take an active role within the GSP.1425 In 1977, the GSP had branches in Basel, 
Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich and in the Italian-speaking canton. The influence of 
the PLO within the GSI remained strong, as PLO representative at the UN Afif Safieh 
was a member of its National Commission, which coordinated the activities of the 
different GSP chapters. The requests Safieh had submitted to the GSP General 
Assembly in 1977, which dealt with the GSP’s relations with other organizations, had 
also all been accepted by the attendants. The PLO’s apparent influence led the author 
of the report to the conclusion that at this point in time “the GSP understood itself as 
an instrument of the PLO or let itself be used in that way.” 1426  However, some 
members of the GSP disagreed with the group’s role as a recipient of orders of the 
PLO and tried to steer it in a more independent direction. They considered Palestine 
to be just one of the many battlefields against Imperialism and Capitalism. The Swiss 
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authorities speculated that the recent arrests of Albonico, Mantovani and Bacchetta in 
early 1978 were the results of these internal rifts. 1427 What had happened?  
In April 1978, GSP members were arrested in Lebanon and Egypt for their involvement 
in the planning of terrorist attacks. The defendants included two prominent figures, 
Sergio Mantovani and Gian Battista Bacchetta, who had both had leading functions in 
the PC Zurich. Mantovani, Gian Battista Bacchetta and his wife were accused of having 
planned terrorist attacks against an Israeli military delegation in collaboration together 
with Palestinian terrorist groups and the Italian Red Brigades. The Egyptians believed 
that Giorgio Bellini, who entertained contacts with the Red Brigades, was the 
mastermind behind the plans. Bellini denied this.1428 Soon afterwards, there was 
another terrorist incident involving a GSP activist. On May 6, 1978, the 23-year old 
Swiss law student Nannie Albonico was arrested at Beirut Airport before boarding a 
flight to Zurich, when a time-bomb was discovered in her luggage. After she initially 
claimed that she had received the package containing the explosives from a 
Palestinian friend without knowing of its content, she later admitted that she was 
supposed to deliver it to a Palestinian agent in Switzerland.1429 Albonico was 
apparently also a member of the GSP, underscoring the fact that Swiss pro-Palestinian 
activists were not only involved in the PLO’s networks of propaganda, but also of 
terrorism. The police also found several internal documents of the GSP in her 
possession.1430 This was not the only incident which linked the Swiss pro-Palestinian 
activists to international terrorism. 
As already discussed above, there were several past incidents in which members of 
the Swiss pro-Palestinian scene were shown to be connected to the PLO terrorist 
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network in Europe, which was engaged in a campaign of terror attacks in Europe 
against Jewish, Israeli and Jordanian targets. It is therefore worthwhile to take a closer 
look at terrorist operations in Europe. In the early 1970s, the Algerian Mohammed 
Boudia was the central figure in the PFLP terrorist network in Europe, also known as 
the Haddad Network. On June 27, 1973, Boudia was killed by the Israeli secret service 
in Paris. After his death, the PFLP operations in Europe came to be known as 
commando Boudia. Wadie Haddad appointed Michel Moukharbal as its leader, with 
Marxist Venezuelan Ilyich Ramírez Sánchez, who was then lingering in London, as his 
assistant. Sánchez would eventually become even more notorious than Mohammed 
Boudia, assuming the nom de guerre, Carlos the Jackal. In June 1975, Carlos killed 
Moukharbal and several officers of the French secret service, DST, after Moukharbal 
became an informer for the service. 1431 Interestingly, Boudia had numerous links to 
Switzerland. Since summer 1972, Boudia was a frequent guest in Geneva, where he 
occasionally met with François Genoud, Daoud Barakat and Bachir Boumaza, the 
leader of the Algerian opposition party Rassemblement unifié des Revolutionnaires, 
which actively supported the military struggle of the Palestinians.1432 The Swiss 
believed that Mohammed Boudia was involved in several terrorist attacks during this 
period, including the preparation of a terrorist attack on the transit camp in Schoenau 
in Austria. The camp was the main gate for Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union on 
their way to Israel. The conspirators had left several traces in Switzerland. In late 
January, two Arab groups of three persons each travelled separately to Austria. The 
first group arrived in Vienna on January 20, 1973 from Geneva airport and were 
arrested for their false Israeli passports. During their interrogation in Vienna, the Syrian 
terrorists revealed that they had received the falsified Israeli documents during their 
three day stay in Geneva from January 17-19 from an unidentified person, whom the 
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Swiss believed to have been Mohammed Boudia. In January 1973, Boudia was staying 
in Geneva, where he maintained close contact with the members of the PC Geneva. 
Two women of the committee, Anne-Marie Bollier and her friend Catherine Erschoff, 
seem to have worked for him.1433 
Both women were part of Daoud Barakat’s circle in Geneva and active in the pro-
Palestinian scene of the city. They regularly hosted Arabs, who had connections to the 
PLO and were on transit in Geneva, in their apartments. For Boudia, they fulfilled 
mostly menial tasks, having a function similar to that of a secretary: Making his flight 
reservations, picking him up from the airport, and hosting the various Arab visitors, who 
were connected to Boudia, during their stay in Geneva. On January 15, 1973, Erschoff 
booked a flight for Boudia to Paris for a meeting with a certain Carlos. Boudia told 
Carlos that he had received 100’000 francs, without further information. Is this Carlos 
identical with Carlos the Jackal? It is likely, since Carlos was a member of Boudia’s 
entourage. Boudia returned to Geneva on January 18, departing one day later for 
Vienna and returning again on the 21st. The travel pattern coincided with that of the 
Palestinian terrorists. On January 23, the police arrested Bollier and one day later 
Erschoff for questioning. However, they were released on the same day. In the 
aftermath of the arrest, the Geneva police observed that the pro-Palestinian activists 
in Geneva proceeded with greater caution. They no longer talked openly about 
sensible issues on the phone but rather restricted their conversations to the 
propaganda work of the PC Geneva.1434 However, they clearly continued to be linked 
to the Boudia network. Thus, Anne-Marie Bollier maintained contact with Michel 
Moukharbal, the future leader of the PFLP operations in Europe, who was residing in 
Geneva in March 1973.1435 In November 1974, Bollier quit her work for the committee. 
This however did not mean an end to her activity for the PLO. Just one month later, 
she hosted Aweida Faisal in her flat. Faisal was the chief of the Department of Foreign 
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Affairs of the PLO. He later headed the PLO offices in India and the UK. But the Swiss 
authorities also suspected him of being a key man of Black September, one who was 
responsible for recruiting, training and sending terrorists to Europe.1436 
7.6 Seeking recognition: The PLO Office in London 
As discussed above, PLO representatives had worked at the Arab League Offices 
since the mid-1960s. After Fatah’s takeover of the PLO in 1969, it significantly 
expanded its presence in Europe. In 1970, the PLO appointed Abdallah Frangi as their 
representative at the office of the Arab League in Bonn in West Germany, at this time 
the most important Fatah base in Europe. Frangi joined a growing list of PLO 
representatives in Europe, which included Mahmoud Hamchari in Paris, Wael Zwaiter 
in Rome, Said Hammami (Hamameh) in London and Naim Khader in Belgium.1437 The 
PLO largely inherited this network from the GUPS. Thus, Frangi and Hamchari had 
served as GUPS representatives before assuming their functions for the PLO.1438 In 
March 1971, the Arab League decided to attach official PLO representatives to all of 
its 14 Offices and to equip them with a yearly budget of $100’000. The PLO however 
wished to open independent PLO offices in 12 of the 14 countries where the Arab 
League operated information offices. Besides the US, these were Switzerland, the UK, 
Germany, France, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, Chile and two 
others.1439 The negotiations between the PLO and Switzerland will be discussed in 
detail in the next sub-chapter. 
Said Hammami, the PLO representative in the UK, started working at the Arab League 
Office in London in September 1971 under the official title of an information attaché of 
the PLO. He would have monthly meetings with the other Arab ambassadors in the 
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British capital.1440 On January 18, 1972, the director of the Arab League Office in 
London sent a request to the Home Secretary for opening a PLO office in the British 
capital. Its aim was to conduct propaganda and gain support for the PLO rather than 
liaising with the British government. The letter further claimed that such offices had 
already been set up and officially recognized in all Arab countries and Switzerland.1441 
As we have seen, this latter claim was not true, as Switzerland had explicitly rejected 
the Arab League demand. The FCO however, which assumed responsibility for the 
issue, took the claim at face value and only evaluated it five months later. While some 
in the security establishment opposed the PLO’s plans, the general consensus within 
the FCO was that there were no legal grounds for preventing the setup of the office, 
as long as it acted within the limits of British law. 1442 The status of the PLO office at 
the UN in New York, which had operated since 1965, possibly influenced the British 
position. The State Department informed the British that the PLO office and its staff 
enjoyed neither diplomatic nor official status. The PLO presence did not equate to its 
recognition by the US.1443  
During the next three months, the FCO and the Home Office disagreed on the PLO 
plans. Initially, the responsible Home Office official, G. Emerson, equally saw no legal 
ground for preventing the establishment of the office, despite being of the opinion that 
the Home Secretary wished them to find “indirect means” to do exactly that. According 
to British Law, he maintained, only individuals posing a security risk to the country, but 
not organizations, may be banned from entering. The only possible way to prevent the 
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establishment was to prove that the PLO was “associated with acts of violence, which 
might be committed in this country.” He concluded with the surprising statement that 
he “had looked through various Security Service reports about the PLO over the past 
few years and I have not been able to find evidence amounting to this, although there 
are indications in that direction.”1444 However, it seems to be the case that opposition 
from the Home Office grew stiffer in the coming weeks. In a memorandum in late March 
1972, Emerson argued that although PLO officials had until now primarily engaged in 
propaganda and it was not possible to prove that the PLO was directly involved in 
terrorism outside of the Middle East, the PLO’s member organizations, foremost the 
PFLP, were involved in terrorism and it was therefore advisable to prevent the PLO 
office’s establishment.1445 A memo on April 11 noted that Fatah controlled the PLO and 
that there was an “indirect association” between Fatah and the terrorists involved in a 
recent assassination attempt on the Jordanian ambassador in London. According to 
the memo, most Arabs in the country sympathized with Fatah. The Security Service 
also continued to oppose the establishment of the PLO office, fearing increased 
terrorism and the lack of sufficient manpower to monitor it.1446 
In spite of these concerns, the FCO maintained its support for the office. A 
memorandum by D. A. Gore-Booth mentioned the lack of legal means to prevent it, as 
he analyzed in the third paragraph of the document. Still, Britain could have declared 
the PLO to be a terrorist organization, which would have provided the legal grounds, 
or have just ignored the request. Gore-Booth was unequivocal about the fact that these 
actions were not feasible politically because of the support the PLO enjoyed from Arab 
countries and from pro-Arab parliamentarians: “In theory it might be possible either to 
ignore the PLO request or to indicate that it was unwelcome. In the first case there is 
little doubt that the PLO or the Arab League or both would renew their request or, 
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alternatively, get one of the pro-Arab Members of Parliament to ask a Parliamentary 
Question which would almost certainly force us to reveal the position set out in 
paragraph 3. In the second case it would be disadvantageous to our relations with the 
Arab world to suggest that the PLO application was unwelcome (…). Nor for political 
reasons could we maintain the view that the PLO is itself a terrorist organisation 
(although some of its component bodies certainly are). The PLO is a member of the 
Arab League and has an interest in acting respectably (…).”1447 Thus, expectedly, the 
decision to allow a PLO office on British soil was not only based on legal 
considerations, but on political ones as well.  
On April 14, the Home Office finally consented to the PLO plans. Two weeks later, on 
April 27, 1972, A.D. Parsons from the NENAD called Said Hammami to inform him of 
the positive reply to the Arab League request. He cautioned him that the British would 
not condone any terrorist activities emerging from the office, a warning which 
Hammami readily accepted. However, Hammami told Parsons that the friendly 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the PLO made it appropriate for him to wait 
for the opening of the PLO Office in Moscow before realizing his plans in London. On 
a more personal note, he further let him know that he did not believe in Pan-Arabism, 
which had let down the Palestinians. Instead, he advocated an incremental approach 
with the goal of establishing a binational state. First, the Palestinians would establish 
a secular state in Gaza and the West Bank, which would eventually encompass Israel. 
Whether he wanted to achieve this aim through conquest or through consent he did 
not explain.1448 
The British embassy in Tel Aviv was uncomfortable with the decision. On May 8, a new 
PFLP action had made headlines, when PFLP terrorists hijacked a Sabena aircraft at 
Lod airport near Tel Aviv. In a commando action, two of the hostage-takers were 
eventually shot, but one of the hostages died as well. British ambassador to Israel 
E.J.W. Barnes argued that in light of these events, the permission to open the PLO 
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office was inappropriate and amounted to an unwelcome “extension of Fedayeen 
activities”.1449 In another letter in June 1972, ambassador Barnes again expressed his 
criticism for the decision, remarking that if there had been sufficient political will to block 
the PLO office, ways could have been devised to do so. Moreover, he argued that the 
PLO’s involvement in violence jeopardized a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
he had hoped was in Britain’s interests. He therefore asked for a revision of the 
decision.1450 He adduced a resolution by the Political Committee of the Council of 
Europe, which asked its member states to shut down the PLO offices because they 
were involved in the planning of hijackings and sabotage.1451 
As we have seen, the British decision to allow the establishment was also influenced 
by fears that the Arabs would react negatively to a rejection. Not all agreed. The British 
ambassador in Israel faulted the FCO for its assessment that the Arab states would 
generally welcome the decision, citing the example of Egypt, which had recently 
criticized the Palestinian organizations. Consequently, he implied that the British were 
more worried about the opinion of the Arab world than the Arabs themselves by asking 
“need we be plus Arabe que les Arabes?”1452 The British ambassador in Lebanon also 
emphasized the fact that the decision somewhat embarrassed the Lebanese 
government, which was itself fighting against the Palestinian guerrillas. He therefore 
asked London to treat the affair discretely, something which was not easy to realize.1453 
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As expected, the criticism from the Israelis was even more severe. In a phone call on 
May 18, the Israeli ambassador intimated to NENAD chief Joseph Godber that the 
Israelis had intelligence that the PLO Office in Belgrade had been used as a “base for 
subversion”. He also underlined that the British were setting a precedent, as other 
requests for establishing PLO offices had been declined.1454 According to the Israelis, 
the PLO had only been allowed to set up offices in Yugoslavia, Mauretania, China and 
North Korea. 1455 On June 26, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban lodged a formal 
protest with Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, stating: “My government is 
concerned at this development which will enable an organization, openly committed to 
the destruction of the state of Israel and to the murder of its citizens, to operate against 
my country under the protection of a liberal tradition which it holds in contempt.”1456 In 
a letter to the FCO on June 27, 1972, the Israeli ambassador in London, Michael 
Comay, underlined the view that propaganda and terror were two sides of the same 
coin: “The information work in which, according to your letter, the PLO office in London 
will engage, is an integral part of the general function of the PLO, which is to carry on 
operations by violence against Israel and other countries. The political and propaganda 
aspects of its activities cannot be divorced from other aspects.”1457 The Israeli 
ambassador also suggested that Britain was breaching the UN Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States of 1970 by harboring the PLO. He cited the following passage: “No State shall 
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or 
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interfere in civil strife in another State.”1458 In a debate in the Knesset on July 5, 1974, 
Eban again cited the resolutions of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe 
regarding the PLO offices and the UN Declaration to criticize the British plans, warning 
of a deterioration of British-Israeli relations.1459 
The British however were not ready to acquiesce to the Israeli pleas. A memo by 
NENAD on the letter from the Israeli ambassador again warned that “If we were to 
brand the PLO as a terrorist organization in itself (which would be the only way to 
provide ourselves with a legal basis for preventing the PLO office opening) we should 
provoke a very hostile reaction from the entire Arab world, not excluding Saudi Arabia 
and the other conservative regimes.”1460 Thus, despite repeated assertions to the 
contrary from the FCO, we see that the decision not to intervene with the opening of 
the PLO office was as much – and possibly more –  grounded on political as on legal 
reasoning. 
The whole affair received significant coverage in the press, which was often negative. 
The Daily Telegraph called the prospective PLO office a “Hi-Jack Office” and criticized 
the British decision.1461 The PLO office received wide coverage in the press, most of it 
critical. In a letter to the editor of the Times, Said Hammami defended himself and the 
PLO, alleging that they were the victim of a political campaign orchestrated by Israel 
and its supporters. The prospective office would solely “act as an information centre to 
lobby support in the media and political parties and to help the Palestinian refugees 
and student resident in Britain (…).”1462 He denied that the PLO was involved in 
terrorism, but refrained from condemning it, stating: “A small minority of Palestinians 
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have been forced to resort to methods of violence as the only way open to them to 
secure a public hearing of their case.”1463  
The Home Secretary also had to defend himself from criticism in the parliament. MP 
Michael Fiedler personally addressed the FCO to protest the step. In its response, the 
FCO cited the alleged fact that Britain did not create a precedent, as there were already 
several independent PLO offices in other countries.1464 The problem was that this was 
not entirely true. The British authorities had taken this claim, which had first been 
mentioned in the Arab League letter from January 1972, at face value. Only in late 
June 1972 did the FCO venture to examine these claims, when it sent an inquiry to the 
respective countries to investigate the nature of the PLO presence.1465 The British 
embassies in Bern, Santiago de Chile, and Islamabad responded to the inquiry, 
informing the FCO that the PLO did not possess independent offices in their 
countries.1466 This contravened the FCO’s earlier statements, which had relied on false 
information by the Arab League. The FCO therefore apologized to MP Michael Fiedler, 
but it did not disclose that its original decision to allow the office partly rested on false 
assumptions. Moreover, the FCO continued to believe that the PLO owned official 
offices in France and the US.1467 In fact, France only agreed to recognize the PLO 
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office in France in 1975.1468 In another letter to the Minister of State, Michael Fidler 
drew attention to the fact that the French were not aware of a PLO Office in Paris. 
When the FCO checked the issue with the French, they confirmed that the PLO 
representative in Paris was not working in an official function, but only as a journalist. 
They were also reluctant to discuss the issue with the British, quite possibly because 
of the blurry and quasi-legal nature of the PLO presence in the French capital. The 
NENAD blamed the French for the error of allegedly misinforming them. To avoid a 
public embarrassment, the NENAD therefore suggested to the Minister of State to treat 
the issue confidentially and to call Michael Fiedler in person.1469 On June 4, 1972, the 
PLO office was also discussed in the House. A motion called the decision 
deplorable.1470 
Reports that PLO chief Yassir Arafat was planning to attend the opening of the office, 
if true, were liable to further incense the situation.1471  Besides the Israelis, the 
Jordanians were also worried by Arafat’s visit.1472 However, the FCO had not received 
a request for a visa by Arafat.1473 The FCO was divided on the question of how to deal 
with such a request. A memo by A.D. Parsons of the FCO advised against the 
admission of Arafat – not because he was the chairman of the PLO, but for his 
leadership of Fatah. The visit would lead to a deterioration of the relations with Israel 
and Jordan and inflame anti-Arab opinion in the country, which would be far more 
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damaging for the relations with the Arab world than the mere refusal of the visa.1474 
Gore-Booth agreed that Arafat should be prevented from coming to London. However, 
he recommended that instead of refusing him the visa, the FCO should signal to him 
that he was unwelcome and that it was in his interest to withdraw his request in order 
to avoid a public scandal.1475 Under Secretary Martin Le Quesne tended towards the 
opinion of Gore-Booth. In particular, he made the case that the internal pressure by 
the PLO’s critics and the supporters of Israel would be something that the FCO could 
readily cope with: “I am afraid, however, that unfortunately, I am doubtful whether it 
can be said that there are likely to be violent demonstrations, etc. in the event of his 
coming. There will be a row in House, the correspondence columns of The Times, and 
on the media, no doubt. But I do not think that it can be said that, on past form, the 
Jewish lobby is likely to react by taking to the Streets. (…) Moreover, with to(?) opinion 
this country, a refusal of a visa to Arafat would surely produce at least as strong a 
public reaction from the pro-Arab lobby as a grant will from the anti-Arab lobby.”1476 
This suggests that the non-violence of the pro-Israel supporters worked against their 
interests. 
Eventually, Said Hammami decided against establishing an independent PLO Office 
and remained attached to the Arab League Office.1477 When the famous entrepreneur 
and Zionist Joseph Edward Sieff was attacked by a PFLP hitman, who was later 
revealed to have been Carlos the Jackal, there were calls to expel the PLO 
representative from the UK. However, NENAD opposed this, stating that the Home 
Secretary had found no evidence that Hammami was involved in illegal activities and 
out of fear “to provoke the very hostile reaction that would undoubtedly be caused in 
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the Arab World if we were to expel the representative (…).1478 This fear invariably 
protected the PLO personnel in Europe. 
7.7 A PLO Office in Switzerland? The First Round of Negotiations 
One has to consider the circumstances to understand Switzerland’s negotiations with 
the PLO. As discussed in Chapter 6, Switzerland was struck by several terrorist 
attacks, authored by the PFLP, in the period 1969-1970. After the conviction of the 
PFLP terrorists responsible for the Kloten attack in January 1969, Switzerland was 
fearful of retaliations from the Arab world.1479 On February 21, 1970, a Swissair plane 
was indeed struck by a PFLP bombing, murdering 47 passengers and crew. This 
probably happened by mistake, as the original target had been an El-Al plane. Still, it 
was set to influence Switzerland. In September 1970, the Western world faced the 
biggest terrorism crisis until September 11, 2001. On September 6, 1970 at midday, 
Palestinian terrorists hijacked three airplanes in mid-air. A fourth attempt to hijack an 
El-Al machine on its way to New York failed: One of the two terrorists was killed and 
the other, the notorious Leila Khaled, subdued. After the plane was landed at Heathrow 
Airport, she was incarcerated. Two airplanes, a Swissair machine on its way to New 
York and a TWA Airlines plane, were flown to the abandoned British airstrip, Dawson’s 
Field near Zerqa, a suburb of Amman. The third hijacked airplane, a Panamerican 
craft, was landed in Cairo and blown up one day later after the release of the 
passengers. An ultimatum delivered on September 7 demanded the freeing of the 
three PFLP convicts in Switzerland, three terrorists who stood behind the bomb 
targeting El-AL passengers in Munich in February 1970, and Leila Khaled in return for 
the non-Jewish hostages. The PFLP demanded each state to enter separate 
negotiations. The fate of the Jewish American hostages however would depend on the 
release of prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons.1480 The affected countries formed 
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the Bern Group to deal with the hostage situation. The International Red Cross acted 
as a mediator between the Bern Group and the PFLP.1481 Britain and Germany broke 
the consensus, entering into direct negotiations with the PFLP. 1482 
The civil war in Jordan, which had started on the day of the hijackings, further 
complicated the situation. At the end of September 1970, Egyptian dictator Jamal 
Nasser negotiated a ceasefire between the PLO and Jordan at the Arab summit in 
Cairo. As a result, the PLO pulled its forces from Jordan and moved them to Lebanon. 
On British stipulation, Nasser also included a section on the hostage crisis in the deal. 
In exchange for the release of the hostages on or around October 1, the European 
countries and Israel were to free their Palestinian prisoners. On September 27, the 
British decided not to prosecute Leila Khaled.1483 The Swiss soon followed suit. On 
September 30, 1970, the three terrorists were picked up at the prison in Regensdorf, 
a suburb of Zurich. Shortly before their departure at 11:50 p.m., the police presented 
them with an envelope, containing one thousand Swiss Francs. The money was 
donated by François Genoud and distributed among the three convicts.1484 The same 
day, François Genoud flew to Beirut and subsequently to Cairo, where he stayed until 
October 10.1485 Unlike the British and the Germans, the Swiss were not ready to 
negotiate directly with the PFLP or the PLO.1486 This would soon change. 
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It has recently been claimed that Switzerland struck a secret deal with the PLO. 
According to this version of events, the far-left Geneva politician and sociologist, Jean 
Ziegler, struck a deal with the PLO on behalf of federal councilor Pierre Graber.1487. If 
such a deal did indeed happen, it would have to have been concluded in the period 
between late September 1970, when the release of the terrorists was negotiated, and 
the start of the negotiations between the PLO and the Swiss authorities in January 
1971. Such a deal would have to have been of a very general nature, given that 
practically all questions regarding the relationship between the PLO the Switzerland 
were subject to the negotiations. Ziegler, if we assume the theory is true, would have 
acted rather as a mediator than a negotiator. In fact, I will suggest one possibility that 
reconciles this version of events with the records at our disposal. 
According to the records, the origins of the Swiss-PLO talks lay in the first half of 1970. 
In May 1970, the Swiss priest Pierre Martin, who was administering the St. Gervais 
church in Geneva, participated in a conference in Lebanon on the issue of Palestine 
together with Lebanese Christians and influential Palestinians, who subsequently 
invited him to visit Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Half a year later, in December 1970, Pierre 
Martin was approached by Emile Khoury, a member of the national council of the PLO; 
a certain M. Carbonard, a delegate of the ecumenical council of churches in Algeria; 
and Mr. Bentoumi, the president of the bar in Algeria, who was part of the defense-
team for the three Arab Palestinian terrorists during the Winterthur trial. Bentoumi asks 
Martin to facilitate the establishment of a PLO office in Geneva. The aims of such an 
office would be to make contacts with Swiss authorities and political parties, the 
international organizations present in Geneva and, probably most controversially, 
“participating” in the discussion of the issue of Palestine in Switzerland, an aim which 
can only be understood as the intension to actively influence this discussion. The group 
subsequently meets with Hans Ellenberger, the aforementioned anti-Zionist activist 
and according to the report also the representative of Fatah in Switzerland. Ellenberger 
is charged by them with the assignment of approaching the Swiss authorities on behalf 
of the project. 1488  The motives of Pierre Martin for acting as an intermediary between 
                                             
Gyr, Schweizer Terrorjahre, chap. 8.1487 Gyr, Schweizer Terrorjahre. 
1488 “Conversation with minister Pierre Martin” February 1, 1971, CH-BAR#E2001E-
01#1987/78#409*. 
425 
 
Swiss authorities and Arab Palestinian nationalists remain obscure. As he confided to 
Swiss authorities on January 28, 1971, he was hoping that the PLO would eventually 
engage in secret relations with Israel via the Jewish World Congress also located in 
Geneva. He himself, as he assured them on this occasion, was in contact with both 
the current Israeli administration and its opposition and was set on travelling 
independently to Israel in the near future, plans his Palestinian friends were allegedly 
aware of.1489 He also argued that it would only be fair to confront the already existing 
“Jewish propaganda apparatus” in Geneva with a PLO office. Ultimately, this would not 
lead to conflict but to a dialogue between the adversaries.1490  
The negotiations between the PLO and the Swiss would eventually start in January 
1971. On January 16, 1971, Minister Dr. M. Gelzer from the Federal Department for 
Foreign Affairs received Ellenberger in his office. During the conversation, Ellenberger 
informed the minister on the plans to set up a PLO office in Geneva. As the reason for 
this undertaking, Ellenberger cited the difficult time the Palestinians were living 
through. It was the time of Black September, the civil war between the PLO and the 
Jordanian government. These events made it necessary for the Palestinians to act. 
According to Ellenberger, the future PLO office’s aim was to promote the Palestinian 
cause by establishing contacts with leading politicians and journalists. If it were not 
possible to establish an official office at the UNO or at the Swiss government, the PLO 
would prefer to set up an unofficial PLO office, as, in the words of Ellenberger, the FLN 
had via the ‘Croissant Rouge Algérien’. Ellenberger further stated that Emil Khoury was 
distancing himself from the terrorist attacks perpetrated against Switzerland. He did 
not fail to mention that, while the PLO could not make any promises, there would be 
no similar actions in the future and the establishment of a Palestinian Office in Geneva 
would certainly help to prevent such attacks.1491  Either Ellenberger was bluffing or he 
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was indeed in a position to influence the PLO’s actions toward Switzerland. Whether 
his statements were intended as a threat or not, Gelzer appears to have understood it 
this way, as he made clear in a confidential note. This suspicion was further 
corroborated by a report coming from the Swiss embassy in Belgrade at the same time: 
A Jordanian businessman had informed them that a PLO commando was preparing 
another terrorist attack in Switzerland.1492 
In an internal memo, the Swiss listed the chances and risks of an official PLO presence 
in Geneva in dialectical fashion. The fact that most of the Swiss population 
sympathized with the Israelis spoke against the opening. The step would certainly be 
opposed by the Israelis and possibly also by the Jordanians, the memo cautioned. 
Moreover, taking this step may lead other ethnic groups to also consider opening their 
own offices. The memo however also mentioned several factors in favor of the PLO 
office. The Swiss hoped that the opening would steer the Palestinians away from 
terrorism towards more peaceful, “primarily (…) journalistic means”, to advocate their 
interests.1493 The open nature of a PLO Office in Geneva was preferable to the current 
underground activity of Fatah and possibly the PFLP in Geneva. By providing a direct 
contact, “it would enable a dialogue in Switzerland and allow us to get to know better 
this people and its concerns.” 1494 The memo contended that the opening of the PLO 
office was not creating a precedent for other independence movements, as the 
situation of the Palestinians was unique: “The Palestinians are a victim of 
decolonization and the guilty conscience of the Europeans; they have lost their 
homeland and can nowhere else make the world aware of their legitimate claims in an 
undisturbed and untroubled way.” 1495 Weighing up the pro- and contra-arguments, the 
memo advised that the Palestinians be given a residence permit to fight for their cause, 
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but that authorizing the opening of an official presence should be delayed for the 
moment.1496 
In a meeting of senior officials headed by Gelzer on January 27, the matter was further 
discussed. Dr. Amstein, head of the Federal Police, vehemently opposed the idea of 
setting up a PLO office. He did not believe Ellenberger’s claim that it would have a 
moderating effect on Swiss-Arab, respectively Swiss-Palestinian relations. As a 
counter-argument he evoked the example of Fuad el-Shamali. Despite his presence in 
Switzerland, Palestinian attacks on Switzerland had continued unabated. Therefore, 
any hope that the establishment of a PLO office would exert a moderating influence on 
Palestinian terrorist groups was in vain. Another participant, Dr. Mäder, head of the 
Swiss Aliens Police, feared the negative repercussions these plans would cause in the 
Swiss public, giving the advice to keep the character of such an office strongly 
unofficial.1497 The Swiss decision-makers were thus pulled between different 
arguments in favor and against the authorization of such an office. On the one hand, 
such an office would make it possible to oversee Palestinian activities which otherwise 
might take place secretly. In addition, a refusal might be understood as a rejection of 
the Swiss-PLO ‘dialogue’, which Swiss authorities, also in light of recent terror attacks, 
considered of the utmost importance. Further, it would provide an opportunity to talk to 
the Palestinians directly and not via the Arab states. On the other hand, they feared 
the negative repercussions an authorization might cause in the public opinion. It might 
be seen as a precedent, effectively inviting rivaling Palestinian and similar international 
organizations to set up their branches in Switzerland. Lastly, they also mentioned 
rather casually that the project bore the risk of harming relations with Israel and 
possibly Jordan.1498  
In another discussion between Gelzer and the two representatives of the Palestinians, 
Ellenberger and Pierre Martin on February 18, 1971, Gelzer made it clear that while a 
                                             
1496 Ibid. 
1497 “Protokoll der Sitzung betreffend Eröffnung eines Palästina-Büros in Genf” 
January 27, 1971, CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#409*. 
1498 “Ouverture d’un bureau palestinien à Genève: les pour et les contre” February 2, 
1971, CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#409*. 
428 
 
possible future PLO Office in Geneva could potentially enter into contact with both 
international organizations and the Swiss authorities, it was to abstain from any 
interference in Swiss politics. Furthermore, any contact or public statement to the 
media would require the prior approval of the Swiss authorities. Pierre Martin 
announced that the Christian PLO central committee member Emile Khoury, who had 
approached him with the idea in the first place, was nominated for occupying the post 
of the PLO Office. Like Ellenberger had before, Pierre Martin argued ambiguously that 
while the presence of a PLO member in Geneva was no guarantee for a suspension 
of terror attacks, it would certainly help Swiss interests. In return for agreement, he 
promised in the name of the PLO that Swiss volunteers to the PLO would be refused 
by them, and that using Switzerland as a hub for arms trafficking would cease. He 
again insisted that the moderates within the PLO were ready to engage in negotiations 
with the Jews, as he put it, and that Geneva would be the place where this could 
happen.1499 
Gelzer received them again in his office on February 26, this time accompanied by the 
PLO representatives Mohammed Abu Omar and Daoud Barakat, as had been agreed 
in the last meeting. They again expressed their wish for the PLO representative in 
Geneva to entertain relations with both Swiss and international personalities and the 
media, as well as being able to distribute a brochure published in Frankfurt, 
emphasizing again, as Gelzer did not fail to notice, the importance that the PLO placed 
on the “work of information” (travail d’information), i.e. propaganda activity. Gelzer put 
forward the idea that the representative could officially work as a journalist, thus being 
able to properly address the public. The two PLO members agreed on this proposal. 
Incidentally, they also mentioned that they were already entertaining similar offices in 
major cities of the Western world: in Stockholm, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Rome, New 
York, Paris and Belgrade.1500 
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At the end of March, Dr. Mäder, head of the Swiss Aliens Police and Dr. Amstein, head 
of the Federal Police, were still opposing the plans, despite the continuing negotiations 
between Ellenberger and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.1501 In a meeting held 
by senior officials on March 10, the prospects for the establishment of an office were 
brightening. Although tough Mäder and Amstein remained skeptical, the latter pleaded 
for “not exaggerating the motive of security, as the Palestinians who present a danger 
to Switzerland are not the ones of Fatah, but the 2% dissidents (Dr. Habache etc.).”1502 
He also admitted that the installation of such an office might also facilitate police work. 
Eventually they agreed on the acceptability of a PLO representative working in Geneva 
under the title of a journalist, and a continuation of the negotiations. 1503 This notion 
was rejected by the Federal Council of Switzerland in a note handed out on the first of 
April, which, on principle, accepted the establishment of a PLO Office in Geneva, but 
with the condition that it act overtly as a propaganda office for the PLO and not under 
the cover of journalism.1504 In late April, Dr. Mäder seems to have had a change of 
heart. Suddenly everything was developing quickly. In a letter dated April 19, 1971, 
and signed by the head of the Aliens Police Dr. Mäder, he informed the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police on the forthcoming plans of establishing a PLO Office 
in Geneva.1505 A report on the background of these plans was appended to the letter 
originating from Mäder’s own department which had a strikingly positive tone regarding 
the plans, especially in light of his prior skepticism: “A profound study (…) has led to 
the conclusion that the advantages of an opening of a Palestinian office in Switzerland 
appear clearly to be more numerous than the disadvantages. It is appropriate to 
emphasize that the opening of such an office could contribute to creating a certain 
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balance in the area of information on the Middle East, that Switzerland has on the other 
hand always tried to facilitate a real dialogue between the conflict parties, that it is 
therefore only fair to authorize the Palestinians to make their own voice heard.”1506  
In response, the department of Justice and Police of Geneva agreed in principle on the 
establishment of a PLO Office, on the condition that the PLO convincingly renounced 
acts of air piracy and sabotage, something which both Swiss representatives of the 
PLO, Ellenberger and Pierre Martin, had failed to do before.1507 In a letter sent by 
general secretary Thalmann to the Swiss ambassador in Jordan on May 10, 1971, he 
commissioned him to enter into direct contact with PLO senior member Abu Omar and 
to present him with a document delineating the framework of an eventual establishment 
of a PLO Office: The PLO had to submit all public statements to the Swiss beforehand 
for authorization. This stipulation was dismissed in harsh terms: “The Geneva 
authorities seem to forget that the PLO has always militated [Fr. s’est prononcéé] 
against these acts of violence and, you need to believe us, has even condemned them; 
on the other hand she seems not being capable of preventing them:” Abu Omar was 
then asked to travel by himself or to send another PLO official to Switzerland in order 
to finalize the negotiations directly, and not by the intermediaries Ellenberger and 
Martin,1508 but apparently Abu Omar preferred to continue the work through these 
intermediaries, as the guidelines were handed over to them on June 25, 1971.1509 
On August 2, 1971, the first secretary Alon of the Israeli embassy to Switzerland paid 
a visit to Brunner of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in order to receive 
information on the prospective plans to establish a PLO Office in Geneva. He remarked 
that similar offices, e.g. in Paris, were involved in the coordination of terrorist activities 
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and cited a currently ongoing trial in Israel, in which it  was discovered that five terrorists 
from France had been trained by Palestinian officials in Paris. Brunner assured Alon 
that Switzerland would be watchful in order to prevent any such activity.1510 The 
ambassador of Jordan, Ibrahim Zreikat, raised similar concerns to Minister Gelzer in a 
meeting on August 10, fearing that the PLO officials would attack Jordan, especially in 
light of the changed strategy of the PLO, which was now stressing that “the way to Tel-
Aviv leads through Amman.”1511 Despite these objections, the plans for an agreement 
with the PLO were pursued in the following days.  
On August 4, 1971, Brunner received Daoud Barakat, the representative of the PLO at 
the Arab League in Geneva and prospective chief of the PLO Office in Geneva. On 
this occasion, Barakat announced his agreement with the guidelines of the Swiss 
government, which were: 
1. Assignment limited to one chief and a co-worker 
2. Respect for the Swiss rules concerning political activities of foreigners, 
abstention from any activities and propaganda against the democratic 
institutions of Switzerland which could compromise Switzerland’s relations with 
third countries 
3. Observance of the resolution of the Swiss Federal Council of February 24, 1948, 
concerning political speeches of foreigners.1512 
Furthermore, Barakat informed the Swiss official of his plans to appoint Fuad el-
Shamali as his co-worker at the Office. Brunner notified Barakat on the impracticability 
of this plan, as there was an entry ban on el-Shamali. Moreover Brunner stressed the 
impossibility of Barakat being a diplomatic member of the Arab League and the chief 
of the PLO Office at the same time, as the members of the PLO Office could not benefit 
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from diplomatic immunity.1513 Therefore one month later, on September 8, Barakat 
announced Mrs. Zeinat as the Chief of the Office.1514  Already two weeks before on 
August 24, Barakat had sent a letter to the Arab delegations located in Geneva, 
soliciting them for financial assistance.1515 Meanwhile the establishment of the Office 
did not progress, as the PLO, in the eyes of Swiss officials, did not stick to the 
guidelines, when it announced an opening ceremony for its Office. It thus violated the 
terms of discretion upheld by the Swiss. Additionally, they were renting bigger locations 
than the ones agreed upon. But Barakat felt it was the Swiss who were breaking their 
promises and therefore threatened to abort the project altogether, instead continuing 
the representation of the Fatah unofficially, as had been the case for the past three 
years. Despite having had no authorization, the PLO would also continue to distribute 
its propaganda, as Barakat bragged: “We have 4’000 addresses for our distribution. Of 
4’000 publications imported this way, e.g. from Morocco, about 3’000 make it 
through.”1516 
The negotiations seemed to reach a deadlock. Martin threatened in a meeting with 
ambassador Thalmann on December 3, 1971, that failure of the project could lead to 
a resurgence of terrorist attacks, including ones aimed at Switzerland. Ambassador 
Thalmann rebutted any attempts to exert pressure on Switzerland and warned that the 
Swiss would withdraw their concessions in response. Martin, Dr. Ellenberger and 
Thalmann were all in agreement that Barakat was not the suitable man for the 
continuation of the negotiations. As they also ruled out el-Shamali, they opted for Abu 
Omar as a future partner. 1517 However, the prospects of an agreement seemed to 
brighten only a few days later, when Barakat and Dr. Ellenberger visited Gelzer on 
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December 7. Barakat stepped back from some of his demands: The representative 
location would be abandoned in favor of a more modest one. In addition, only Abdel 
Majid Zeinat would be appointed to the post. She would run her activities not as an 
official representative of the PLO, but as a journalist. 1518 The matter was accepted by 
the PLO, as Barakat communicated to the Swiss officials on December 15. 1519 
A renewed wave of Black September terror affected the negotiations. The same day 
the PLO and Switzerland had agreed on the establishment of a PLO Office in Geneva, 
an assassination attempt on Jordan’s ambassador to Great Britain, Zeid al Rifai, failed 
in London. The Fatah-linked group Black September claimed responsibility.1520 Already 
one month before, the terror group Black September entered the stage, as it conducted 
its first operation with the assassination of Jordan’s premier, Wasfi al-Tal, on November 
28 during his attendance of an Arab League meeting in Cairo. Actually, Black 
September was not an independent group but rather a Fatah special operations group 
led by Abu Jihad, which pursued its terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East in 
the years 1971-1974. PLO- and Fatah-leader Arafat claimed responsibility for the 
attack, thus reducing to absurdity the strong distinction between moderates and 
extremist fringe groups within the PLO that the Swiss authorities had drawn during their 
negotiations with the PLO.1521 A telegram sent by the Swiss embassy in Cairo also 
contested the distinction between Fatah and Black September, as “these operations 
did not fall into the responsibility of dissident Palestinian resistance groups, but were 
rather offshoots of Fatah and were acting on their impetus and under their control.”1522 
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Only one day after the incident in London, a giant explosion shook the offices of the 
Jordanian Consulate in Geneva. Consul Ibrahim Zreikat had left the building before in 
order to inform the police about a suspicious package he had received and was 
therefore unharmed, but the three police officers sent out to examine it were gravely 
injured.1523 Although the National Jordanian Liberation Movement, a hardly-known 
group which committed two other foiled terrorist attacks, claimed responsibility,1524 the 
Jordanian authorities accused Fatah, and linked the attack with the ones in London 
and Cairo. In line with the rampant anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in the Arab world 
observed before, they still could not abstain from hinting at an “international Zionist 
plan which aims at crushing the national unity of Jordan […].”1525  
In light of this terror wave, the authorization for the project was withdrawn by Dr. 
Amstein until the authorship of the attacks was clarified. A meeting with Abdel-Majid 
Zeinat fixed for December 22 was also cancelled.1526 When Barakat and his contact 
person met for lunch on December 22, Barakat denied any involvement of Fatah and 
the PLO as well as himself, el-Shamali and Teubat in the recent terror attacks, as their 
interests “were not at all in accordance with the aims of such perpetrators”. Barakat 
asserted the belief that these attacks were probably personally motivated acts of 
revenge, or in the case of the attack in Geneva, perpetrated by the Jordanians 
themselves in order to put blame on the PLO. The group Black September was 
“insignificant”.1527 One has to keep in mind that, according to François Genoud, Daoud 
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Barakat himself and Shamali were core operatives of this  group.1528 Despite Barakat’s 
assertions, in a report by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to the Federal 
Council of Switzerland dated January 24, 1972, the postponement of the establishment 
of the PLO Office in Geneva was announced, a project the realization of which “cannot 
be accounted for last but not least in view of the public.” 1529 The report further stated 
that hopes of reducing the risks of terror attacks in Switzerland were proven futile by 
the recent assassination attempt in Geneva. In spite of this, the report advocated the 
continuation of the dialogue with the PLO, because in the eyes of its author it could not 
be ignored that this dialogue had helped to improve relations with the Arab world. On 
the other hand, cancelling the project would carry great risks and could lead to a 
deterioration of Swiss-Arab relations and possibly to a rekindling of terrorist attacks 
targeting Switzerland.1530 As in Britain, this fear was a strong motivating factor in the 
negotiations. 
7.8 A PLO Office in Switzerland? The Second Round of Negotiations 
As discussed above, a first attempt to establish an official PLO Office in Geneva ended 
in a failure in January 1972, after a Black September terrorist attack in Geneva. The 
PLO however continued to work for an officialization of its presence in Switzerland. 
Meanwhile, the terrorism wave did not abate. On March 1, 1973, Black September 
occupied the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum and murdered two Americans and one 
Belgian diplomat. A Newsweek article claimed that Daoud Barakat was a Black 
September operative himself and had been involved in the Munich massacre. The 
presence of Daoud Barakat also worried the UN, which feared a possible attack on its 
premises in Geneva.1531 In light of the fears about the PLO’s extensive activity in 
Switzerland, the Swiss decided to send Barakat a warning. By this, they hoped “to 
prevent, that the Palestinians would become completely careless and further expand 
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their basis in Geneva.”1532 A good-cop, bad-cop tactic was employed to achieve this 
end, with Attorney General Hans Walder volunteering for the latter role. In a press 
conference in early March 1973, Walder explicitly hinted at the role Barakat had played 
in the Munich massacre. 1533 The remarks succeed in provoking a reaction from 
Barakat. 
Black September was a commando unit consisting of Fatah members. Vis-à-vis the 
Swiss authorities however, Daoud Barakat maintained the charade that Black 
September was a group independent from the PLO and Fatah. After Walder’s press 
conference, he immediately complained about the Attorney General’s comments in a 
phone-call to Ernesto Thalmann of the EPD, stating that he was unaware of the fact 
that the Attorney General was investigating him. He also threatened that the comments 
were drawing attention to Switzerland and that they therefore bore the risk, “that the 
terrorists will extend their feelings of revenge again to Switzerland.”1534 The Swiss 
obviously tolerated these threats. In another talk between Barakat and the EPD in late 
March 1973, the Swiss expressed their worries about Fatah’s involvement in the 
Khartoum attack. It had now become obvious that the PLO, through Fatah, was directly 
involved in terrorism. When the Swiss questioned Barakat’s claim that the Fatah 
operative had acted without instructions, Barakat just smiled. Barakat asserted that the 
PLO had decided to refuse European volunteers and that he himself had turned down 
several volunteers in his Office in Geneva. In light of the recent Lod attack, which 
employed the services of Japanese left-wing terrorists, the Swiss also did not believe 
him. 1535 A report by the Attorney General on Palestinian terrorism in June 1973 further 
dispelled the myth that Black September was a separate group, maintaining that it 
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consisted of elements of Fatah.1536 The PLO leadership’s efforts to present itself as a 
moderating influence on Palestinian terrorist groups enjoyed less and less credibility. 
As Germany banned the GUPS and Israel hunted down Fatah operatives in Europe, 
Switzerland became increasingly important in the PLO’s foreign policy. After the killing 
of the French and Italian PLO representatives Mahmoud Hamchari and Wael Zwaiter 
in Rome by Israeli agents, Daoud Barakat assumed their responsibilities. In March 
1973, Barakat announced that the PLO was also planning to upgrade the PLO’s 
presence in Switzerland, which, together with France, allegedly enjoyed an excellent 
reputation at the PLO’s headquarters. Still, the PLO could not warrant for “the actions 
of lone perpetrators and splinter groups”.1537 These extension plans were soon 
confirmed. On June 19, 1973, Abou Omar, a senior member of Fatah’s Revolutionary 
Council, who was not identical with the Abou Omar who started the negotiations in 
1971, called on the EPD accompanied by Barakat. Acting on the orders of Arafat, he 
made several official announcements. The PLO respected Swiss neutrality and 
regretted Palestinian terrorist attacks, which ran counter to their interests and were 
playing into the hands of Israel. The PLO wished to receive an official status for its 
presence in Geneva and to upgrade the Office to the PLO’s “window on Europe”, 
meaning its headquarters in Europe. In the typical fashion of PLO diplomacy in Europe, 
Abou Omar’s promises of security were accompanied by the thinly-veiled threat of 
violence. Thus, Abou Omar declared that the PLO would not necessarily be able to 
halt all terrorist attacks against Switzerland but that it would see to it that Switzerland 
was no longer a target by punishing the perpetrators. “(…) Fatah”, he intimated, “knows 
all the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, including the bombers of Geneva (Mission of 
Jordan).” 1538 Despite this assertion, the EPD did not press Abou Omar for information 
about the whereabouts of the Palestinian terrorists responsible for the Würemlingen 
attack. Alfred Hohl, the deputy chief of the EPD, believed that the rationale behind the 
PLO’s plans in Switzerland was to replace the loss of its infrastructure in Germany, on 
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which the German authorities had clamped down after the Munich massacre.1539 
Meanwhile, Barakat had become fearful for his own life after receiving information that 
he was on an Israeli target list. He therefore inquired whether it was possible to receive 
police protection. The Swiss were generally open to the request. The Federal Police 
believed Barakat to be a propagandist, not a terrorist.1540 A recent report from the 
Attorney General had come to the same conclusion.1541 As a consequence, Federal 
Police director André Amstein intervened with the Israelis, warning that the Swiss 
would stop working with the Israeli security services if anything should happen to 
Barakat,1542 apparently with success. However, Barakat’s connection to terrorism 
remains a matter of contention until this day. According to François Genoud’s 
biographer Pierre Péan, al-Shamali, Barakat, Hamchari and Ali Hassan Salameh 
represented the senior leadership of Black September.1543 
On November 22, 1974, the PLO achieved a groundbreaking diplomatic success with 
the adoption of resolutions 3236 and 3237 by the UN General Assembly. The 
resolutions recognized the Palestinians’ right to national independence and admitted 
the PLO as an observer to the UN.1544 As the PLO had become “socially acceptable”, 
Barakat seized this opportunity to again press its demands for an official representation 
in Switzerland in a conversation with EPD deputy chief, Alfred Hohl on December 2, 
1974 . 1545 Hohl declared that the Swiss would continue their policy of non-recognition 
vis-à-vis the PLO, but would accommodate a PLO observer bureau at the UN in 
Geneva. He also scolded the Palestinians for their arrogance vis-à-vis Israel after the 
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recent diplomatic successes, which mirrored that of the Israelis until the Yom Kippur 
War. Barakat indicated that there was a chance that the PLO would eventually 
recognize Israel but, for the moment, this could not be voiced publicly in order to 
preserve the PLO’s inner unity. Moreover, he invited Hohl to visit Lebanon in January 
1975 to get to know the leaders of the PLO and learn about their concerns.1546  
Even another round of Palestinian violence affecting Switzerland was unable to deter 
the PLO’s march to legitimacy. During a terrorist attack on the Hotel Savoy in Tel Aviv 
on March 6, 1975, two young Swiss tourists, Andreas Krähenbühl and Maria Roth, 
were killed. The PLO officially assumed responsibility for the attack.1547 This presented 
problems for the Swiss diplomats as, at the same time, there were discussions around 
whether the PLO would attend the next Middle East conference later in the year in 
Geneva. Internal inquiries by the EPD revealed that Arafat may indeed face arrest by 
the Swiss authorities if he were to attend the conference, unless he travelled under 
official diplomatic cover and not simply as the chairman of the PLO. The EPD’s 
Directorate of Public International Law warned that this would have “unpleasant effects 
in terms of foreign policy” and suggested that ways to get immunity for Arafat through 
an international organization be sought.1548 Some elements in the EPD were obviously 
willing to undermine the criminal prosecution of terrorist acts not to repeat the events 
of 1969, when Switzerland had become the target of heavy Arab pressure and 
international terrorism. On April 16, 1975, the UN finally asked Switzerland to provide 
the PLO observer at the UN with the necessary privileges and immunities in order to 
fulfill his work. In addition, the Swiss were asked to provide office space for the PLO 
Office in Geneva. On June 25, 1975, the Federal Council decided to comply with the 
demand, authorizing the establishment of an official PLO Office in Geneva.1549 As 
expected, Israel protested the decision. In a visit in September, the Israeli ambassador 
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handed the EPD a paper, which made the case that Switzerland was not obliged to 
grant non-state actors any diplomatic privileges or immunity.1550 There were, however, 
no consequences. Six years after the Kloten attacks, the PLO had an official presence 
in Geneva. 
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8 Outlook and Conclusion 
In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that in a world dominated by 
communication technologies and mass media, propaganda is usually not just one 
battlefield in the conflict, it is the battlefield. From Lebanon to Iraq, Western armies 
succeeded in dominating non-Western enemies, only to be repeatedly bested by non-
Western insurgents in the area of propaganda. From the beginning, the Arab-Jewish 
conflict over Palestine was, to a significant degree, a media and propaganda battle. 
Never was this more obvious than in the late 1960s, when Palestinian terrorists sought 
to draw the world’s attention to the Palestinian issue through spectacular attacks 
carried out on Western and Israeli targets. From the late 1960s onwards, Europe was 
the site of a comprehensive campaign to force the European governments to 
acknowledge the Palestine issue and normalize its relations with the PLO. This 
campaign was led by a diverse set of actors and used different means. These included 
diplomatic and economic pressure, terrorism and, to a significant degree, public 
diplomacy. Until the 1970s, a clear majority of Europeans sympathized with Israel. This 
manifested in the international wave of sympathy for Israel during the Six-Day War. 
The PLO, whose member organizations Fatah and PFLP engaged in terrorist and 
guerrilla warfare, was considered a terrorist organization. The pro-Israeli consensus in 
Europe incensed the Arab states, but also worried many European governments, 
including the British and the Swiss, which feared a deterioration of their ties with the 
Arab states and an escalation of terrorism against their citizens. These European 
governments therefore tended to accommodate the activities of Arab propaganda 
organs in Europe, as they sought a balance with the allegedly pro-Zionist Western 
public opinion. Unbeknownst to the public, European governments started negotiations 
with the PLO in the early 1970s. As a result, the PLO established an official presence 
in Europe, a presence which would eventually lead to its normalization. Even when it 
became clear that the PLO was connected to international terrorism, this evidence was 
conveniently ignored by European diplomats. 
During the 1970s, there was a continuous shift in European public opinion towards the 
Arab view of the conflict. In addition, the Third World and the Non-Aligned Countries 
built pressure in international bodies to support the national struggle of the Palestinians 
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and to isolate Israel. This changing environment facilitated the start of the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue in 1974 between the EC and the Arab countries, a project which had also 
been advocated by the pro-Palestinian activists of CECAAMA. 1551 Although the 
Europeans succeed in excluding the PLO from the talk, they made several concessions 
in the course of the Euro-Arab Dialogue.1552 In a parallel development, the Palestinians’ 
national rights were recognized by the UN General Assembly in November 1974, and 
the PLO granted observer status.1553 In August 1975, the conference of Non-Aligned 
Countries “condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called 
upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology (...).”1554 This tendency 
was taken up at the UN session in November 1975, when a bloc of mostly Muslim, 
African, and communist countries pushed for the adoption of UN General Assembly 
resolution 3379 declaring that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination.”1555 The vote was accompanied by stormy discussions with the 
American ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan taking the lead in opposing 
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the resolution.1556 To the shock of Israel’s supporters worldwide, the UN General 
Assembly morally delegitimized Israel just twenty eight years after it had brought it into 
existence via the partition resolution 181. While the Europeans opposed such 
excesses of anti-Zionism, they also increasingly became more open to Palestinian 
demands. In 1977, the EC issued a statement, recognizing that the Palestinians had a 
right to a homeland and affirming that the issue stood at the heart of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This statement severely deviated from the Israeli position, which held that the 
non-recognition of Israel by the Arabs lay at the conflict’s heart. The EC sought to settle 
the conflict in a comprehensive peace settlement including the Palestinians and the 
Arabs. These efforts failed. Rather, the American and Israeli approach of separate, 
bilateral negotiations proved to be successful at Camp David in 1979, when Egypt and 
Israel signed a peace treaty. Eventually in 1980, the EC advocated the inclusion of the 
PLO in the peace negotiations, providing a de facto recognition for the organization.1557 
The PLO was no longer seen as a terrorist organization, but as a potential player in 
bringing peace to the Middle East. As discussed in this study, the central reason for 
accommodating the PLO was not the moral recognition that the Palestinians needed a 
national state of their own, but rather the fear of terrorism and economic repercussions 
from the Arab states. This is a fact that must be acknowledged. Whether this policy 
incentivized future terrorism, as some scholars have claimed,1558 is a question worthy 
of further discussion. 
This success was the culmination of an ongoing lobbying and propaganda campaign, 
which had started in the 1930s, and was only interrupted by World War II. The 
campaign was carried out by a transnational pro-Arab and anti-Zionist network, 
spanning the US and Western Europe, which consisted of Arab activists, institutions 
and native supporters. This transnational advocacy network had a remarkable 
institutional and personal continuity: The SMC under Amin al-Husseini was the original 
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driver of the internationalization effort. It was replaced by the AHC, which was equally 
headed by al-Husseini. In 1944, the nascent Arab League tasked Musa Alami with the 
setting up of Arab League Offices to coordinate the propaganda campaign in the West. 
However, his Offices were soon placed under the authority of the resurrected AHC. 
Thus, there was a smooth transition from the AHC to the Arab League as the primary 
body responsible for foreign propaganda. Some of Amin al-Husseini’s original 
followers, like Izzat Tannous, were active in foreign propaganda institutions until the 
1960s. Since the mid-1960s, the Arab League Offices sought to mainstream 
Palestinian nationalism by attaching PLO representatives to its offices. These PLO 
representatives eventually succeeded in establishing their own official PLO Offices in 
Western Europe and Canada since the mid-1970s. In Switzerland, the opening of this 
Office was condoned by the Federal Council in 1975. We are therefore able to speak 
of a single network with numerous sub-branches, the history of which is still evolving. 
Studies that deal with the changing attitudes towards Israel and Palestine in Europe 
and the Americas have to take the activities of this transnational advocacy network into 
account. 
One area where this advocacy network was particularly active was the US, this despite 
the fact that Israel continues to enjoy significant support in the US. It has therefore 
often been contended that there was no significant Arab outreach in the US. Thus, 
Mearsheimer/Walt claimed in a widely read article in 2006 that “pro-Arab interest 
groups are weak to non-existent, which makes the [Israel] lobby's task even easier.”1559 
Moreover, the pro-Palestinian campaign enjoyed greatest success in Europe and the 
Third World in the late 1960s and the first half of 1970, while the US remained opposed 
to the PLO until the late 1980s. It may therefore come as a surprise that the Arabs put 
the strategic focus of their propaganda campaign on the US until the Six-Day War. In 
the years of World War II, both the Arabs and the Zionists had become convinced that 
it was in the US where the future of Palestine would be decided after the war’s end. In 
their tours before World War II, , the Arab emissaries had learnt that there was a 
substantial base, consisting primarily of Arab-Americans and a mostly Protestant elite 
class of scholars, missionaries, diplomats and politicians, who sympathized with the 
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national aspirations of the Arabs. It was therefore in the US where the Arab 
propagandists invested most of their resources. To their great disappointment, these 
efforts did not prevent the UN from endorsing the partition of Palestine in 1947. Still, 
the US remained central in the Arab strategy even after this defeat and it was therefore 
no coincidence that in 1955 the first Arab Office was again opened in the US, this time 
in New York and led by the Lebanese, Fayez Sayegh. They did not have to start from 
scratch (?), as they were assisted by an influential pro-Arab supporter base, which had 
constituted itself into the state sponsored AFME. The Arab League’s New York Office 
served as a template for similar offices, which were later opened in Geneva, Bonn and 
other important cities in Europe and elsewhere. During the first four decades of the 
Arab propaganda outreach to the US, their message was decisively pro-American. 
Thus, the brochures of Khalil Totah’s IAAA compared the Arabs positively to the 
American pioneers. Internal documents advised the Arab propaganda effort to focus 
on the Republicans, corporations involved in the Middle East and the “Aryan upper 
class”, where they believed that they would find a more receptive audience than in 
“Jew York”, as the Lebanese delegate to the UN put it.1560 In the early years of the 
Eisenhower administration, the Americans kept their distance from Israel while looking 
with sympathy towards the Arab nationalists in the image of Nasser, who seemed to 
take the region by storm. The Arabs therefore had reasonable hope of winning over 
the American mainstream for their anti-Zionist policies. They did not give up hope on 
this until the Six-Day War. Against the advice of the State Department, President 
Lyndon Johnson, a philo-Semite who had helped Jewish refugees from being deported 
from the US before the Holocaust, steered US foreign policy in a decisively pro-Israeli 
direction.1561 After 1967, as a result the US became the prime guarantor for Israel’s 
security as well as its main supplier of arms. This increased the Arab nationalists’ 
enmity towards the US. Thus, Fayez Sayegh came to the conclusion that the US was 
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the enemy of Arabs. When he became the head of the Arab Office in 1970, he no 
longer sought to convince the American mainstream, but instead build an alliance of 
marginalized groups, including the New Left, to constitute the core of non-Arab 
opposition to Zionism. Anti-Zionism became distinctively anti-American, something 
which had not always been the case. 
A similar development was occurring in Germany.  The social-democratic Left in 
Europe and the US, which was shaped by the catastrophe of World War II, rejected 
both Communism and Nazism. One central credo of this belief was that these horrors 
should not repeat themselves. This was the context which allowed the popular German 
philosopher Theodor W. Adorno to state that the “demand that Auschwitz should not 
be repeated is the very first requirement of education. It is so much in the forefront of 
everything else that I do not believe I have to justify it or intend to do so.”1562 For 
progressive intellectuals like Adorno, though generally critical of nationalism, the 
historic circumstances made the existence of a Jewish nation state necessary. Arab 
propagandists identified this social-democratic Left as a central pillar of European 
support for Israel. Arab student movements present at German universities actively 
worked with their German colleagues to push the student movement in an anti-Zionist 
direction. After 1967, the left-wing support evidently started to crumble. While Arab 
propagandists were not the single reason, they were instrumental in it. Ideological 
changes within the Left and geopolitical events were responsible. The concurrence of 
the Vietnam war and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 made it possible to 
construe them as instances of a single global war between an imperialist US and 
oppressed national liberation movements. Moreover, in a development the significance 
of which is still unrecognized today, in particular by the contemporary Left itself, the 
New Left embraced nationalism. Marxist class struggle was replaced by national 
struggle between oppressive and oppressed nations. This anti-imperialistic model had 
a complex pedigree. Anti-Imperialism was in fact never a functioning ideology, but 
rather a foreign policy strategy to recruit the Muslim, African and Asian enemies of the 
Western powers. It had been embraced by world powers like Germany and the Soviet 
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Union, but also by political movements like National Bolshevism and the New Left. The 
New Left failed to understand this and elevated what was basically a foreign policy 
strategy to an ideology. The New Left’s anti-Imperialist ideology was also compatible 
with the far-right’s own anti-Imperialism: Liberation Nationalism. As a result, anti-
Semitic activists like Ahmed Huber or Hans Fleig easily managed to integrate 
themselves in the New Left. Activists like Huber used the Arab-Muslim world as a wall 
on which to screen their projections. It was construed as a counterimage of everything 
that they opposed in the West. The Arabs and Islam were not Jewish and Christian, 
capitalistic and materialistic. As shown in this study, sympathy for the Arabs and Islam 
on the Left and the Right fringe of the political spectrum was and continues to be often 
motivated by anti-Semitic and anti-Western prejudice. The New Left’s turn against 
Israel has been a subject of heavy criticism – also within the Left, for decades. This 
debate is especially severe in Germany. Still, critics had glanced over the fact that 
there was a small but dedicated anti-Zionist movement in Germany between 1945 and 
1967, which originated from the political Right. One of the earliest critics of New Left 
anti-Zionism, the writer Jean Amery, noted in 1969 that the military triumph of Israel in 
1967 had come as a big relief to the Left, which now, free of remorse, “could talk like 
the Deutsche National- und Soldatenzeitung.”1563 Indeed, the positions and slogans of 
the anti-Zionist Right before 1967 are often undistinguishable from that of the post-
1967 anti-Israeli New Left, as I have shown in this study. From the perspective of the 
Arab League and the PLO, the decision to join their struggle with the New Left was 
primarily strategic. 
The Arab propaganda outreach to the West pursued different strategies. The Arab-
Muslim opponents of Zionism worked to extend the scope of the conflict in order to 
change the power balance between both sides. The rationale was clear. While the 
Arabs in Palestine enjoyed no international influence, the global community of Arabs 
and the Muslims did. The Arab-Muslim leadership under the guidance of the SMC and 
later the AHC thus succeeded in bringing the conflict to the attention of the wider Arab 
and Muslim world in the 1920s and 1930s. Parallel to this approach, it started a 
campaign in Western countries, which reached its climax during the years of the Arab 
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Revolt, 1936-1939. After World War II, the Arab League replaced the SMC and the 
AHC as the main institution behind the Arab propaganda campaign. Because of the 
diversity of their audience, it was necessary to frame the anti-Zionist message 
differently depending on the context. This meant that Arab propagandists worked to 
couch their opposition to Zionism in the arguments and language which was most 
comprehensible and acceptable to their target audience and strove to link up the Arab-
Jewish conflict in Palestine with the popular causes of their times. As a result of this 
framing process, anti-Zionism was articulated differently depending on time and 
location. The propaganda directed towards the wider Arab and Islamic world always 
emphasized that the conflict was of a religious nature and that the Jews were the 
enemies of Islam. This propaganda contributed to the deterioration of the living 
situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab and Islamic countries, ending with their 
expulsion in the period between the 1940s and the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. 
The distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, which is so central to the 
debate on anti-Zionism in Western scholarship, was therefore never relevant in this 
region, where anti-Zionist propaganda was always obviously anti-Semitic. On the 
background of this, the popular narrative that the Arab-Israeli conflict only underwent 
an Islamization since the rise of Hamas or that the aims of the Palestinian national 
elites “were largely secular”, as Meir Litvak has claimed, are questionable.1564 In fact, 
the religious-Islamic element of the conflict was always intermingled with the national 
element, and this continues to be the case.  
In Western countries, Arab propagandists tended to portray the conflict as a purely 
national and anti-Imperialist struggle of the Arabs for independence, usually in the form 
of a pan-Syrian or a pan-Arab state. They contended that Zionism was in contravention 
of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. This appealed to widespread American 
suspicion regarding the foreign policy of European powers. In contrast to Arab 
propaganda in the Arabo-Islamic world, any religious motivation for anti-Zionism was 
usually played down. Arab emissaries to liberal Western democracies tried to avoid 
any impression of religious or anti-Semitic opposition to Zionism. This was already the 
case in the US in the 1920s and 1930s, well before anti-Semitism eventually became 
                                             
1564 Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of 
Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 148–49. 
449 
 
socially unacceptable after the Holocaust. Some Arab anti-Zionists, for instance Mitrie 
Ribhany, were genuinely opposed to anti-Semitism and fought Zionism on nationalistic 
and anti-Imperialist grounds. Often, the decision to abstain from anti-Semitism rested 
on strategic grounds. Thus, the foreign propaganda of the AHC was opportunistic. In 
countries where anti-Semitism was widespread or even a political force, like in Eastern 
Europe in the 1930s or in South America during the time of the UN discussion on 
partition, Arab propagandists appealed to anti-Semitic sentiment to raise sympathy for 
their cause. After World War II, Arab propagandists in the US again sought to 
emphasize that their struggle had nothing to with anti-Semitism and that the Jews 
would be equal citizens of the future Arab Palestinian state. However, the recent 
collaboration of Amin al-Husseini with the Third Reich, to whom the Arab propaganda 
offices still reported and the persecution of Jews in Arab and Muslim countries 
undermined the credibility of the message that the Jews had nothing to fear in such a 
state. This contributed to their eventual defeat at the UN in November 1947. 
Arab Christians played a key role in the outreach to Western audiences, both because 
they were better suited for the service in Western countries and because they 
emphasized the message of Muslim-Christian unity. When members of the Maronite 
community broke with this supposed unity and voiced support for Zionism, Arab 
nationalists reacted harshly. Most of the members of this selected group of Arab 
Christian nationalists had been educated at the Protestant elite institutions in the 
region, like the AUB. They spoke Western languages, often – with the possible 
exception of Khalil Totah – possessed a well-tempered disposition and could appeal 
to their audiences with rational and educated arguments. They were as far removed 
from the fiery rhetoric of the Palestinian national leader, Amin al-Hussein, as it is 
possible to be. Interestingly, neither Amin Rihani, Philip Hitti, George Antonius or Albert 
Hourani were Palestinians, but Lebanese. Emil Ghoury, the Western spokesman of al-
Husseini, was a notable exception. Fayez Sayegh, who shaped the PLO’s post-1967 
propaganda approach in the US, equally descended from a family that had only very 
recently immigrated to Palestine from Syria. Their anti-Zionism was a product of their 
Arab nationalism, not of a Palestinian identity. There are even statements by Philip 
Hitti in which he is dismissive of the concept of Palestine. Their Arab Christian identity 
however was ambiguous and precarious. Solidarity between the Arabs notwithstanding 
their religious background was a stipulation of Arab nationalism, not a political fact in 
the region. The days of the recent Lebanese Civil War in 1860, which had resulted in 
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massacres against the country’s Christians and a French humanitarian intervention – 
the first in history – preceded this generation by only 15 to 30 years. The Ottoman 
genocide against the Armenians, of whom many fled to Syria and Lebanon, was an 
event of their lifetime. It is therefore of little surprise that they embraced an ideology 
which decreed equality of all Arabs. However, despite these noble assertions and Arab 
nationalism’s secular trappings, there was always a tension between Arab nationalism 
and Islam and, as a result, several played down their Christian heritage and openly 
praised Islam, like Philip Hitti did. However, not all Lebanese Christians made the same 
choices this groups of intellectuals did. In light of their own history as a minority 
suffering from persecution, many Lebanese Christians looked with sympathy upon the 
fact that the Zionists were gaining a foothold in Palestine.  
The internationalization strategy, which the Palestinians had been pursuing since the 
beginning of the mandate until today, has been a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it allowed them to maintain the struggle for their national rights. After the territory 
of the prospective Arab state in Palestine was split up in the Israeli War of 
Independence between Jordan, Israel and Egypt, for a short time it seemed like the 
issue of the Arab Palestinians would disappear from history. However, through Nasser, 
under whose auspices the PLO was founded in 1964, the question of Palestine was 
again put on the international agenda. The internationalization also allowed Palestinian 
leaders, like Amin al-Husseini or Yassir Arafat, to punch above their weight and 
become iconic and prestigious figures in politics – something which was only justified 
by their symbolic power and not their real power base, which was in fact very limited. 
However, the internationalization also contributed to make the realization of the 
Palestinian’s national rights more difficult and has consequently prevented a lasting 
peace between Israelis and Arabs to this day. The internationalization increased the 
number of stakeholders in the conflict: The Muslims, Arabs, the European Left and 
other groups, who took sides with the Palestinians and have their own visions on how 
to solve of the conflict. Thus, Islamists see everything but a complete conquest of the 
Land of Israel as tantamount to surrender, leaving no room for negotiation. These 
stakeholders have made it more difficult for the Palestinians to come to a settlement 
with the Israelis and to find a solution to the conflict. One important step in the right 
direction would be to de-internationalize the issue and to place the conflict in its right 
proportions; as a regional conflict between two peoples, each one in possession of 
their national rights. However, as left-wing anti-Imperialists and Islamists have turned 
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the conflict into a central cornerstone of their political identity, it is doubtful if such a 
process can be achieved in the near future. 
The Arab League and PLO propaganda campaign was accompanied by a terror wave 
against Western and Israeli targets. As shown in the case study, terrorists and 
propagandists maintained close contact, or were acting in both functions, as was the 
case with Fuad al-Shamali. This double strategy has also been observed with other 
actors, most notably with the Zionist-Revisionist paramilitary group, Irgun. Bruce 
Hoffmann has described the Irgun as the pioneer of this strategy.1565 In fact, as I have 
showed in this work, the AHC already pursued such a double strategy during the Arab 
Revolt (1936-1939). While the AHC and bodies associated with it led the fighting on 
the ground in Palestine, AHC emissaries also staged an international propaganda 
campaign, which extended from the Middle East to the US. They were critical in raising 
public and financial support to sustain the revolt. They thus preceded the Irgun’s own 
campaign, which started in 1944, by eight years. Whether the Irgun was inspired by 
the Arab model or the strategy was just the obvious one to follow cannot be 
ascertained. In Menachem Begin’s book ‘The Revolt’, which was read by both Civil 
Rights activists like Nelson Mandela and Islamist terrorists like Osama bin Laden, we 
find no clue about this.1566 
Despite ample documentation that such a pro-Arab, anti-Zionist network has been 
operating in Western countries for decades, the scholarly disinterest in it is striking. A 
search on Google Scholar for the terms ‘Zionist lobby’ or ‘Jewish lobby’ renders almost 
4’800 results, more than ten times the number received than when using the terms 
‘Arab lobby’ or ‘anti-Zionist lobby’, which results in little more than 460 entries.1567 
Moreover, very few scientists have ventured into the archives to test such narratives. 
Why has this network escaped closer scrutiny until now? As discussed, there was an 
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anti-Zionist tendency in Oriental studies at least since the 1930s, when scholars with 
strong political convictions like Philip Hitti started pushing the field in a pro-Arab 
direction. Hebrew studies, which had given rise to prominent Zionist activists, were 
pushed out of Oriental departments. Oriental experts in academia and politics 
overwhelmingly opposed Zionism and sympathized with Arab nationalism. Leading 
activists, like Kermit Roosevelt, also painted the picture of Zionist control over US 
foreign policy making, which still dominates both popular imagination and 
academia.1568 
The central problems of Arab propaganda in the West however were not that it was 
not influential, that it lacked funding or that it did not enjoy broad support, as it has 
been alleged by the likes of Roosevelt. The problem was that Arab propaganda 
advocated a goal which was unrealizable and undesirable. The political vision of a 
united Palestine under Arab dominance would have meant the destruction of the 
Jewish proto-state in Palestine, the Yishuv, in 1947, as the UN commission 
investigating the situation came to realize. After 1948, with the state of Israel firmly 
established, such a vision was even more out of touch with the facts on the ground. 
Only when the Palestinians started formulating a realistic goal, an independent nation 
state in the West Bank and Gaza, did they lay a lasting foundation for diplomatic 
success in the West. 
Since the 1970s, the anti-Zionist near-consensus in the academic fields concerned 
with the Middle East was even strengthened under the impressions left by the works 
of Edward Said and his followers. Several generations of students of the Middle East 
were educated with the flawed impression that Western scholars of the Middle East 
were inimical to the Arabs and Islam and had misrepresented them.1569 However, as 
shown in this work, the contrary tended to be the case. Instead of questioning the 
paradigms of Oriental studies or of Middle Eastern Studies, as the field is now mostly 
known, which included partisanship and an uncritical rejection of Zionism, recent 
scholarship continues in this tradition. This ideological bias, which is translated into an 
institutional bias at universities and research institutes, helps an understanding of this 
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lack of research. We also have to remember that radical Arab groups have focused 
their activities on European and US universities since the 1950s, often with tangible 
support from Arab states, in particular Egypt. In Germany, groups like the GUPS 
gained the upper hand on campuses, dominating student politics for years, hand-in-
hand with the New Left. University scholars need to reflect critically upon the effect this 
history has on their own research. Scholars need to show openness in questioning 
their own frames and biases. Knowledge can only be gained through the dialectical 
method, and research therefore only thrives in environments where there is diversity 
of thought. Dissenting voices should therefore not be marginalized at universities, as 
it is too often the case in our times, but rather encouraged. It is therefore my hope that 
my work will inspire and stimulate other scholars to undertake research in this field and 
thus improve our knowledge of these networks. 
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